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2ABSTRACT
At the turn of twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a Mongol chief, 
Temujin, best-known by his title Chinggis Qan, began his expansion and 
created a vast empire in north and central Asia. The conquest was completed 
in three stages: first the unification of Mongolia, second the submission of 
neighbouring nations, third an expedition to Central Asia. The history of his 
military conquests has been extensively studied by modem researchers, while 
the non-military factors which also contribute to his success have been given 
less attention. The background of Temujin’s success lacks clarity too, because 
of confusion in the available accounts.
This thesis focus on two topics in the career of Temujin. The first 
three chapters in part one analyze the relationship between Temujin’s family 
and Toyoril, the ruler of the Turkic Kereit tribe, who was a crucial figure in 
Temujin’s rise to power. The essential reconstruction of the early history of 
the Kereit ruling family in this part presents also the background of Temujin’s 
triumph. Part Two studies Temujin’s strategy of expansion via his relationship 
with the other Turkic tribes, his Mongol kinsmen and the powerful Jurchen 
regime in the south. This examination consists of three chapters and it reveals 
that Temujin did not accomplish his career solely by the sword.
Since these aspects have not been sufficiently investigated because of 
the confusion of the primary sources, a serious attempt has been made to 
clarify the situation. Three major sources have been carefully studied in their 
original languages, respectively Monggol-un nijucha tobchiyan in Mongolian, 
JamV al-tawarikh in Persian and Sheng-wu ch ’ing-cheng-lu in Chinese. 
Through a careful comparison of all the relevant details, the career of Temiijin 
can be re-interpreted from a new perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
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This thesis studies two important aspects o f the career of Chinggis-Qan, 
or in his given name, Temujin.
Academic researches in recent decades concerning the history of the 
Mongol empire, or the world affected by the Mongols in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, can be roughly classified into four categories. The 
majority of the researches focus on "regional history", such as the local 
histories o f China, Persia and Russia (or just Rus) which were under Mongol 
rule. Some other researches adopt a biographical approach, and focus on 
eminent personalities in the royal family or individuals in the service of the 
Mongol court.1 A third approach looks into the interaction of miscellaneous 
cultures under Mongol rule. This type of research, like "East meets West", is 
more challenging because it requires the researchers to have a comprehensive 
knowledge o f the tradition of at least two cultures, either the life styles of 
steppe or sedentary, or the heritage of the nations which were under attack.2 
The last category is the never-ending textual criticism and comparisons which 
focus on obscure terms or copying errors in the sources.3 This is the basic 
task o f making the sources "meaningful" and conveniently "available" to
1 This variety o f  research can be represented by the recent publication o f  In the Service o f  
the Khan: Eminent Personalities o f  the Early Mongol-Yiian Period, ed. by Igor de Rachewiltz, 
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993.
2 Mentioning only Chinese-related studies, there are Morris Rossabi’s study o f  the Muslims 
and Herbert Franke’s study o f  Tibetans in Mongol China (in China under M ongol Rule), 
Petech’s study o f  Tibetan relations with Sung China and with the Mongols, Thomas Allsen’s 
study o f  the Uighurs and Mongol China, and Igor de Rachewiltz’s study o f  the Turks who 
were in China under Mongol rule (in China among Equals).
3 Such as the works on Yuan shih by Louis Hambis (chapters CVII and CVIII) and 
Waltraut Abramowski (chapters II and III), on Sheng-wu c h ’ing-cheng-lu by Paul Pelliot, on 
Meng-Ta pei-lu  and Hei-Ta shih-liieh by Erich Haenisch and others, N  C Munkuev for the 
former, volume two o f  JamV al-tawarfkh and Tarikh-i Jahan-Gusha by John Andrew Boyle, 
the whole translation o f Jam i1 al-tawarikh  by Khetagurov and Smirnova, and many individual 
articles by Francis Cleaves, Nicholas Poppe, John Boyle, Gerhard Dorefer and et cetera, also 
plenty o f  works by Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese researchers.
8researchers or readers, especially since the sources of this study are written in 
several very different languages.
Researchers also study "the" Mongol history, that is the development 
of the Mongol tribe, from these four approaches. Mongolian history has been 
compiled, dozens of biographies of Chinggis-Qan in different languages have 
been published, Mongolian society and culture during this period can be easily 
examined,4 and attempts have been made to explain the Mongolian terms (or 
the Turkic element in them) which appear in the sources.5
As for the history of the founder of the Mongol empire, Temujin, best- 
known by his title Chinggis-Qan, this is the most attractive topic during this 
period because of the importance of his career as well as the abundance of 
written records about his life. Temujin began his expansion in central 
Mongolia, and created a vast empire in north and central Asia. The conquest 
was completed in three stages: first the unification of Mongolia, second the 
submission of neighbouring nations, third an expedition to Central Asia. The 
history o f his military conquests has been extensively studied, however, the 
non-military factors which also contributed to his success have been given less 
attention. The background of Temujin’s success lacks clarity too, because of 
confusion in the available accounts.
The following studies look into the early career of Temujin in these two 
less examined fields: the background, and the non-military conquests.
4 This category can be represented by Jagchid-Sechin and Paul Hyer, M ongolia’s Culture 
and Society, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.
5 This category can be represented by Erdentei and others. Meng-ku-pi-shih tz'u-hueihsiian  
shih (Annotation o f selected terms in Monggol-un ni^ucha tobchiyan), Hohhot: Nei-meng-ku 
jen-min ch’u-pan-she, 1980, and the indispensable volumes o f  Tiirkische und Mongolische 
Elements im Neupersischen  by G Doerfer, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963 and 1965. Gerard 
Clauson’s An Etym ological D ictionary o f  Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972) also contributed to the researches under this category.
9The three chapters of Part One of this thesis look into the background
of Temujin’s early career from another perspective, the Kereits’. The Kereit
tribe has been interestingly identified in European imagination as the legendary
"Kingdom of Prester John", the Christian kingdom in the remote east which
rivalled with Muslim world. Western scholars are more or less affected by
this, and the studies of this tribe have been directed to its religious aspect, not
its history.6 From a Mongolian point of view, the Kereit ruler Toyoril
appeared as "harbouring a stinking liver" towards their national hero Temujin.
This moral judgement which is represented in the Secret History o f  the
Mongols (SH) in some way distracted researchers who relied upon this source
heavily for an objective observation of the relationship between Toyoril and 
Temujin. As for Chinese scholars, the problems in Chinese sources regarding
the Mongol regime attracted most of their effort. Other than being influenced
by S H s  implication, which is immediately available in Chinese, the tribal
identity confusions in Chinese sources directed investigations towards the
ethnic identification o f some eminent Kereits in the service o f the Yuan court.
This investigation appears not to help much in reconstructing early Kereit
history when it was a steppe tribe.
To researchers who are interested in the history of Temujin, the 
relationship between Toyoril and Temujin is the most appealing section in 
Kereit history. Accordingly, the other parts which are "irrelevant" to
Temujin’s career tend to be neglected. Traditionally, a study of the Temujin-
Toyoril relationship from the perspective of Mongol history begins with a 
review of the anda friendship between Toyoril and Temujin’s father in the 
earlier generation, which was established as a result of Yesiigei’s military 
assistance to Toyoril in his struggle for the Kereit throne. Then the study
6 Such as D M Dunlop, "The Karaits o f Eastern Asia", Bulletin o f  the School o f  Oriental 
and African Studies 11 (1943-46): 276-289, Igor de Rachewiltz, Prester John and E urope’s 
Discovery o f  East Asia, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972. The latter 
article is accompanied by a comprehensive list o f essential studies on this topic (pp. 18-25). 
L N Gumilev’s interesting study (in short, poiski vymyshennogo tsarstva, 1970) has been 
translated by R E F Smith into English as Searches fo r  an Imaginary Kingdom: The Legend 
o f  the Kingdom o f  Prester John, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
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skips several decades and jumps to the youth of Temujin, relating that young 
Temujin formed a personal relationship with Toyoril, as seen in the SH, in an 
attempt to renew the old friendship, in order to get support for his own power 
building. The narrative continues with various acts of mutual assistance 
between Temujin-Mongol and Toyoril-Kereit, and ends with the final collapse 
of the latter, when Toyoril turned hostile to Temujin. From the Kereit point 
of view, this relationship was a minor part of Kereit history.
Since Kereit history is not fully supplied by the sources, which were 
written for the purpose of illustrating the history of Temujin, the majority of 
the accounts relating to Kereit history in these sources are those of this 
relationship. However, is it possible to study the triumph of Temujin more 
satisfactorily, not by putting together all the direct relevant accounts to show 
its course, but by a panorama of the background of his triumph, that is the 
situation on the Mongolian steppe?
This is the main purpose of the discussions in Part One. Through a 
reconstruction of Kereit history, a huge steppe tribe in central Mongolia, its 
domestic affairs and foreign contacts, it should be possible to reflect a larger 
view of the situation in twelfth and early thirteenth century Mongolia. Also 
when we observe Mongol matters from a Kereit perspective, biases presumably 
lessen because first, there is no problem of cultural difference, therefore, the 
Mongols are not necessarily to be over-sympathized with from "the steppe 
perspective", and second, the Kereit tribe was an equal to the Mongol tribe on 
the steppe, there is no need to emphasize the concept of "equals" between the 
Mongols and their surrounding powers —  apparently, the Mongol tribe could 
not be treated as an equal to the superpower Jurchen China at this time but to 
the Kereit tribe, it could.
In this way, an examination of the development of the Mongols as 
observed by the Kereits would give a more objective evaluation of the 
situation: no matter whether it is positive or negative, at least, as it was.
11
Scarcity and the fragmentation of accounts may be a problem in 
restoring a comprehensive picture of twelfth century Mongolia; nevertheless,
because the Toyoril regime was the most significant partner to Temiijin in 
developing his career and their relationship is recorded in the sources, it is 
possible to reconstruct at least the relationship and at most the power structure 
and intertribal relationship in central Mongolia by an investigation o f these 
scattered and "irrelevant" Kereit accounts.
After Part One, which studies the Kereits’ relationship with their 
surrounding tribes, especially the Mongols, Part Two of this thesis carries on 
to examine Temujin’s relationship with his surrounding tribes/clans, from the 
Mongols’ point of view.
Three types of important connections which contributed to Temujin’s 
steppe expansion are discussed in Part Two: Chapter Four discusses one aspect 
of the social framework on the steppe during that time, the genealogical 
connections; Chapter Five discusses the other aspect of the social framework 
on the steppe during that time, the in-laws’ relationship; Chapter Six relates the 
interactions between the steppe tribes in Mongolia and Jurchen China, the 
superpower to the south of them, in the hope of revealing the power structure 
and intertribal relationship of twelfth century Mongolia. In these relationships, 
Temujin used his intelligence, not his fist, to create a favourable situation for 
his expansion. Although some of these ploys failed, most of them worked. 
These studies reveal that it was this network of relationships which contributed 
most to Temujin’s rapid expansion on the steppe belt, where the inhabitants 
had a mutual understanding of Temujin’s social custom and tradition.
As for the sources used in this thesis, as mentioned above, the four 
categories of Mongol studies reflect the fact that the limitations of the sources 
are the main obstacles in this field of study. Researchers may have noticed the 
importance of the above proposed two studies, but such topics have been left 
inadequately investigated because of the confusion of the primary sources. The
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three major sources which are crucial for the study of this period are Mongqol- 
un niucha tobcha’an (*Monggol-un niyucha tobchiyan, the SH) in Mongolian, 
Jam i1 al-tawarikh (JT) in Persian and Sheng-wu ch ’ing-cheng-lu (CCL) in 
Chinese. Monggol-un niyucha tobchiyan, anonymous, is written in story­
telling style, which has been divided into twelve chapters/volumes. The first 
ten chapters cover early Mongol history, the legend and the life of Temujin up 
to the completion o f the conquest of the steppe tribes. The eleventh and 
twelfth chapters relate the Mongol conquests of Jurchen China, the Tangyut 
nation and Transoxiana during the reigns of Temujin and Ogetei. According 
to §278 of the source, it was completed in the Year of Rat, which could be 
1228 (during Tolui’s regency after the death of Temujin) or 1240 (one year 
before Ogetei’s death) or 1252 (one year after Mongke’s accession). The 
dating is still in dispute among scholars. The source exists in Chinese 
transcription, not in Mongolian script, with Chinese glosses and an abridged 
Chinese translation. It has been restored by modem scholars into Mongolian 
script or, more commonly available, in a romanized form. Jam i1 al-tawarikh 
may be regarded as an official history, written by Rashid al-DIn ibn ‘Imad al- 
Dawla Abu al-Khair (1247-1318), joint chief minister of the Il-khanate during 
the reigns of Ghazan Khan and Oljeitii, which consists of a collection of 
"histories". Volumes one and two which concern Mongol history in eastern 
and northern Asia are consulted in this thesis, including volume one part one, 
which recounts the history of the steppe tribes in Mongolia and its surrounding 
area, part two, which records the history of Temujin and his ancestors, and 
volume two, which records the history of Temujin’s successors up to Toq- 
Temiir. According to the author, this section was based on an important but 
now lost Mongolian chronicle, the Altan Debter ("Golden Book"). This source 
supplies an incomparable detailed account which is indispensable to the study 
of early Mongol history, therefore, it is a primary source even though late in 
its existing form. Sheng-wu ch ’ing-cheng-lu is an outline-style source, 
presented in Chinese, anonymous. Probably a translation from a now lost 
Mongolian source, it covers Mongol history from the birth of Temujin (1162) 
to the death of Ogetei (1241). It was presumably translated during the reign
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of Qubilai (1260-1294). Although it contains many copying errors, the 
narratives are less corrupted than the re-drafted annals of Temujin in the 
Chinese official dynastic history, Yuan shih. On the basis of comparison with 
Jam ic al-tawdrikh, Pelliot and Hambis argued that its material may also come 
from the Alt an Debter.
Nevertheless, each of the sources has its limitations in terms of scope 
and point of view. Clarification is essential to find out which account, not 
which source, is reliable, by comparing the texts in their original languages. 
Thanks to the efforts of previous researchers who have attempted to translate 
or/and annotate these sources, the results of which are presented in French, 
German, Russian or Chinese —  even Persian, many confusions have been 
pointed out and possible suggestions have been made. However, because of 
my limited knowledge of these languages, unfortunately many of them are 
inaccessible to me. I hope that this shortcoming can be compensated for by 
my careful and critical reading of the three primary sources, in their original 
languages.
The editions of sources used in this thesis are explained as follows. For 
Monggol-un niyucha tobchiyan, the standard edition of Ssu-pu-ts’ung-k’an is 
used. The collated edition by Erdentei and Uyun-Dalai which was published 
in 1980 in Hohhot is also consulted, as well as the translations and annotation 
by Igor de Rachewiltz in Papers in the Far Eastern History 4; 115-163, 5:149- 
175, 10:55-82. 13:41-75. 16:27-65. 18:43-80,21:17-57,23:111-146, 26:39-84, 
30:81-160, 31:21-93, additions and corrections 33:129-137, 1971-1986. The 
passages of the SH  are quoted by their paragraph numbers, not page numbers, 
as I believe that this is more convenient in both writing and reading. As for 
CCL, the collated edition by Wang Kuo-Wei in his Meng-Ku shih-liao ssii- 
chung (1926) is used. Pelliot and Hambis’s study: Histoire des campagnes de 
Gengis Khan: Cheng-wou ts ’in-tcheng lou (1951) is useful for reference but 
unfortunately they finished only one third of the whole text, halting at 
Temujin’s defeat of the Tatars at Dalan-Nemurges in winter 1200/01.
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Regarding JT, the collated and annotated edition by Muhammand Rawshan and 
Mustafa Musawl (Tehran: Alburz Press, 1952) is the best reference available 
to me. The Persian text which is published together with I N Berezin’s 
Russian translation of Sbornik letopisei (1858-1888) is also consulted. An 
English translation and annotation of volume one part one regarding the tribes 
can be found in D G M Muller’s PhD dissertation (1957, University of 
London), and volume two regarding Temujin’s successors can be found in J 
A Boyle’s The Successors o f  Genghis Khan (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1971).
Because o f the linguistic variety of the primary sources and the fact that 
this thesis must be written in English, I have worked hard to find the most 
suitable transliterating/transcribing method which would avoid any risk of 
confusion between the languages. Persian and Arabic texts are transliterated 
according to the Encyclopedia o f  Islam , except for changing /dj/ to /j/, /k/ to 
/q/. A table of this transliteration is supplied in Appendix I.
Regarding Chinese characters, they are romanized in modem Mandarin 
pronunciation. As for the transcription system, I must discard the fashionable 
Piny in system which uses /x/ for the palatal fricative voiceless hs(i)-, Iql for 
the palatal affricate voiceless aspirated ch’(i)- and Id  for the blade-alveolar 
affricate voiceless aspirated ts- or /z-, because Ixl is commonly used to 
transliterate Mongolian /y/ and /q/; and the Pinyin /q/ clashes with the uvular 
plosive Persian /q/ in letters where their pronunciations are like chalk and 
cheese. The Id  for ts- or tz- causes problems rather than making the sound 
clear, as when Id  is pronounced see or k- in English. Since the traditional 
Wade-Giles system is generally adopted in scholarly researches and is 
generated by English scholars, it fits better into an English thesis. The system 
is slightly modified in order to avoid some confusion, such as replacing /- with 
yi-, to avoid confusion with the Persian transliterating letter hi. The Chinese 
transcription table for this thesis is supplied in Appendix II.
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Mongolian transliteration is another problem, since the terms must be 
quoted in their twelfth century forms in order to match their counterparts in 
Persian and Chinese sources. It is well known that the Mongols began to have 
their language written down very late, and during the period covered in this 
thesis, its orthography was inconsistent. The other difficulty in transcribing
these Mongol terms is that in its written form, Mongolian itl and /d/, /y/ and 
/q/ and fkJ and /g/ (in masculine or feminine7), /o/ and /u/, /o/ and /ii/ share 
the same letters, also the initial form of /j/ and /y/ and the medial form of /ch/ 
and /j/, were not distinguished before the seventeenth century, not to mention 
the fact that the diacritical marks on /n/, /q/ group, ishJ are rarely used during 
this period.8 This problem cannot be solved by comparison with modem 
written or spoken Mongolian because owing to the elapse of the intervocalic 
consonant /y/ and the assimilation of vowels, spoken Mongolian changed 
through the centuries, and this affected its written form.
In order to establish a consistency from the inconsistency, for the words 
which appeared in the SH, I follow the transcription provided by the revised 
edition of SH  text by Igor de Rachewiltz (based on a previous romanization 
which was restored by Paul Pelliot9), except for certain proper names with - 
reyit ending, which I would incline to consider -yi- as a long vowel /I/ 
therefore "Kereit" and "Je’ureit", not "Kerevit" and "Je’tireyit". I have also 
inserted the elapsed /y/ where De Rachewiltz use / ’/ in masculine words, to 
minimise the appearance of /*/ which appeared in Chinese romanization as
1 According to the opinion o f Hamod Hakanchulu, who is a Mongolian scholar both in 
ethnic and in academic fields, there is no strict regulation that /y/ and /q/ sounds must be 
written in masculine letters and /k/ and /g / sounds must be in feminine letters. Therefore, the
Mongol qan after Ogetei can be Giiyiik, not necessarily Giiyiig, the one after him can be
Mongke, not necessarily Mongge. This information is obtained from an oral discussion with 
him at the Mongol-Tibetan Cultural Association, Taipei, April 1995.
8 Nicholas Poppe, Grammar o f  Written Mongolian (1964), pp.1-26. For y elapse and
vocalic assimilation, for instance, "y" in the word "mountain"(*ayu/h) elapsed to make *aula,
then from *au!a to ilia o f modem Mongolian: two vowels contracted into a long vowel. The
other is the assimilation o f  vowels, the best example is Ogodei < Ogedei, an assimilation o f
the first two vowels.
9 Igor de Rachewiltz, Index to the Secret History o f  the M ongols, p.2.
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"stress" and Persian transliteration representing The elapsed initial lh/
for certain names has been restored so as to be compatible with its counterparts 
in other transliterations, therefore, "Hambaqai" not "Ambaqai", "Ho’eliin" not 
"Ulun".
When there are variations in spelling, a "sample" will be picked out and 
applied throughout this thesis. The same rule applies to words which did not 
exist in the SH  and which are inconsistent in Chinese or Persian transcriptions: 
I have selected or created "samples" for them, with variations quoted in 
footnotes. It must be emphasised that these "sample" transliterations do not 
imply any suggestion regarding the medieval phonetic value or spelling of 
those words,11 they are used in this thesis merely for consistency in the 
narration. The corresponding Mongolian letters for the transliterations are 
listed in Appendix III.
As for those terms whose identification is not certain, they are quoted 
as they were presented in the language of that source, such as Pi-li-ke-po-wa 
or ’YLMH khatun. Generally accepted terms such as Khitai (pi. or adj. 
Khitan), Uighur, Mongol, Jurchen will be applied throughout. Khan, qaan, 
qahan, qayan will be rendered as qan for consistency. As for the Mongolian 
letters which were transcribed into Persian by the velar uvular scrape /khA they 
will be restored to /q/. The /kh/s in Persian or Arabic words remain the same.
When English grammar clashes with the word formation of foreign 
terms, I follow mostly the English form, although this may appear strange: 
such as, to add the plural suffix - 5  to certain plural foreign terms like Taichiyut 
or Mongol, except for "Chinos". If I were not to adopt some "English
10 r  is transliterated as /h/ when it is the first letter o f the word. 1 did not replace the / ’/ 
in feminine words with fyl because these feminine words should not be confused with Persian 
terms.
" The modem restored Mongolian edition o f  the SH  has an appendix o f  the possible 
medieval phonetic values o f  the related Chinese characters. Bayar, Monggol~un niyucha  
tobchiyan , Hohhot: Nei-meng-ku jen-min ch’u-pan-she, 1980/81.
17
elements" in writing and used terms like "Taichiyut" in every case, the 
descriptions and arguments would be very confusing. Therefore, when
"Taichiyut" appears without -s ending, it acts as an independent noun for the
tribe or an adjective "of Taichiyut" as in "the Taichiyut residence", while when 
the term appears with -s ending, it designates "the Taichiyut people". In other
words, "the Mongols", but "Mongol empire". I have tried to avoid the other
forms of adjectives, such as "Mongolian kinsmen" or "Betekitei qan". The
meaning is clearer when we adhere to the stem, that is, "the Mongol kinsmen"
and "the qan of Betekin". I hope these explanations have clarified the
designations used.
To provide cross-references to scholarly views of aspects which have 
been discussed in this thesis will enrich its content. However, this has been 
reduced to a minimum in the body of the thesis because the style of citation 
in the thesis must be reasonably adjusted in order to maintain a degree of 
readability in what are complex arguments and discussions. The previous 
academic work on the life of Temujin by Ratchnevsky, which "attempts to 
approach historical truth by undertaking a critical comparison of the original 
sources"12 has received a comment regarding "the detailed, yet often 
contradictory, nature of these sources [which] dictates a somewhat slow style, 
as the author shifts through the evidence, reaching conclusions —  often 
tentative ones —  before continuing on", which reflects the difficulty of 
presenting the results of this kind of research in a conventional approach. 
Therefore, the essential information to facilitate a degree of cross-referencing 
between the present thesis and Ratchnevsky’s book is related in Appendix IV.
12 Ratchnevsky, English translation p.xiii.
Part One
The History of the Kereit Tribe 
and
Its Impact on Mongol History
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Chapter One
Early Kereit History up to the Defeat o f Giir-Qan
JT , CCL and the SH  all trace Kereit history back to Toyoril’s struggle 
for the Kereit throne after the death of his father Quijaqus-Buiruq-Qan, since 
this event is essential in explaining the formation of the sworn-brother 
relationship between Toyoril and Yestigei. Beyond this, some fragmentary 
accounts about earlier Kereit history can be found in JT, which supplies much 
information in explaining why Toyoril had to struggle for his throne, also a 
nearly ignored early friendship between the Kereit Sariq-Qan and the Mongols,
although the account is very unexplicit.
There are three significant figures, who are directly related to Temujin’s
early life, are o f intangible personality —  Toyoril, also called by his Jurchen- 
Turkic title Ong-Qan, Jaya-Gambu, the younger brother of Toyoril, and 
Jamuqa, Temujin’s anda and also his opponent. Toyoril was always portrayed 
as evil-hearted —  probably a judgement by the source recorders rather than 
the truth in order to justify Temujin’s destruction of him. His earliest action 
in the sources was to usurp the throne by killing two of his brothers. If  we are 
going to accept this direct portrait without considering the possibility of 
another explanation which is based on an investigation of Kereit history, the 
story ends here. In fact, a reconstructed scene from the accounts in JT  reveals
that Toyoril’s qanship struggle was probably not motivated by his wicked 
ambition but resulted from an astounding political entanglement in the Kereit 
realm. The story went back to his youth, to a battle with the Tatars.
Because of a marriage connection created during this battle against the
Tatars, Toyoril did not succeed to the Kereit throne easily. The Betekin 
influence in Kereit politics placed an obstacle in his pathway to qanship. 
Toyoril had exercised a great effort to remove his Betekin-related half­
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brothers, but this success was condemned by his uncle which brought on him 
an unexpected attack. His exile in this period, which can be regarded as his 
first dethronement although he does not appear to have ascended the throne, 
provided him with an opportunity to be associated to the Merkit leader 
Toqtoya and a Mongol leader, Yestigei. The intertribal connection of the 
Kereit regime will be discussed in section I.
As for the internal power struggle over the Kereit leadership, section 
II compares the conflicts between the heir and his brothers. The discussion 
starts with an examination of the attitude of the younger brothers of Toyoril 
towards their elder brother, then goes on to the method which Toyoril used to 
make these rival brothers leave him. The places these brothers went afterwards
illuminate Toyorif s intertribal relationship with the other steppe rulers, and 
finally, the discussion returns to a similarity in the personality of Toyoril and 
Temujin, which suggests that a mutual understanding, or, sympathy, existed 
between the two rulers.
Section III discusses the situation on the Mongolian steppe during 
Yesiigef s expedition against the Kereit Giir-Qan. Since it is closer to the time 
of Temujin, this section is more attractive to researchers who are interested in 
the history of Temujin, and his immediate ancestors. Yesugei’s assistance to 
Toyoril will be discussed and the relationship between Qabul-Mongol and 
Taichiyut-Mongol will be analyzed in this section. The end of the section is 
a bold attempt at dating some incidents in early Kereit or Mongol history, 
which may not be precisely reliable, but at least, it gives an idea of what might 
have been happening in Mongolia during this period.
I. The battles with the Tatars and between the Kereits
The earliest comprehensible story from Kereit history in JT  can be 
traced back to Sariq-Qan.
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Sariq-Qan was a Kereit leader, who lived as the same time of Qurjaqus
but his relation with Marqus or Qurjaqus is not recorded. The Kereit tribe was
strong at that time, and Sariq-Qan is said to have had an army of four hundred
thousand.1 JT  pp.90-92 recounts that two leaders of the Alchi-Tatar attacked
Sariq-Qan, Sariq-Qan captured and killed one of them, but subsequently he
was defeated by the other in a raid on the Orqan river. Sariq-Qan then took
refuge with the Betekin tribe.2 The Betekin ruler married his own daughter
Tore-Qaimish to Qurjaqus, who was the son of Marqus-Qan, the brother of
Giir-Qan3 and father of Toyoril, who later became the Kereit Qurjaqus-
Buiruq-Qan. After this, a Betekin prince called Qajir/Qadir-Qan helped Sariq-
Qan to fight against the Tatar and recovered the Kereit ulus. In this campaign,
they rescued and set free Toyoril and his mother, who were previously 
captured by the Tatars.
A reader who is familiar with Mongol history will instantly associate
this event with two other similar contributions by the Mongols to Toyoril- 
Kereit. Betekin’s assistance to the Kereits in recovering the Kereit ulus from
the Tatars is as significant as Yesiigei’s assistance to the Kereit Toyoril in 
recovering the Kereit ulus from his uncle Giir-Qan, and Temujin’s assistance
to Toyoril, again, in recovering the Kereit ulus from Naiman. Since the
sources treat the latter two instances of assistance with high respect, Betekin’s
assistance in this occasion must also have been much appreciated by the
Kereits.
1 JT p.91, chihil tuman lashkar. When we compare this with the strength o f  the Tatars, 
this amount must be exaggerated. The whole Tatar tribe consisted o f  seventy thousand 
households. Sariq-Qan could not have been defeated if he possessed a troop o f  four hundred 
thousand —  and these Kereit soldiers were all killed by the Tatars except for forty people, 
according to JT.
2 The name o f the Betekin ruler: BYTAKTAY ’WTAKW QWRCHY BWYRWQ KHAN 
shall be read as "Betekitei (Betekin’s) Otegii Qorchi Buiruq Qan". The first gives his tribal 
identity, not a part o f his honourable title. About the tribe o f  Betekin, no description can be 
found in the sources. Even this tribal name is a reconstruction based on the above grammatical 
analysis o f  the term Betekitei. All relevant accounts o f its history, which are solely found in 
JT, have been put in order and mentioned in this section.
3 JT  p .l 17.
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Like the firm friendship established between Toyoril and Yesiigei, or 
Toyoril and Temujin after their assistance, this similar incident also started a 
good friendship between the Betekin and the Kereit, especially when a
marriage linkage was formed between the ruling families of these two tribes.
The problem started from here: the Betekin appeared to enjoy too many
privileges in Kereit politics, which affected Toyoril’s claim to the Kereit 
throne.
The background of ToYoril’s first struggle 
of the Kereit leadership
There are several ways to make the subsequent Kereit history clear. To 
fix the exact dating of the regime of Sariq-Qan and this campaign is less 
possible, but the dating is not needed in explaining the reason for Toyoril’s 
struggle for his throne, which appears more significant in the rise to power of 
Toyoril.
First o f all, we have to confirm that Toyoril had a right to the throne, 
and to single out to what extent the Betekin people exercised an influence in
Kereit politics.
A knowledge of the age of Qurjaqus’s children and their matrilineal
progeniture is sufficient to account for the root of the political entanglements.
First, there is evidence that Toyoril was the oldest son of Qurjaqus, and 
probably the legitimate heir to the throne. From the above description of the
Tatar invasion, two facts can be extracted: (1) JT  supplies the name of 
ToyoriFs mother as ’YLMFl/’TLMH khatun. Toyoril was not born to the 
Betekin princess Tore-Qaimish. (2) When his father Qurjaqus married Tore-
Qaimish. Toyoril had already been captured by the Tatars, together with his 
mother. Therefore, Toyoril must have been much older than the children born 
to this Betekin princess.
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The account of SH  §152 recounts that when Toyoril was thirteen years
old, he was carried off by the Tatar Ajai-Qan (unidentified) with his mother.
The Qan made him look after the camels. Finally, Toyoril escaped and 
returned. Despite the difference in details, this incident may have been a
variation of his capture by the Tatars in JT. If these two accounts are possibly 
related to each other, this capture might have happened during the time when 
the Kereit ulus was taken over by the Alchi-Tatars after they put Sariq-Qan to 
flight, when Toyoril was thirteen years old. If this assumption is correct, his 
father Qurjaqus might have married the Betekin princess when Toyoril was 
around thirteen. Then, Toyoril must have been at least thirteen years older 
than the children bom of the Betekin princess.
Furthermore, Toyoril was mentioned in SH  §177 as the "eldest o f forty
sons" of his father. When we compare this seniority to Qurjaqus’ separation
of the yurts of his brother Giir-Qan and his son Toyoril, from the yurts 
belonged to Tai-Temtir-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir4 (for details see below), it is
not difficult to see that Toyoril had a certain right to the Kereit ulus, or the
throne, although the sources do not say whether his mother was the senior
khatun or not. It would be reasonable to assume that Toyoril had a legitimate 
right to the Kereit throne, also the eldest status among his brothers.
As for the other children, JT  p. 117 relates that Qurjaqus had several
sons including Toyoril, Erke-Qara, Tai-Temiir-Taishi, Buqa-Temiir, Ilqa- 
Senggiim.5 According to JT  p.361, Qurjaqus had several sons including
Toyoril, Erke-Qara and Jaya-Gambu (Kereidei). According to the SH,
Qurjaqus had forty sons. Although the accounts vary, we can see that Tai-
Temiir-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir among their brothers attracted special attention
from their father qan in that Qurjaqus had separated their yurts from Toyoril
4 JT  p.87. Buqa-Temiir (YWLA-MAGHWS/BWLAMAGHWS, reconstructed as BWQA- 
TAMWR by comparing Pu-hua-t’eh-mu-erh in CCL p.48a), Tai-Temiir-Taishi 
(BAYTYMW R/TATYM W R TAYSHY, CCL p.48a T’ai-t’eh-mu-erh-f ai-shih).
5 Ilqa-Senggiim appears in JT  as Toyoril’s brother and in the SH  he was his son. JT  also 
mentions a Senggum who was a son o f Toyoril.
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and Giir-Qan’s yurts. These two children were bom to the Betekin princess 
Tore-Qaimish.6
The special treatment which these children received reflects the 
importance of the Betekin relationship in Kereit politics. Unfortunately, this 
high regard was not granted with goodwill, but owing to the situation. In fact, 
Qurjaqus disliked his Betekin kin, and this dislike is revealed in two incidents. 
First, Qurjaqus apparently did not enjoy very much the companionship of his 
Betekin wife Tore-Qaimish; he sent someone to murder her, then he killed the 
murderer after it was done. Later, before his death, he separated the yurts 
which were assigned to his blood brother and eldest son from the yurts which 
were assigned to these Betekin seed brothers, and said: "If they are together, 
they will not have harmony, after my death, from night to dawn and from 
dawn to night, they will not be passing the Kereit ulus".7
This secret murder and separation, and the negative comments, show 
that Qurjaqus did not enjoy a close Kereit-Betekin relationship at all. 
According to JT  p. 130, the Betekin realm at that time exceeded that of the 
later Ong-Qan and the Naiman Tayang-Qan; their strength was also 
demonstrated in the campaign against the Tatars. Apparently, the tribe was out 
o f Qurjaqus’ control. The situation can appropriately be compared with the 
later conflict between Temujin and Toyoril: since Toyoril disliked Temujin, 
he tried to get rid of him; however, he tried his best not to do this openly,8 
because Temujin had previously offered him great assistance in recovering the 
Kereit ulus. The secret attempt of Qurjaqus to rid himself of his Betekin wife 
is more or less the same as his son’s evil attempts against Temujin (see 
Chapter Three section II). probably these two father and son were thinking and 
acting in the same way.
6 JT  p.92. T6re-Qaimish had four more children but their names are unknown.
1 JT  p. 116, ulus-i kiralt-ra ... nagudharand.
8 See Chapter Three section III.
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If  the Betekin kin had indeed exercised an excessive influence in Kereit 
politics, even though Qurjaqus could handle it when he was alive, the qanship 
succession after Qurjaqus would be a real crisis in the Kereit ulus.
Unfortunately, as revealed in the sources, the circumstances o f the 
Kereit leadership immediately after the death of Qurjaqus were that the 
Betekin-related people did have control of the ulus.
This situation is not stated plainly in the sources. It is restored from 
two subsequent accounts. JT  pp.117-118 mentions that when Qurjaqus died, 
the brothers from the Betekin line filled their father’s place while Toyoril was 
somewhere at the frontier. The other account, also in JT, supplies a more 
accurate description in a speech of Toyoril, of the shift of real power. In JT  
p .l 16, after the death of Qurjaqus, Toyoril said to Tai-Temur-Taishi and Buqa- 
Temlir: "when our father was alive, we shot arrows on the condition that we
did not miss.9 Now, why should the ulus leadership be allowed to go to 
Elchitei?"
"Why should the ulus leadership be allowed to go to Elchitei?" means
neither Tai-Temur-Taishi nor Toyoril were in power, it was Elchitei who was 
in charge of Kereit affairs. Who was this Elchitei?
This Elchitei can be most probably identified with the Elchitei in JT  
p.91, who was a man in love with Toyoril’s mother when the Betekin saved 
Toyoril and this khatun from the Tatars, and he had been given to them 
forever.10 The background of this Elchitei is not clearly stated in JT, nor in
other sources, but he was most probably a Betekin.
9 The words "shot" and "did" are in the present tense in the Persian text, however, 
according to English grammar, I have to translate them into the past tense.
10 JT  p.92, chun mardT fattan bud, u-ra bi-ishan "chunggal" dad. Russian translation 
annotated "chunggal" with the variation o f munkkai\ then the sentence reads as "he was given 
to them forever".
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If we consider the subsequent practice of khatun regents after the death 
of Ogetei and Giiytik, ’ YLMH khatun may have been acting as regent after her 
husband’s death. It is also possible to assume that this Elchitei was acting as 
’YLMH’s husband after her husband’s death, if we compare this to the 
relationship of "Father" Monglik and Temujin’s mother Ho’eliin. In this way, 
the Kereit rulership had been strangely transferred to the Betekin Elchitei, not 
to the younger generation.
As seen from the above discussion, the political situation of the Kereit 
alas immediately after Qurjaqus’s death may have been a regency. For some 
unknown reason, Qurjaqus planned to pass the Kereit rulership to his wife, the 
mother of Toyoril, probably because he foresaw that Toyoril and the Betekin- 
related brothers would be in conflict all the time, and this was bad for the
future of the Kereit alas. Therefore, Qurjaqus separated the yurts of the 
Betekin-line children from the yurts of Gur-Qan and Toyoril, the original 
Kereits, before his death, to prevent internal dispute by a counter balance in
the yurts.
However, no matter what the background of Elchitei was, apparently
Toyoril was not happy with his usurpation of "his" throne, nor with the 
Betekin brothers. According to the above quotation o f Toyoril’s speech, 
apparently, Toyoril was attempting to drive a wedge between the Betekin 
Elchitei and the Betekin brothers, and to attract the brothers to his side.
Toyoril then successfully lured the brothers into leaving their place11 to come
to him.
After this, when Toyoril found an opportunity, he assailed or assaulted 
them. The brothers came to the Merkit Toqtoya. Toqtoya preferred not to 
provoke Toyoril, therefore, he decided to hand them back. Toyoril then had 
them done away with (m st gardamd).12 CCL p.48a recounts that after
11 Pers. mawda\ place, must be the yurts their father assigned to them.
12 JT  p .l 16.
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Toyoril killed the brothers, he pretended that he had no knowledge of where 
they were. I f  this account is reliable, Toyoril must have had done away with 
them secretly, as his father had done to the Betekin princess.
The history of Toyoril5s first struggle for the qanship up to the secret 
murder of Tai-Temiir-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir then can be summarized as
follows. After assisting the Kereits to recover their ulus from the Alchi-Tatars, 
the powerful Betekins had a prominent influence in the Kereit ruling family 
although the Kereit rulers might not have liked this. When Qurjaqus-Qan died, 
the Kereit throne was passed to his khatun 5 YLMH, probably because of the 
young age of his children, or other political considerations. However, Elchitei, 
probably a Betekin, was in fact in charge of the affairs of Kereit ulus because 
of his intimate relationship with 5 YLMH khatun. The children of Qurjaqus, 
although they were at odds with each other, were all unhappy with this take­
over. Since Toyoril was the most clearly rightful heir and he was at least 
thirteen years older than these brothers, he made use of this chance to destroy
his younger opponents from the Betekin line by a trick.
To7 oril-Toqt07a relationship
Since the above discussion has mentioned several steppe tribes, it would 
be desirable to continue with an analysis of the intertribal situation on the 
steppe here. The significance of Toyoril’s struggles with his rival brothers will 
be discussed in section II.
The above battles and marriage illuminate the general situation of the 
region surrounding the Kereit territory at this time. The Tatar tribe was strong, 
and strong enough to attack the Kereit tribe. They defeated the Kereits, and 
this crisis made the Kereit leader create an in-laws5 relationship with the ruling 
family o f the Betekin tribe. With the military assistance of the Betekin people, 
the Kereits recovered their ulus from the Tatars, but at the same time, the 
Kereits were determined to live under Betekin influence afterwards.
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After the death of Qurjaqus-Qan, Toyoril, the candidate o f the 
successor, tried to get rid of the Betekin group. Those Betekin-related princes
went to the Merkit tribe because of oppression. However, the Merkit leader 
did not give them his protection: this marked their end. In other words, the 
decision of the Merkit leader had indirectly helped Toyoril in this struggle for 
succession and resulted in his rivals perishing.
The Merkits appeared three times crucially in relation to Toyoril’s 
struggle for his throne. The first time, their leader Toqtoya’s refusal to accept 
Tai-Temur-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir partly contributed to ToyoriTs success in 
destroying these rival candidates. The second time, Toyoril fled into the 
territory o f the Merkits when his uncle turned against him. Toqtoya protected 
him from being destroyed, in other words, this provided him with one more 
chance to regain his throne. The third time was quite late in 1197/98, when 
Toyoril was preparing for his restoration against the mighty Naiman, and the 
Merkit wealth had been transformed into Toyoril’s resources. This 
"contribution" will be discussed in the first section of Chapter Three. After all, 
the Merkits had saved Toyoril or helped him to survive three times when he 
was under threat, although the last time was not of their own will.
In spite of this assistance at crucial moments, the sources do not supply 
a clear picture of the relationship between Toyoril and Toqtoya. The 
ambiguous background makes the great assistance of Toqtoya peculiar, 
especially on the third occasion where Toyoril was apparently hostile to 
Toqtoya. Therefore, it is necessary to make the relationship more clear.
The issue can be examined from several perspectives. Toqtoya seemed 
to be a peace loving person. None of the accounts of him show him behaving
ambitiously or aggressively, except to avenge his father’s death, who was
killed by the Taichiyut Qadayan-Taishi.1' His gentlemanly manner is clearly
demonstrated in his preparation for the revenge. Toqtoya did not raid or fall 
upon the Mongols unexpectedly as Temiijin or Toyoril always did, he declared 
war openly by sending a messenger to Qadayan-Taishi to ask for a date and
13 JT p .256 .
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the location of the battlefield. Qadayan-Taishi then summoned a quriltai, 
which is recorded in detail in JT.14 After his messenger returned from the 
Mongols, Toqtoya set off for war.15 On a later occasion, Toqtoya raided 
Temiijin. However, this was not a plundering attack, as what Temiijin had 
done to him afterwards was, but another act of revenge: an unexpected capture 
for an unexpected capture in order to take revenge for the abduction of 
Hd’eliin. It carried out with a just claim.
Other than his politeness and sense of justice as reflected in his acts of 
revenge, Toqtoya seemed to be lacking interest in the domestic affairs of the 
other tribes. His earlier response to the Kereit fugitive Tai-Temur-Taishi and
Buqa-Temiir shows that he tried to avoid conflicts with the other tribes, on the 
other hand, so as not to bring his own tribe into trouble. The Merkits might 
have been fierce and warlike, as mentioned in YS,]6 or as Toqtoya’s father 
was,17 but not Toqtoya. The Toqtoya-Merkit was always a victim of 
plundering and looting by other warlike tribes such as Toyoril-Kereit and 
Temiij in-Mongol.
Besides the personality of Toqtoya, an in-laws’ relationship also 
assisted in creating a friendly relationship between Toqtoya and Toyoril when 
the latter sought refuge from the former. This marriage of Toyoril’s daughter 
and Toqtoya was mentioned by Temiijin when he reprimanded Toyoril in 
1203. Temiijin recounted that Toyoril gave his daughter to Toqtoya before 
Yesugei helped him to expel the Kereit Giir-Qan. According to this account
in SH  §177, this marriage must have taken place during the time of Mongol
Qutula-Qan because Yesugei’s expedition against Giir-Qan was carried out in
the reign of Qutula.
u JT  pp.256-258.
15 JT p .259.
16 YS 134 chuan 21 the biography o f Koko, p.3250.
17 JT  pp.255-256, Toqtoya’s father turned down Qadayan-Taishi’s invitation to become 
allies. His arrogant reply infuriated Qadayan-Taishi so the latter decided to go to war.
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When we are considering that this marriage may have established a
good relationship between Toqtoya and Toyoril, another account in the same 
source, which can be dated in the youth o f Temiijin, seems to be denying their
friendship. SH  §§104-113 relate that Toyoril had assisted Temiijin to attack
the Merkits in order to rescue Temujin’s wife, Borte.
JT  and the SH  have conflicting accounts about the rescue of Borte. 
Since the story in SH  is less contradictory to the otherwise friendly attitude of 
Toyoril towards Temiijin, researchers would easily incline to believe in the 
accuracy of this account. However, with the knowledge of a former quda
(Mong. in-laws) relationship between Toqtoya and Toyoril which is mentioned 
in the SH, J T  s version becomes less fabulous.
According to JT  pp.299-300, when the Merkits captured Borte, because
"at that time the Merkits and Ong-Qan were at peace", they sent the pregnant
Borte to Toyoril. Toyoril treated her with honour and respect —  he did not 
"take" her as his emirs suggested. Later Temiijin sent Saba to Toyoril and 
carried Borte back to his place, and Jochi was bom on the way.
This account makes us to think about two questions. One is, were 
Merkit and Toyoril "at peace" during the Borte incident? The other is, if they 
were at peace "at that time", were they not at peace before or/and after this
incident?
A story in SH  §152 confirms that the Kereit and the Merkit had not 
been living in harmony before this in-laws' relationship: when Toyoril was 
seven years old, he was once carried off by the Merkits and made to pound
grain in the Buyura Steppe by the Selengge river; his father saved him by a 
raid. This hostility is further justified by the attitude of the Betekin-related 
Kereit princes. The brothers could have turned to the Merkits for help because
of their nearby location, but probably their decision also took Toyoril’s earlier 
dissension with the Merkits into account. Later when the Kereit princes Erke-
Qara and Jaya-Gambu dissented with the Kereit ruler, they reacted in the same
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way by fleeing to the historical enemy of the Kereit ruler: the Naiman qan.
However, as time passed, Toyoril grew up and the Merkit leadership shifted 
to a younger generation.18 The marriage was apparently proceeded with
regardless o f the former dissension.
After the marriage, however, there does not seem to have been a long
peace between the Kereits and the Merkits. Skipping the debatable incident of
Borte which might have taken place around 1179, Toyoril attacked Toqtoya, 
his son-in-law, plundering and looting the Merkit people, killing Toqtoya’s 
children, paying no attention to their qnda relationship. This would not have
happened, or should not have happened, if the marriage was arranged out of
true affection.
If the marriage was not arranged out of affection but appeared to the 
Merkits to be a ceasefire agreement to end the old enmity between Toyoril and 
the Merkits, or if, to Toyoril, it served another purpose, we should reconsider 
the nature of this marriage. In S IT s reprimand, Temiijin commented that
Toyoril gave his daughter to Toqtoya "to seek prestige".19 This might be
true, if we compare this marriage to the marriage between Jaya-Gambu’s 
daughter and the Tangyut ruler. Jaya-Gambu did this when he was looking for 
another protector after his former protector Temiijin had been defeated.20 As 
for Toyoril, he was in a similar isolated situation when he went to the Merkit 
leader. Both marriages appear like fugitives’ offering to the protector in
exchange for personal security.
!S This might have taken place during the time o f the Taichiyut Qadayan-Taishi, if  the 
father o f  Toqtoya was killed by Qadayan. The lifetime o f Qadayan-Taishi was similar to that 
o f Qutula, because both o f  them were mentioned by Hambaqai, and before Yesiigei’s 
expedition against the Kereit Giir-Qan, because Qadayan died shortly before the expedition. 
In this way, Qadayan might have just passed his adolescence in 1130s. and probably was 
"murdered" in 1160s. Discussion see section III of this chapter.
19 SH  §177.
20 Detailed discussion see Chapter Two section II and III.
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Although the Merkits might consider this marriage as the beginning of
long-lasting peace between the Merkit and Kereit tribes, especially since their
leader Toqtoya had a peace loving character, Toyoril might not have forgotten 
the captivity in his childhood, and have considered this marriage humiliating.
In this way, Toyoril might not have arranged this marriage with goodwill, but 
for immediate benefits21 from the unwanted son-in-law. Therefore, when he 
was no longer in need of this relationship, he ignored the affection and 
obligations involved in being an in-law, and attacked his son-in-law without 
mercy.
The paragraphs below turns back to the abduction of Borte. From the 
above discussion, it is certain that there was a short-term peace between 
Toqtoya and Toyoril, and it was not the result of respecting the neighbours, 
but based on a close affection linkage of marriage between the ruling families. 
Therefore, it was possible for Toqtoya to send the pregnant Borte to his father- 
in-law as a present, as recorded in JT. Since no further evidence can either
confirm or deny either story, I do not attempt to establish which story we
should believe in. However, the above analysis of the Toqtoya-Toyoril 
relationship from 1160s to the end of the century has provided a more solid
ground for believing in the accuracy of the JT  story.
If it is possible that the JT  story might have a certain accuracy, then,
when Borte had been sent to Toyoril by his son-in-law, what did Toyoril think 
of this offer? In the JT  story, Toyoril did not turn down this friendly present,
and he did not take her, either. When his emirs asked him: "Why do not you
take her?", Toyoril replied that he was considering his anda relationship with
Yesugei, and in that relationship, Borte could be considered as his daughter-in-
law.
The wonder of his emirs: "Why do not you take her?" gave the general 
opinion of what Toyoril should do with Borte: Borte was booty of Toqtoya,
21 See discussion in Chapter Five section II.
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and his father-in-law Toyoril got a share. Toyoril’s decision not to take 
advantage on this matter shall be examined in a political way rather than from
the viewpoint of his affection for Yesugei. In this dilemma, if we consider the
political situation of Toyoril as the Kereit ruler, declining the friendly giving 
of a share o f their booty would have offended his powerful but unwanted in­
law, while on the other hand, he also could not risk ruining his friendship 
with the Mongols by enjoying this share of booty.
Toyoril’s position in this incident, in the JT  version, reflects the essence 
of intertribal politics in twelfth century Mongolia. The "relationships” on the 
steppe were based on a variety of connections, for instance, aqa wa in i  
tribes/clans within one’s own genealogy, in-laws (quda) relationship with the 
tribes outside one’s own genealogy, individual bondage such as anda or ndker, 
plus a subordinate relation, such as tribesmen to their clan leader, servants 
{boyul) to their lord. Since there was no fixed constitution or complicated 
bureaucracy in a nomad world, these relationships actually provided the 
organising framework of this world. The so-called intertribal politics on the 
steppe were in essence a wise way of maintaining peace and balance in these 
relationships, not by oppression or occasional military victories, although 
"might" is everything behind politics. The significance of some of these 
relationships will be discussed in Part Two of this thesis, in which Temiijin’s 
wisdom in maintaining these for his own use are analyzed, as well as some 
aspects of his unwise handling of these relationships which caused his career 
disadvantages.
In the Borte incident, for Toyoril in such a position, a quda affection 
is clashed with an anda affection. Toyoril had made a clever resolution and 
avoided the conflict: he accepted the present, but he did not touch her; later 
when Temiijin asked for her, he allowed Temiijin to carry Borte back. A 
happy ending for both sides. When a similar dilemma came to Temiijin, 
namely a conflict between discipline and seniority, Temiijin acted in an 
uncompromising and straightforward fashion to the disobedient aqa. wa in i
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(kinsmen) —  this resulted in a leadership crisis which nearly brought him to
his end. This crisis will be discussed in Chapter Three section III from the
perspective of the Kereits, and in Chapter Four section II (iii) from the
perspective of Temiijin. Compared to Toyoril’s handling of the Borte 
incidents, Temiijin was less clever than Toyoril, we may say, in the art of 
politics.
II. "Stinking livers" towards brothers
According to the sources, Toyoril had many conflicts with his brothers: 
first with Tai-Temiir-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir, later with Erke-Qara: last with
Jaya-Gambu. He is described as "having a miserable nature"22 in general, and
he had committed a long list of crimes against his brothers and supporters.
The SH  starts counting his crime from the killing of his two half-brothers, and
then he intended to kill his other brother Erke-Qara (§151). As to his loyal
pseudo-son Temiijin, Toyoril did not give him a share of his loot from the 
Merkits (§157), and he left Temiijin alone to face the Naiman general Kokse’ti-
Sabraq at the battlefield of Baidaraq-Belchir (§159). Because Toyoril 
"harboured a stinking liver" towards Temiijin (?), his younger brother Jaya- 
Gambu and nobles joined and plotted against him (§152). After Jaya-Gambu 
left him, Toyoril still allowed his son to conspire against Temiijin (§167), and 
finally turned hostile against Temiijin without considering all his services to
him.
Toyoril is portrayed as wicked throughout the sources, in particular in 
relation to his attitude towards Temiijin. Jamuqa is also portrayed as wicked
in the sources, but the description of "a wicked Jamuqa" may have simply been
a defamation rather than truth if we consider Jamuqa’s competitor role in
Temtijin’s success.23 Is it possible that Toyoril was also abused by the
12 SH  §152.
23 This is going to be discussed in Chapter Three section II and Chapter Four section II 
(ii) and (iii).
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authors because he eventually turned against Temiijin? Or, did he really 
harbour a stinking liver towards his brothers and pseudo-son?
Toyoril’s attitude towards his rival brothers and Temiijin, or vice versa, 
is the main theme of the discussion in this section. The study of his 
"miserable nature" starts from his relationship with his brothers.
Who was plotting against whom?
Making a close examination of the occasions when Toyoril’s three 
conflicts with his brothers occurred, it is surprising to see that these conflicts 
all resulted from or caused a challenge to Toyoril’s claim to the Kereit 
leadership. The first occasion of his conflict with the Betekin-related half-
brothers was in the regency period immediately following the death o f their 
father qan. The second conflict, which involved Erke-Qara, resulted in a 
Naiman invasion and Toyoril’s dethronement. On the third occasion, Jaya- 
Gambu plotted with Kereit nobles in the Kereit camp just a few months after 
Toyoril recovered the Kereit ulus from the Naiman.24 All these incidents 
happened coincidentally at the crucial period when Toyoril had a chance to
secure the throne but before he could consolidate his rule. Did Toyoril really 
"harbour a stinking liver" to all these potential opponents to his claim for the
Kereit throne, or, vice versa?
Toyoril’s "disagreement" with his brothers, conversely, also reveals the 
hostility of several parties in the Kereit ulus towards Toyoril. First, the
Betekin Elchitei and the Betekin-related brothers Tai-Temur-Taishi and Buqa-
Temiir were in a favourable position after the death of Qurjaqus, and this was
a severe threat, or at least a great obstacle, to Toyoril if he had the most just 
claim to the Kereit throne, and when he wished to preserve this claim. 
Second, in the conflict with Erke-Qara, JT  p.564 supplies the background of
24 JT  dates this conspiracy in the winter o f Monkey Year (1200/01), that is the very winter 
after Toyoril defeated the Naiman and regained his throne.
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their disagreement: "because [they] disputed over the nation and ulus, he
(Toyoril) killed most of [his] brothers and uncles." It seems that Toyoril had 
just settled another power struggle among the Kereit princes. Third, Jaya- 
Gambu conspired in 1200/01 because "he (Toyoril) killed all the aqa wa in i 
[and he came] to such a state that ‘he’25 went to the region of Qara-Khitai".
This description confirmed ToyoriTs earlier struggle with those Kereit princes, 
in which "he killed all the aqa wa in i', before Erke-Qara fled to Naiman.
This knowledge of the background of Toyoril’s conflicts with his 
brothers and his attempts to do away with these brothers, except for Jaya- 
Gambu, shows that Toyoril’s actions were "responses" to a threat to his claim 
to the Kereit leadership. These rivals, on the first occasion the Betekin sect in
the Kereit ruling family and on the second occasion the anti-Toyoril kinsmen, 
even appealed for foreign help to achieve their goals. Although the Merkits 
did not help the Betekin group, the Naimans dethroned Toyoril upon the 
request of Erke-Qara. Upon this pressure, Toyoril reacted in the same way as 
in the case of his rival brothers; he appealed for assistance from Yesugei and
later Temiijin to expel his uncle and later the Naimans. These conflicts 
actually reflect a cold-blooded struggle for power among the Kereit princes.
Why did this situation arise? The constitution of the Kereit rulership 
may provide the best explanation. According to JT, the huge Kereit tribe, 
including all its divisions, was subjected to single leadership of the descendants 
of the "Kereit" branch, which means the ruling family of the Kereit tribe must
25 The Persian verb in this sentence clause bears a plural suffix "they", as the subject o f  
the clause o f  "entered the region o f  Qara-Khitai". I am doubtful on this subject. No other 
evidence confirms that the aqa wa in i  who Toyoril had "killed" had gone to Qara-Khitai. I 
assume this is a mistake, and the correct usage here should be "he entered the region o f  Qara- 
Khitai" when this singular "he" is Toyoril. This assumption fits, first, the real situation that 
because after Toyoril had killed his aqa wa ini, Erke-Qara fled and the Naiman put him to 
flight, that, "he entered the region o f  Qara-Khitai". Second, the same plot in CCL p.33a reads: 
"My brother has no settled heart. [He] slaughtered [and] exterminated brothers [and he] has 
been attached to [Qara-]Khitai," The character c h ’a n g here shall be read as "has [once] been", 
not "often".
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have come from the "Kereit" branch.26 This single leadership of the huge 
tribe must have been the dream of many Kereit princes, and the position of 
leadership must have been very tempting when the person on the throne had 
not consolidated his power. As related by the SH, Qurjaqus had forty sons and 
Toyoril was the eldest, this would mean thirty-nine competitors to Toyoril, not 
to mention Qurjaqus’s brothers or other nobles. Toyoril must have been living 
in an atmosphere of conspiracies and plots aimed at him, throughout his life,
no wonder he is described as melancholy in all the sources and appeared 
overanxious on every possible occasion which might have threatened his 
leadership.27
The political situation of the Kereit ulus during the life time of Toyoril
can be compared with the leadership anarchy of the Taichiyut-Mongol. The 
Taichiyuts which consist of several sub-clans —  therefore it is mentioned in 
Persian sources as "the Taichiyut tribes/clans" —  had no general leader after 
the death of Hambaqai-Qan. As revealed in the sources, many Taichiyut 
princes were interested in this exalted position, and nobody agreed to the
other’s succession. Therefore, the position of the general leadership of the
Taichiyut tribes/clans had been left vacant since the 1130s, until they were 
defeated and annexed by Temiijin in the 1200s. This comparison shows that 
the Kereit situation was not unique, and the details of the Taichiyut leadership 
struggle will be related in section III of this chapter, also in Chapter Four
section II.
26 JT  p .114 records that originally "Kereit" was a general name for many branches from 
a same ancestor. Afterwards, each o f the branch had their own title (laqab) so that the name 
Kereit became strictly used to refer to the branch which was "the ruler among them" 
("padishahl dar Tshan"). The other branches had become the subordinates (banda) to that 
ruling brother branch, "no ruler among them" ("az Tshan padishah nabuda"). The titles o f  
other Kereit branches were Jirgin, Tongqayit, Saqayit, Tiibegeyit and Albat.
27 His distrust o f  his loyal partner Temiijin is the best example, and this will be discussed 
in Chapter Three section II.
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The "indirect" measures to drive the brothers away
An outsider might not have had a chance to know so many hidden
stories within the Kereit ruling family, in which not only Toyoril was plotting 
against his brothers, but his brothers did the same trick to Toyoril. Therefore, 
an outsider might have judged Toyoril’s harsh measures against his brothers 
from a moral point of view. After Toyoril had been put to flight by his uncle
Giir-Qan, he went to Yesugei with a hundred men requesting assistance to
recover his realm. When Yesugei consulted the opinion of the famous Qutula- 
Qan of the Mongols in this matter, Qutula commented:
A friendship with him is not advisable because we know him 
well. It is worthier to be anda with Giir-Qan, while he is a
man of gentle good nature. This man [Toyoril] killed his own
brothers and with their blood, he stained the rays of the
standard. Meanwhile the mountain ox was hit by an arrow and 
a wild ass remained with a load cart28 on the neck, for this 
reason he had come to us [seeking] for protection."29 
This comment is apparently negative.
Toyoril’s uncle Giir-Qan did not make a favourable comment on him, 
either. An account suggests that the Kereit Giir-Qan thought this way when
28 JT  p .l 17 "gur kharl ’GHRWQ dar gardan andakhta mTmanad". The term ’GHRWQ 
should be understood as "load" (cargo) here, rather than "base camp" which is suggested by 
some translators. "Ayuruq" in Mongolian is a base camp where family members stayed in, 
The usage appears in SH  § 136, also throughout Chinese records as Ao-lu. The meaning o f  this 
term as "base camp" is used in certain JT  accounts, such as in JT  p.206, where the envoy o f  
Ong-Qan was sent to Jochi-Qasar who was staying in the ’GHRWQ. However, this meaning 
cannot be fitted in this sentence: "casting the base camp upon the neck o f an wild ass", no 
matter how idiomatic the sentence is. JT  p.210 uses ’GHRWQ as "load" in Jebe’s famous 
seizure o f  the city o f  Tungking. The story relates that instead o f laying a siege, the Mongol 
troops pulled away from the city gate. When the Tungking people thought the attack was 
suspended, Jebe "abandoned ’GHRWQ-ha ( ’GHRWQs)", rode back at full speed and stormed 
the city. CCL p.77a records the detail o f  this tactic as "[he] ordered every soldier took with 
a spare horse". The base camp would never be allowed to travel with a troop — so that 
"loads" is the appropriate interpretation here.
29 JT  p .l 17. There may be different translations for the meaning o f "niza-i ‘alam" and the 
last idiom, I translated them according to my personal understanding.
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he decided to set out against Toyoril: Toyoril killed his brothers shortly after 
his father’s death, so "how shall the ulus be preserved?"30
Qutula-Qan is a legendary figure who had been elected to lead both
Qabul-Mongol and Taichiyut-Mongol to avenge the death of Hambaqai-Qan.31
A judgement from such a tribal leader could have certain weight in fairness
and justice. The "gentle and good" Giir-Qan, as evaluated by Qutula, held a
similar attitude to Toyoril’s behaviour as Qutula-Qan. Their similar negative 
comments on this matter revealed the justice of their social conduct, which
may also be the social conduct among the steppe people at this time, that
killing brothers, or half-brothers, certainly was unacceptable, and this behaviour
should be condemned and punished.
Perhaps under such a consideration of avoiding being condemned by 
general public, other than pretending he had no idea about the location of his
Betekin-related half-brothers after the secret murder, Toyoril may have forced 
the rival brothers to depart in an indirect way. This tactic can be observed in 
relation to the departure of the Betekin-related brothers and later, Jaya- 
Gambu.32
In JT  p .l 16, after Toyoril had lured the brothers into leaving their yurts 
to come to him, he tdkhtan hard the brothers. I am not sure if the verb should 
be read as "assailed" or "assaulted" because no other evidence suggests what 
the real situation was. The next sentence recounts that after Toyoril tdkhtan 
hard the brothers, they went to Toqtoya. Again, there is no evidence to show 
that the brothers fled to Toqtoya after a defeat. How Toyoril got them out of 
his sight remains obscure.
30 JT  p .l 17.
31 SH  §§57-58. For more discussion on his leadership over the M ongols, see section III.
32 There are no sources available for the departure o f Erke-Qara.
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A later situation, that of Toyoril’s reprimand of Jaya-Gambu, gives a 
clue to the interpretation of the meaning of tdkhtan kardan. In the winter of 
1200/01, Jaya-Gambu, who was also a brother to Toyoril, plotted against 
Toyoril. The plot was aborted, and Jaya-Gambu finally left Toyoril and went 
to the Naimans. The reason of plotting, according to SH  §152, was:
"forgetting how his son Temiijin has treated him, he (Toyoril) harbours a 
stinking liver. How shall we deal with him?"33 and according to JT  p.374, 
Jaya-Gambu said to Altun-Ashuq, El-Qotor, El-Qongqor and Qul-Bari34 that 
"this our elder brother is melancholy natured, not a single place was restful. 
Out of a bad nature, he killed all the aqa wa in i  [and he came] to such a state 
that ‘he’ went to the region of Qara-Khitai. With this nature and manner, he 
did not put the ulus in order, ("ulus-ra nagudhard ki bi-yasayad") How shall 
we deal with him?"
S f f s  version of the reason for their treachery implies that these Kereit
nobles/generals rebelled against Toyoril on behalf of Temujin, because Toyoril 
did not preserve good intentions towards Temujin. This seems peculiar, unless
these Kereit rebels had more affection to Temujin rather than to their own 
leader, or own brother. In this way, the dialogue in JT  appears more 
convincing because it focuses on a distrust of Toyoril’s leadership especially 
in relation to Toyoril’s unpredictable manner towards his kinsmen.
No matter what the motivation was, the plot was not carried out
because one o f the conspirators, Altun-Ashuq, passed their discussion to
Toyoril. Toyoril’s reaction to "another" threat to his leadership is remarkable. 
He captured El-Qotor and El-Qongqor, and said to El-Qotor35 in front of the
other nobles/generals: "What had we said when we travelled to the region of
33 Translation by Igor de Rachewiltz, PFEH  13 (1976) p.46.
3-4 CCL p.32b records exactly the same four persons.
35 In SH  §152, Toyoril reprimanded all the conspirators. However, CCL p.33b and JT  
p.375 record only one and the same person Toyoril had spoken to.
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Tangyut!" He reprimanded him: "What am I to think of the like of you!" 
Then he spat on him.36
. Toyoril’s reaction is full of implications, and these implications can 
only be uncovered with a knowledge of the identity of these conspirators.
Among the four conspirators, first, Altun-Ashuq had withdrawn from the plot,
therefore, it does not matter what his identity was. Second, Jaya-Gambu was 
Toyoril’s brother. Third, El-Qotor was bom to a woman who escaped with 
Sariq-Qan after the defeat of Alchi-Tatar and he was possibly a son of Sariq-
Qan although this is not stated plainly in the sources.37 What is certain is that
El-Qotor could not have been Toyoril’s blood brother because he was not born 
to ’YLMH khatun. However, it is obvious that El-Qotor was a close kinsman 
to Toyoril. As for El-Qongqor and Qul-Bari, their background is not clear.
Why did Toyoril reprimand El-Qotor in public but not the leader of the 
conspirators Jaya-Gambu? Would this decision have been made in order to 
"save the face" of his brother, by not making known his evil intention against
his brother qan? El-Qotor was a kinsman of the royal family, but not 
Toyoril’s brother. Probably because of the closeness in kinship, he had been 
"chosen" by Toyoril as a scapegoat to be condemned, and to show Jaya-Gambu 
an example.
After this open humiliation of a minor conspirator, designed to
intimidate the head conspirator who was also his own brother, Toyoril 
reprimanded Jaya-Gambu several times indirectly, saying "you always harbour 
a stinking liver"38 —  curiously enough, in the SH, these words were used by
Jaya-Gambu to describe the heart of Toyoril. These reprimands justified
36 Same record o f  Toyoril’s reprimand in JT  p.375, CCL p.33b and SH  §152.
37 JT  p.91, the woman called TARJBAY-QAYAN. She encouraged Sariq-Qan after the 
defeat. She had a son called ’YL-QWTWY, This ’YL-QWTWY can be identified with El- 
Qotor when the last /y / is a copying corruption from /r/. A woman who escaped and was 
staying with a fleeing qan must have had a special relationship to the qan; she might have been 
a khatun or a concubine to Sariq-Qan.
38 CCL p.33b.
42
Toyoril’s anger towards Jaya-Gambu because of the conspiracy. If Toyoril did 
try to avoid a public condemnation of Jaya-Gambu as assumed above, this 
reprimand of "stinking liver" would have been administered privately. The
reprimand made Jaya-Gambu feel "insecure"/9 then, later at an unspecified
time, Jaya-Gambu left the Kereit country and went to Naiman Tayang-Qan 
with El-Qotor, El-Qongqor, Narin-Toyoril and Alin-Taishi.40
Apparently, on this occasion, Toyoril made Jaya-Gambu leave without 
using force. Compared with the earlier case of Tai-Temur-Taishi and Buqa- 
Temiir, are there not many similarities? If there are, shall we understand the 
verb tdkhtan kardan as "assailed"? Furthermore, Temujin’s open punishment 
of his kinsmen for their disobedience, which will be related in Chapter Four 
section II (iii), caused an unexpected reaction of treachery which nearly 
brought Temujin’s leadership to an end. Do these two examples prove that it 
was the steppe custom that humiliating one’s kinsmen was inappropriate, at 
least in public? In response to these humiliations, in public or in private, the 
humiliated kinsmen left the dominion and turned to foreign powers for 
help/protection, at the same time, treachery was planned.
To7oril’s location during the conflicts
An examination of Toyoril’s location during his conflicts with his 
brothers can put the history of his regime and its relationship to the 
surrounding tribes/nations in a nutshell.
When the losers in the qanship struggles were forced to leave the Kereit 
territory, they looked for a strong protector. The patrons they sought reveal 
the current location and situation of Toyoril.
39 CCL p.34a.
'10 SH  §152 mentions that Alin-Taishi was among the conspirators. J T p.375 recounts that 
the people went away with Jaya-Gambu as NARYN-TGHRYL wa ALYN-TAYSHY (Narin- 
Toyoril and Alin-Taishi). CCL p.34a mentions El-Qotor, El-Qongqor, Na-lien-t’uo-lien-t’ai- 
shih (Narin-Toyoril-Taishi) and etc. Alin-Taishi certainly appeared later in Naiman Tayang- 
Qan’s camp.
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In this first conflict, before Tai-Temur-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir went to
Toqtoya, they had been lured to Toyoril’s presence. When they decided to 
leave, they must have departed from Toyoril’s residence, and have gone to a 
nearby tribe which was strong enough to counter Toyoril. This course of 
action explains that Toyoril must have resided somewhere next to the Merkits 
during this period. According to JT , Toyoril was supposed to be at the 
"frontier" of the Kereit realm at this time. The Merkit tribe was located to the
northeast of the Kereit tribe, therefore, it is reasonable to say that Toyoril was 
at the northeastern frontier of the Kereit at this time, probably on the frontier
which separated the two tribes.
His presence on the frontier next to Merkit territory at this time is 
confirmed by the later attack of his uncle Giir-Qan. In SH  §177, when Giir-
Qan marched against him from the Kereit heartland, Toyoril was forced to flee 
to Qarayun gorge, where he gave his daughter Hujayur to Toqtoya to be his 
wife. Qarayun gorge was located on the Selengge river which was a Merkit 
residence. The gorge is described as being resided in by the Merkits in a later 
account of the events of 1204/05.41 So, Toyoril must have stayed at the 
northeast border of the Kereit ulus at least from the death of Qurjaqus until he 
expelled Giir-Qan.
After Toyoril obtained assistance from Yesugei, they expelled Giir-Qan 
in the direction of Qashin (Tangyut), and Toyoril must have returned to the 
heartland of Kereit ulus from the northeast. The reconstructed route of this
expedition (see section III) makes it clear that Toyoril came out from the 
Qarayun gorge to the northeast of the Kereit territory, then he passed through 
the heartland of his country to reach the southwest border which adjoined the
Tangyut nation. This is the first appearance of the Tangyuts which is 
associated with Kereit or Mongol history. Giir-Qan disappeared in the Tangyut 
territory and never returned; it seems that the Tangyuts were not interested in 
getting involved in this power struggle.
4! CCL p.70b.
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The flight of Erke-Qara took place during the period when Toyoril had 
regained the throne and was staying in the Kereit heartland. Supposing that
Erke-Qara had to flee to a strong ruler nearby, Tangyut would not be a good 
choice because Giir-Qan did not return after he went there. The Merkit tribe
in the northeast could not be counted on, since Tai-Temiir-Taishi and Buqa-
Temiir were handed back to Toyoril. The in-laws’ relationship between 
Toqtoya and Toyoril made Erke-Qara no chance at all. To the east, Yesugei 
and his descendants were friendly towards Toyoril at this time. Having no 
alternative, Erke-Qara had to turn to the long-standing enemy of the Kereits, 
or we could better say, of the Kereit rulers, for help. The subsequent 
development shows that his choice of Naiman was correct, and the Naiman qan 
had Toyoril dethroned.
When it came to Jaya-Gambu's conspiracy in 1200/01, Toyoril had just 
recovered his country from the Naiman. There were not many choices for
Jaya-Gambu to adopt, when he was feeling "insecure”. The Naiman Buiruq- 
Qan had recently been defeated by Toyoril, his strength could not be counted 
on. The Merkits were no longer a friend to Toyoril after his attack in 1198 
which caused severe damage, both to the tribe and their relationship, they 
remained very weak and unable to challenge Toyoril. To the east, Toyoril and 
Temujin had just reconfirmed their relationship in the Red Hills Promise (see
Chapter Three section II). Their association was recently strengthened. To the
south, Jaya-Gambu had not obtained any sufficient protection from the 
Tangyut and Jayut regions during his last exile, therefore, he would not expect 
any from them this time. In such a situation, Jaya-Gambu could only go 
further west to the Naiman Tayang-Qan, who was the only power left on the 
steppe who could be expected to be strong enough to counter Toyoril or/and 
Temujin.
M urderous brothers
As for the relationship between Kereit and Mongol history, or Toyoril 
and Temujin, one comparison can be made here, of their attitude towards their
half-brothers who challenged their authority.
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The moral judgement of the Mongol Qutula-Qan and the Kereit Giir-
Qan upon Toyoril’s secret murder of his half-brother during this period, 
provides a clue to understanding the real situation regarding Temujin’s murder 
of his half-brother Bekter. When Temujin killed Bekter, Ho’eliin was enraged 
by this offence and severely rebuked Temujin and Qasar, her own children,42 
for killing their half-brother.43 Her reaction agrees with the negative criticism 
by Qutula and Giir-Qan, of Toyoril’s killing of his half-brothers.
This account in the SH  is followed immediately by the sudden arrival 
of some Taichiyuts: they came over to capture Temiijin.
Paul Ratchnevsky has suggested that there might "perhaps" be a 
relationship between Bekter’s murder and Temiijin’s captivity. However, he 
did not go further in examining the possible connection, although he did 
enquire into this indirectly.44
The SH  supplied an idiomatic sentence with may explain the
Taichiyut’s motivation for this capture:
qoluqat qoyojijuyu, shiliiget shberijii ’u
literally means "the chicks have shed [their down], the lambs have grown
up".43 The surface meaning of this sentence is not difficult to understand —
the young had attained a certain age. Curiously, the Chinese gloss does not
gloss these words literally as it usually does. The sentence is glossed, as
translated by Francis Cleaves, as "the wicked have molted, the drivellers are
42 SH  §60.
43 SH  §77.
44 Paul Ratchnevsky, Cinggis-Khan, sein Leben und Wirken, English translation by T 
Haining, Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy, p.24 and p.25.
45 Translation by Igor de Rachewiltz, PFEH 4 (1971) p.138. I added brackets to the 
phrase "their down" because the words are not in the Mongolian text. On the other hand, 
Urgunge Onon suggested that the word qoluqat = qoraqat that is "lambs" so he read the first 
sentence as "the lambs are shedding their fleeces". Onon, p.23.
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grown up".46 The meaning is negative. Was this gloss simply an imaginative 
interpretation from the annotator, or, did it just honestly represent what 
Tarqutai-Kiriltuq was really thinking, and judged, when he ordered Temujin’s 
capture?
JT  implies throughout its narration of Temujin’s history that the
Taichiyuts were jealous of Temujin’s potential of becoming a great leader. 
However, the assumption that "the Taichiyut intended to capture Temujin in 
order to prevent him from getting strong" cannot be sufficiently supported by
the sources. First, there was no long lasting enmity between the two clans.
Second, both clans were descended from Qaidu, Taichiyut-Mongol and Qabul- 
Mongol were the closest brother clans in the NIrun genealogy.47 Third, they 
appeared to be in accord at least since the time of Qutula-Qan; even after the
death of Yesugei, Temujin’s family was living peacefully with the Taichiyuts 
until his mother insulted the elders of the Taichiyuts.
Fourth, the detailed account of this incident in the SH  supplies more
doubts than simply justifying a belief in the jealous nature of the Taichiyut:
(1) The Taichiyut did not come as a well-equipped invading force —  
there were only Tarqutai-Kiriltuq and/or his bodyguards (Mong.
kebte ’til).
(2) It is very clear that they came for Temujin alone: "send your elder 
brother Temujin. We don’t need you others!"
(3) In the subsequent description of the escape of Temujin, they chased
after and encircled him. If these Taichiyuts really intended to
exterminate Temujin’s power, the simplest way was to kill him by
setting fire to the hill or shooting him, but they did not.
(4) When the Taichiyuts caught Temujin. they put a cangue on his neck
and had him showed around the camps. This might be explained as an
40 Francis Cleaves, p.25.
47 Genealogical connection, see Chapter Four.
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exhibition of their gains, while it could also be interpreted as education 
to the public of what a shame it was to be a criminal.
(5) Temujin finally escaped when the Taichiyut were having a feast, where 
he was guarded by a weak young man. If Temujin was so dangerous 
as to be a threat to the future of the Taichiyut tribe, he should have 
been kept under a strict watch.
Fifth, although CCL p.2b relates that Temuj in-Mongol got into trouble
with Taichiyut-Mongol from the time of Tarqutai-Kiriltuq and Quril-Bayatur, 
the sons of Adal-Qan, it is surprising to see that in the SH, Tarqutai-Kiriltuq
of the Taichiyuts was acting as a guardian to young Temujin. Tarqutai took 
care of Temujin when he was small and being abandoned in a deserted camp,
he instructed Temujin as if training a two or three years’ old new colt. When
he was caught and was being sent to Temiijin, he plainly spoke that "had I
wished to make him die, would I not have been able to make him die [when
he was young]?"48
All these pieces of evidence deny that the Taichiyuts must have had a 
destructive motivation for this capture.
Regarding Gtir-Qan’s attack of Toyoril, JT  and CCL also suggest that
his motivation was ambition for the Kereit throne49 —  and this is possible
since the Kereit ulus was traditionally under a single rulership, but the
consequence o f his attack against Toyoril proved that Giir-Qan did not have 
a destructive intention. If Giir-Qan’s campaign was motivated by an ambition
to seize the throne, he should have killed this legitimate heir upon his victory,
48 SH  §149, translation by Igor de Rachewiltz, PFEH 13 (1976) p.42.
49 CCL p.48a, Temujin’s message to Toyoril: "previously your uncle Giir-Qan had spoken 
to you: ’[you] did not hand over the throne o f my elder brother Qurjaqus-Buiruq-Qan to me, 
[you] seized it yourself.’" J T p.387 in the same message, Temujin recalled that the Giir-Qan 
said to Toyoril: "you did not give me the place (ja) o f  my elder brother Buiruq-Qan, and my 
two brothers Tai-Temur-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir, you done away both two!" I am doubtful 
o f  the accuracy o f  this message because Tai-Temiir-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir were not Giir- 
Qan’s brothers.
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as Toyorii had done away with his half-brothers, or have pursued him in order 
to exterminate him. He did not. In this way, the attack may be understood as
a punitive attack, like the later Battle of Thirteen Giire’en which put Temujin
to flight. The purpose o f this attack was simply to teach this evil-doing
legitimate young heir a lesson.
Can this also have been the purpose of Taichiyut’s capture of Temujin? 
Tarqutai also had a comment on young Temujin, like Qutula and Giir-Qan’s
comments on young Toyoril. Tarqutai-Kiriltuq mentioned that he looked after 
Temujin like "breaking in" a colt, this description is more or less equivalent
to Qutula-Qan’s description of the punished Toyoril: the setback of a reckless 
mountain ox, or the restraint of a wild ass. These steppe usages are all making 
it clear that the elder kinsmen wished to discipline these young heirs and to 
prevent them from wrong doing —  in this case, killing their half-brothers.
During the lifetime of Toyoril and Temujin, four killing-brother sins 
can be found in the sources. First, Toyoril killed Tai-Temur-Taishi and Buqa- 
Temiir. Although he did this secretly, his uncle acknowledged it and attacked
him as a punishment. Second, Temujin killed Bekter. His mother Ho’elun
was terribly angry about this, and probably the elders of their closest clan
Taichiyut also learnt about this so that they came as kinsmen guardians to 
inflict punishment for this wrong-doing. Third, if  the usage is correct, the
younger brother (Mong. d e ’ii) Taichar was killed by Temujin’s people, this
killing resulting in another punitive attack of a tribal alliance consisting of
thirty thousand men. Fourth, Temujin killed Sacha-Beki and Taichu, the
leaders of the closest elder brother branch to Temujin’s branch in the
genealogy, which is deliberately concealed in the sources. Temujin’s later
seizure of Qasar was stopped in time by their mother,50 or, the four sins
miuht have become five.
50 SH  §244.
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It is difficult to give an evaluation of the murderous mind of Toyoril 
and Temujin. An outsider, in theory, can give a more objective comment on 
these matters. However, to the person who was involved in the power 
struggles, it must have seemed that he acted spontaneously to defend his own 
interest, or to secure his own survival. Ratchnevsky has suggested that "the 
motive for Bekhter’s murder was undoubtedly more fundamental than the mere 
theft o f a fish. TemuchhTs acceptance as head of the family was at stake."51 
Comparing this with Temujin’s thundering seizure of his blood brother Qasar 
after he had been recognised as the steppe Chinggis-Qan —  just because he
heard of a slander from Teb-Tenggeri — , we cannot blame Toyoril for his 
suspicious nature towards his kinsmen, and his anxiety when he heard about
Temujin’s alliance with the Naimans. They were both the eldest among their
brothers and the heir to an exalted position, they reacted in the same manner
and speed when they felt their leadership was under threat. It can hardly be
denied that Temujin and Toyoril did have some "similarities" to Toyoril when 
they were young, although Toyoril appears clever in concealing his intention 
while Temujin just spoke and acted straightforwardly. This resemblance in
personality probably laid a solid ground for the later compact relationship
between Toyoril and Temujin.
III. Expedition to Expel the Kereit Giir-Qan
Regardless of the advice of Qutula-Qan, Yesugei decided to help 
Toyoril to expel Giir-Qan. Yesugei "took with him Qunan52 and Baqaji from 
the Taichiyut", he attacked Giir-Qan at Qurban-Telesiit and sent him into exile 
with twenty or thirty men towards Qashin (Tangyut).53
51 Ratchnevsky, ibid. English translation, p.24.
52 Udur-Qunan in JT  p.387.
53 SH  §177, cf. §150.
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The process of the assistance is given in more detail in CCL and JT, 
which record that the two Taichiyuts came out with Toyoril from Qarayun 
gorge, then they crossed over the plain/valley o f Qara-Buqa (mountain?),54
crossed over * Abja-Buqa(ge’u) mountain, passed through Tuleten-Ttilengut and 
Jensuten-Tulengiit (*Ttileten and *Jensiiten),55 crossed over the top of the 
Gorge,56 and arrived in Guse’iir-Nayur. It was a hard year for the Kereit, 
therefore Yesiigei was able to "exhaust" the nation. When Giir-Qan heard 
about this, he hid at Qurban-Telesiit, where Yesiigei pursued him and forced 
him to flee into the land of Qashin.
The reconstructed route of this expedition reveals how Yesiigei 
strived57 for this campaign. The assistance which Yesiigei had offered to
Toyoril was a long march across central Mongolia, starting from the Qarayun 
gorge on the Selengge river, which was on the northeastern frontier of the 
Kereit realm, passing through the hilly ground to the heartland of Kereit
54 The geographical feature o f  this place is sahra  '(usually "plain") in JT  p.387 or a "valley" 
in CCL  p.48b. The verb used in CCL is "passed over" and in JT  "gudhashta" ("passed"). 
Compared with the following sentence in CCL , Qara-Buqa and *Abja-Buqa (this place is 
missing in JT) were probably the names o f  two mountains, and their valleys. The narrative 
style o f  this paragraph appears to be in parallel pairs in its original Mongolian form, in which 
"Qara-Buqa" pairing "*Abja-Buqa", "TUleten-Tulengu[t]" pairing "Jensuten-TulengQ[t]M.
55 The place names readT’u-leh-t’an-t’u-ling-ku Chan-su-f an-chan-ling-ku in CCZ, pp.48b- 
49a. These two names are not replicated, as some annotators suggest. These two place names 
can be identified with the location o f Toyoril’s Right Wing troops: TWLSWTAN JASWTAN, 
or a variation, TWLWTAN JALWTAN. (JT  p. 112) Apparently they are two different but 
related place names. They are restored in this paragraph as *TUleten and *Jensiiten, following 
the account o f  CCL.
T ’u-ling-ku and Chan-ling-ku in CCL are both presumably to be tulengu[t]. J T p.388 
reads: "bi-mawda‘-i QWLATAN-TWLANKWTY gudhar karda", "passed by the place of 
* T U le te n -T U le n g tt[t]-f  " (v a ria tio n s T W L A T A N -T W L A N K W Y /T W L A B A N -  
TW LANKW QY/*W LATAN-W -DW LA*KW TY). The Chan-ling-ku in CCL could possibly 
to be a copy error which assimilated with the first phoneme o f the previous noun T’u-ling-ku. 
Regarding the transcription in JT, the -t ending o f tiilengii[t] shows that the term is a 
Mongolian noun in the plural. The last /I/ was not a Persian suffix for "one" or to change the 
noun into adjective; it is a Mongolian case marker which is attached to the end o f the noun, 
and it was misread by Rashid al-DTn as a part o f  the place name.
56 JT  p.388, "sar-i BALA-yi QABCHAL gudhashta". "crossed over the height (lit. tall) 
o f the Qabchal (lit. gorge)". The "Ch’iieh-ch’iin Ai" (Ch’iieh-ch’Qn gorge) in CCL p.48b is 
probably the name o f that gorge.
57 JT  p.387 describes "bi-chirlk bar nishast".
51
nation, and then he pursued Giir-Qan southwestward into the territory of 
Tangyut. No wonder Toyoril owed Yestigei-Mongol a great debt.
This campaign provided an important hint of the strength of the 
Mongols at this time. Yesiigei must have possessed a similar strength to the 
Giir-Qan’s so that he could put him to flight. So, how strong were the 
Mongols, when Yesiigei was probably not the single Mongol leader at that 
time? Mongol history before Temujin is vague. This incident in Kereit history 
may help in making certain situations clearer.
The myth of a single leadership 
over the Qabul-Mongol and the Taichiyut-Mongol
Toyoril recovered his throne from his uncle Giir-Qan with assistance 
from the Mongols. The assistance came from Yesiigei, and some Taichiyuts 
who were represented by Qunan and Baqaji.
SH  §57 relates that in the old days, "all the (Qabul-)Mongols and the
Taichiyuts gathered in the Qorqonaq valley by the Onan and made Qutula their 
qan". If  we accept that the Qabul-Mongols and the Taichiyuts had elected 
Qutula-Qan as their jo in t leader, the Taichiyut presence in a campaign
conducted by Qutula-Qan is not surprising. However, apparently Qutula-Qan
did not take part in this attack against Giir-Qan. He even advised Yesiigei not
to fight Giir-Qan for the condemned Toyoril. If the attack was conducted by 
Yesiigei alone, since he could not be the Mongol qan when Qutula was the
qan. and, if we admit that the Qabul-Mongol and the Taichiyut-Mongol were 
under the single leadership of Qutula, then, how could Yesiigei obtain 
Taichiyut's assistance while he was acting against Qutula’s opinion?
If we do not follow this assumption of a single leadership, the image 
that these two branches had been united before Temujin’s era should be 
reconsidered.
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First, it seems that the Taichiyuts did not have a generally recognised 
leader after the death of Hambaqai-Qan and before the death of Qadayan- 
Taishi. JT  p.266 relates that after a period  following the death of Hambaqai-
Qan, his relatives and children and the emirs of the Taichiyut gathered together 
to elect a new ruler (padishah). They were at that meeting for quite a while, 
and had not agreed on anyone. Qadayan-Taishi came down to the plain of 
KWY-Keher, went to the neighbouring Kereit Giir-Qan, and met Giir-Qan at 
KWKABAS QWQANAS.58 They stayed there for ten days. When it was 
time to return, Giir-Qan's hoy orchis (Mong. cook) brought forward a bottle of 
tarasun (Mong. wine). Qadayan-Taishi and his ndkers all drank the wine. His 
nokers threw up afterwards, which probably resulted from over-drinking or
over-eating during those days, but Qadayan-Taishi did not. Qadayan-Taishi 
felt ill afterwards, and since "nothing occurred to the nokers'\ he became 
suspicious that there was lethal poison in the wine. He became sick and died 
in the spring. When the autumn came, the Taichiyuts gathered again to discuss 
the election.
This narration confirms that the Taichiyuts had no general leader after 
the death of Hambaqai-Qan and before the death of Qadayan-Taishi. 
Gatherings for election had been summoned several times, but no agreement 
was reached. However, since Hambaqai had mentioned Qadayan-Taishi when 
demanding revenge/'9 Qadayan-Taishi was apparently acting as a leading
eider among his nine brothers and his kinsmen after the death of Hambaqai- 
Qan.
Qadayan-TaishiTs commanding position in these crises was revealed in 
their warfare with the Merkits. When the Merkit Toqtoya sent a messenger to 
the Taichiyuts demanding a war, Qadayan-Taishi spoke to his Taichiyut 
kinsmen: "It is known to all that my father Hambaqai-Qayan had left 
appointing me to be your leader (bar sar-i shuma) and had made [me] the ruler 
{hakim). It is necessary that when I become the chief and [when] I set off to
ig KWKABAS QWQANAS probably are two versions o f  the same place name.
59 SH  §53.
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that quarter, you should not stay behind and you should not disobey. If  you 
disobey, it is clear that when I, Qadayan-Taishi, am seriously harmed, the 
entire Taichiyut tribe is harmed."60 This preparation for the battle shows that 
although the Taichiyuts had not come to an agreement over the successor to 
Hambaqai, Qadayan had had a voice in important affairs of his tribe, especially 
when a serious threat was ahead.
On the other hand, Qutula seems have been granted a similar
commanding position on another special occasion. JTp.263 relates that when
the news of Hambaqai’s death reached the Mongols, Qadayan-Taishi and 
Todo’en and Yesugei-Bayatur together with the tribes and ulus of
miscellaneous Mongols held a meeting to discuss retribution and retaliation for
his blood. Qutula-Qan had been appointed to be "a qan" (khan?), as a result.
They gave him all the troops and set out in the direction of Khitai.
The event of the election of Qutula-Qan was significant therefore it is 
reported in detail both in JT  and the SH, but the appointment was apparently 
made for a special reason: to march against the powerful Jurchen. This sounds 
more likely to be a position of military commander-in-chief, leading the tribes 
and ulus of "miscellaneous Mongols" in this campaign.
Qutula and Qadayan-Taishi did both participate in the Mongol 
campaign to exact revenge for Hambaqai.61 However, the authority which 
Qutula could exercise over the Taichiyuts may have been limited to this special 
military campaign. Other than on this occasion, no source maintains that 
Qutula had had political or jurisdictional authority which extended outside the 
Qabul-Mongol. Qutula was capable of being a good military leader, his ability 
is reported in JT  to the effect that the sons of Qabul-Qan were all bayaturs,
60 JT  p.259.
61 SH  §58. The SH  recounts that they fought the Tatars while JT  says they marched to 
Khitai.
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but Qutula-Qan was braver and stronger than his brothers.62 Therefore, J T s 
statement that "among the six sons of Qabul-Qan, Qutula-Qan became the ruler 
(padishdh)"63 should be understood as meaning that Qutula had become the 
leader o f Qabul-Mongol, not all the Mongols.
In this way, the avenging campaign of the Mongols under the
leadership of Qutula against the Jurchen may be compared with the battle
between the Taichiyut-Mongol and the Merkits. In the former campaign, the
tribes and ulus of miscellaneous Mongols made Qutula the leader of "whole
Mongol" to fight the Jurchen; in the latter campaign, Qadayan asked the 
miscellaneous branches of Taichiyut to unite under his single leadership to 
defend the "entire clan" from the Merkits.
Summing up the above discussion of the elections and the crises, we
may come to the conclusion that Qadayan-Taishi enjoyed an prominent 
position in the tribal affairs of the Taichiyuts, although he had not been 
recognised formally in the tribe meeting as the successor of Hambaqai-Qan.
On the other hand, Qutula seemed have no voice in the tribal affairs of
Taichiyuts, although he was formally recognised as a leader in the campaign 
to take revenge for the death of the late ruler of Taichiyuts. This analysis 
confirms that the Qabul-Mongol and the Taichiyut-Mongol were not under a 
single leadership at the time of Qutula, except for certain mutual-agreed joint-
force movements.
Since the analysis has confirmed that the Qabul-Mongol and the 
Taichiyut-Mongol were not governed under a single leadership, we may go 
back to examine the Taichiyut participation in the expedition against the Kereit 
Giir-Qan. Since Qutula had no right, or no intention, to summon the 
Taichiyuts to assist Yesiigei in this expedition, another explanation has to be 
supplied.
6: JT  pp.260-261. The sentence is followed by many exaggerated descriptions o f  his 
impressive heroic behaviour.
63 JT  p.260.
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If  we take the puzzling death of Qadayan-Taishi into account, a 
possible, and it seems the only possible explanation which can be extracted is:
some Taichiyut joined Yesiigei"s expedition to attack the Kereit Giir-Qan to 
take revenge for Qadayan-Taishi. The death of an important elder and a great 
warrior was a loss to the entire Taichiyut tribe although he might not be their 
general ruler. It is reasonable to assume that some of the Taichiyut believed 
that the death of Qadayan-Taishi might have involved the Kereit Giir-Qan, 
when Qadayan himself believed that he was poisoned by Giir-Qan’s boy orchis.
These dqd wa m i  then joined Yesiigei to exact revenge, no matter what
Yesiigei’s motivation was.
If this assumption of Taichiyut’s motivation is sensible, this attack
further justifies the view not only that Qutula-Qan had no authority over the
politics of Taichiyut, but that Yesiigei had none either. If Yesiigei did not 
have any authority over the Taichiyuts, then, later when the Taichiyuts 
abandoned Temujin’s family because Ho’elun offended their elders, they ought
not to suffer from u n n ec essa r y  blame and accusations which were levelled at
them by the authors of the available sources.
Ages and dates examined
A reconstruction of early Kereit history up to the defeat of the Kereit 
Giir-Qan also helps in solving some dating problems in Mongol history. This 
part of the discussion concentrates on reconstructing the age of some Mongol 
and Kereit key persons, and on possible dating of certain incidents between the 
1130s and the 1160s. The analysis starts with the dating of two murders.
The Tatar. Mongol and Kereit tribes were great tribes on the steppe, 
and their interaction was frequent throughout medieval history. The earliest 
narration of a Jurchen-Tatar relation which is related in the history of the 
Mongols dated back to the murder of Hambaqai-Qan, and a Jurchen-Tatar 
connection could be found in the murder of the Kereit Qurjaqus-Qan.
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Unfortunately, no exact dating of these incidents is given in the records of 
steppe society.
An inference based on counting the age of Temujin and Toyoril and 
their ancestors by comparing the detailed genealogical data recorded in SH  and 
JT , would help in revealing the possible period of the murders.
First, the birth year of Temujin and the Mongol rulers. The problem 
of the birth year of Temujin must be solved first. Various suggestions of the 
birth year of Temujin have been listed and discussed by Paul Pelliot in his 
renowned annotation of Marco Polo’s The Travels.64 The death year of 
Temujin was no doubt the year of 1227, "Year of Pig". However, as for his 
birth year, Rashid-al-DTn records that it was a Pig year, namely 1155. YS, the 
official history of the Mongol Yuan dynasty records that Temujin died when 
he was sixty-six. and CCL relates that Temujin was forty-two in 1203 (k ’uei- 
hai, a Pig year), and sixty-five in 1226 (ping-hsii, a Dog year).65 Temujin 
appears to be one year younger in CCL than in YS because of the different way 
of counting ages in these two sources. Although YS and CCL are both 
presented in Chinese script, YS is written by Han Chinese so that the age of 
Temujin was counted in the Chinese way, in which a child is one year old 
when he is born, while CCL is merely a translation from an unknown source, 
probably a Mongolian one. The age of Temujin was counted in the original 
of CCL from the time when he was born. Therefore, both sources imply that 
Temujin was born in 1162, a Horse Year. The following age inference will 
be based on the birth year supplied by these Chinese accounts.
According to the age of fecundity and the example of Temujin’s 
marriage, the interval of a generation on the Mongolian steppe in the twelfth 
century can be assumed roughly as fifteen years. If Temujin was born in
64 For the existing suggestions on the birth year o f Temujin, see Notes on Marco Polo, vol
1, pp.281-288.
65 CCL p.65b and p.97b.
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1162, since he was the eldest son of Yesiigei, Yesiigei must have been bom no
later than 1147. Yesiigei was the third son of Bartan-Bayatur, therefore Bartan 
must have been born at least by 1130. Bartan was the second son of Qabul- 
Qan, Qutula the fourth son and Todo’en-Otchigin the seventh son,66 therefore, 
Qabul must have been born at least by 1114. According to J T  s account of 
Hambaqai’s capture, Hambaqai went to the Tatars with Todo’en-Otchigin.67 
As a companion, Todo’en cannot not have been too young during this visit and 
when Hambaqai was captured. Supposing Todo’en was fifteen at the time of 
the capture, the year of Hambaqai’s visit would be no later than 1136. From 
this age inference based on Mongol genealogy, Hambaqai’s capture must have 
happened no later than 1136 and possibly in the first half of 1130s. This date 
coincides with the founding period of the Chin regime and the beginning of a 
friendly attitude on the part of the Tatars towards the Jurchen.
A Chinese account shows that the Tatars and the Jurchen regime began 
to have a good relationship at least from 1132. In this account, a general of 
the former Liao regime (Khitai) called Yeh-Lu Yii-Tu fled from Jurchen rule 
on the pretext of hunting. He went into the country of Hsia (Tangyut), the 
Hsia people asked him how many soldiers he had brought, he replied that he
had a bodyguard of two or three hundred. Because of this, the Hsia people did 
not accept him. He then went to the Ta-Tan (Tatars). The Tatars had received 
a secret order before his arrival, so that the leader pretended to welcome him 
and provided food in a tent, but sent soldiers to encircle him secretly at the 
same time. "The Tatars are good at shooting. [As he] had not got any armour, 
Yu-Tu went out to defend [himself]. Unable to counter [the arrows], both the 
father and sons were killed."68
66 Follows the genealogy in the SH. JT  has a different version o f their kinship relations.
67 Detail quoted in Chapter Six.
68 Hung Hao, Sung-mo chi-wen, p,2ab. Yeli-Lii Yu-Tu was called Yti-tu-ku in this 
account, and his name appeared in the Annals o f CS also his biography in CS  as Yeh-Lu Yii- 
Tu. The story is recorded in the most detail in Sung-mo chi-wen. Yeh-Lii Yii-Tu fled in the 
ninth month o f  the tenth T’ien-Huei year (1132), and he and his children were killed by a 
tribal leader called T’u-ku-ssu in the eleventh month o f the same year, that should be at the
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This evidence suggests that the Tatars were acting on behalf of the 
Jurchen interest against a fugitive from the Jurchen regime in 1132. Going 
back to an earlier record, the Tatars had presented sheep in front of the 
headquarters of a Jurchen commander in 1127.69 This could be a gesture of 
paying homage and this event took place five years earlier than their execution 
o f the Yeh-Lu fugitive. These accounts reveal that the Tatars submitted to the 
Chin regime soon after the Jurchens had consolidated their power in northern 
China in 1125. This dating of their relationship is useful in fixing the dating 
of the captures and murders of the Kereit Marqus-Qan and the Mongol 
Hambaqai-Qan.
Second, the birth year of Toyoril and the Kereit rulers. As for Kereit 
chronology, it is not systematically recorded in the sources, hence the 
following reconstruction is based on the genealogy revealed in historical
events. First, the birth year of Toyoril. A possible birth year of Toyoril can 
be restored from the age of his daughter. Toyoril had given a daughter to the 
Merkit Toqtoya when he was forced to flee by his uncle Giir-Qan. Toyoril 
must have been at least sixteen at the time since he had a daughter to be
betrothed. The possible birth year of this daughter could be restored from the 
age of her son Chilayun: when Toyoril attacked the Merkits in 1198, he 
brought the son born of his daughter and the people belonging to him to 
submission. Supposing that this Chilayun was at least fifteen (possessing 
people of his own) when he submitted to his maternal grandfather, he must
have been born no later than 1183. If this was so, his mother, Toyoril’s 
daughter, must have been born at least by 1168. Consequently, Toyoril must 
have been born no later than 1153.
turn o f  1 132.33. See CS 3 chi 3 p.64 and 133 chuan 71 his biography.
69 The event is recorded in Chien-Yen t ’ung-wen-lu by Fu Fang(/P’ang), which is quoted 
and thereupon preserved in San-ch 'ao pei-m eng huei-pien vol 110. It relates that on the fifth 
day o f  the seventh month o f the first Chien-Yen year (1127), Fu was acting as the envoy o f  
Sung regime to visit the Chin regime. The Jurchen commander received Fu in his audience 
room, in front o f  the envoys from Ta-Tan (Tatar) and Hei-Shuei nations. The tribal envoys 
were allowed to sit on felt as the Jurchen officials, but Fu seemed to have knelt when replying 
to questions. Yeh-LU Yii-Tu was among the Jurchen officials that day. (p.3b)
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The birth year of Toyoril can also be restored from the age of his 
grandson. Temujin had proposed to marry his eldest daughter Qojin-Beki to
the son of Senggtim (the grandson of Toyoril). Supposing that Qojin-Beki was 
born soon after Temujin’s marriage,70 the birth year of Qojin-Beki would be 
1178. Yesiigei had arranged a bride for Temujin who was one year older than 
Temujin, therefore, assuming that the age of Toyoril’s grandson was similar 
to Qojin-Beki’s, he must have been bom around 1178 if he was the eldest. In 
this way, Senggiim must have been born by 1163, and Toyoril must have been 
born no later than 1148 whether Senggiim was his first child or not.
Toyoril was killed in 1203 and he must have been over fifty-five at that 
time if he was born no later than 1148. This age of death fits Tayang- 
Naiman’s description o f Toyoril as an "old” qan when he was killed.71
In the light of this evidence, let us assume that Toyoril was bom no 
later than 1148. According to this assumption, since Toyoril was the eldest 
son of his father qan Qurjaqus, Qurjaqus must have been bom by 1133;
Qurjaqus’s father Marqus must have been born no later than 1118. Marqus
could not have been captured and executed before Qurjaqus was bom,
therefore, the possible dating of his murder should be placed after 1133.
The capture of Marqus could not have happened too late, either.
Marqus is not seen in the accounts of Alchi-Tatar’s invasion during the Kereit
Sariq-Qan period. According to JT , the young Toyoril was left behind with
his mother while his father Qurjaqus fled with Sariq-Qan to Betekin during this
invasion. If  Toyoril was born around 1148, according to the above evidence 
and inferences, the disappearance (more or less, death) of Marqus should be
dated between the 1130s and the 1140s. This period also fits into the supposed
friendly period of Jurchen-Tatar relations, moreover, it coincides with the
possible period of the capture of Hambaqai.
70 Qojin was the eldest among Temujin’s children, JT  p. 164.
71 SH  §189.
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Chinese researcher Feng Ch’eng-Chiin pointed out that a tribal leader 
called Mo-ku-ssu in a Chinese account was probably the Kereit Marqus.72 
This Mo-ku-ssu was captured by a Khitai general, and was delivered to and 
executed by the Khitai Liao court in 1100. If Mo-ku-ssu was Marqus, Toyoril 
could have been bom much earlier, but not so early as the 1100s, or he would 
have been over a hundred years old when he was killed.73 Since Temujin
died at sixty-six, if we allow that the death of Toyoril was at a similar age, 
Toyoril would have been born between the 1130s and the 1140s.
Third, the dating of the murders and other incidents. Could the 
captures of Hambaqai and Marqus have happened near to each other in timing? 
There is evidence to show that the murderers of both qans could have been 
from the same group o f Tatars. The Tatars who Hambaqai had visited were 
called Aviriyut-Buiruyut Tatar in JT  and SH  §53. SH  supplies that these 
Tatars lived between Buvur-Nayur and Kolen-Nayur. As for the incident 
relating to the Kereit Marqus-Buiruq-Qan, J T p.l 15 mentions that the head of
Tatar "rulers" at the time was called Nayur-Buiruq-Qan, yurted at Buyur- 
Nayur. The accounts at least confirm that a group of Tatars at Buyur-Nayur 
was active at the time of Mongol Hambaqai-Qan and Kereit Marqus-Qan, and 
these qans were seized by these Tatars.
In summary, the possible dating of the incidents relating to Marqus and 
Hambaqai in the 1130s and 1140s justifies a close dating for these two 
incidents. Taking with account the fact that the Tatars were in a subservient 
relationship to the Jurchen at least since the 1130s, as well as the possibility
11 Feng. "Liao Chin pei-pien pu-tsu k’ao", pp. 191-192, in his Hsi-yii nan-hai shih ti k'ao- 
cheng lun-chu huei~chi.
73 But if  Marqus was executed by the Khitai ruler, Toyoril’s later flight to Qara-Khitai, 
the direct descendant o f  the Khitai ruling family in China, and seeking for protection would 
appear illogical. This situation is different from Temujin’s acceptance o f  the Jurchen 
title/position when Hambaqai was executed by the Jurchen. Hambaqai was the leader o f the 
Taichiyut-Mongol, not a direct ancestor o f the descendants o f Qabul-Mongol, and Temujin had 
been disconnected from the Taichiyuts for at least fifteen years before he accepted this title. 
The Kereit tribe was under a single leadership, and Marqus, Sariq, Qurjaqus, Toyoril are 
supposed to have come from the same line o f the ruling family.
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that the same Tatar group carried out the capture, the murders could be most 
plausibly be dated in the 1130s.
Apart from fixing the dating of the murders, the inference about ages 
also helps to place the early events in Mongol and Kereit history in a more 
convincing chronological sequence. In Kereit history, the death of Qurjaqus
serves as the key date for Toyoril’s murdering of his half-brothers and Giir- 
Qan’s confrontation with Toyoril. Toyoril could not have been too small 
when he was plotting against his half-brothers, also, as related above, he gave 
his daughter to the Merkit ruler in marriage when his uncle sought revenge for 
his murdering of the half-brothers. On the other hand, Qurjaqus married the 
Betekin princess when Toyoril was thirteen. The children born to this princess 
must have been at least in their teens when Toyoril plotted against them. 
Therefore. Qurjaqus probably died during Toyoril’s late twenties and no earlier 
than the early 1160s, and the punitive attack and the offering of marriage must
have taken place in the 1160s,
So, the reign of the Kereit Qurjaqus-Qan can be estimated. Qurjaqus 
could not have ascended to the throne before the death of Marqus, therefore, 
he would probably have become the ruler of the Kereits in the late 1130s to 
1140s, and have reigned until the 1160s. Although the gap cannot be narrowed 
down any further, it shows that the Kereit enjoyed some two decades of peace 
during this period: their Betekin in-laws were strong enough to protect the 
Kereit ulus from further Tatar invasions. Also because of the Betekin 
influence, the Kereit ulus fell into chaos again with qanship struggles, after the 
death of Qurjaqus.
The situation of Sariq-Qan remains unclear. It seems that he disagreed 
with the Betekin ruler later because he refused to hand over some Mongols. 
He seems to have wandered around Dalan-Dabas in Mongolia in poverty, 
(driven into exile?) According to his obscure suggestions to the Mongols, he 
was in such a situation that he was "distanced" by the Betekin in-laws or 
Qurjaqus, who had an in-law relationship with the Betekins, probably he was
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also unhappy with the Betekin Elchitei who took Toyoril’s mother ’YLMH 
khatun, and he warned the Mongols not to go into mountainous areas.74 This
legendary person is interesting and can be studied as a separate topic.
In the light of these datings in Kereit history, certain events in Mongol
history can also be fixed in chronology. Toyoril sought assistance from 
Yesiigei to expel his uncle Giir-Qan in the 1160s, therefore, the expedition
against Giir-Qan could have happened in the 1160s. If this was so, the death
of Qadayan-Taishi, which must have happened before Giir-Qan had been put 
to flight, must have taken place in this period. Since Hambaqai died in the
1130s and Qadayan died in the 1160s, this makes clear that the anarchy of the 
Taichiyut leadership must have lasted for at least two decades. As for the 
Qabul-Mongol, Yesiigei was apparently strong in the 1160s. His strength was
not only demonstrated in his expedition to expel the Kereit Giir-Qan, swearing
cmcki with the new Kereit ruler when he was not the Mongol ruler —  he
fought the Tatars as well: Temujin was born in 1162 when Yesiigei returned
from a victorious battle with the Tatars. These events reveal a strong Qabul-
Mongol in the 1130s to 1160s.
*  *  =t= *
The above reconstruction of Kereit history and their relation to Mongol 
history sketches a clearer picture of the history of Mongolia in the mid-twelfth 
century. As for the Tatar tribe at Buyur-Nayur, after the establishment of the 
Jurchen regime in China, the Tatars submitted to them and had a good 
relationship with them from at least late 1120s. In addition to their customary 
steppe warfare, the Tatars also acted as an agent for the Jurchen to supervise 
the movement of steppe tribes. As a result of their behaviour, the Tatars had 
executed a Khitan fugitive, also captured and handed over the Mongol 
Hambaqai-Qan and the Kereit Marqus-Qan to their overlord in the south. 
These seizures of tribal leaders caused chaos in the leadership or social life of
74 JT  pp.92-93.
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the Mongols and the Kereits, and the fighting between the Tatars and these 
tribes never stopped.
Regarding the general situation in central Mongolia, the Qabul-Mongols 
were strong and powerful in the 1160s during the time of Qutula-Qan when the 
Kereit tribe fell into chaos because of a struggle in the rulership, while the 
Taichiyut-Mongols were also in a leadership anarchy because of the lack of a 
generally recognised tribal leader. Princes were struggling with each other,
and they never completed the election of a new qan before they were annexed 
by Temujin.75
As for the future Chinggis-Qan, Temujin was born at the peak of 
Qabul-Mongol’s supremacy. His father had a sworn-brother friendship with 
the Kereit ruler and military strength to fight the Tatars. Temujin inevitably 
enjoyed a glorious and honourable childhood because of the glory of his father, 
until another Tatar attempt which resulted in the murder of Yesiigei, and the 
separation of the Taichiyuts which resulted from his mother’s offensive 
behaviour.
75 Details o f  their disagreement, see Chapter Four section II (iii).
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Chapter Two
The Second Dethronement of Toyoril
According to available evidence, Toyoril had been driven into exile 
twice: first by his uncle Giir-Qan, later by the Naiman force which backed
Toyoril’s rival younger brother Erke-Qara. The study in Chapter One of the 
first interruption of Toyoril’s rulership over the Kereit ulus uncovered not only
a passage of dramatic Kereit history, but also some significant aspects of
unexplicit Mongol history since Qutula and Yesiigei were related. In this
chapter, another attempt is made to investigate the history of the other severe
interruption of Toyoril’s qanship, which was crucially related to the 
establishment of Toyoril-Temujin mutual-assistance, in order to unveil the 
obscure situation in Mongolia after 1160s and before 1196. This period might 
be regarded as the period of preparation for Temiijin’s triumph, although recent 
researchers did not focus on this topic sufficiently because of the confusion in 
the relevant written accounts.
The failure to provide a comprehensive study of the history of these 
three decades is essentially a result o f the lack of exact dating of the principal 
events. The earliest explicit dating supplied in CCL is jen-hsii, which should 
be 1202, in which year Temujin attacked the Alchi-Tatars and Chaqayan- 
Tatars.1 In the SH, the earliest dating takiya-jil (the Year of Hen) is 1201, 
when Jamuqa was being elected Giir-Qan.2 Rashid al-DIn wrote clearly that 
the early history of Temujin before bars yU (the Year of Tiger, 1194, y il = 
jil) could not be reckoned year by year,3 and the first explicit dating he 
supplied in the "History of Chmgglz-Khan" is the spring of lu iy il, the Year
1 CCL p.38a.
2 SH  §141.
3 JT  p.325.
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of Dragon (1196) in which Toyoril returned from his western exile.4 
Although many stories of Temujin’s life before 1196 can be found in the 
sources, they could not be dated. In this way, the early development of 
Temujin’s career could not be traced.
With the help of a reconstruction of Kereit history of this period, it is 
possible to arrange those events in order. Even when the analysis below could 
not provide an exact dating for each important incident, a narrowed down 
possible dating has been worked out. Combined with a separate discussion on 
Temujin’s early life in Chapter Four, which is based on the Mongol 
perspective, a general picture of the situation of Mongolia up to 1196, before 
Temujin reached his thirties, can be revealed.
The following examination weaves in a tortuous way because of the 
complexity of accounts and argument but it will stick to three principles: (1) 
to find out the most acceptable account among the contradictory ones; (2) to 
work out the significance of certain incidents which would be useful in 
understanding the situation of the Mongolian steppe and the Mongols’ 
encounters with peripheral nations; (3) to establish an acceptable sequence of 
these crucial events through comparison, which helps to reconstruct Kereit and 
Mongol history during this period.
I. Preliminary work
Before beginning an overall discussion of the Kereit-Temiijin
relationship during Toyoril’s second dethronement, a preliminary fact and a 
rough dating should be verified: who was in which incident, and when did the
dethronement take place?
4 JT  p.363. Rashid al-DTn supplied the same dating in the Brief Chronicle at the end o f  
the "History o f  Chlngglz-Khan", but the 1195 events in the Brief Chronicle present a dating 
problem. See discussion below. JT  p.572.
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Who was in which incident
The story of Toyoril’s first dethronement has been reconstructed in 
Chapter One: Giir-Qan made Toyoril flee because of his murder of his half- 
brothers Tai-Temtir-Taishi and Buqa-Temiir, then Yesiigei helped Toyoril to 
expel the Giir-Qan despite the opposite advice from Qutula-Qan. According
to the dating examination in the last section of Chapter One, this incident must 
have happened during the reign of the Mongol Qutula-Qan and in the lifetime 
of Yesiigei.
Subsequently, while the exact and relative timing is also obscure,
Toyoril’s younger brother, Erke-Qara, went to the Naimans. Then the 
Naimans marched against Toyoril and made him flee. This is the second 
dethronement of Toyoril. All the relevant accounts of this incident record that 
it was Temujin who helped Toyoril to fight the Naimans and restored his 
rulership, except for two accounts in JT.
JT  p.118 says that Yesiigei helped Toyoril to expel Erke-Qara and
Temujin helped Toyoril to expel the Giir-Qan. The other account on p. 119 
says that because Yesiigei expelled the Giir-Qan, Toyoril and he became anda;
another time he5 recovered the country from Erke-Qara and gave it to him.
Then, who was the Mongol assistant in recovering the Kereit ulus for Toyoril
from the Naimans?
These seems no doubt that the above two paragraphs were mistaken,
according to extensive supporting evidence in CCL and SH, also another
account in JT  which related that at the time when the Naimans attacked
Toyoril and made him flee, Yesiigei was dead. JT  pp.362-363 explains the
whole situation from a Kereit perspective. It relates that when the Naiman
Inanch-Qan (/Inalch) attacked Toyoril to make him flee, "YisugaT-Bahadur 
was dead at that time". Then, Toyoril passed through three wilayats to take
5 Subject is not specified. Verbs are in past tense, singular.
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shelter under the ruler of Turldstan, the Qara-Khitai Giir-Qan. That wildyat 
as well as the Uighur and Tangyut towns had fallen into disorder at that time, 
he became rebellious and left. His career reached the lowest ebb, he had come
to a situation in which he had to survive with only five goats and two or three 
camels. When he heard about the rise to power of Temujin, he decided to 
come to him. He finally arrived in Giise’iir-Nayur in the spring of a Dragon 
Year (1196), and sent two ndkers to Temujin to report that he was coming.
From this account, we can tell that the second dethronement and the
following restoration of Toyoril were absolutely unconnected to any assistance 
from Yesiigei, but solely from Temujin. This contradiction of different
accounts in the same source reminds researchers that the comparative reliability
of a source should not transcend the importance of a close study of every
passage on an individual basis, especially in the study of Mongol history at the
turn of the thirteenth century.
Possible period of the dethronement
To focus the following discussion better, the possible period of 
Toyoril’s second dethronement needs to be narrowed down. In the following 
discussion, the period has been set roughly between 1181/82 to 1196.
The second dethronement of Toyoril and his exile in the west no doubt 
took place in the time of Temujin according to the confirmation of the initial
discussion. The date of the end of his exile is given by the sources definitely
as 1196, therefore, the task left is to calculate a possible starting date of his
dethronement. A close look into a series of events of the early life of Temujin
may help to further narrow down the possible period of this dethronement.
JT  and CCL do not have many accounts regarding the early life of
Temujin. Moreover, even in some of the recorded passages such as the
desertion by the Taichiyuts or Battle of Thirteen Giire’en, no exact date or his 
age is given. Therefore, in the study of Temujin’s life before his thirties, we
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must rely mainly upon the SH, which supplies many accounts of Temujin’s 
private life behind or beside his heroic public image. These personal stories 
are specially valuable when they are related to his age, by which means we 
may set up a sequence of those accounts.
First, according to the above mentioned JT  account, the second 
interruption of Toyoril’s regime must have occurred after the death of Yesiigei. 
Putting the YS age of Temujin and the SH  story of the death of Yesiigei 
together, according to which Temujin was born in 1162 and his father died 
when he was nine or shortly afterwards, Yesiigei must have been murdered in 
around 1171/72.
Then. Toyoril appeared for the first time in the SH, in which account,
he received a present from Temujin, and agreed to gather his scattered people
for him.6 Temujin’s submissive gesture to Toyoril and Toyoril’s promise to
Temujin showed that Toyoril enjoyed considerable power and noble status at 
that time —  the most likely position would be the ruler of the Kereit ulus.
Since the present, a black sable coat, was a dowry from the Qonggirats on
Temujin’s marriage when he was fifteen years old, Toyoril must have been 
living a stable and steady life at least up to 1177/78.
The second Toyoril-Temujin encounter came when Temujin’s wife, 
Borte, was abducted by the Merkits. Two different stories can be found in the 
sources, the one in SH  §104 tells us that Temujin appealed to Toyoril for his 
military help to rescue Borte, while in JT  Toyoril was in an ambiguous 
position in that the Merkits had sent Borte to him as a present (see Chapter 
One). No matter which account is nearer to the truth, at least both of them 
show that Toyoril was involved in this incident, and he was in power at this 
time. The abduction of Borte must have happened at least two or three years
after Borte married Temujin, since Borte’s eldest son Jochi was born on her 
way back home after this incident and before Jochi, Borte had given birth to
6 SH  §96.
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a girl.7 Therefore, by calculating the possible date of the Borte incident, 
Toyoril must still have been enjoying a high status in around 1179/80.
Subsequently, after a successful attack against the Merkits, Temujin 
stayed together with Jamuqa for one and a half years, then Temujin decided 
to separate from him. With the support of his followers, Temujin became their
qan (the Qan of Qabul-Mongol, see Chapter Four). Temujin informed Toyoril 
about his ascendancy, and Toyoril was happy to hear that.8 Supposing the 
election took place immediately after Temujin’s separation from Jamuqa and 
Temujin informed Toyoril at once, this appearance of Toyoril should not be 
dated earlier than 1181/82. In this account, Toyoril seemed in a normal 
condition, with no sign of interruption to his regime.
Toyoril is not seen in the sources afterwards until his return from the 
west except for a mistaken account which alleged that Toyoril had joined with 
Temujin in the latter’s attack against the Tatar Megiijin-Se’tiltti. (see the 
duration of his exile below) In that case, what had happened to the Kereit 
ulus, or Toyoril’s regime, between 1181/82 and 1196?
II. The Kereit relationship with Temujin during the dethronement and the exile
This section continues the examination of Kereit-Temujin relations 
during Toyoril5s second dethronement and exile, which is helpful in 
establishing a more precise possible period for this incident, also in revealing
the unexplicit history of Temujin’s early life in which the turning points of his 
strength-building had taken place.
The purpose of this section is to arrange some undated Kereit-Temujin 
events in order. A definite suggestion for the dating of certain crucial
7 JT  p .164. Qojin-Beki was the elder sister o f Jochi.
8 SH  §§118-126, special notice in §118 (one and a half years) and §126 (Toyoril).
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incidents will be made in section III where some "foreign” evidence will be
compared with the Kereit-Temujin story restored in this section. The
restoration is basically a series of assumptions made to link up several
incidents in spite of the scarcity of evidence. The incidents to be related in
this section are four: the second dethronement of Toyoril, the Battle of 
Thirteen Giire’en, Jaya-Gambu’s journey to the regions of Tangyut and Jayut 
(JAW’QWT), and the significance of Temujin’s obtaining the Jayut-Quri title 
from the Jurchen commander. These assumptions are intended to link up the
events and the three suggestions are, first, Toyoril had been dethroned before 
Temujin was under attack in the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en; second, the
odyssey of Jaya-Gambu showed his attempt to find a strong protector for his 
personal security; third, Jaya-Gambu and Toyoril terminated their odyssey or 
exile and came to Temujin at last because the power and status of Temujin was 
recently confirmed by the Jurchen super power.
The discussion falls into two parts. The first parts discusses all aspects 
in the first phase of the course of this Kereit chaos, concentrates on its 
connection with a Mongol battle: the battle of Thirteen Giire’en, also how the 
consequences of the battle affected the temporary severance of the Kereit- 
Temujin relationship. The second part discusses all aspects related to the 
second phrase of the interruption, mainly a change in Temujin’s situation 
which concluded the exile of the Kereit royalty.
(i) Connections between Toyoril’s second dethronement and the Battle of 
Thirteen Gtire’en
The Battle of Thirteen Giire’en was a punitive attack against Temujin 
by a league of Mongol tribes9 because one of Temujin’s subjects had killed 
Jamuqa’s tribesman Taichar. As a result, Temujin was put to flight, and such
9 For detailed discussion o f the significance o f this battle in Temujin’s career as the second 
punitive attack he suffered because o f  his wrong doing, see Chapter Four. The league was 
made up o f  the tribes/clans o f Taichiyut, Ikires, Uruyut, Noyakin, Barulas, Bayarin, and 
Jamuqa. These were all Mongols. CCL pp.5a-6a.
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a disgraceful experience was deliberately concealed, or even put in reverse, in 
most of the relevant accounts.
This battle seemed to be simply a conflict between some Mongols and 
Temujin, a totally internal affair of the Mongol tribe —  and irrelevant to the 
Kereits. It is true that no evidence suggests that there was any relation 
between the nature, cause and result of the battle and the dethronement of 
Toyoril. However, some "participators" in Temujin’s camp during this purely 
Mongol conflict hinted that an untold turmoil might have happened in the
Kereit ulus before the battle was fought; moreover, the consequences of this 
battle also included a series of "journeys" of an important Kereit prince, Jaya- 
Gambu.
The argument starts with a confirmation of dating that the Battle of 
Thirteen Giire’en cannot have been fought before 1181/82 by a study of the 
life of Temujin. Then follows the main argument that Toyorif s dethronement 
could be related with the battle in a chronological sense, by discussing an event
which "did not happen" and the curious appearance of the Tiimen-Tubegeyits,
a branch of the Kereit tribe, and a Kereidei, presumably the same person as
Jaya-Gambu, in Temujin’s camp in this battle. To support this argument, two 
sub-examinations have been made, to justify this appearance of Jaya-Gambu 
by an examination of the motivation of his odyssey, and to conclude that
Toyoril’s regime was surely overthrown before the battle by an analysis of his 
strength and the dispersion of the Kereit people.
First, a sequence question. In JT  and CCL, the description of this battle 
follows after Temujin’s family was deserted by the Taichiyuts. The SH  puts 
the description of this battle later after Temujin separated from Jamuqa and 
became the leader of Qabul-Mongol; unfortunately, there is no indication of the 
length of the interval.
When was this battle fought? From the evidence of multi-clan 
composition and the thirty thousand manpower strength of both camps, this
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battle cannot have been fought in Temujin’s early teens immediately after the
desertion of the Taichiyuts since his family and he himself were so weak and 
isolated. On the other hand, the sequence of the stories supplied by the SH
seems more reasonable: Temujin’s break-up with Jamuqa and being elected as
the Qabul-Mongol Qan justified the termination of the Jamuqa-Temiijin
friendship and a multi-clan composition of Temujin’s supporters which fought
for Temujin in this battle. If we follow S H s accounts of these events, the
Battle of Thirteen Giire’en cannot have been fought before 1181/82.
A detailed discussion of the significance of this dating in Temujin’s
career, that is that the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en was fought after Temujin was
twenty years old, can be found in Chapter Four. The reason I relate this
analysis of Temujin-Mongol here is a coincidence of dating from Kereit
history: 1181/82 is also the last available date suggesting the existence of the
Toyoril-Kereit regime. Can there have been any connection partially relating 
Toyoril’s dethronement to Temujin’s Battle of Thirteen Giire’en? If there was 
any, another sequence question must be asked: which event happened earlier?
The examination starts by looking into an event which did not happen. 
Taking all Toyoril’s appearances from 1177/78 to 1181/82 into consideration, 
Toyoril and Temujin were on friendly terms for several years —  Temujin 
acted as a subordinate, and Toyoril was in a caring position in this relationship. 
Then, a doubt arose: it is curious to see that Temujin did not ask Toyoril for 
military assistance or negotiation or whatever in this battle, and not even a 
single piece of evidence suggests that Temujin had ever thought about sending 
a messenger to Toyoril about this battle.
One may argue that this was warfare among the Mongols, in which
Toyoril could not intercede, or, that the unexpected attack did not allow 
Temujin to inform Toyoril in time, or, that Temujin really had not thought of 
turning to Toyoril. However, there is still one among all these possibilities 
which should not be eliminated: Toyoril himself might have been in serious 
trouble as well —  he was not able to offer any help to Temujin.
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The fact that some Kereits appeared in Temujin’s defensive troop is an 
additional hint. Some Kereit tribesmen including the younger brother of 
Toyoril, Jaya-Gambu, were fighting for Temujin in this Mongol warfare.
First, the Kereit tribesmen. Some tribesmen of the Tumen-Ttibegeyit, 
which is a branch of the Kereit people, were probably under Temujin’s 
command in this battle. In CCL p.8b, a wing of Temujin’s troop was made 
up of
San-ha-ch’u-lai (Sem-Qachula)’s son Pen-f a-ch’u-pa-tu 
(Btiltechu-Bayatur), t ’u-pu-ke-yi-tim (?) Mu-hu-erh-hao-lan 
(Muqur-Quran) in charge of A-erh-ta-chin (* Ardagin, = Adargin 
= (H)adargin) ...
Biiltechu-bayatur was the son of Sem-Qachula who was related to Qabnl-Qan, 
and Muqur-Quran was the clan leader of the Hadargin, a Mongol tribe.10 The
incomprehensible term "f u-pu-ke-yi-tun" can only be identified when we
compare this account with the third wing in JT  p.329, which reads:
Btiltechu-Bayatur from the offsprings of Sem-Qachula11 [who
was] the elder brother of Qabul-Qan, (?) who are a branch of
the Kereit [tribe], with the tribe of Hadarkin that their leader
was Muqur-Quran ...
There must be a phrase or a clause missing where I placed a question mark
because the offspring of Sem-Qachula would not be "a branch of the Kereit
[tribe]". Furthermore, to mention there was "a branch of the Kereit [tribe]" in
Temujin’s troop sounds so astonishing that researchers will at first doubt the
accuracy of this record. However, if we read the incomprehensible "t’u-pu-ke-
yi-tun" in CCL as "f u-pu-ke-yit(-un)" (*Tubugeyit-un, = Ttibegeyit-tin), which
in Mongolian grammar means "Tubegeyit’s", the two confusions can
10 yrp.201.
n The script in JT  p.329 is SM-SCHWLH, SH  §48 Sem-Sechiile. However, comparison 
with its variations SM-QAJWLY/SM-QAJYWN/(?)M-TAHW(?)Y/SMM-QAJWLY/SM- 
QA JW(?)Y/(?)M-QAHWLY and CCL San-ha-ch’u-lai, suggests that the first consonant o f  the 
second part o f his name is more likely to be /q/. The feminine form o f  /q/ ( ^ ) in Mongolian 
script is possible to be misread as /s/ ) especially in handwriting.
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compensate each other and the missing clause then can be reconstructed as 
"[somebody] of the Ttibegeyit". In this way, the sentence is made intelligible, 
i.e. that the third wing was made up of Bultechu-Bayatur, somebody (name 
missing) of the Tubegeyits where the Ttibegeyit was a branch of the Kereits,
and some Hadargin under Muqur-Quran.
How did it come about that the people from a Kereit branch, or at least 
part of them, was in attendance to and under the command of Temujin?
The "Kereidei"
Another unidentified person in the seventh wing of Temujin’s troop in 
this battle is Kereidei (KRAYDAY), who is only mentioned in JT , not in CCL 
and the SH. It is perilous to identify this person with Jaya-Gambu on the 
grounds that Jaya-Gambu was formerly called Kereidei and the other Kereideis 
mentioned in JT  can all be identified with Jaya-Gambu. However, it is also 
too arbitrary to deny his presence in Temujin’s camp because Kereidei is not 
mentioned in the relevant accounts in CCL and the SH.
A few words regrading the usage in the sources shall be mentioned 
before continuing the discussion. It is a general feature that many of the key 
persons have been referred throughout the sources in their later honourable 
titles rather than their proper name, such as Temujin was Chinggis-Qan no
matter how young he was, and Toyoril Ong-Qan receives the same treatment. 
Apparently, their names in the accounts of the events before they received the 
title had been amended subsequently by the narrator: they were replaced with 
their later titles.
In the case of Jaya-Gambu, I would like to point out that although the 
Kereidei in the battle of Thirteen Giire’en might be Jaya-Gambu or might not 
be him, we cannot not deny the possibility that he was him, since the account 
of the participators in Temujin’s camp in CCL and JT  was in confusion. The 
above reconstruction of the Kereit elements in Temujin’s camp already showed
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how severe the confusion was. The narrator might not be absolutely sure of 
the identity of this Kereidei —  and there are many more unidentified proper 
names in this account —— so that he left this name "unreplaced". If this was 
the way, the account is extremely valuable in confirming that the battle was
fought before Jaya-Gambu went to the Tangyut nation; however, no one can 
be sure of that. Therefore, I take another approach to confirm his presence in 
Temtijin’s camp by a suggestion on the motivation of his travelling whereas 
the argument will be much stronger than putting all one’s faith in a feeble 
equation: "this Kereidei must be Jaya-Gambu because he was formerly called 
Kereidei".
Come back to the discussion. Jaya-Gambu is another mysterious 
eminent figure in the sources besides Jamuqa. Not only because his father-in-
law relationship to Temiijin's offspring made him impossible to be ignore, his
relation to the Tangyut nation is also mysterious as is the reversal of his 
attitude to his elder brother Toyoril, which has been related in Chapter One. 
One of the puzzles to be examined here is a series of his travels outside the
Kereit ulus before the end of 1196.
Was the Kereidei in this battle Jaya-Gambu? I assume that he was, by 
a study of the motivation of a series of travel of Jaya-Gambu.
In the sources, Jaya-Gambu seemed to have been travelling outside the 
Kereit territory in a certain period. He had appeared in Temiijin’s camp, the 
Tangyut nation and the Jayut region. The former was in Mongolia but 
definitely not in the Kereit territory, and the latter two were outside Mongolia.
If these travels are to be studied, a fundamental question comes first: why did 
not Jaya-Gambu stay in the Kereit ulus?
No clear solution to this doubt could be found in the sources. A
reconstruction of the sequence of the places he visited might reveal the reason.
A possible reconstruction is: Jaya-Gambu had first appeared in Temujin’s 
camp, if this Kereidei was him, then he came to the Tangyut nation where he
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obtained his Tangyut title "Jaya-Gambu". Afterwards, he went on to the Jayut 
region which was the northern borderland of Jurchen China, and at last, he
returned to Mongolia in 1196 and joined Temujin again.
This event sequence is reconstructed with the following inferences. 
First, for the sequence of his stay in Temujin’s camp and the Tangyut nation:
(1) Jaya-Gambu is not supposed to have obtained his Tangyut title before 
he had arrived in the Tangyut nation;
(2) His Tangyut title could not have become his "well-known name" before 
he obtained it, and the previous account of his life must have been
recorded in his original name Kereidei;
(3) If Jaya-Gambu was still well-known as Kereidei during the time of 
Battle of Thirteen Gure’en, the battle must have happened before he
went to the Tangyut nation.
Second, for the sequence of his appearance in the Jayut region and then return 
to Mongolia, all sources state "Temujin made Jaya-Gambu come to him from 
the Jayut region". Third, for the sequence of Jaya-Gambu’s going to the 
Tangyut nation and the Jayut region:
(1) Temujin fetched Jaya-Gambu back directly from the Jayut region, so 
that there was no opportunity for Jaya-Gambu to go to the Tangyut 
nation between his stay in the Jayut region and return to Mongolia.
(2) The change of the objective situation in the Tangyut nation, which will 
be discussed in section III of this chapter, gives good support to the 
assumption that Jaya-Gambu had to leave the Tangyut territory. He 
could not come back to Mongolia owing to the unfavourable situation
for him there, the only alternative was going into the neighbouring 
territory of the Tangyuts, that is the Jayut region on the Jurchen 
borderland.12
The sequence of these travels could be better explained by looking into 
their motivation. The study starts with the best recorded journey among them: 
the life of Jaya-Gambu in the Tangyut nation.
12 The coverage o f  ja y u t  as a region, see Chapter Six.
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Regarding his life in the Tangyut nation, three relevant passages are 
found in JT. The first in p.962 records that when Kereidei moved into the 
Tangyut nation, he found a position (murtabat) there and the Tangyut rulers 
gave him the title "Jaya-Gambu" which meant "great and grand emir of state 
(mamlakat)". The second in p .117 tells us that when the Tangyut people got 
(bi girifcind) him and found that he was a strong man (mardi jald) with 
capability (kifayat), they rendered "Jaya-Gambu" as his name, which meant 
"regional (waldyat) great emir". The third is in p.361: the Tangyut tribe had 
captured Kereidei in his childhood days. For a time he stayed in their 
presence, he became magnificent and reputable. Because of his sagacity and
efficiency, the Tangyuts awarded him the title Jaya-Gambu. The meaning of 
jayct is "region" (waldyat) and of gcnnbu "great emir" (amir-i mu'cizzam), so
"great emir of region". The first passage is more acceptable when we read it 
with Jaya-Gambu's quda (in-laws) relationship with the Tangyut ruling family. 
Jaya-Gambu had given one of his daughters to the Tangyut ruler — possibly 
at this time.
What made Jaya-Gambu make the Tangyut ruler such an offer? This 
recalls a similar offer which was made by his elder brother a long time 
previously: Toyoril had offered his daughter to the Merkit Toqtoya when he 
was expelled by his uncle the Kereit Giir-Qan. As discussed in Chapter One,
the reason of this offer was probably an exchange of the M erkif s favour, or,
protection. Did Jaya-Gambu give this similar offer for a similar reason? As 
a common understanding, the father-in-law of the Tangyut ruler would surely 
hold high-respect in the nation ("grand emir of the state") and have secure
enough protection against threats.
Was there any possibility that Jaya-Gambu was under threat at this 
time? If so, since he had a good relationship with his elder brother, Toyoril 
the Kereit ruler, why did not he turn to him for status and protection? Did he 
disagree with his elder brother, or, was his elder brother not able to provide 
such assistance to him, in this period?
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Jaya-Gambu was always in accord with his elder brother Toyoril,13
and at least until the confrontation with the Naiman Kokse’iil-Sabraq in
1199/1200, we can still see him in accord with his elder brother.14 What
made him lose the protection of his elder brother and compelled him to seek
it elsewhere outside the Kereit territory? One and the most convincing
explanation is that Toyoril had lost his authority and power over the Kereit 
territory. Only when Toyoril was not in power, did his loyal supporter, Jaya- 
Gambu, have to flee.
On the same ground, Jaya-Gambu’s appearance in Temujin’s camp 
might also have been a result of the dethronement of Toyoril. The Temujin- 
Mongol and the Toyoril-Kereit had no historical enmity to each other, and 
probably partially because of the friendship between Toyoril and Yesiigei’s 
family, the successor of Yesugei would be valued as a potential protector for
a Kereit prince-in-exile —  especially when Temujin, this young qan of the
Qabul-Mongol, possessed the support of thirty thousand people, a considerable
power in central Mongolia.
However, things did not turn out as expected. When Temujin’s
strength was put to the test, he was defeated in the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en
although this was merely a punitive attack. Kereidei (Jaya-Gambu) was 
exposed to danger again. Apparently he had separated from his elder brother
very early in the turmoil; when Toyoril fled to the far west, Kereidei was still 
in central Mongolia. His situation was more dangerous than his brother’s
because his location made him the nearest target for the usurpers of the Kereit 
ulus. He needed to seek another strong protector after the current protector 
had been defeated, even if he could not find one in Mongolia. The way to the 
west was blocked by the Naimans, however, the nearby Tangyut nation to the 
south appeared to be a good choice.
13 y rp .1 1 8 .
14 Ibid. Also in the detailed account o f  Kokse’U-Sabraq’s plundering, Jaya-Gambu was 
moving with Senggtlm to join Toyoril but they were plundered half way. JT  p.368.
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It seems that the Kereits had no enmity towards the Tangyut people, 
nor any connection or friendship. What Kereidei had done was to create an
association by offering his youngest daughter to the Tangyut ruling family.15
By this quda relationship, he was supposedly safe again.
Unfortunately, the situation in the Tangyut nation changed soon 
afterwards. Jaya-Gambu left the nation. Since the situation in Mongolia had 
not changed, he had no intention of returning but continued his odyssey into
the Jayut region. This journey will be discussed in detail along with the dating 
of this event in section III. He stayed in the region of Jayut until Temujin 
fetched him back to Mongolia where Temujin was no longer a loser in battles 
but a victor over the Tatars.
Jaya-Gambu's attempts to acquire protection from non-Kereit powers 
suggest that there must have been a great problem in the Kereit ulus and for
the Kereit regime which formerly favoured Jaya-Gambu, during this period. 
If the beginning of Jaya-Gambu’s odyssey could be traced back to his 
appearance in Termijin’s camp in the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en under his 
original name "Kereidei", the change of the former favoured situation of Jaya- 
Gambu must have happened before the battle.16
The composition of Toyoril’s "Kereit” regime
It was not only the odyssey of a Kereit prince which showed that the 
Kereit ruling family was in trouble, the scattered Kereit people also suggested 
chaos in their rulership. Since the Kereit branches were traditionally under a
15 J T p A  18 and p.361. This daughter was probably the most beautiful among her sisters. 
On p .l 18, she was married to the son o f the Tangyut ruler, and in p.361, she was given to the 
Tangyut ruler.
161 cannot provide any evidence for the above assumption o f Kereidei’s life after Toyoril’s 
dethronement, nor if  the life mentioned here was what happened "after" Toyoril’s 
dethronement. The above assumption is completely based on inference. 1 understand how  
unreliable that is: however this will also be an opportunity to discover a possible way to 
reconstruct the events.
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single rulership, there must have been something happening to the stability of 
the rulership.
Who had been affected by the dethronement? Curiously, only the
Tubegeyits and the Dongqayits were mentioned as "scattered". How about the
other Kereits? According to JT , the Kereit tribe consisted of the following
branches: Kereit (the ruling branch), Jirgin, Dongqayit, Saqayit, *Tubegeyit
and *Albat.17 Only Jirgin, Tumen-Ttibegen and Olon-Dongqayit appear in
the 57/,18 while CCL relates the same.19 Where were the other Kereit
tribesmen in this dethronement? The following study of the Kereit people who
were affected by the dethronement clarifies the composition of Toyoril’s
"Kereit" regime at this time, and this clarification explains Toyoril’s easy 
defeat by the Naimans, because some Kereit branches were in fact not under
his command during that period.
First, according to the accounts in JT, the Saqayit branch had
apparently separated itself from the Kereit single rulership and appeared as an
independent Turkic tribe during or possibly before the reign of Toyoril. 
Saqayit is described in J T s  description of the Kereit tribe as "they are also a
tribe", and a "Saqayit" tribe is mentioned in J T s  chapters of Turkic tribes. 
JT  p. 109 tells that these Turkic Saqayits had fought for Temujin against the 
Taichiyuts. Comparing this description with the participators of the Battle of 
Thirteen Gtire’en recorded in CCL p. 10a, a Saqayit tribe is found in Temujin’s
troop. Moreover, SH  §122 records that some Saqayit tribesmen had joined
17 JT  pp. 113-115. Kereit (KRAYT), Jirgin (CHRQYN), Dongqayit (TWNGQAYT), 
Saqayit (SAQYAT), *Tiibegeyit (TWBAWWT, Tubauut < Tiibe’iiit < Tiibe’e’it, =  Tiibegen 
in the SH,  with an alternative form o f  plural ending) and *Albat ( ’LBAT).
18 In theiSH, they read as Tiimen-Tiibegen (> Tiibe’en in §187), 01on-Dongqayi(-t/d) and 
Jirgin.
19 In CCL, Jirgin appeared as Chu-li-chin in p.46b, Tiimen-Tubegeyit appeared as T’u-man- 
t’u-po-yi (*Tiimen-Tiibuyi < TQmen-Tubu’uyi[t3 < Tiimen-Tubegeyit) in p.21b, also the 
mysterious phrase T’u-pu-ke-yi-t(un) (*Tiibiigeyid = Tubegeyit) in p.8b. Dongqayit appeared 
as Tung-ai (*D ong’a[yit]) in both p.21b and p.46b.
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with Temiijin at Ayil-Qaraqana shortly after he separated from Jamuqa. This 
event can be dated earlier than the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en.
From the picture revealed by these accounts from different sources, this 
Turkic Saqayit tribe may possibly have developed from the Kereit branch of 
Saqayit, which was also Turkic in nature. Besides, it was free from the Kereit 
regime from an early period, at least since their joining with Temujin at Ayil- 
Qaraqana showed their automony against ToyoriFs Kereit sovereignty. In 
addition, The Saqayits were not mentioned in the later events such as the
"reunion" of the scattered Kereits, or the 1203 battle at Qalaqaljit-Elet. These 
absences show also its independence from Toyoril’s authority.
There is no sufficient evidence to support a further examination of the 
history of the *Albat branch. As for the rest of the branches, there are plenty 
of records about the Tilbegeyits, the Dongqayits and the Jirgins in all three 
sources, and most of these records suggest that they were under the command 
of Toyoril for a certain period. The accounts relate that in the spring of 1203, 
the Jirgins, Tiibegeyits and Dongqayits were arrayed and set out against
Temujin in the battlefield of Qalaqaljit-Elet. They were led by their tribesmen
but under the general command of Toyoril.20 Later in the autumn of the
same year, Toyoril was defeated by Temujin and his people were divided up 
among the Mongols. This human booty mentioned in SH  §§185-187 were
exactly the Kereits who belonged to these three branches. These two pieces
of evidence show that at least in the year 1203, these three branches made up
the core of ToyoriFs force; their branch identities remained distinct while 
Toyoril acted as their superior leader.
What then was their role during the period of ToyoriFs dethronement 
and exile, which was at least seven years earlier than their final defeat?
Surprisingly, it seems that the Jirgin branch cannot be identified as "ToyoriFs 
men" in an earlier period. First of all, similar to the Saqayits, the Jirgin branch
20 SH §§170-171.
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is not mentioned in the reunion of the scattered Kereit people. Both CCL and 
SH  relate that when Jaya-Gambu finally returned to Mongolia and settled down 
in Temujin’s camp, the "scattered" Tiibegeyits and Dongqayits got together 
again.21 Curiously, the Jirgin people are not mentioned in this gathering.
When the ruler was put to flight, his people scattered. Were the Jirgins 
scattered like the other two branches during the dethronement? Why did not 
they join the reunion? The courage of the Jirgin people was highly regarded 
even by Toyoril,22 these champion warriors would play a significant role in 
Toyoril’s restoration campaign —  if they were available to Toyoril.
A revision of the accounts about the Jirgins reveals that their absence 
in the accounts of dethronement, reunion and restoration was probably simply 
because they were not Toyorii‘s subjects at that time. This hypothesis may be 
supported by a study of the residents at Qarayun-Jidun.
Qasar was looted by some Kereits at Qarayun-Jidun in 1203. CCL 
p.61a tells that when Qasar lived separately at Ha-la-wen-chih-tun hill 
(Qarayun-Jidun), his wife was captured by Ong-Qan and he escaped with his 
younger son to meet Temujin at Baljuna. SH  §183 tells of the same event in 
a different way: Qasar abandoned his wife and children at the place of Ong-
Qan and decided to come to Temujin, he "climbed the ridges of Qarayun- 
Jidun" but he could not find his brother. JT  supplies a third version of the
story: Qasar was separated from Temujin and at the place of Qarayun-Jidun, 
his wife and children were looted by [the force of] Ong-Qan. He escaped
alone and was in a desperate situation. Then he caught up with Temujin at
Baljuna. Despite the difference in details, the key place name mentioned in the
21 CCL p.21b tells us that "meanwhile, T’u-man-t’u-po-yi (Tiimen-Tubegeyit) [and] Tung- 
ai (Dongqayit) these tribes, which are the defeated and scattered people, also come to submit." 
SH  §150 relates that JaYa-Gambu "made the Tumen-Tiibegen and the Olon-Dongqayit, two 
scattered tribes o f  the Kereyit, also come and submit to Chinggis-qahan." (trans. by Igor de
Rachewiltz, PFEH  13 (1976) p.44). It is not certain if Jaya-Gambu gathered them around 
himself, or they came to Temiijin’s camp to reunion with Jaya-Gambu.
21 SH  §170.
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three sources was the same. This incident shows that Toyoril was able to 
exercise a certain influence in the region of Qarayun-Jidun in 1203.
However, this place is not in the list of Toyoril’s summer and winter 
campsites.23 If Qarayun-Jidun was not within Toyoril’s personal dominion,
then what had contributed to this extension of his power? An account suggests 
that Qarayun-Jidun was a Kereit-related site where it was inhabited by the 
Kereit branch of Jirgin. JT  p. 113 records that the leader of the Jirgin tribe at 
the time of Ong-Qan was called Giiyuk-Bahadur, who was in charge of a 
giire’en of one tilmen. His yurt was located at Qarayun-Jidun and CHYGR- 
CHLGHR. Supposing that Qarayun-Jidun was traditionally the residence of 
the Jirgins, or at least the ten thousand Jirgins under Giiyuk-Bahadur, the above
evidence of the extension of Toyoril’s power shows that there must have been 
a relationship established between the Jirgins and Toyoril around or before 
1203. As a matter of fact, the Jirgins had fought for Toyoril shortly before 
their looting of Qasar, and the victim of this looting was the younger brother 
of the enemy in the previous battle at Qalaqaljit-Elet.
When this branch came under Toyoril’s command is unknown. 
Although it is clear that the Jirgins were serving under ToyoriFs banner in 
1203, their relationship before 1203 is obscure.
Looking back to the dethronement, which definitely occurred before 
1203, would a huge force of ten thousand brave Kereits have seemed difficult 
to contest or to conquer or to force into dispersion even for the mighty 
Naiman? There is no single piece of evidence to support (or deny, of course) 
the notion that the Naimans had confronted the Jirgin when they attempted to 
dethrone Toyoril. Therefore, there might be a possibility that the Jirgins had 
not scattered after ToyoriFs dethronement nor had they been collected for the 
preparation of ToyoriFs restoration simply because they were not a part of 
ToyoriFs "Kereit" regime before and during this dethronement. 
Chronologically, the first appearance of the Jirgin people was on a very late
23 y r p .112.
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occasion: the battle at Qalaqaljit-Elet in early 1203. They might have entered 
Toyoril’s service quite recently.
If this suggestion is reasonable, the above analysis of the composition
of ToyoriFs "Kereit" regime shows that Toyoril did not have authority over 
every Kereit branch before his second dethronement, although in theory it
should have been so. The branches which were actually under his power were 
the branches of Tubegeyit and Dongqayit, not the autonomous Saqayit, nor the 
valorous Jirgin. In this way, the collapse of ToyoriFs regime at a single touch 
by the Naiman force is no longer an astonishing event if the authority of this 
so called "Kereit regime" was limited beyond its two great branches. On the 
other hand, the strength of the Naiman force can also be evaluated more 
accurately as a result of this clarification. A less exaggerated estimation of the 
strength of the Naimans provides a reasonable explanation for their rapid defeat 
by the Temujin-Toyoril joint force in 1199.
*  *  *  sfc
Summing up, as for the Kereit relationship with Temujin during the 
dethronement and exile, the connection between ToyoriFs dethronement and 
the Mongol Battle of Thirteen Giire’en has been established. During the first
phase of this interruption of ToyoriFs regime, Toyoril, the ruler of part of the 
Kereits, was overthrown by the Naiman force before the Mongol battle was
fought. The ruler fled to the west, while some Kereit refugees, including the
prince Jaya-Gambu, took shelter under Temujin and fought for him in the 
Mongol battle. Unfortunately, Temujin lost the battle. A defeated power
could no longer provide sufficient protection to the Kereits against the
Naimans, therefore, the Kereit prince fled into the Tangyut nation.
The second phase of ToyoriFs dethronement and exile is also associated 
with the history of the Mongols. Temujin has been regarded as a hope of 
ToyoriFs restoration during this period, and the change of attitude and situation 
will be related in the following discussion.
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(ii) Temujin as a hope for restoration
Mutual assistance between Toyoril and Temujin was a crucial 
development for both Kereit and Mongol history at the end of twelfth century. 
Under a friendly agreement, Toyoril obtained assistance from Temujin to set 
out against the Naimans to recover his ulus and his throne, while Temujin 
gained a strong alliance with Toyoril which guaranteed a friendly attitude and 
support to his west when he launched a series of attacks in eastern Mongolia,
which strengthened him as a great Mongol power. Traced back to the 
beginning of a good relationship between these two important tribe leaders, the 
foundation was laid in an earlier period.
The first occasion for Toyoril, Jaya-Gambu and Temujin to live under 
one roof, which marks a close relationship among them, was when Toyoril and 
Jaya-Gambu arrived as exiles in Temiijin’s camp. The two helpless Kereit 
princes were actually looked after by Temujin afterwards. According to the
sources, after resting under Temujin’s protection for three years, Toyoril was 
able to launch his restoration campaign against the powerful Naiman. A 
revival of his strength could not have happened without Temujm’s assistance, 
and the circumstances contributing to their alliance are worth careful 
examination.
Before their settlement in Temtijin’s camp, the situation of these two 
Kereit princes is not clear. According to JT , Toyoril travelled westward after 
his dethronement. He passed through the Uighur and Tangyut territories to 
reach Qara-Khitai. Before a year had passed, he left the place and wandered
about until he heard of the strength of Temujin. On hearing this news, he
decided to return to Mongolia. On the other hand, the Kereit prince Jaya- 
Gambu remained in Mongolia after his elder brother had been dethroned, until
his protector seemed no longer strong enough to guarantee his safety. He then
left Mongolia and went into the Tangyut nation, where he established an in­
laws relationship with the current Tangyut ruler, hence he secured respect and 
protection from that regime.
It is curious to see their later coming to Temujin, when Jaya-Gambu’s 
leaving showed that Temujin offered no advantage to him at all after Temujin
lost the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en. It is clear that a change of attitude towards
Temiijin took place subsequently. In this way, the incident which caused this
change could be taken as the turning point of the Temujin-Toyoril relationship, 
and the foundation of a later good relationship between these two powers.
The following investigation of the background of the significant 
Toyoril-Temujin union will first reveal the nature of the Toyoril-Temujin 
alliance via an examination of ToyoriFs intention and calculation in his 
decision to come to Temiijin, and second, single out the possible watershed,
an event in the career of Temiijin, which enhanced ToyoriFs and even Jaya- 
Gambu’s decision making.
A great expectation
If Toyoril and Jaya-Gambu had not returned to Mongolia, to remain 
part of Kereit history, Toyoril would have faded out from the political stage 
in the same way as his uncle Giir-Qan who never returned from exile. As for 
the history of Temujin, the course of his rise to power would have been very 
different since most of his early victorious campaigns were fought in co­
operation with the Kereit force. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the 
situation which was favourable to their return as a part of Kereit studies, as 
well as noting its relevance to Temiijin-Mongol’s where the situation could be 
associated with the first military triumph of Temujin.
There are different accounts of Temiijin’s reception of Toyoril among 
the sources. In CCL pp.23b-24b, when Toyoril arrived in Guse’iir-Nayur,
Temujin heard about the news and, "thinking of his anda relationship with
Yesugei", Temujin sent two companions to bring Toyoril in. Moreover,
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Temujin welcomed him in person from the Keliiren, kept him in the camp, and
levied shares to sustain him. SH  §151 has a same description as the CCUs.
In general, the SH  and CCL accounts describe the reception as kindly
benevolence on the part of Temujin while JT  records that it was Toyoril who
resolved to come to Temujin, and when Toyoril arrived in Guse’iir-Nayur, he 
sent his two companions "down the Keliiren" to inform Temiijin about his
coming, then Temujin welcomed him in person.24
Was it Toyoril’s intention to come to Temujin, or he had just being 
picked up at the lakeshore by his saviour? When we take the recent condition
of Toyoril into account, J T s  version seems more appealing. A formal ruler 
of a huge tribe in central Mongolia would have the ability to avoid 
inappropriate action which might lead to a threat to his life —  to travel into 
a region close to his enemy, such as Guse’ur-Nayur. would not be considered 
a wise decision unless he did this on purpose. Guse’ur-Nayur is listed as one 
of Toyoril’s (personal) summer camps.25 Although its previous status is not
clearly stated in the sources, it seems that the place was part of the Kereit 
territory, or along the border of the Kereit territory before Toyoril secured his 
throne from his uncle Giir-Qan.26 An ex-ruler would be aware of the danger
of going close to his former realm while his enemy was not far away.
Assuming that Toyoril did not re-enter Mongolia unintentionally, he 
must have made his calculation. In the same JT  account related above, 
Toyoril’s career reached its lowest ebb during the exile. Subsequently, he 
decided to come to Temujin when he heard about "the fame of outburst glory
and the strength" of Temujin, and he also counted on his sworn brotherhood 
with Yesiigei.
24 JT  pp.362-363.
25 JT  p.l 12, a khasa (private domain) of Ong-Qan.
25 jr p .3 8 8 , Temujin recalled that in Yestigei’s expedition against Kereit Giir-Qan, the 
Yesiigei force "went to a place called Gusau’ur-Nau’ur and [Yesiigei] looked for your uncle 
Gur-khan there (anja). Gur-khan was at a site called Qurban-Talasut. [Giir-Qan] had been 
caused to run and had been put to flight from there (az anja)."
If we follow this explanation of his motivation, it suggests that Toyoril 
began to consider the advantage of having a supportive relationship with
Temiijin. As analyzed in Chapter One section I, Toyoril did not seem to be 
acting ardently on behalf of Temujin in the incident of Borte as told in the SH.
He did have a connection with Temiijin at that time, however, the connection
did not seem to be a firmly tied one.
The JT  account suggests two bases for ToyoriFs description to bring 
about this closer relationship: his friendship with the father of Temujin, and the 
"glory and strength" of this potential partner. Did the "friendship" or 
Temtijin’s "glory and strength" or both of them help Toyoril to make the 
decision?
"Thinking of ToyoriFs cinda relationship with Yesiigei" is also 
mentioned in the relevant accounts in CCL and the SH , however, it is 
mentioned as Temujin’s concern. Would an old sworn brotherhood between 
two individuals have weighed more than the present strength of a potential 
partner in ToyoriFs calculation, or in Temujin’s affection?
From a practical point of view, the anda relationship between Toyoril
and Yesiigei might guarantee Toyoril a friendly eye from Temujin, but an 
affectionate linkage of the last generation might not be strong enough to
encourage Temujin to protect this "wanted ex-ruler" against his neighbouring
big power, the Naiman, unless he himself was strong enough to counter them,
and he was interested in fighting them.
Second, Toyoril was in exile. His exile was basically a journey 
between great western powers. A strong desire of seeking protection (security)
and support (restoration) might be the unspoken intention, since the travels of 
Jaya-Gambu revealed a similar theme, as well as the travels of his ancestor 
Sariq-Qan into the Betekin land.
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Third, an examination of the performance of the verification ceremony 
for establishing every non-natural but serious personal bondage in Mongol 
society, as well as the duties and rights involved in such a relationship, reveals 
that the anda relationship between Toyoril and Yesiigei does not seem to have 
contributed very much in consolidating a firm friendship between Toyoril and 
Temujin, as CCL and the SH  emphasise, or, overstate.
The examination starts with the verification of the Toyoril-Temujin 
relationship in the post-exile period. In CCL and JT , Toyoril and Temujin 
verify their "father-and-son" relationship after Toyoril returns from the west. 
This shows that although an anda relationship existed between Yesiigei and
Toyoril, their personal bondage or relevant pseudo-kinship did not 
automatically extend to the next generation, say, Temujin, or Senggum. SH
§164 records the verification of the Toyoril-Temujin pseudo father-and-son 
relationship after Temiijin rescued ToyoriTs people from the Naiman general 
Kokse’ii-Sabraq. Although this is a chronological mistake,27 the record still 
reveals that a formal verification of the relationship is necessary — before this, 
the bond between Yesiigei and Toyoril could only make Temiijin "count" 
Toyoril as his pseudo-father. It shows that every non-natural personal bond 
needed to be formally verified through a public declaration.
Moreover, a formal verification of a pseudo kinship connection between 
a Turkic tribe leader and a Mongol tribe leader had a great significance in 
steppe politics. It should not be underestimated by confusing it with an 
affectionate andaship, such as the one between young Temujin and young 
Jamuqa. A formal personal bondage between two mature tribe leaders usually 
served a purpose. As the declaration of these linkages was formal and made 
public, exactly what beneficence could both parties share in such a relation? 
From the above discussion, we can see that Toyoril declared a formal anda 
relation with Yesiigei only after Yesiigei’s great expedition which restored 
Toyoril to the Kereit throne. What contribution, then, had Temujin made to
27 Events mentioned in SH  §164 were a conflation o f  at least two occasions. See 
discussion o f "Black Forest Declaration" and "Red Hills Promise" in Chapter Three.
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cause Toyoril to declare a formal father-and-son relationship with him? It is 
not possible to relate the promise behind the scene to another painstaking
restoration, which Toyoril was striving for at that moment. .The subsequent 
accounts in the sources justify this underlying offer: Temujin returned the
Kereit people in his camp to Toyoril and looted the Merkits to boost Toyoril’s 
wealth. Finally, Toyoril was able to set out against the Naimans in 1199.
Furthermore, a pseudo father-and-son relationship probably demanded 
a great deal of the son’s fidelity/loyalty to his father, far more than a natural 
father-and-son relationship because there was no linkage by birth in the 
connection. Was Temujin’s extermination of the Jiirkin line which was the 
eldest branch of Qabul-Mongol, soon after the declaration of the father-and-son 
relationship,28 a gesture of his true loyalty to his Kereit father? At least in 
Temiijin’s own words, he admitted that this was one of his "contributions" 
(haqq) to Toyoril.29
From a pragmatic analysis o f ToyoriFs expectation and what Temujin 
could offer and the subsequent development of the Toyoril-Temujin 
relationship, we may conclude that the Toyoril-Yesiigei anda relationship did
not have much effect in consolidating their personal bondage —  it did serve
as an incentive agent in the groundwork of this relation, but no more than that.
The mutual-assistance nature of the Toyoril-Temujin relationship became more 
explicit in the later Red Hills Promise —  affection has no part in politics.
The fame
When ToyoriFs intention has been interpreted by means of the above 
assumption, the next investigation shall concentrate on the stimulus of this
intention —  the fame or reputation of Temujin at this time.
28 CCL p.24b, they declared themselves father-and-son in autumn and in the winter o f  the 
same year, Sacha-Beki and Taichu were caught up at Tele’etti Pass and exterminated.
29 JT  p.388, he killed them "for the sake of' Toyoril. ("man jahat-i tu")
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As revealed in the discussion of the last section, Temujin was
subsequently defeated by his Mongol fellowmen in the Battle of Thirteen
Gtire’en after Toyoril had been dethroned. Although the sources do not say 
explicitly that Temujin was in disgrace during this period, the deliberate
modification of the result of the battle in relevant records in CCL and JT
shows that Temujin’s reputation might have been worsened by this setback.
The subsequent leaving of Jaya-Gambu revealed a judgement on Temujin’s 
strength from this Kereit prince: Temujin could no longer be relied on. This
situation was exactly the opposite of the later incident in which Toyoril 
decided to come to Temujin when Temujin enjoyed a respectable reputation
which spread across Mongolia and to the further west.
The respectable reputation of a power usually comes from a constant 
celebrity such as the potency of the Jurchen, or is occasionally caused by an 
unexpected triumph. The sources do not tell us explicitly where Temujin’s 
reputation came from but his previous disrepute might suggest that his later 
reputation was derived from an astonishing success.
If there was an astonishing success which gave Temujin a good 
reputation, this success must have taken place between the Battle of Thirteen 
Giire’en when he was badly regarded by Jaya-Gambu, and the return of 
Toyoril when he was highly valued by the ex-ruler. Among the accounts 
concerning this period, all of them celebrate a glorious event which might have
brought Temujin an intertribal reputation —  his victory over the Tatars.
Temujin’s warfare against the Tatars was the key incident in the second
phase of this interruption in Kereit history. As in the case of the relationship
between the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en and Toyoril’s dethronement, there is 
no direct and plain connection between this pure Temiijin-Tatar conflict in
eastern Mongolia and Toyoril and Jaya-Gambu’s returning to Mongolia from 
west and south. However, Temujin’s victory and the fame and reputation
which accompanied it had probably stimulated their impulse to return: a hope
for restoration.
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This event had been singled out after a comparison of the sequence of 
events in the three sources. The relevant events from the very beginning of 
Temujin’s life up to the coming of Toyoril are recorded in CCL in the 
following sequence:30
(1) Temujin was born and named
(2) Most of Yesiigei’s subordinates deserted Temujin and went over to the
Taichiyut
(3) The Battle of Thirteen Giire’en
(4) Temujin lured the Je’iireits to join himself
(5) Some of the Taichiyut’s subordinates came to Temujin (part of the
account is in the wrong chronological order)
(6) Disagreement between the Jurkins and Temujin
(7) The Jurchen attacked the Tatars
(8) Temujin annexed the Jurkins
(9) Jaya-Gambu came to Temujin
(10) CCL recalls the qanship struggle of Toyoril
(11) Toyoril returned from the west, welcomed by Temujin
(12) Temujin and Toyoril swore themselves father-and-son on the Tuyula 
river
(13) Temujin exterminated the Jiirkin line
The sequence found in JT  is:31
(1) Temujin was born and named
(2) Most of Yesiigei’s subordinates deserted Temujin and went over to the 
Taichiyuts
(3) The Battle of Thirteen Giire’en
(4) The submission of some Je’tireits
(5) Some of the Taichiyut’s subordinates came to Temujin (part of the
account is in the wrong chronological order)
(6) Disagreement between the Jurkins and Temujin
i0 CCL pp.la-24b.
31 yrp p .309-312 , 327-340, 359-363.
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(7) The Jurchen attacked the Tatars
(8) Temujin annexed the Jurkins
(9) Jaya-Gambu came to Temujin
(10) JT  recalls the qanship struggle of Toyoril
(11) Toyoril returned from the west, welcomed by Temujin
(12) Temujin and Toyoril swore themselves father-and-son32
(13) Temujin exterminated the Jtirkin line
The recorded sequence of the above events in the SH  is as follows:33
(1) Temujin was born and named
(2) The Taichiyuts deserted the family of Temujin
[ Then the marriage, the abduction of Borte and rescue campaign,
Temiijin stayed together with Jamuqa and their separation, Temujin was
made the leader of Qabul-Mongol, Toyoril was pleased with this while 
Jamuqa was not.]
(3) The Battle of Thirteen Giire’en
(4) [N o Je’iireit is mentioned]
(5) [ The coming of the subordinates of the Taichiyuts is mentioned in a 
later paragraph of §149 but before Jaya-Gambu and some Kereits 
finally went to Temujin.]
(6) Disagreement between the Jurkins and Temujin
(7) The Jurchen attacked the Tatars
(8) Temujin annexed the Jurkins
(9) Jaya-Gambu came to Temujin
(10) The SH  recalls the qanship struggle of Toyoril
32 The site o f the declaration in JT  p.363 is "Qarayun-Qabchal" which being annotated: 
"means black forest". Obviously the place name is a mistake. Qarayun-Qabchal which means 
Qarayun Gorge was located on the Selengge river, where Toyoril escaped to when his uncle 
attacked him, and later in 1204 the Merkit Dair-Usun took his people to reside. As JT  
annotated the place name as "black forest", the correct form o f this place name should be Qara- 
Tun and it is located on the Tuyula river. Compare with CCL "in the black forest on the 
Tuyula river" and SH  §177 "tuyula-yin qara-tun" (Tuyula’s black forest).
33 SH  §§59 (birth), 70-72 (desertion), 94 (marriage), 98-113 (Borte), 118 (Jamuqa), 123- 
124 (qan), 126-127 (response), 128-134, 136, 150-151. I have omitted many domestic affairs 
during this period because those events were not significant in TemQjin’s intertribal 
relationship.
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(11) Toyoril returned from the west, welcomed by Temujin
(12) Temujin and Toyoril declared themselves father-and-son at the Black
Forest on the Tuyula river34
(13) [ Temujin’s extermination of the Jiirkin line is mentioned after 
Temujin’s victory over the Tatars.]
The recording sequence of CCL and JT  is so close that these two 
sources are believed to have been derived from the same narrative record, or, 
the same version among a variety of accounts of Temujin’s history. Moreover, 
although the account order in the SH  does not coincide with the above two 
sources, its detailed information on the description of the events should not be 
ignored since the SH  took another approach to arranging the events: it 
associates the events by subjects rather than strictly chronologically, (see 
discussion below)
As seen in the sequences, despite some variations, all three sources 
agree on a sequence of
(1) the split between Temujin and the Taichiyut;
(2) the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en took place;
(3) Temujin’s disagreement with the Jiirkin;
(4) Temujin’s battle with the Tatar Megiijin-Se’ultu;
(5) the return of Toyoril, also Temujin’s extermination of the Jiirkin line. 
This sequence is the backbone of a chronological reconstruction. The
connection between the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en and the dethronement of
Toyoril has been discussed earlier, and the extermination of the Jurkins has 
been related above. The separation of the Taichiyuts and Temujin’s 
disagreement with the Jiirkins will be discussed in Chapter Four. Therefore,
the next investigation will concentrate on Temujin’s warfare against the Tatars.
Although Temujin’s victory over the Tatars under Megiijin-Se’ultu 
should more likely to be counted as a looting of a division of scattered and
Recalled by Temujin in SH  §177, not mentioned in the previous narrative.
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frightened non-military people rather than a formal battle confrontation 
between two tribes, Temujin won. It is related in all three sources that among 
his booty, there were a silver cradle and a precious blanket.35 JT  supplied a 
description of the acquisitions: "because these kind of luxurious articles were 
rare among the Mongols at that time, they considered the action great and 
received reputation".j6
Besides this luxurious booty, this victory inevitably also brought 
Temujin a considerable fame within steppe society. If we look at this event 
from a community perspective, the Tatar tribe was renowned for its enormous 
strength and warlike nature in steppe society down the ages. The disgrace of 
this tribe would have drawn attention from every steppe people.
Furthermore, since the Tatars had a long-lasting enmity towards the 
Mongols and the Kereits for generations, the setback of the Tatars would be 
much valued as an respectable achievement by both Mongols and Kereits. In 
Kereit history, generations before Toyoril succeeded the throne, the Kereit 
ruler Marqus-Buiruq-Qan had been captured by the Tatars, sent to Jurchen
China and executed there.37 Another undated but presumably later incident 
was the attack of the Alchi-Tatars against the Kereit Sariq-Qan. In this attack 
the Tatars overran the Kereit ulus and Toyoril’s father Qurjaqus had to marry 
the Betekin princess in order to obtain the assistance of this foreign power to
recover their country. Toyoril would have understood the power of the Tatars 
from the sufferings of previous qans, not to mention his personal experience 
of being captured and enslaved.38 Therefore, the news of their defeat would
have been impressive to Toyoril, especially when that division of the Tatars 
might have been the very one who formerly had a good relationship with the
35 Also see in CCL p.19b.
36 JT  pp.337-33 8, "shuhrat padhlrufta". Booty also mentioned in SH  §133 and CCL p. 19b.
37 jr p .1 1 5 .
38 See Chapter One, Toyoril’s first struggle for the Kereit qanship.
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Jurchen. Toyoril’s excitement would have been further heightened when the 
victor turned out to be someone who formerly had a good relationship with
himself.
In addition, other than the material booty and fame with in steppe 
society, Temujin had had bestowed on him a title by the Jurchen authority 
because of this victory: Jayut-Quri, or just quri. Being appointed by the 
Jurchen authority was undoubtedly a recognition from the superpower which 
recognised Temujin’s assistance and confirmed his strength, not to mention the 
significance of the first establishment of a friendly relationship between the 
two powers. Temujin’s willingness to accept this position or title regardless 
of the blood feud resulting from the Jurchen’s execution of Hambaqai-Qan 
might also suggest how this recognition was highly valued in the steppe society 
of Mongolia. Therefore, becoming a Jurchen subordinate could also possibly 
have contributed to his widely spread reputation across Mongolia.39
If the fame and reputation of Temujin which Toyoril had heard about 
can be associated with Temujin’s victory over the Tatars, this may explain the 
situation which made Toyoril decide to end his exile and come to Temujin: he 
was confident in Temujin’s strength when Temujin proved his strength in 
beating the Tatars —  he relied upon this new steppe power to help him 
recover his country.
The coming of Ja7a-Gambu
On the other hand, regarding the journey of the Kereit prince Jaya- 
Gambu, JT  recounts in the brief chronological account at the end of the 
detailed history of Chlngglz-Khan that: "From battle (az jang ), Jaya-Gambu, 
the brother of Ong-Qan [who is] the Kereit ruler, and the tribe of Dongqayit 
which is a branch of the Kereits, gathered with him (Temujin). [They] united
39 A full discussion o f  various aspects concerning this Temujin-Jurchen relationship is 
related in Chapter Six.
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and opposed Ong-Qan [should be the Merkits], then [the Merkits] retreated. 
Settled in the principal yurt in his (Temujin’s) own ordos, he occupied himself 
in merry-making."40
The "battle" which made Jaya-Gambu and the Dongqayit people gather 
with Temujin can be identified with the Merkit assault. In CCL p.2 lab, the
story reads:
At that time, His Highest lived in the land of T’a-tuo-su
(Dersiit).41 There was the younger brother of Ong-Qan of the
Kereit tribe, Jaya-Gambu, [who] came to submit. Meanwhile 
the Merkit tribe confronted with us, His Highest [joined] with
Jaya-Gambu [and] approached to fight, their people were 
defeated and left. At this time, there were the tribes of T ’u- 
man-f u-po-yi Tung-ai (Tumen-Tiibegeyit, Dongqayit) who were 
the defeated and scattered Kereit people, [who] also came to 
submit.
This account makes it clear that the az jang  in JT  p .563 should not be 
interpreted as meaning that Temujin brought Jaya-Gambu to him by force.
The account in JT  p.388 reveals more clearly the situation when Jaya-
Gambu came to Temujin. In this personal recall of Temujin, he beckoned
Jaya-Gambu to come to join him from the Jayut region. When he "brought" 
Jaya-Gambu to him, Temujin was ambushed because of a wish for revenge. 
The Merkits also caused Jaya-Gambu to run. Temujin saved Jaya-Gambu from 
the hand of the Merkits.
In spite of slight difference in details, a comparison of the three 
accounts confirms some uncertain readings of sentence meaning, and a general 
picture of Jaya-Gambu’s coming would be "Temujin beckoned Jaya-Gambu to
40 JT  pp.563-564. The ’ WNG-KHAN in this sentence is a mistake. It should be MRKYT, 
the Merkits, according to other versions o f Jaya-Gambu’s coming. A copying error in Persian 
script. See the first footnote in section III.
41 The Chinese transcription tuo (££,) is probably a copying error o f  erh ( ^ ) .
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come to him from the Jayut region. Jaya-Gambu agreed. Half way, Temujin 
had been assaulted by his enemy who also attacked Jaya-Gambu. Temujin and 
Jaya-Gambu repelled the Merkits together. After this battle, Jaya-Gambu 
stayed with Temujin. He collected the scattered Kereit tribesmen and made
them stay with Temujin’s people."
Other than some detailed questions such as the collection of scattered 
people and their reunion with Toyoril,42 three points are worth attention here.
The first is the dating of Jaya-Gambu’s coming, the second is the position of 
this incident in event sequence, the third is the renewal of the Temujin-Jaya- 
Gambu connection.
The coming of Jaya-Gambu is dated in a Hare Year in the account of 
JT  pp.563-564, which shall be 1195 including January 1196. However, the 
description of this account is quite unreliable because it mistakenly substituted 
"Ong-Qan" for "Merkit", which contradicts to its detailed counterpart in p.388. 
This error suggests that the other parts of this account might also have been 
altered, therefore, we must be cautious in believing the dating supplies by this 
account. SH  §150 relates the account of the coming of Jaya-Gambu after the
account of Temujin’s defeat of the Taichiyuts. This arrangement is apparently 
not in a chronological order, because the Taichiyuts were defeated in 1200, 
after Toyoril restored himself to the Kereit throne.
To examine the position of this incident in event sequence can help to 
clarify the confusion in dating. An investigation of the background of 
Temujin’s invitation suggests that Temujin invited Jaya-Gambu to come to him 
before Toyoril returned to Mongolia. First, as mentioned in the sources, the
Tumen-Tiibegeyits and the Dongqayits were "the defeated and scattered" Kereit 
people at this time. Therefore, this invitation must have made before any 
attempt to unite the Kereit resources in Mongolia. Second, Temujin recalled 
the situation of the invitation in his words to Toyoril that:
42 Later on, because Temiijin was friendly with Toyoril, he sent Jaya-Gambu and that tribe 
o f  Dongqayit once again to his presence. JT  p.339.
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When you hide in the low cloud and became concealed, and
while the sun sunk made you invisible, Jaya-Gambu anda was
in the middle of the JAW’QWT region. I kept shouting loudly
the right sounds and had beckoned to him with a hat, I did
daldmtshi — that means I called with a hand. And for that
sense, Jaya-Gambu anda was brought to me.
This piece of evidence suggests that when Temujin invited Jaya-Gambu, 
Toyoril was still in exile. Therefore, the invitation must have been given 
before Toyoril returned to Mongolia.
Moreover, from the standpoint of the history of Temujin, the coming
of Jaya-Gambu was placed immediately after Temujin put the Jiirkin leaders 
Sacha-Beki and Taichu to flight, before Temujin’s reception of Toyoril into his 
camp. Combining these three pieces of evidence, it seems to be no problem 
that the coming of Jaya-Gambu had taken place before Toyoril returned to 
Mongolia and the scattered Kereit people were being gathered, and most
important, after Temujin’s assault upon the Jiirkin, which definitely happened 
after his victory over the Tatars and his obtaining of the Jurchen recognition.
The only possible contradiction to this assumption of event sequence 
would be the record order of the relevant accounts in the S H  As mentioned 
above, the SH  records the coming of Jaya-Gambu in §150, while in §149 it 
relates Temujin’s complete destruction of the Taichiyut tribe. These two 
paragraphs do not chronologically coincide with the event sequence in CCL 
and JT, and it seems that we can only choose to believe one of them since no 
further precise evidence supplies more information. However, these two 
versions are not absolutely contradictory if we take the writing style of these 
sources into account —  the SH  groups historical events by topics rather than 
arranging them in a strictly chronological approach. Taking the paragraphs 
immediately before and after §150 as example, we can see that the incidents 
related in SH  §136 to §149 are domestic affairs within the Mongol 
genealogical network —  those were Temujin’s "war and peace" with the 
branches of Jiirkin, Jalayir, Jadaran (Jamuqa) and Taichiyut. From §150 on,
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the accounts in the SH  recount Temujin’s war and peace with non-Mongol
tribes, such as Kereit, Tatar, Merkit and Naiman. These are Temujin’s
"foreign" expansion. Knowing the arrangement principle of the SH , placing
the coming of Jaya-Gambu after the complete destruction of the Taichiyuts 
would no longer seem confusing if we consider the Jaya-Gambu record as the 
first event of the second group, and it is not necessary to have a chronological
connection between the last record of first group (§149) and the first record of
the second group (§150). The situation is rather odd here, but it is not
unresolvable.
Therefore, the above assumption of event sequence remains acceptable:
(1) Background: the Kereits were scattered, Toyoril was still on exile, 
Jaya-Gambu was in the Jayut region;
(2) Temujin’s victory over the Tatars and obtaining the title of Jayut-Quri;
(3) Temujin’s first attack upon the Jiirkin kinsmen;
(4) Jaya-Gambu came to Temujin and was attacked by the Merkits half 
way;
(5) Toyoril returned.
Hence, with the establishment of this sequence, here is the third
interesting point: a circumstance which favoured a renewal of the Temujin-
Jaya-Gambu connection. Jaya-Gambu had decided to leave Temujin earlier. 
Why was Temujin in a position to attract Jaya-Gambu to leave the Jayut 
region and join him in Mongolia at this time? Furthermore, the process must
have been a peaceful one since Temujin beckoned to Jaya-Gambu "with a 
hat".43 Without a comiection with the Kereit people and the Kereit ex-ruler,
by what means was Temujin able to "bring" Jaya-Gambu to him?
Jaya-Gambu was in the Jayut region, "that is the Khitai region" as 
understood in JT  and "han-sai" in CCL when Temujin proposed the invitation. 
Coincidentally, Temujin received a title/position from the Jurchen authority
43 j r p .3 8 8 .
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after his defeat of the Tatars in spring 1196.44 According to the above 
sequence, Temujin had obtained this title before he offered Jaya-Gambu the 
invitation because the invitation was made after Temujin set out against the
Jiirkins, and Temujin’s attack against the Jtirkins happened after his victory
over the Tatars —  where he had been rewarded with the Jurchen title. Would
this Jurchen title/position give Jaya-Gambu confidence in Temujin, and 
therefore did he choose to leave the Jayut (Khitai) region and come to the 
residence of this appointed "commander-in-chief of several tribes'1?45
Even if the title did not provide an extensive administrative power, it 
was a recognition as well as a support from the Jurchen. Moreover, Temujin
had shown his strength in looting the Tatars. Jaya-Gambu would probably 
have come to Temujin for this practical advantage, that is, a "recent" strong 
protector. That his odyssey ended in Temujin’s camp proved that Temujin had 
become the most influential, at least in reputation if he was not mighty in 
strength, potentate in central Mongolia at this time (1196).
*  *  *  *
Summing up, the above assumption reveals that Temujin’s triumph over
the Tatars was a crucial event in the second phase of Toyoril’s dethronement 
and exile. His strength, or his fame obtained from the victory or from the
Jurchen recognition, had been valued positively by both Kereit princes, and the
expectation of practical advantage drove them to approach and join Temujin
in central Mongolia. That their odysseys terminated at Temujin’s residence
showed that this new power was the ultimate protector for them in their
misfortune, and their choice was correct.
As for the event sequence which has been partly restored in this section, 
Jaya-Gambu and Toyoril appeared before Temujin after Temujin’s victory over
44 Dating discussion see section III.
45 Discussion on the meaning of Jayut-Quri is related in Chapter Six section II.
102
the Tatars and the Jurkin branch of the Qabul-Mongol. Combined with the 
sequence reconstructed in this section and a study of precise dating of crucial
events in the coming section, the duration of this interruption of ToyoriTs 
regime could possibly be restored, and a general account of both Kereit and 
Mongol histories during this period could then be presented on a chronological 
basis.
III. Dating of the dethronement
In the preliminary examination section of this chapter, we have arrived
at a possible period of ToyoriTs dethronement. However, it was a long span 
of fifteen years from 1181/82 to 1196. A further narrowing down is necessary
and the more precise the dating is, the more clearly the history of Toyoril- 
Kereit and Temujin-Mongol can be presented.
In section II of this chapter regarding the course of ToyoriTs 
dethronement and exile, we have reconstructed the sequence of numerous
events in spite of their uncertain dating. The outline of this sequence is:
(1) The Kereit prince Erke-Qara escaped from Toyoril and took refugee 
under the Naiman Inanch-Qan;
(2) The Naiman Inanch-Qan attacked Toyoril and dethroned him;
(3) Toyoril fled west, Kereidei (later Jaya-Gambu) came to Temujin;
(4) Temujin was defeated in the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en;
(5) Jaya-Gambu left Temujin and went to the Tangyut nation;
(6) Jurchen’s campaign against the steppe tribes;
(7) Temujin dispersed the Tatars at the Ulja river;
(8) Toyoril and Jaya-Gambu came to Temujin. Toyoril from the west, 
Jaya-Gambu from the Jayut region.
We cannot find the exact dating of the above events in the sources which focus
on the history of Temujin. These sources begin to supply dating in quite a late
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period: JT  starting from 1195,46 the SH  from 1200 when Jamuqa was elected 
Giir-Qan, and CCL from 1202 when Temujin set out against the Four Tatars.
Fortunately, some of these events are related to the history of the 
neighbouring countries, therefore, some clues from these neighbours’ historical 
records would be valuable supplements as evidence for dating.
Since it was the Naimans who caused the dethronement of the Kereit
ruler, the history of these two tribes during this period would be the key in
fixing the dating of this incident. This section is going to examine three dates:
first, the reign of Naiman Inanch-Qan; second, the time when Jaya-Gambu left 
the Tangyut nation and entered the Jayut region; and third, the duration of 
Toyoril’s exile. The former two are useful in fixing the inaugural date of 
Toyoril's dethronement, which suggest that 1193 was an important year in the 
whole incident. The latter one narrows down the duration of ToyoriTs exile 
to 1192/93 to late spring of 1196, accordingly, his dethronement must have
taken place around 1192/93 and not earlier than that. These topics are selected 
not only because of their importance, but also by a consideration of the 
sufficiency of supplementary evidence, basically from Chinese sources.
The rediscovery of a possible dating of ToyoriTs dethronement and 
exile helps to reconstruct the whole chronology by fitting it into the above 
reconstructed event sequence. A knowledge of this dating explains many 
puzzles in Kereit history and Mongol history, and give researchers a new 
insight into the situation of central Mongolia in the second half of the twelfth 
century.
46 The Brief Chronicle which starts from p.563 bears the earliest dating in JT. The dating 
o f  1195 is not stated in the chronological main text. I am doubtful o f this dating because in 
the year 1195, Temujin might to have been busy with domestic affairs with the Jurkin, 
according to the main text. Besides, although the account in the Brief Chronicle mentions a 
merry-making, this cannot be Temtijin’s feast with the Jurkin kinsmen because there is no sign 
in other accounts that Temujin had fought the Merkits immediate before or after his merry­
making with the Jurkins, The description o f this 1195 paragraph is quite unreliable because 
copier’s corruption. The word "Merkit" ( $  ) had been mistakenly changed into "Ung-
Khan" C in JT  p.564, which altered the meaning o f the whole description.
104
The Naiman Inanch-Bilge-BWKW-Qan
JT , CCL and the SH  all relate that when the Kereit prince Erke-Qara 
fled to the Naimans, it was the Naiman Inanch-Qan who set out and overthrew
the Kereit ruler Toyoril. However, when Toyoril struggled for his restoration 
in 1199, apparently Toyoril was fighting the Naiman Buiruq-Qan, who was a 
son of Inanch-Qan. Inanch-Qan is not mentioned in the accounts later than his 
campaign against Toyoril. It is possible that Inanch-Qan had passed away in 
or before 1199. Since the undeniable evidence shows that he was alive when
he put Toyoril to flight, we may propose that Inanch-Qan died after Toyoril 
began his exile and before 1199. In this way, we may be able to determine the
latest date at which Toyoril could have been overthrown, by fixing the dating 
of Inanch-Qan’s last appearance in the existing sources.
No evidence supplies plainly an approximate period of the reign of the 
Naiman Inanch-Qan. Since he was an esteemed steppe ruler, we may probably 
relate him to an unidentified steppe ruler in a quotation in CS. A Jurchen 
ruler, Chang-Tsung, was going to the north to avoid the hot summer. An 
officer called Tung Shih-Chung tried to stop him. He appealed with two other 
officers that "recently the frontier is not submissive and rebellious, Pi-li-ke-po- 
wa is greedy, ruthless and truculent, [the situation] is of great concern". The 
emperor did not accept their remonstrance. Tung then submitted a second 
appeal. In this appeal, he went into more detail about the situation along the 
frontier: "Besides, the two subordinate tribes in the south and the north [who] 
defended the frontier for several decades are now lured and intimidated by Pi- 
li-ke-po-wa, with the whole tribe/clan [they] followed after [him]". Under 
such circumstances, how could the emperor risk himself in danger? After a 
debate, the emperor agreed not to go to the north.47
This account is clearly dated in the fourth Ming-Ch’ang year, that is 
1193. We can also tell by the motivation of the travel that this appeal must
41 CS 95 chuan 33 the biography o f Tung Shih-Chung, pp.2114-2115.
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have been made in spring, before the emperor went to the north to avoid the 
hot summer. The significance of this account can only be revealed when we 
can identify this Pi-li-ke-po-wa with a steppe ruler known to us, and when if 
he was the Naiman Inanch-Qan, this dating of 1193 would confirm his 
existence at least in this period.
Could Pi-li-ke-po-wa be the Naiman Inanch-Bilge-BWICW-Qan? The 
examination of this possibility can be approached from three directions: first, 
the strength o f the steppe ruler; second, the proof of a Sino-Naiman 
connection, third, the identity of "the two subordinate tribes in the north and 
the south" in Tung’s appeal.
Which steppe ruler possessed such mighty power on Jurchen’s northern 
frontier in 1193? Could this person possibly be the Naiman Inanch-Bilge- 
BWKW-Qan? The strength of Inanch-Qan had been revealed in Erke-Qara’s 
choice. Erke-Qara would not have fled to a ruler who was weaker than 
Toyoril for protection or even military assistance against Toyoril. Therefore, 
we can tell that at least in the judgement of Erke-Qara, Inanch-Qan had a
strength which could counter-balance Toyoril’s. It seems that no other steppe 
ruler in Mongolia possessed an equivalent or greater power to Toyoril at this 
time, or they are not mentioned in the sources.48 The titles of Inanch-Bilge- 
BWKW-Qan also provides a clue of resemblance between he and Pi-li-ke-po- 
wa, when the transcription Pi-li-ke-po-wa can possibly be matched to *Bilge- 
Bo’a (?= Bilge-Boko, "wise" and "strong").49
48 /T p .130 , the Betekin Qajir/Qadir-(Buiruq)~Qan and his ancestors were greater and more 
respectable than Ong-Qan and Tayang-Qan and the other Kereit and Naiman rulers, but later 
the later rulers became stronger than the Betekins, This Betekin ruler must be the one who 
helped the Kereit Sariq-Qan to recover the ulus from The Tatars. See Chapter One.
49 The problem o f BWKW can be analyzed as follows. First, an assumption o f  a 
Mongolian term. JT  transliterates the title and the name o f Inanch-Qan as ’NANJ/’YNANCH  
BLGH/BLGA BWKW KHAN. I cannot find other Persian variations for BWKW in JT. I am 
very curious about the resemblance between BWKW and a Mongolian word Boke, "strong 
(man)", ("starker", Doerfer, p.349.) This word spelt in its written form as boke, such as in 
Ariq-Boke, but in daily colloquial usage, it may be uttered as boko, such as in Buri-BSko (SH  
§131 and §140). This alternation is occurred by the Altaic linguistic rule o f  "assimilation o f  
vowels".
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Second, there is evidence to suggest that the Naimans did have a 
relationship, no matter if only nominally, with the regimes in China, which 
could be the Jurchen or whatever existed earlier. Examining the titles of 
Naiman rulers, three Tayang-Qans can be found in JT\ one was called 
Narqish, one was the son of Anyat-Qan, one was the son of Inanch-Qan. Only 
about the last one can we find more information in the sources, he was the one 
Temujin had defeated and killed in 1204. The title Tayang is believed to come 
from a Chinese title, which reads ta-wang in modern Mandarin, but possibly 
tai-ang/ong (> tal-ang = tayang)50 in its medieval reading, which means 
"grand prince" or "grand king".
Many questions can be raised in the study of Chinese titles on the 
steppe, such as. did the ruler in China confer each of them, or were they 
inheritable by nature, or did the Jurchen only confer the Tayang title on the 
son of Inanch-Qan? However, I do not wish to go further into a detailed 
discussion of these. What I wish to emphasize is, this title of Chinese origin 
did exist as a part of the title of some Naiman rulers, which means, both the
Second, the pronunciation o f the Chinese transcription. The five Chinese characters 
o f  the name/title o f the steppe ruler are quoted here in their modem Mandarin pronunciation, 
not in their medieval phonetic value. To find out the correct medieval phonetic value of 
Chinese characters is an special field o f  academic research, and a difficult one. The term o f  
pi-li-ke  had been identified by scholar Wang Kuo-Wei at the turn o f  twentieth century as 
BelgUtei, but when we compare this to the traditional usage on steppe, this is obviously a 
misleading comparison. As for po-w a, the character wa ( f t ) is pronounced in modern 
Cantonese as a , at the back o f mouth. This resembles the pronouncing position o f  Mongolian 
feminine vowels e, o, 0. If the Cantonese phonetic value could be a relic o f medieval northern 
Chinese, this resemblance is o f  great significance.
I do not assert that po-w a  or BWKW must be an equivalent to the Mongolian boke, 
but, since JT  relates BWKW to a legendary ruler, BWKW may become a prestigious title for 
later rulers. Bilge is a commonly known Turkic word for "knowledge" or "wisdom" (Clauson, 
p.339), therefore, it is not impossible for BWKW to be "strong" as a prestigious title, and both 
o f them appeared as a part o f Inanch’s honourable title.
50 For the medieval phonetic value o f these two Chinese characters, we may consult their 
pronunciation in certain Chinese dialects, for instance, in Cantonese as dai-wong, or in 
Fukinese as dai-'ong.
107
Chinese regime and "these” Naimans, that is, at least part of the Naimans,51 
could have known each other or have had a connection at a certain period.52
Third, the identification of the "two subordinate tribes" in Tung’s
appeal. The assumption for the identity of these two tribes proposed here is,
the south one might have been a group of Kereits who were under Toyoril’s 
leadership, the north one might have been a group of Naimans who were under
Tayang-Qan’s leadership.
As for their subordinate relationship to the Jurchen authority, the Kereit
Toyoril was definitely the "Ong!,-Qan, and the title is recorded as being 
obtained from the Jurchen regime. CCZ, JT  and the SH  all mention the
obtaining of Toyoril’s ong title in the same paragraph that relates Temujin’s 
acceptance of his Jurchen title. They all supply, very explicitly, the 
information that both of the titles were bestowed by the Jurchen authority. 
However, to mention these two events together would be more suitably 
considered as "related" by the nature of the events, rather than in a 
chronological sense. As discussed in the event sequence during this period, 
Toyoril must have been dethroned and have fled far away in the west before 
Temujin defeated the Tatars. Certainly it would have been impossible for him
to take part in this attack, if we choose to believe in the dates provided in the 
campaign details in CS.
If Toyoril did not obtain the title at the same occasion as Temujin’s, he 
must have obtained it after his return from the west or before his dethronement
and exile. It seems that the second dating is more convincing because the
51 The Tayang-Naiman is just a group o f Naimans under the leadership o f a qan who bore 
this Chinese-style title. There are other groups o f Naimans under the other leaders, such as 
Buiruq-Qan. Discussion see below.
52 It is difficult to tell if  there was any formal relationship between the regimes o f Jurchen 
and Tayang-Naiman. JT  pp. 128-129 does relate that the Khitai rulers entitled (laqab kardari) 
Tai-Buqa as TaT-wang, however, laqab kardan in this sentence would possibly be just 
descriptive, without a serious investiture meaning.
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sources have recorded historical events after 1196 in detail and they do not 
mention the reception of this title in the later accounts. If Toyoril had, or 
started, a good relationship with Jurchen China and obtained his ong title
before Temujin got his, also before he left Mongolia and fled into Qara-Khitai,
would Toyoril have been considered as a subordinate by the Jurchen authority 
before he lost his rulership, and could he possibly be identified as a
"subordinate" who "defended the frontier" by Tung Shih-Chung?
Tung Shih-Chung related that these "subordinate tribes" had been 
"intimidated by Pi-li-ke-po-wa" and "with the whole tribe/clan [they] followed 
after [him]". This is an observation from an officer of the Jurchen regime. 
Would this "intimidation", in reality, be Pi-li-ke-po-wa’s "acquisition" of this 
tribe? Only by overthrowing this "Jurchen subordinate", could the "whole 
tribe" of "Ong"-Qan appear as withdrawn from Jurchen’s control and to have 
"followed after" another authority. More accurately, this incident might simply 
be a shift of the Kereit rulership to another Kereit prince, Erke-Qara, who had 
no relation to the Jurchen regime but was supported by the Naiman Inanch- 
Qan.
ToyoriTs Chinese-style title suggests that he has a connection with the 
Jurchen authority, and this connection must have started from his generation, 
not his ancestors’. This connection does not have a precedent in Kereit history 
because no other Ong-Qan can be found in the sources —  apparently the title 
was not obtained by inheritance. If the title was given to him by the Jurchen 
authority, as recorded in the sources, he might have been considered as a 
subordinate by the Jurchen officials, and the "intimidation" or "acquisition" of
a Jurchen subordinate tribe by Pi-li-ke-po-wa corresponds to ToyoriTs 
dethronement by Inanch-Qan. In this way, to compare ToyoriTs regime to the 
southern subordinate tribe in Tung’s appeal is logical.
If one of the "subordinate tribes" can be identified with Toyoril-Kereit, 
then who can be the other?
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Let us look into the Tayang title of some Naiman rulers. There were 
several Tayang-Qans in Naiman history, nevertheless, it seems that no two 
Tayang-Qans existed in the same generation.53 There were many other titles 
for the Naiman rulers, such as Buiruq or Giichuluk, or in the example of 
Inanch-Qan, a ruler could bear a series of honourable titles — but not everyone 
a Tayang. Besides, as seen from the Naiman history related in JT, when the 
descendants of Naiman rulers disagreed with each other, they separated from 
each other and lived apart, while each of their leaders bore their own 
honourable titles. This multi-leadership is different from the single rulership 
of the Kereit tribe. Suppose a group of Naimans whose leader bore the 
Chinese-style title of Tayang "joined" the group of Inanch "Bilge-BWKW" 
Qan, would this incident be understood, or judged, by the Jurchen as "a 
subordinate tribe" (Tayang) "who now lured" (joined) and withdrew from the 
Jurchen, with the "whole tribe/clan" (a shift of overlordship) going under the 
leadership of Pi-li-ke-po-wa (Bilge-BWKW)?
I admit that to relate the Toyoril-Kereit and the Tayang-Naiman to the 
two subordinate tribes of Jurchen only by a similarity in Chinese title Is 
dangerous. However, we cannot deny the manifest uniqueness of this 
evidence: the only two tribes whose rulers bore a Chinese title, at the period 
around 1193, can found in the sources are precisely the Naiman and the Kereit.
The examinations of the date when Toyoril obtained the title, and the 
administrative structure of the Naiman tribe can reinforce these assumptions.
If the assumptions are correct, it confirms that the Pi-li-ke-po-wa in this
account was Inanch-Bilge-BWKW-Qan.
53 I doubt that one o f  the Tayangs, who was a son o f Anyat-Qan, could be the same 
Tayang, who was a son o f Inanch-Qan, because this Anyat-Qan can possibly be the same 
person as Inanch-Qan. First, JT  relates that Anyat-Qan had two sons, Buiruq and Tayang(- 
Khan), they disagreed with each other. Compare with the history o f  Inanch-Qan, where there 
seems no gap between the succession o f Buiruq and Tayang to the throne o f  Inanch-Qan, and 
they two disagreed with each other. Second, J T s transcriptions for the names o f Anyat-Qan 
and Inanch-Qan are curiously puzzling: ’NYAT/’YNAT for the former, ’NANJ/’YNANCH for 
the latter. I cannot find further evidence to verify this possible identification, however, if  
Anyat was Inanch, there would be only two Tayang-Qans in Naiman history, as seen in the 
sources.
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Since Inanch-Qan can be identified with Pi-li-ke-po-wa, Tung Shih- 
Chung’s appeals in the spring of 1193 supports the view that Inanch-Qan was 
alive at that time. As for the account recounting the sovereignty shift of 
"being lured" (Tayang-Naiman) and "being intimidated" (Toyoril-Kereit), it is 
certain that Toyoril had been dethroned in, or before, the spring of 1193 — the 
incident seems to have happened not far from the time of the appeals.
JaYa-Gambu in the TangYut and JaYut regions
In the reconstructed event sequence, Kereidei (Jaya-Gambu) left
Temujin after his defeat in the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en, and went to the
Tangyut territory. Later, he appears again in the sources, in the Jayut region. 
JT, CCL and the SH  do not report the story of Jaya-Gambu’s travel from
Tangyut to Jayut, probably because it is not closely relevant to the history of 
Temujin. However, the date on which he entered the Tangyut nation is useful 
in fixing the dating of the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en, also the earlier
dethronement of Toyoril; the period in which he wandered in the Jayut region 
could help to fix the date of the return to Mongolia, which ended his exile.
According to JT, Jaya-Gambu enjoyed high prestige and had a quda
relationship to the royal family of the Tangyuts when he was in the Tangyut 
nation. It is very strange to see him wandering along the Chinese-Mongolia
border subsequently, unless the situation in the Tangyut nation was no longer 
as favourable as it was.
An aspect of Tangyut history in the period 1181/82 to 1196 is valuable 
in working out the former dating. In the end of 1193, the long-reigned
Tanygut ruler Jen-Tsung died (1140-1193). Huan-Tsung54 succeeded him to
be the Tangyut ruler. Would this change in the Tangyut rulership effect Jaya- 
Gambu’s interest in the Tangyut nation? Considering the "favourable" and 
"unfavourable" situation of Jaya-Gambu, since he had obtained his title {laqab)
"grand emir of the state" there, it might be reasonable to assume that a change
54 Both Jen-Tsung and Huan-Tsung are their temple titles which appear in Chinese records.
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of attitude on the part of the court had made Jaya-Gambu leave. To support 
this hypothesis, evidence is supplied as follows.
First, in the period from 1181/82 to 1196, there were two Tangyut 
rulers, Jen-Tsung and his successor Huan-Tsung. Who gave Jaya-Gambu 
protection, Jen-Tsung or Huan-Tsung? If it was Huan-Tsung who gave Jaya- 
Gambu his protection, married his daughter and raised him to a high position, 
Jaya-Gambu must have enjoyed an even more prestigious status after Huan- 
Tsung succeeded to the throne in 1194. However, the fact was that, until
Temujin brought him back to Mongolia in 1195 or 1996,55 Jaya-Gambu was
in exile along the Jurchen border. This exile confirms that the Tangyut ruler 
who gave Jaya-Gambu his protection could not be Huan-Tsung, but the late 
old ruler, Jen-Tsung.
Second, later in the winter of 1200/01, when Jaya-Gambu was at odds 
with Toyoril, he was forced into flight. If Jaya-Gambu had had a good 
relationship with the Tangyut Huan-Tsung in his last exile, Huan-Tsung would 
have been his prime choice for this exile. However, he went to the Naiman
Tayang-Qan instead of this Tangyut ruler. Does this imply that Jaya-Gambu 
did not expect Huan-Tsung to be a suitable protector against Toyoril? The 
Tangyut nation was well-known for its closeness with the Jurchen regime, in 
its strength and connection, it could not be considered weak or unable to
protect Jaya-Gambu, unless the ruler had no intention of offering him 
protection.
Third, Huan-Tsung5s attitude towards steppe affairs. This Tangyut ruler 
reigned from 1194-1205, a period which covered Temujin’s defeat of the
Tatars up to Temujin’s destruction of both the Kereits and the Naimans. When
the Kereits had been defeated, Toyoril’s son Senggiim fled, went past the
55 JT recorded this incident in 1195 in its Brief Chronicle, but according to the previous 
discussion about Jaya-Gambu’s coming to Temiijin, this incident would be better placed in 
1196. In either case, the event must have taken place in 1195 or 1196, not earlier or later.
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Tangyut territory and was not sheltered by the Tangyut ruler.56 This flight
must have taken place immediately after the defeat of Toyoril in 1203, in 
which case, he was not sheltered by the Tangyut Huan-Tsung. It seems that 
Huan-Tsung was not enthusiastic in offering political asylum. On the other 
hand, turning back to the earlier exile of Jaya-Gambu, 1193/94 was a feeble 
period of the Tangyut regime. After a long and well-established rule of the 
late ruler which lasted for fifty-four years, the novice ruler would reconsider
the danger of keeping an exiling Kereit prince under protection. Although
Huan-Tsung might not be hostile to Jaya-Gambu, the national interest of 
Tangyut would weigh more than the friendly attitude of the late ruler, or their 
in-laws’ relationship. To keep peace with the powerful Naiman Inanch-Qan, 
or Pi-li-ke-po-wa, to whom his territory was adjoined, was far more important 
to a new holder of the Tangyut rulership.
In the light of all this supporting evidence, the death of Jen-Tsung was
apparently the turning point of the fate of Jaya-Gambu because he had to leave 
the country once he could not secure protection from the newly-succeeded
Huan-Tsung. Where could Jaya-Gambu go? He could not return to Mongolia 
because the Naimans and the new Kereit regime were there. From Tangyut, 
Jaya-Gambu had only two directions to go, either passing through the Tangyut 
territory to Uighur, then going further west to join his elder brother, or 
southeast to the Jurchen border, staying in the buffer zone between the steppe
50 JT  did not mention that Senggtim had passed the Tangyut territory when he fled 
westward. CCL p.64b relates that Yi-la-he (Ilqa-Senggiim) went towards Hsi-Hsia (Tangyut), 
passed by the town o f  Yi-chi-na, and arrived at the tribe o f  P o-li-f u-po. He plundered around 
and wanted to settle down there. [Po-li-jt’u-po [people] gathered tribesmen and drove him 
away. YS p. 12 recounts that Yi-la-he went towards Hsi-Hsia, plundering everyday to sustain 
himself; after a while [he] was driven away by the Hsi-Hsia [people] as well, [he] arrived in 
the nation o f  Ch’iu-tzu (Kucha). In a later account, in 1226, YS relates that Chinggis set out 
against Hsi-Hsia in person because they accepted the enemy Yi-la-he-hsiang-k’un (Ilqa- 
Senggiim) and did not send hostages. According to JT, the 1226 campaign was in nature 
punitive because the Tangyuts refused to send troops to assist in Chinggis’ Transoxiana 
campaign. With so many variations o f the fleeing route o f Senggiim, one could be properly 
agreed is, SenggUm might have passed by the Tangyut territory but he did not settle there. 
YS's accounts are odd among these records because in the first account, it seems to be an error 
mistaken from the events with CCL 's "T’u-po", and in the second account, it seems 
unreasonable for Chinggis to set out so late because o f an offence which happened twenty 
years earlier.
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and Chinese settlement. His next presence in the sources shows that he had 
chosen the shorter way and had gone into the Jayut region.
If the above inference and hypothesis are correct, Jaya-Gambu must 
have come to the Tangyut country before the death of Jen-Tsung, that is the 
end of 1 193.57 With this dating, two other datings can be restored: the Battle
of Thirteen Gure’en and the dethronement of Toyoril. Since Temujin’s defeat 
in the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en was the immediate cause for Jaya-Gambu’s 
seeking protection from the Tangyut Jen-Tsung, the battle can be dated in 1193 
and no earlier than that. Since Kereidei (Jaya-Gambu) was in Temujin’s camp 
when the battle was fought, Toyoril’s regime must have been overthrown 
before, or shortly before, this 1193 battle.
From the above study of the reign of Naiman Inanch-Bilge-BWKW-
Qan, Inanch appears to be alive in 1193, and in or before the spring of 1193.
he had incorporated the Tayang group of Naimans under his leadership, and
had Toyoril’s Kereit regime overthrown. Combining this conclusion with the 
result of the examination of Jaya-Gambu’s journey, the date at which Toyoril 
was overthrown by Inanch-Qan can be set between 1181/82 and the spring of
1193. After the dethronement, the battle of Thirteen Gure’en was fought in 
1193, and then Jaya-Gambu went to the Tangyut nation before the end of 
1193.
The duration of ToYoriPs exile
It seems impossible to know for how long Toyoril had been dethroned
at this time. All the details of the course of the exile we can extract from the
sources are as follows: Toyoril passed through three regions to go to Qara- 
Khitai. He did not stay more than a year there then he left. He was reduced
to such straits that he had to survive with only five goats and two or three
57 The death o f Jen-Tsung was reported to the Jurchen court by his successor on the keng- 
yin g  day o f the eleventh month o f the fourth Ming-Ch’ang year. (CS  10 chi 10 p.230) The 
last day o f 1193 was the sixth day of the twelve month o f the fourth Ming-Ch’ang Year, 
therefore, the date was at the very end of 1193. Jen-Tsung must have died before this date.
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camels. When he heard about the fame of Temujin, he came to join him.
Toyoril arrived in Giise’ur-Nayur, which was not far from the yurt of Temujin, 
in the spring of a Dragon Year (1196). He sent two ndkers to Temujin to
report that he had already returned to Mongolia. These accounts provide no 
clue to precise dating, except for the time of ToyoriTs arrival at Giise’ur- 
Nayur.
We can try to reconstruct the duration of ToyoriTs exile with this one 
available dating, the reconstructed event sequence, and the results of the above
dating discussions. According to the study of ToyoriTs motivation of returning 
Mongolia in section II, Temujin’s victory over the Tatars was the immediate 
cause which stimulated Toyoril to return. According to CS, the Jurchen had 
launched a large scale campaign against the steppe tribes from 1195 to 1196, 
in which the dispersal of a division of the Tatars on the Ulja river could be 
identified with a contribution by the force of Temujin. This dispersal was 
dated in early 1196.58
If Temujin defeated the Tatars in early 1196, according to CS, and 
Toyoril had arrived in Guse’iir-Nayur in the spring of 1196, according to JT, 
the victory must have happened earlier enough for the news to spread to the 
west, which "echoed" with the return journey of Toyoril. In this way, the 
victory should be assumed to have been achieved in early spring of 1196, and
ToyoriTs arrival in late spring of that year.
Taking these dates into account, it seems surprising that Toyoril was 
able to return from the west in no more than three months. However, no one 
can deny that this is a realistic record of the speed of travel from the 
surrounding region of Qara-Khitai to central Mongolia at the end of the twelfth
century. The speed suggests that the "very distant" exile of Toyoril was an 
illusion resulted from his uncertain "long [time] away" from Mongolia —
actually, he was not so far away in distance.
58 Details see Chapter Six.
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Since he was not so "far away" from Mongolia, we shall also reconsider 
the question of whether he had been "long away". If the duration of ToyoriTs 
return journey was not more than three months, combining this evidence with
the other accounts, we may conclude that ToyoriTs exile did not last long. 
Trekking his outbound route and his "less than a year" stay in Qara-Khitai, it
would take him, at most, two years before he decided to go wandering. At the 
following stage of wandering, although the duration is not mentioned in the 
sources, his poverty would not have allowed it to be long, if he had got only 
five goats and some camels for sustenance. Then, as soon as he heard about 
the fame of Temujin, he returned. In this way, Toyoril might not have spent 
much time in travelling to his destination, but most of his exile in wandering.
Combining this personal experience with the general situation in 
Mongolia, when Inanch-Qan "intimidated" the whole Kereit tribe prior to. or 
in the spring of 1193, and Jaya-Gambu arrived in Tangyut no later than the 
end of 1193, it seems that the year 1193 would be a proper focus in the long 
span of the possible period of ToyoriTs dethronement. In this way, the most 
logical reconstruction of ToyoriTs exile will be: Toyoril was dethroned in 
early 1193, after he had spent one or two years in the far west, he must have
begun wandering in or around 1195. After wandering for an unknown, but not 
very long period, let us allow for half to one year maximum, he heard about 
the "fame" of Temujin in spring 1196. Owing to his impoverishment, he must 
have hurried back to Mongolia at full speed regardless of hardship. In no 
more than three months, he arrived in Mongolia in the late spring of 1196. 
This chronology seems to fit both the suggested dating and the accounts in the 
sources.
We cannot place his dethronement after the spring of 1193, and we 
cannot date his return to Mongolia before the late spring of 1196. In the light 
o f a comparison of the speed and the distance, his poverty during the exile and 
the "no less than a year" stay in Qara-Khitai, his exile could not have lasted 
long. Therefore, it is reasonable to fix his exile at early 1193 to late spring
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of 1196, or, being more flexible, that it started at 1192/93 but not earlier than 
that.
* *  *  *
The reconstruction of the above dating is of great significance to both 
Kereit history and the history of Temujin. According to the above discussions,
a chronology can be set up as follows: When Erke-Qara escaped from Toyoril 
and took refuge with the Naiman Inanch-Qan, the latter attacked Toyoril on 
behalf of Erke-Qara, and dethroned Toyoril in 1192/93, or no later than the 
spring of 1193. The Kereit ulus fell into chaos, Toyoril fled west, and 
Kereidei (later Jaya-Gambu) came to Temujin. Unfortunately, Temujin was 
subsequently defeated by his Mongol kinsmen in the Battle of Thirteen
Giire'en, which must have taken place later in the same year of 1193, so that
Kereidei left Temujin and went to the Tangyut ruler. However, unfortunately 
for Jaya-Gambu this time, the Tangyut ruler who offered him protection and 
prestige had passed away at the end of 1193. The new ruler adopted a new
policy, which caused Jaya-Gambu to leave the Tangyut territory, and to 
wander on the border of Jurchen China.
Two years later, in the winter 1195/96, the Jurchen launched their long- 
prepared campaign against the steppe tribes. In the pursuit of the defeated 
Tatars, Temujin offered assistance to the Jurchen troops by attacking the 
frightened Tatars at the Ulja river in early 1196. Temujin won the battle and 
seized some valuable booty, which brought him a good reputation across the
steppe. Poor Toyoril in the west heard about the news, and decided to come 
to Temujin immediately. He arrived in Mongolia, at Guse’ur-Nayur which 
was not far from the yurt of Temujin and informed Temujin of his coming in 
late spring of 1196. Temujin welcomed him in person, collected provisions 
from his own tribe to support Toyoril, and in that very autumn, they declared 
themselves father-and-son in the Black Forest on the Tuyula river. The 
chronology regarding Toyoril’s dethronement and exile, combined with the 
history of Temujin, is now clear.
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When the dates have been worked out, many interesting suggestions can
be made on the ground of this explicit chronology, especially a new view of
the history of Temujin. If the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en took place in 1193,
when Temujin was thirty-one years old, and he was defeated, in what way did
he rebuild his strength, which was strong enough to earn him the title Jayut- 
Quri in just two and half years? What had happened to him between 1193 and
1196? What was Temujin’s relationship to his fellow Mongol branches, the 
Taichiyut who attacked him in 1193 and the Jurkin who quarrelled with him 
in the winter of 1195/96? Did his fellow Mongols take advantage of Toyoril’s 
absence from Mongolia to turn against Temujin? What was his situation 
before 1193, before he reached his thirties? Some of these aspects will be 
discussed in the following chapters.
As for Kereit history, if it is linked up with the last appearance of
Toyoril in the sources before the dethronement, the reconstructed dating 
reveals that Toyoril was in a stable situation and stayed in power in 1181/82 
until he was overthrown by the Naimans in 1192/93. It seems that he had
enjoyed a decade of peace before his career reached its lowest ebb. He had a
peaceful and enjoyable middle age, if he was born around 1148.59 At this
age, mid-thirties to mid-forties, Toyoril as the ruler of the Kereit ulus could
also be regarded as a stabilising power on the steppe for this decade, and
young Temujin, the leader of the Qabul-Mongol, looked upon the middle-aged
Toyoril as his "counted" father.
In the year 1193, the good days were over and disturbances entered 
Temujin’s life, starting with his defeat in the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en. The 
subsequent disorders brought the young man experience and maturity, while 
the powerful middle-aged man fell from the height of his career and was 
severely damaged by the interruption. The power structure of the Mongolian 
steppe began to change, and according to the reconstruction of facts, sequences 
and dating in this chapter, this crucial change occurred in a rather short period
59 See discussion in Chapter One section III.
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of three years: from 1192/93 to early 1196. After this period of change, steppe 
history moved into a new era of expansion, of the Temtijin-Mongol.
Chapter Three
119
From Friend to Foe:
A Change in the Temtij in-Toyoril Relationship
The general situation of Mongolia in mid-1196 can be described as 
follows. In the east, some Tatars had recently been defeated by the huge 
Jurchen force at the Keltiren river. A division of the Tatars retreated 
northwards along the Ulja river, and they were assaulted from the front by 
Temujin. This victory brought Temujin fame as well as a title/position from 
the Jurchen commander. In short, eastern Mongolia was in disorder during this 
period because of warfare.
In central Mongolia, Temujin was at odds with his Jurkin kinsmen,
while at the same time he befriended the exiled Kereit princes. Jaya-Gambu 
and Toyoril were both welcomed to stay in his camp, and the scattered Kereits 
were also gathered together at this time. The situation marks a change in 
Temujin’s attitude towards relationships: as a leader of the Qabul-Mongol, he 
would rather accept the friendship of his neighbouring Turkic regime than keep 
up with the pride of his genealogical seniors.
To the west of Temujin’s dominion, the mighty Naiman tribe was still
in possession of the Kereit territory. According to Temujin’s new dimension
of thought towards relationships, if Temujin decided to rely upon Kereit
support, he had to restore Toyoril to his former leadership first. This could 
only be achieved by defeating the Naimans.
To the south, Temujin had recently obtained a peaceful relationship 
with Jurchen China and to his east, the Turkic or Mongol tribes were occupied 
with the subsequent attacks of the Jurchen force; neither Jurchen China nor the 
tribes would pay attention to developments in central Mongolia. This
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circumstance did allow Temujin to prepare for a campaign against the Naimans 
who were in the opposite direction.
In the autumn of 1196, Toyoril and Temujin formally declared their 
close relationship in the black forest on Tuyula river. Afterwards, Temujin 
assisted Toyoril in preparing for his restoration. The steppe situation at this 
moment was different from the time when Toyoril was dethroned; several 
changes of the situation contributing to this successful restoration will be
discussed in section I.
At the end of the restoration campaign, an incident happened when the 
Toyoril-Temiijin joint force met Kokse’ii-Sabraq at Baidaraq-Belchir. The 
cause and consequence of this incident are investigated in section II of this
chapter. After this, Toyoril and Temujin continued with their agreement to 
assist each other in several campaigns, until their ambitions clashed. An
extensive analysis of the rapid change of the political situation in 1202-1203
will be provided in section III, which ends in the final collapse of the Toyoril 
regime.
I. Factors contributing to the restoration
After Toyoril and Temujin had confirmed their friendly relationship in 
the Black Forest Declaration in the autumn of 1196, Temujin took care of
Toyoril, as a son to his father, until Toyoril had become strong enough to 
launch his restoration campaign. It is not clear whether Temujin had supplied
Toyoril with any military assistance in his campaign against the Naiman 
Buiruq-Qan, although he did appear, on the side of Toyoril, in a later 
confrontation with Kokse’ii-Sabraq, a general of Buiruq-Qan. Anyhow, in the
earlier campaign, the restoration force pursued Buiruq-Qan of the mighty
Naiman1 to his camp at Kishil-Bash (lake)2 and plundered the Naiman people.
1 "Buiruq-Qan o f GuchugQt-Naiman" in SH  §158, Giichiigurtei Buiruq-Qan in §177.
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Buiruq-Qan fled temporarily to Kem-Kemjiut, which was in the territory of the 
Kirgiz.3
However, this success should not be credited alone to the generous
assistance and care of Temujin. A change of the situation on the Mongolian
steppe, especially those within the Naiman tribe and between Toyoril-Kereit 
and Toqtoya-Merkit, helped a lot in creating favourable circumstances for 
ToyoriTs restoration.
First, the Naiman tribe had lost its former predominant superiority, after
Toyoril had been dethroned and before he was restored, owing to internal 
disagreements. JT  pp. 128-129 relates that Inanch-Bilge-BWKW-Qan was an
esteemed ruler (mu'tabar). His elder son was called Tai-Buqa,4 whom the
Kliitai (Jurchen) rulers entitled (laqab kardan) Tal-Wang, and so he was the
Tayang-Qan. Another son of Inanch was called Buiruq-Qan. These two sons
did not get along well with each other, as even their father could tell when he
was still alive. After the death of Inanch-Qan, these two brothers quarrelled
over a concubine of their father and became hostile and separated. The emirs
and troops separated, too, following their chosen leader. Tayang, since he was
the elder son, possessed the Naiman throne and lived on plains, while Buiruq
lived in the hilly lands.
As discussed in section III of Chapter Two, Inanch-Qan may have died 
in or after 1193 but before 1199. According to this dating, the quarrel 
between the two sons after his father’s death, must have happened sometime 
around 1193 to 1199. Their disagreement had obviously split up the Naiman
2 JT  p.366 QYZYL-BASH, CCL p.26b, Hei-hsin-pa-shih. The first consonant o f this place 
name, Ikf in the SH, /q/ in JT  and /h/ in CCL, are the same in written Mongolian. This is 
evidence for the existence o f an original written Mongolian text for these three sources.
3 JT  p.366. The attacking route follows SH  §158. SH  §158 recounts the consequence as 
"they destroyed him" at Lake Kishil-Bash, however, this would not cohere with his later 
appearance in the Battle o f Koyiten and his final capture by TemUjin on Soqoq-Usun (river) 
at Uluq-Taq (mountain) in 1206.
4 TAYBWQA, or BAYBWQA/BAY-BWQA. JT p.365 TAYBWQA/TABWQA
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realm, and also their officials and supporters, into two. This disagreement can
be further proved by a historical event: when Toyoril was fighting Buiruq-Qan 
in 1199 and pushed him back, apparently Tayang-Qan did not help his defeated 
brother. The split of the Naiman authority inevitably divided their strength, 
so that the Naimans were not as strong as they were six years previously. The 
internal disagreement of his enemy had made ToyoriTs restoration easier.
Second, Toyoril rebuilt his force in two years from 1197 to 1198. How 
did he obtain such a speedy renovation of his force? The material foundation 
was not provided by the Temujin-Mongol, but came with the wealth of the 
Turkic Merkits. According to the records of JT  and CCL, Temujin looted the 
Merkits in the autumn of 1197.5 In this attack, Temujin fought Toqtoya at 
Muruche-Se’ul by the Qadiqliq (/Qadingliq) Niruyun (ridge),6 then Temujin 
offered all the booty: horses, tents and "crops", to Toyoril to assist him in his 
poverty. After this, in this year 1198, Toyoril set out alone to attack the 
Merkits on the Buyura steppe. He chased Toqtoya towards the Barqujin, killed 
his eldest son Togus-Beki, seized his women and held part of the Merkit 
people who belonged to the brother or son of Toqtoya.7 He did not give a 
share of this booty to Temujin. Apparently, the abundant booty of these two 
lootings was useful in recovering ToyoriTs strength.
5 CCL p.25a, "the next autumn" after the Black Forest Declaration. JT  p.364, a Snake 
Year.
6 SH  §177 "Muriiche-Se’til by the Qadiqliq ridge", YS "Mo-na-ch’a mountain" or "Ha-ting- 
li", CCL p.25a "Mo-ch’a-na mountain" or p.51a "the west o f  Ha-ting-hei mountain, the plain 
o f Mu-na-ch’a-hsiao-li". JT  p.364 "at a place which is called MWRWCHH-S’WL" or variation 
MWNJH. Apparently, M o-ch’a-na on CCL p.25a should be Mo-na-ch’a. The conflict o f  
Miiriiche and MWNJH can be solved if the /r/ (^>) in SH  is a misreading from /n/ (-f ). JT  
p.364, the site is before the Keliiren and not far from the Selengge river. SH  alone records that 
Temujin chased Toqtoya towards the Barqujin, which is on Lake Baikal, I am in doubt o f  the 
accuracy o f  this account, and I believe that his flight should be correctly placed in the next 
defeat o f Merkit in 1198, in which Toqtoya was overwhelmed by Toyoril, his wives/daughters 
and sons/brothers were killed or captured while himself fled to Barqujin.
7 SH  §157, wives and sons. CCL p.26ab relates that Toyoril had captured two khatuns, 
and beckoned to the two younger sons o f  Toqtoya to come to him. JT  p.364 relates the 
captured women were Toqtoya’s "two daughters/girls" and these men his "two brothers", while 
in p.368 it relates that for these two males, Qodu was Toqtoya’s brother and Chilayun was his 
son. In the account o f  Merkit tribe, JT  p.95 relates that Qodu was the brother o f  Toqtoya and 
Chilayun "who bom to Ong-Qan’s daughter".
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Temujin’s 1197 attack upon the Merkits is not difficult to understand, 
because the long enmity between the Merkits and the Temujin family does not 
need further explanation. However, it is curious to see Toyoril turning against 
his son-in-law. Toqtoya seems to have maintained a good relationship, also 
an in-laws’ connection with Toyoril since his first struggle for the Kereit 
qanship. Under what circumstance, or with what excuse, would Toyoril attack 
Toqtoya?
Perhaps an earlier incident can supply an explanation for this action. 
When the Merkits assaulted Temujin in 1196, they had carelessly targeted also 
the exiled Kereit prince Jaya-Gambu. There seems to have been no other 
wealthy tribes nearby but Toyoril needed desperately to boost his material 
possessions. No matter how intimate the Toyoril-Toqtoya relationship was, 
wealth which could support Toyoril’s restoration seemed much more valuable 
than affinity at this crucial time. Probably with this excuse. Toyoril took 
"revenge" and plundered Toqtoya.
With the shelter provided by Jayut-Quri, a division of the Naiman 
authority and the possession of Merkit’s wealth, the situation was favourable 
for Toyoril to launch his restoration campaign. Toyoril did take advantage of 
this situation, and successfully recovered his ulus from the Naimans. The
future of this Toyoril-Kereit regime seemed bright, if he could still make use 
of the circumstances, namely, friendly support from the Temtij in-Mongol, a
weakened Merkit and a split Naiman. However, some problems had occurred
at the end of 1199, and the subsequent incidents led to a quick downfall of his
regime, in no more than four years.
II. Distrust in 1199-1200
The friendship between Toyoril and Temujin went well, until a 
desertion on the battlefield.
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In the winter8 of 1199/1200, the forces of Temujin and Toyoril came
to face a brilliant Naiman general: Kokse’ti-Sabraq.9 After an initial fight, or
according to the SH, before they fought, Toyoril and Temujin were stationed
at Baidaraq-Belchir overnight to wait for dawn. During the night, Toyoril 
pulled out secretly. Next morning, Temujin discovered this desertion, or
betrayal. He was apparently enraged. Temujin then withdrew from the
battlefield as well, and returned to the Sayari steppe.10
It seems that the sources implied that this desertion was caused by an
untrue slander uttered by Jamuqa. The sources relate that Jamuqa had told
Toyoril that "Temujin is the migratory lark", implying that Temujin was 
unreliable and that he was going to migrate to the other side.
This opinion does not have a solid basis when we compare it with the
timing described in the same sources. All three sources record that at dawn,
when Jamuqa saw that the standard (tuq) of Toyoril was not in its previous
location, he rode to him and spoke those words. If the timing in the three
sources is correct, Jamuqa should not be used as a scapegoat for ToyoriTs 
withdrawal: Toyoril could not have withdrawn (moved his standard) before 
Jamuqa’s slander reached him at the next dawn, if his movement was solely
stimulated by the slander.
If his withdrawal was not caused by a slander, then what made him pull 
out without informing his ally in front of a dangerous rival? Would he not 
have understood that the consequence of this action would be the destruction
8 CCL p.27a.
9 KWKSWW SAYRAQ/KWKSAKW SRAQ/KWKSAKY. Tayang-Qan’s high official 
Qori-SUbechi had said o f  him in 1204: "what a pity that Kokse’ii-Sabraq has grown old; how  
lax has the discipline in our army become!" (SH  §194) It is clear that, from this description, 
Kokse’u-Sabraq was not very young in 1199, and, he must have been an expert in military 
affairs especially in putting the troops under discipline.
10 JT  pp.366-368, CCL pp.27a-28a, SH  §159 and §161.
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of his ally and caring son Temiijin? Supposing that this action was not related 
to slanders, then what is the explanation?
The evil intention and attempts
The real reason, which I take to be a more convincing elucidation of
Toyoril’s pull-out can only be explained if taken together with some other later 
incidents. According to JT , immediately after the settlement of this Naiman
campaign, Toyoril had attempted to bribe Temiijin’s closest noker Boyorchu, 
and to capture Temiijin at a feast.
First, to bribe Boyorchu. After the Baidaraq-Belchir encounter, 
Kokse’ii-Sabraq went after the retreating Toyoril and plundered his people at 
Telegetti Pass. Toyoril appealed to Temiijin for reinforcement, and Temiijin 
sent out his nokers, including Boyorchu, to recover the Kereit people. When 
the warfare was concluded, "one day", Toyoril invited Boyorchu to his place. 
He gave him ten golden manqur (?goblets) as a present. Compared with the 
booty Temiijin had got from the Tatars, these goblets must have been very
valuable. Boyorchu then reported this to Temiijin and handed in the goblets 
when he returned. He confessed to Temiijin that he should not go over to 
Toyoril’s place, and leave Temiijin unattended.11
According to the record sequence of events in JT , after Toyoril failed
to bribe Boyorchu, he had tried to capture Temiijin when they were having a 
gathering at Sayari steppe (Temiijin’s residence) in the spring of 1200. 
"People say that", in the feast, a Bayarin called Usun suspected [something 
unusual]. He put a knife into his boot, and sat between Toyoril and Temiijin. 
He was eating meat, kept turning back to look [at them] and having a
conversation [with others]. Because of this, Toyoril acknowledged that they 
had known about his villainy, so that he was unable to carry on.12
11 JT  p.370. BWRCHY reads Burju, < Boyorchu.
12 JT  p.371. The record is not complete. The last sentence o f  this record is "Chinggis-Qan 
by this reason, tuman-i BARYN ... ". If we relate this to the award Usun had received from 
Temiijin, the complete sentence would possibly be either "Chinggis-Qan by this reason, he
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This Usun-Noyan in JT  can be identified with Usun-Ebtigen (Usun the
Old Man) in SH  §216, who had been awarded a prestigious position: the beki
of the Bayarin tribe, by Temiijin. No explicit contributions of his which are 
directly related to his prestigious award can be found in the sources, except for
a vague sentence in the same paragraph of the SH, which relates that Usun
always reported to Temiijin what he saw, heard, thought and comprehended
without hiding or concealing. This attitude can possibly be related to his
uncovering and prevention of the above attempt upon the life of Temiijin.
Three attempts were carried out in a few months —  must there not 
have been some intention behind them? Is it reasonable to conclude from 
these incidents that Toyoril had tried to destroy Temiijin? This first 
abandonment is suspiciously evil, while the later two were certainly
malevolent, as implied in the accounts.
Let us turn back to the time of the withdrawal from the battlefield, the 
winter of 1199/1200. Looking into the circumstances of the power structure 
on the Mongolian steppe during Toyorifs restoration campaign, the Naiman 
tribe and the Temiij in-Mongol were undoubtedly the strongest. The Tatars
were weakened in the warfare with the Jurchen, the Merkits had been looted 
twice in two years, respectively by Temiijin and Toyoril. In the restoration 
campaign, the Naiman Buiruq-Qan was put to flight while his disaffected 
brother Tayang-Qan remain neutral. It seems that all Toyorifs enemies were 
removed.
Temiijin did appear to be too strong as a vassal to Toyoril during this 
time. Young Temiijin would be a good ally, but when the lamb grew up, 
Toyoril might not be able to keep him under control. If Toyoril had made up 
his mind to consider Temiijin as a threat, it was possible for him to abandon 
Temiijin on the battlefield in the final combat, deliberately, and hope that the 
Naimans would do the job for him.
gave the Bayarin Thousand to Usun" or "he made Usun a Thousand leader o f  the Bayarins".
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Temiijin had then come to notice the evil situation, if not his intention,
and furiously described this abandonment as "they certainly treat us like food
burned at the sacrifice for the dead", which means "like something that is no
longer useful and can be discarded".13 This description tells that, in
Temiijin’s understanding, Toyoril intended to disable Temiijin after he had 
outlasted his usefulness. This observation is accurate when we compare the
situation in central Mongolia at that time, also Toyorifs later "attempts". This 
explains the real reason of Toyorifs withdrawal from Baidaraq-Belchir.
The Red Hills Promise
Unfortunately, Toyoril miscalculated the situation and acted too early. 
The Naimans knew who their enemy was. They did not chase after Temiijin
but came after Toyoril. Having no alternative, Toyoril had to turn to the only 
power who could counter the Naimans, that is Temiijin, for help. Temiijin sent
out the reinforcement, and recovered the Kereit people for Toyoril. However, 
Temiijin did not forget the previous desertion on the battlefield. It seems that
Temiijin had demanded from Toyoril an explanation for his previous 
withdrawal, immediately after the warfare concluded. The result of their
explanation and negotiation was the Red Hills Promise in the winter of
1199/1200.
The Red Hills Promise has not been singled out by previous researchers
as an individual and important event, nonetheless it is of great significance to
the development of the Toyoril-Temujin relationship. One possible reason for 
its being neglected is, it is not stated in the explicit chronological history of
Temiijin, but is only recorded in the complicated paragraph dealing with
Temiij in’s reprimand of Toyoril. Besides, in the account of SH  §164, it is
mixed up with the "Black Forest Declaration", therefore, researchers may have
overlooked it if they were unable to separate these two events.
13 SH  §161. Annotation by Igor de Rachewiltz, PFEH 13 (1976) p.51.
128
These two events in SH  § 164 can be separated from each other, by an
investigation of the locations where the events took place. The "Black Forest
Declaration" —  the phrase is invented for narrative convenience in this thesis
—  is the occasion on which Toyoril and Temiijin declared to each other 
father-and-son "in the black forest on the Tuyula river" right after Toyoril 
returned to Mongolia in 1196. To be precise, the "Black Forest Declaration"
was proclaimed in the autumn of 1196.14 The rest of SH  §164 text should be 
referred to a later re-confirmation of their relationship, which took place at 
Hulayan-Qut-Boldayut (Red-cliff-hills) of Jorqal-Qun, according to §177 in the 
same source.
The relevant text in the reprimand in §177 is quoted below:
O qan my father, what did we agreed upon, the two of us? At 
Hula’a nuTit Bolda’ut of Jorqal-qun, did we not say to each 
other that if a snake with teeth incites us against one another, 
to his incitements let us not fall; by explaining eye to eye, we 
shall believe. Did we not agree on this? And now, o qan my 
father, when you aparted from me (ie Battle at Qalaqaljit-Elet), 
did we have an explanation eye to eye? If a snake with fangs 
spreads slander about us, his slander let us not accept; by 
explaining face to face, we shall believe. Did we not agree on 
this? And now, o qan my father, when you separated from me, 
did we have an explanation face to face?15
This account recounts an agreement between Toyoril and Temiijin which 
cannot be found in the chronological history and hence can not be dated. I 
assume that this promise shall be dated to the turn of 1199-1200, immediately 
after Temiijin had rescued the Kereit ulus from Kokse’ii-Sabraq. My 
assumption is based on a coincidence of the site of Red Hills in both accounts, 
and the record sequence of the events in the sources.
14 CCL p.24b, autumn.
15 Translation by Igor de Rachewiltz, PEFH  16 (1977) pp.34-35. I have slightly amended 
the punctuation.
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In the chronological histories, Temiijin reinforced Toyoril’s force and 
fought Kokse’ii-Sabraq at Hulayan-Qut (red cliff) according to SH  §163, or 
"Hu-la-he shan" (*Hulaqa Hill, red hill) according to CCL p.29b. JT  does not 
record the site in its chronological account.
Regarding the promise related in the reprimand, it was agreed at the 
hills of Hu-la-a-pan-ta-wu chuo-erh-wan-hu-nu (Hulaya-Boldayut, Jorqal-Qun), 
according to CCL p.52a, or at a place "on the Qara river, that is HWLAAN 
NWWT (*Hula’a~nu’ut), and close to a hill which is called JWRQAL-QWN", 
according to JT  p.389. A variation of JT  p.389’s HWLAAN NWWT is 
HWLAN-BYLTATWWT, and the latter can be restored as Hulan-Boldayut, 
< Hulayan-Boldayut. This place name means "red hills", and this is the very 
location where Temiij in expelled Kokse’ii-Sabraq.
As for the location mentioned in the reprimand of SH  §177, 
Hula’anu’ut-Boldayut can be possibly be understood as Hulayan-Qut Boldayut, 
with a similar meaning to "red hills". I strongly suspect that the HWLAAN 
NWWT in JT  p.389 is a recent "correction" by the editor of Persian text, who 
put away HWLAN-BYLTATWWT as a "variation" and "corrected" it with the 
spelling in SH  §177.16
On the other hand, both CCL and JT  record this promise in the 
reprimand, after Temiijin has mentioned his rescue of the Kereit people from 
Kokse’ii-Sabraq, and before Temiijin mentions his battle with the Qatagins and 
Saljiyuts. According to the event order in the chronicle in JT , Temujin’s 
campaign against these two tribes should be dated after Temiij in’s attack of the 
Taichiyuts, and Temiijin’s attack of the Taichiyuts happened after the above 
mentioned Toyoril-Temiijin gathering in spring 1200. In this way, the Red 
Hills Promise was agreed undoubtedly after the Kokse’ii-Sabraq incident in
16 This is also the possible situation in respect o f Muriiche-Se’ul. The variation MWNJH 
(*Munacha) seems more accurate when compared with the transcriptions in Chinese sources. 
In this instance, Muruche-Se’ul in the main text appears odd.
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winter 1199 and before the gathering in spring 1200, therefore, it should be 
dated at the turn of 1199/1200.
By comparing the location where the conclusive battle against Kokse’ii- 
Sabraq was fought and the location where the promise had been made, these 
two events have been linked up. Also through the event sequence in the 
sources, the promise has found its place in the chronology. We can conclude 
that the Red Hills Promise comes immediately after Temiij in rescued the Kereit 
people from Kokse’ii-Sabraq, and the promise should be dated at the turn of
1199-1200. Obviously, Temiijin had reviewed his relationship with Toyoril on 
the spot immediately after the disturbances were settled.
From the content of the promise, we can tell that there must have been
an "misunderstanding" between two parties, in which one of them had been
incited by "snake teeth", that implies to believe in slander or whatever evil, and
he did not question the other "eye to eye, face to face" for the truth. It is very
clear that the "misunderstanding" could not be other but the distrust between
Toyoril and Temiijin, or it would be better described as, Toyoril towards 
Temiijin.
The sources do not supply any more information about the incitement, 
however, as discussed above, Jamuqa should not be held responsible for this. 
In fact, the explanation of how they resolved their misunderstanding did not 
really matter to the development of history since the vital consequence of the 
desertion had been avoided. The explanation they accepted and the promise 
they agreed at least calmed Temiijin down and preserved a peaceful 
relationship between the two, for the moment.
In spite of the discovery of Toyoril’s distrust of Temiijin, and the 
failure of several attempts upon Temiijin, Toyoril apparently did not abandon 
his constant "intention" towards Temiijin, or the Temiij in-Mongol. On the 
other hand, it seems that Temiijin also began to have an ambition in the Kereit
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ulus in 1202. The conflict of their ambitions and its impact on the Toyoril- 
Temtijin relationship is related in section III.
III. Ambitions and Circumstances in 1202-1203
After the incident of Kokse’u-Sabraq, Temiijin launched a series of 
military operations against the steppe tribes in eastern Mongolia. Briefly, from 
the spring of 1200 to the autumn of 1202, according to the event sequence in 
JT ,17 Temiijin attacked the Taichiyuts on the Onan, then defeated a hostile 
Mongol coalition at Buyur-Nayur —  an coalition made up of the tribes of 
Qatagin, Saljiyut, Dorben (allied with Turkic Tatars) and Qonggirat. After 
this, Temiijin waged a battle against four Tatar leaders at Dalan-Nemiirges.18 
Thereafter, Jamuqa was elected Giir-Qan by certain Mongol tribes and their 
allies in 1201. They set out against Temiijin but were defeated at Yedi(/Teni)- 
Qorqan.19 Subsequently, in the Year* of Dog (1202), Temiijin attacked the 
Alchi-Tatars and Chaqayan-Tatars from (H)ulqui-Siliigeljit.20 Later in that
17 JT  pp.371-381.
18 JT  pp.375-376 has mistaken the tribal identity o f Alaq-Udur and Qirqan-Taishi 
(QYRQYZ in JT  p.82, Ch’i-erh-ha in CCL p.34a). In CCL p.34a, Alaq-Udur was a Tatar 
leader, and in JT  p.82, he was a son o f Megiijin-Se’iiltii and Qirqan-Taishi was the brother o f  
Alaq-Udur. They were not Merkits nor Taichiyuts, as mentioned in JT pp.375-376. Also, in 
CCL p.34b and SH  §153, the location o f battlefield, Dalan-Nemiirges, appears to be the 
battlefield o f  Temiijin’s Tatars’ campaign.
The account o f SH  § 153 might have confused two battles against the Tatars. The first 
shall be the one which fought at Dalan-Nemiirges, dated in the winter o f 1200/01 (CCL p.34a 
and JT  p.377), the enemy was four Tatar emirs (named in JT  pp.375-376, could be the so 
called "Four Tatars" in SH  §1537). The second is the battle of (H)ulqui-Siliigeljit which shall 
be dated in 1202, see CCL p.37b and JT  p.378.
19 CCL p.37b, T’eh-ni-huo-luo-han, JT  p.378, YYDY-QWRQAN.
20 Toyorifs force might have allied with Temiijin in this campaign. According to JT  
p.378, the attacking force set out in the spring o f 1202, and according to CCL p.38a, they 
paused in summer to avoid the heat. Therefore, the engagement must have taken place in 
autumn, and in the autumn, the allied force under the Naiman Buiruq-Qan approached. JT  p. 
records that when the allied force was approaching, Temiijin and Toyoril retreated towards the 
direction o f  "the wall" (utku, "A-lan sai" in CCL) from the place o f  (H)ulqui-Siiiigeljit. 
Apparently, they were both at (H)ulqui-Siltigeljit that autumn. The Tatars were also an old 
foe to the Kereits, it is reasonable to see Toyoril and Temiijin joined together in destroying 
the Tatars.
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autumn, a huge force made up of the defeated tribes, defeated either by 
Temiijin or Toyoril, struck back, which resulted in their spontaneous dispersal 
at Koyiten.
As for the situation in central Mongolia and the relationship between
the Temiij in-Mongol and the Toyoril-Kereit during these two years, Temiijin 
and Toyoril apparently lived in peace, observing the agreement they made at 
Red Hills, and assisted each other in military affairs21 up to the phoney battle
at Koyiten, until the failure of a marriage proposal in the winter of 1202.
In this disagreement, Toyoril and Temiijin "lost affection" to each 
other. CCL p.42a describes that they "slightly detached [from each other] since
then", SH  §165 describes from the perspective of Temiijin that Temiijin "in his 
heart lost affection for" Toyoril and Senggiim, and JT  p.381 relates that "a 
little sorrow began to appear among them". With our knowledge of Toyoril’s 
"intention" towards Temiijin which has been analyzed in section II, it would 
be more appropriate to say that the tension had "resumed" this time, rather than 
"built up".
Moreover, the circumstances in the winter of 1202/03 provided a fertile
ground for their dissension. An examination of TemiijhTs attitude towards the
Taichiyut tribe, and Toyoril’s attitude towards Jamuqa reveals that during
1200-1202 before their disagreement on the marriage proposal, both Toyoril 
and Temiijin had showed an interest in expanding their dominion by taking
over other existing powers. The failure of the marriage proposal, in fact, was
a clash of their interests, or, ambition.
This section concentrates on indicating important events which reveal
or cause the change of the political situation in central Mongolia during this
period, including Toyoril’s attitude towards Jamuqa and some anti-Temiijin 
Mongols, and Temiijin’s ambition in expanding his leadership.
21 Ibid.
The alliance of Toyoril and Jamuqa
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SH  §144 relates that upon the retreat of the enemy forces in the Battle 
of Koyiten in autumn 1202, Toyoril pursued Jamuqa and Temiij in chased after 
the Taichiyuts.
How should we understand this pursuit? Regarding the relationship 
between the Taichiyuts and Temiijin, the qan of Qabul-Mongol at this time,22 
genealogically, they were the closest kinsmen, brother branches descended 
from two sons of Qaidu, the greatest branches in NIrun-Mongol, peers but 
independent of each other. If Temiijin intended to extend his rulership over 
other Mongol tribes, to unite the Qaidu-Mongol by annexing the greatest 
brother branch would be the first task. Since there was no general leader for 
the Taichiyut tribes at this time. Temiijin had to destroy all of the potential 
opponents.23
If this relation between Temiijin and the Taichiyuts, also his earlier 
campaigns against certain Mongol tribes and the Tatars, can be interpreted as 
"ambitious for power", then, what shall we consider Toyoril’s pursuit of 
Jamuqa?
Jamuqa belonged to the Jadaran or Jajirat tribe, whose ancestor had a 
matrilineal connection to the Borjigin-Mongol,24 and he had recently been 
elected Gur-Qan, supported by important non-Borjigin Mongol tribes. At the 
time of the Battle of Koyiten, he was at the head of these Mongol kinsmen.25
22 See Chapter Four, the analysis o f Temujin’s being elected as a Mongol qan.
23 JT  p. 189, the disagreement among leading kinsmen and the contest for Taichiyut 
leadership continued when Temiijin waged battles against them. Details related in Chapter 
Four.
24 The first ancestor o f the Jadaran clan was called Jajiratai, who was born by a women 
o f Bodonchar but his father was not Bodonchar.
25 A branch o f Qonggirat who elected Jamuqa as Giir-Qan had submitted to Temiijin in 
1201. JT  p,378. Therefore, they were not supposed to fight for Jamuqa in this battle.
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It is strange to see the Kereit ruler pursuing the leader of certain Mongols. 
Could his intention have been similar to Temujin’s: an interest in expansion?
If Toyoril was ambitious for power, there were some other Turkic 
tribes also in retreat: the Naiman, the Oirat and the Merkit. Is it not curious
that Toyoril ignored these Turkic people but followed after a Mongol leader?
The relationship between Jamuqa and Toyoril then needs re­
examination.
First of all, it is a fact that Jamuqa had disagreed with Temiijin since
the incident of Taichar (?1193), and if Toyoril did have a destructive intention 
towards Temiijin since 1199/1200, Jamuqa and Toyoril were both anti-Temiijin 
at this time (1202).
From the perspective of Toyoril, if Toyoril was still keen on 
overthrowing Temiijin, he should have learnt the lesson from his previous 
failure that he would not able to achieve this on his own. To ally with another 
anti-Temiijin power might appear to Toyoril as an opportunity, however, the 
Turkic Merkits, one of Temujin’s enemies, would not befriend Toyoril after 
his plundering in 1198. Another great power which was not getting along with
the Temiij in-Mongol was the Taichiyut tribe. However, obviously the tribe 
was the main target of Temujin’s expansion. It would be unwise to annoy the
powerful Temiijin by having an interest in the Taichiyut-Mongol. In this way, 
Jamuqa who was at the head of a group of anti-Temiijin Mongols might attract 
Toyorifs attention. Most of these anti-Temiijin Mongols had a genealogical 
comiection to Borjigin-Mongol but this connection was distant enough for them 
to have a marriage relationship; besides, they were not under the sphere of 
influence, or interest, of Temiijin, at least at that moment. An interest in this 
group of steppe people then seems sensible, no matter if Toyoril was 
considering whether to ally with them or to annex them.
From the perspective of Jamuqa, he seemed always have been keeping 
in touch with Toyoril. In the accounts of the winter of 1199/1200, Jamuqa had
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appeared on the battlefield of Baidaraq-Belchir, reason unknown, and spoke 
"slanders" about Temiijin to Toyoril. This action confirmed that there was no 
serious enmity between the two at this time, and Jamuqa favoured Toyoril 
more than Temiijin. Later, in 1201, Jamuqa the Giir-Qan marched against 
Temiijin but was defeated at Yedi(/Teni)-Qorqan. Understandably, Jamuqa and 
his subjects were disgraced by this defeat, and at the same time, Jamuqa may 
have realised that he was not strong enough to overthrow Temiijin, if he fought 
alone.
The next year, at the battle of Koyiten, Jamuqa appeared at the
battlefield when his subject tribes participated in the allies’ attack.26
Although Toyoril was in the enemy’s camp, Jamuqa was not necessarily hostile 
to him if we analyze the composition of both forces.
Toyoril and Temiijin fought on the same side in the battle of Koyiten, 
however, their alliance was probably not based on friendship but on practical
mutual assistance. In the rival camp, the Naiman Buiruq-Qan was Toyorifs 
prime enemy, the anti-Temiijin Mongols were Temiijin’s prime enemy, and the
Merkits were a common enemy for both Toyoril and Temiijin. Toyoril and 
Temiijin must have both realised from past experience that they could hardly
win over such an alliance of enemies if they fought alone.
From the same point of view, the mutual-assistance nature of the rival
camp might also suggest that even when Toyoril and Jamuqa appeared in 
confronting camps, Jamuqa was not necessarily hostile to Toyoril: the enemy 
of Jamuqa was explicitly his ultimate rival Temiijin.
26 The three sources mention the tribes which made up the allied force but not the name 
o f  Jamuqa. However, in the aftermath o f  the battle, all sources relate the presence o f Jamuqa 
that he plundered his subject tribes on retreat. As for the leader o f  this allied force, the SH  
implies that it was Jamuqa, but in the narrative of CCL and JT, it seems that the general-in- 
command was the Naiman Buiruq-Qan. If the latter accounts are correct, the mistaken 
description in the SH  may have resulted from the confusion o f two events: the election o f  
Jamuqa and battle at Yedi(/Teni)-Qorqan in 1201, and this allies’ attack in 1202.
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The above accounts of Jamuqa show that he did not turn against
Toyoril from 1199 to 1202, and that he had suffered a further setback at the 
hands of Temiijin. Although it is hard to prove the accuracy of the unique 
pursuit account in the 577, Toyorifs interest in Jamuqa and his people may 
have made Jamuqa a target.
No matter whether Toyoril had subdued Jamuqa in the pursuit or 
Jamuqa was still an independent commander-in-chief,27 Jamuqa’s later 
presence in the sources justified his closeness to Toyoril after the Koyiten 
battle. First, in that winter, Jamuqa appeared in the camp of Senggiim and 
enhanced Senggiim’s hostility towards Temiijin. Second, according to the SH  
alone, Jamuqa went with Toyoril in the battle of Qalaqaljit-Elet, which aimed 
at the destruction of Temiijin. Third, after this inconclusive battle, Jamuqa 
plotted with some Mongols in Toyorifs camp to take over the power of 
Toyoril. This unsuccessful conspiracy concluded their friendship, Jamuqa left 
the Kereits and fled to the Naiman Tayang-Qan. In all these events, it is clear 
that Jamuqa’s main concern in the first two incidents was to counter Temiijin. 
Jamuqa seemed content with this collaboration with the Kereits in their 
attempts to destroy Temiijin, until his power ambition switched towards 
Toyoril.
Since Toyoril and Jamuqa had the same intention towards Temiijin, it 
would not be surprising for them to obtain a good acquaintance with each
other, although ethnically one was Turkic and one was Mongol. Jamuqa must
have inclined to the Kereit side in late fall of 1202, if he was chased and
subdued by Toyoril, or in the winter of 1202/03, after the Kereits and Temiijin 
"lost" their "affection". Even if the account of Toyorifs pursuit of Jamuqa is 
incorrect, their association could still easily have occurred in this period
because o f their common hostility towards Temiijin.
27 It is doubtful that Jamuqa was still in command as a Giir-Qan after he had looted his 
supporting tribes en route from KGyiten.
"Loss of affection"
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Toyoril and Jamuqa were associated together closely after the crisis of 
the marriage proposal between the Temiij in-Mongol and the Toyoril-Kereit in 
the winter of 1202/03. This crisis was the immediate cause which uncovered 
the underlining distrust between Toyoril and Temiijin, and a conflict of their 
ambitions in expansion.
Factors contributing to this "loss of affection" can be examined from 
three aspects, from the perspective of the Kereit regime: Temiij in’s intention 
in the inappropriate marriage proposal, the threat of a joint force invasion of 
Temiijin and Naiman-Tayang-Qan, and the changing of sides by some Mongol 
leaders.
First, the mismatched request for an in-laws’ relationship between the
Toyoril-Kereit and the Temiij in-Mongol. In this marriage proposal, Temiijin 
had asked the sister of Senggiim for his eldest son Jochi, in exchange for a
marriage of his daughter to the son of Senggiim.28 In the latter match,
Temiijin would become the father-in-law of Senggiim’s son when he took
Temujin’s daughter —  this relationship fitted well the current peer status
between Temiijin and Senggiim. However, when Jochi took Toyoril’s 
daughter, Senggiim would become a brother-in-law to the son of Temiijin.
This mismatch would debase Senggiim.
More than being merely humiliating, the marriage might grant Temiijin 
a opportunity to intervene in Kereit politics, if Temiijin had any ambition to 
do so. Senggiim was the only heir29 to the Kereit throne at this time. 
Assuming that the marriage proceeded and the sister of Senggiim gave birth to
28 SH  §165, Temiijin himself offered the exchange. JT  p.3 81 and CCL p.42a, Temiijin and 
Toyoril asked girls from each other.
29 SH  §174 implies that Senggiim was Toyoril’s only son. However, JT  p.362 says that 
Ong-Qan had two sons, the elder one was Senggiim (SNGWN), the younger one was ’YQW  
(*Iqu?). ’YQW ’s daughter Toqus (TWQWZ) khatun was married to Tolui and after him, 
HiilegU acquired her as his wife.
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a son, this child might have a voice in the affairs of Kereit tribe, and his father
and grandfather might also exercise an influence in the tribe via this offspring.
As seen in Kereit history, the offsprings of Betekin seed enjoyed a privileged
status in Kereit politics during the reign of Qurjaqus, which threaten the
succession of the legitimate heir Toyoril. This lesson would have reminded 
Toyoril and Senggiim to be cautious before entering any marriage agreement, 
in particular with Temiijin, a steppe ruler who was too strong to be handle.
Even without a competitor for the throne, an in-law who was too 
powerful would not allow the future Kereit ruler to govern unconstrained —  
if Temiijin sought to intervene. Senggiim’s anxiety over this possible 
challenge to his nation or his future sovereignty is clearly reflected in his 
suggestion to his qan father: he said to Toyoril that even now, while Toyoril 
was still alive and well, Temiijin had not the slightest regard for them; when 
Toyoril became old, Temiijin would not allow them to rule the Kereit people. 
"Whom will he allow to govern it, and how?"J°
Although Temiijin might not have such an ambition in making such a 
proposal, since it was reasonable for the Kereits to understand it in this way, 
the proposal did not work out. This disagreement stirred up a tension between 
the Toyoril-Kereit and the Temiij in-Mongol: they "lost affection" for each 
other.
Two more incidents in this winter further intensified the tension: a 
suspicious connection between the Temiij in-Mongol and the Tayang-Naiman, 
and certain anti-Temiijin Mongols supporting the Kereits in their efforts to 
destroy Temiijin.
A rumour about a secret connection between Temiijin and Tayang-Qan 
frightened the Kereits. Soon after the Kereits and the Temiij in-Mongol lost 
affection on the issue of marriage, Jamuqa said to Senggiim that Temiijin had
30 SH  §167. Translated by Igor de Rachewiltz, PFEH 13 (1976), p.56.
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been sending messengers to the Naiman Tayang-Qan. No matter if this
information was true or again a slander, it struck fatally at the security of the
Kereits. The mighty Naiman tribe which adjoined to the Kereit territory was
always a threat to the Kereit ulus. Although Buiruq-Qan had been defeated
recently, Tayang-Qan, who was the proper ruler of all Naimans, remained
untouched. The Kereit ulus was effectively sandwiched between the nations
of Temiijin and Tayang-Qan, and to the Kereits, these two prominent powers
were hard to deal with even before their alliance. While Temujin’s marriage
proposal has been considered as a design to seize the Kereit regime peacefully
from within, his alliance with the hostile Naimans could be seen as a
conspiracy to take over the nation from the exterior. This critical danger to the
survival of Toyoril-Kereit was intelligently observed by Jamuqa; therefore he 
persuaded Senggiim that "if you do not strike at him by surprise, what will
become of you?"'1
With such fear of the ambition of their neighbours, it was reasonable 
for the Kereits to response instantaneously in a hostile way. At this crucial 
moment, some important leaders of Qabul-Mongol changed sides to oppose 
Temiijin. Their support made the circumstances very favourable for the 
Kereits.
The first Mongol leader who the Kereit authority had accepted was
Jamuqa. Soon after the phoney Battle of Koyiten and the failure of the
marriage proposal, Jamuqa appeared in the camp of Senggiim, the son of
Toyoril, the heir of the Kereit throne. This event appears curious, not because 
of his presence in the Kereit camp but because the Kereits did not reject him.
Toyoril and Senggiim must have known that Jamuqa was the prime rival to 
Temiijin, the only alternative leader of the Mongols who had recently been
defeated by Temiijin (1201). Knowing this, a friend of Temiijin should not
have accepted and listened to Jamuqa. Besides, historically, Temiijin and
Toyoril were "supposed to be" incited by a slander spoken by Jamuqa in
31 SH  §166. Translated by Igor de Rachewiltz, PFEH 13 (1976), p.54.
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1199/1200. This lesson should have reminded the Kereits about the 
untrustworthiness of Jamuqa. Under either consideration, the Kereits ought not 
to have allowed Jamuqa to appear in their camp, or to maintain a good 
relationship with him. Although no evidence in the sources confirms that 
Senggiim had offered Jamuqa any protection and Toyoril was aware of 
Jamuqa’s "glib tongue",32 the absence of any rejection of his stay with the
Kereits was abnormal, if the Kereits and Temiijin were still on friendly terms. 
Apparently, this Mongol leader collaborated with the Kereits from then, until 
his next appearance in the Battle of Qalaqaljit-Elet in 1203.33
No later than the winter of 1202/03, the Kereit authority also accepted
some Qabul-Mongol leaders who disagreed with Temiijin. Altan, Quchar and
Dayaritai, these close kinsmen to Temiijin, were punished by Temiijin because 
of their disobedience in an earlier battle against Four Tatars in 1202. They
came to Senggiim after the failure of the marriage proposal, and promised
Senggiim that they would have their aqa wa m i, "the children of Ho’eliin",
done away with.34
The anti-Temiijin sentiment of these Qabul-Mongol seniors was 
apparently owing to oppression on the part of Temiijin, and they were seeking 
revenge for this embarrassment. However, these being offended seniors were 
not the only Mongols who took the Kereit side. When we examine the 
common feature of the other Mongol betrayers, we can tell that Temiijin was 
in a major crisis of his Mongol leadership in 1202/03.
An analysis of the composition of these anti-Temiijin Mongols tells the
story behind the scene. Other than Altan, Quchar and Dayaritai, the rest of the 
anti-Temiijin Mongols who appeared in Senggiim’s camp were Jamuqa of the
52 SH §167.
33 SH  §170 only. CCL and JT  did not mention this appearance.
33 Details o f  this separation, see Chapter Four section II (ii).
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Jadaran, Taqai-Qulaqai of the Mangqut,35 Muqur-Quran of the Nirun
Hadargin,36 Ebiige(jin) of the Noyakin,37 Toyoril the descendant of Siige38
and Qachiyun-Beki of the Dorben. Examining their genealogical relationship, 
they were from different backgrounds but shared a common feature: they were
not a part of the Qabul-Mongol which was the power base of Temiijin,
The Dorben and Jadaran tribes, although both Mongols, were distant 
from the family line of Temiijin. The Dorben tribe was descended from 
Duwa-Soqor who was a brother to Dobun-Mergen, therefore, Dorben was an 
uncle clan to the Borjigin branch, not in the same line as Temujin’s descent.
35 Taqai-Qulaqai (J 7 > 3 8 2  TGHAY QWLATAY, p. 196 TGHAY-QWLQAY, CCL p.42b 
T’a-hai-hu-la-hai). also called as Taqai-Kuharin (TaghaT-KuharTn). JT  p .196, KuharTn meant 
"a thief' (diircf) or "a liar" (durughgip ; SH §131, §154 and §203, Qulaqai means "thief1 in 
Mongolian.
36 Muqur-Quran Q rp .382  MWQWR QWRAN, p.229 MWQWR QW’RAN, CCL p.42b 
Mu-hu-erh-ha-tan) was the leader o f Hardagin, and he was fighting for Temiijin in the Battle 
o f  Thirteen Giire’en in the third division. (77’p.229) CCL p.8b: "T’u-pu-ke-yi(d)’s Mu-hu-erh- 
hao-Ian commands A-erh-ta-chin", i.e. Muqur-Quran of the Tubiigeyit commands (H)ardagin 
is a misreading, see discussion on this textual error in Chapter Two section II. The 
"Qardakidai" in the SH  should read, not as a proper name, but as "a person o f the Qardakin 
clan/tribe". This Qardakin (=Hardagin) person should be referring the Hardagin leader Muqur- 
Quran in the same account in JT  and CCL. /h/ and /q/, iki and /g / are interchangeable in 
written Mongolian. Hardakin = Qardakin > Ardakin/Adarkin, h i  is shiftable as seen in the 
example o f the tribal name of Merkit/Mekrit. (JT p.93) "Qardakidai" should not be designated 
to "Ebugejin", as annotated by Igor de Rachewiltz. (PFEH 13 (1976), p.73)
37 "Ebiigejin Noyakin", Noyakin is a tribe, and Ebtige(jin) is a proper name.
38 Toyoril could not be a member from the Soge’en tribe as translated by Igor de 
Rachewiltz. (PFEH 13 (1976), p.54) According to the SH §180, this Toyoril belonged to a 
hereditary slave family which was descended from Oqda-Boyol, passed down to Siibegei-Boyol 
to Kokochii-Kirsayan to Yegei-Qongtaqar to Toyoril. Another Persian version of the name 
Siibegei-Boyol is SWKY BW ’WL (JT p.1694, note 3 for the text in page 392) while CCL 
p.55b states his name as Hstieh-yeh-ke (*Sii’ege).
As for the relation between this Toyoril and the description o f "Siige’etei", my 
explanation is as follows. Although the ancestor o f  this slave family was Oqda, who was 
captured by Tumbinai and Charaqai-Lingqu and turned into a slave, I would assume that 
Sugege/Sii’e’e (Siige), the son o f Oqda, was the first bom slave in this Mongol house. It was 
under the reign o f Temujin’s great grandfather, Qabul, when Siige began this hereditary slave 
family. (SH  §180) Because they had no tribe affiliation, it would be reasonable for the Qabul- 
Mongols to called his descendants by referring to Siige. Therefore, Toyoril was called as 
"Siige’etei Toyoril", Toyoril the descendent o f Siige.
There are two more Toyorils in JT\ one was the Kereit Ong-Qan and the other a 
Taichiyut who was the eldest son o f Tbdo’en, Todo’en was one o f the elders o f the Taichiyuts. 
The latter Toyoril, Temiijin called him Toyoril-De’u (TGHRYL DW ’W, p .190). They were 
obviously not the "Siige’etei Toyoril".
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As for the tribe of Jadaran, or Jajirat in JT , it was descended from the son of 
a woman of Bodonchar, where Bodonchar was not his father. This relationship 
implies a connection between Jadaran and Borjigin-Mongol, but to the family 
from which Temiijin descended from, Jadaran might have been counted as a 
maternal half-brother clan.39
The tribes of Noyakin, Hadargin and Mangqut were among the Nirun
Borjigin clans, however, they were not part of the Qaidu-Mongol —  they
descended from the grandsons of Menen-Tudun, their first ancestors parallelled
with Qaidu in generation. As for Toyoril the descendent of Siige, he was from 
a slave family in the service of the descendants of Charaqai-Lingqu and
Tumbinai-Sechen. His family had no relation to the Mongol genealogy.
The background of these treacherous Mongols suggests a rebellious 
anti-Temiijin sentiment within Temiij in’s subjects. Some of them were from 
distant branches from Temiij in’s, and even from within Temiij in’s own clan 
and house, the Qabul kinsmen who elected Temiijin as their qan, and his 
family slave who, in Temiijin’s assumption, was interested in having Temiijin’s 
people.40. The situation is described by the Kereit general Achiq-Shirun as 
"the majority of the Mongols are on our side",41 More precisely, Temiijin 
was in a crisis because some leaders of influential Mongol clans from each part 
of the Mongol genealogy had joined the Kereits against him.
With such an advantage of the draining away of Temiij in’s former 
support, it would be reasonable for the Kereit ruler, under threat, to reconsider
19 If Jamuqa, an offspring had only a "not by blood" maternal connection to the Mongol
genealogy, can have a voice in the tribal affairs o f the Mongols and be elected as Giir-Qan by 
his Mongol "kinsmen", the offspring o f SenggUnTs sister, who has a "by blood" maternal 
connection to Kereit genealogy, is assumed to have a similar right to the Kereit affairs as well. 
No wonder SenggOm had a strong inclination to obstruct the marriage between the ruling
families o f the Kereit ulus and the Temujin-Mongol.
40 SH  §180, JT  pp.391-392.
41 SH  §174.
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taking the risk of attacking Temiijin. As revealed in the discussion between
Toyoril and Senggiim, Toyoril understood that it would be unwise to have an 
evil intention against their major supporter, although this opinion might not
come with a moral concern. However, he still allowed his son to decide what
to do.42 This indecisive attitude of Toyoril may have resulted from his desire
to destroy Temiijin and the repeating failure of his attempts, however,
encountering a pressure from the "ambition" of Temiijin and joined by the
supports of some Mongols, the Kereits inevitably had to react.
The ordeal and the shift of supporters
Owing to their fear of Temujin’s ambition over the Kereits, the Kereits 
collaborated with some anti-Temiijin Mongols to conspire against Temiijin.
The Kereits first burnt Temiijin’s pasture " secretly ".4j This economic 
destruction would have a negative impact on Temujin’s strength, which 
guaranteed his impoverishment in the coming year. Secondly, they set the trap 
of a betrothal feast in order to capture this leader of Qabul-Mongol. These 
secret movements showed that Senggiim had endeavoured to avoid an open 
conflict with Temiijin, which might cost the Kereits too much. However, the 
plan of unexpected seizure did not work out. Taking a preemptive measure, 
the Kereits set out immediately after Temiijin before he prepared for war.44 
A raid would usually minimise the casualties of the attacking force. 
Unfortunately, Temiijin had been informed by Badai and Kishiliq that very 
night, and also by Chigidei and Yadir, so the raid turned into a battle
42 SH  §167 and CCL p.43b. JT  implies that Senggiim was acting against Toyoril’s 
goodwill towards Temiijin.
43 CCL p.43b, JT  p.383.
44 SH  §170: "if on that occasion [the two herdsmen] had not noticed [the approach o f the 
enemy], they would have been [caught] unprepared." Translation by Igor de Rachewiltz, 
PFEH  16 (1977) p.28.
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confrontation —  in the spring of 1203, the Battle of Qalaqaijit-Elet (Qalaqaljit 
Sands) slightly damaged both sides. Temiijin withdrew to Baljuna.
The battle at Qalaqaljit-Elet marked the open breach of the Toyoril- 
Temiijin relationship. The battle array of both sides is a good source for a
close study of their warfare strategy, nevertheless, the discussion is not going 
to be related here. As for its impact on the power structure on the steppe, the 
battle is also significant in demonstrating their strength, which can be regarded 
as an ordeal to both Toyoril and Temiijin, for their pursuit of steppe 
supremacy.
The ordeal nature and the consequence of the battle cannot not be seen 
clearly from the course of the battle, but it is revealed by the shift of 
supporters. On the Kereit side, Toyoril’s failure in destroying Temiijin made 
his Mongol supporters "lose affection" to him. This disappointment can be 
seen in the opinion of Jamuqa and the Mongols who were staying in the Kereit 
camp.
The description of this battle in the SH  is more legend than reality, 
however, a hint may be helpful in uncovering the purpose of Jamuqa’s alliance 
with Toyoril. When Toyoril requested Jamuqa to set (jasa~) the Kereit troops 
in battle array, Jamuqa said:
Ong-Qan tells me to set these troops of his in battle array, but 
I have never been able to fight against [my] sworn brother. For 
Ong-Qan to say that I should set these troops in battle array 
[means that] he is less capable than I am. Not much of a 
companion is he!45
"Not much of a companion is he!" A similar sentence was found, 
curiously coincidentally, in the mind of the treacherous Mongols when they
45 Translation by Igor de Rachewiltz, PFEH  16 (1977) p.29.
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were plotting against Toyoril in the Kereit camp after this battle. They 
thought: "[Toyoril] cannot be relied upon!"46
These comments on Toyoril would initially be related to the 
"unreliable" character of Toyoril. However, in these occasions, this comment 
should not be attributed to his personality in spite of the fact that Toyoril did 
not have a good reputation in maintaining friendship. The real meaning of this
sentence can only be revealed when we take account of their motivation as
supplied in JT  p.3 94, which relates that these conspirers planned to assault
Toyoril by night in order to "become the ruler ourselves". They did not want 
to pay respect to Toyoril or Temiijin any more.47
These reactions, or disappointments, imply their expectations when they 
come to Toyoril at the turn of 1202/03. Jamuqa would have expected that 
Toyoril would be capable of destroying Temiijin by force. When he 
discovered that Toyoril was less capable than himself, he was disappointed. 
Therefore, he commented that "Not much of a companion is he!" As for the 
treacherous Mongols, they would have expected that Toyoril could counter 
Temiijin, but when the result of the battle showed that Toyoril was not capable 
of destroying his opponent even with the "majority of Mongol" on his side,
their confidence in Toyoril was shaken. This disappointment made them think 
"[Toyoril] cannot be relied upon [for his strength against Temujin]", therefore, 
they had to turn themselves into an individual power in order to counter­
balance their rival Temujin.
On the other side, the shift of supporters also took place in the camp
of Temujin. The first Kereit who decided to abandon Toyoril and came to 
Temujin with all his belongings was Quidu, soon after Badai and Kishiliq
1,6 CCL p.62b.
47 JT  p.394. Another brief account is on p. 123.
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informed Temujin of Toyoril5s preparation of an assault.48 YS also tells of 
two "Kereits" who appeared to be in attendance with Temujin at Baljuna in 
1202/03: Cheng-hai (*Chinqai) and Ha-san-na (*Hasana).49
Chinqai was a Kereit or an Uighur or an Onggut,50 or probably an 
ethnic Onggut who could speak and write Uighur (even reading Chinese?). He 
appeared to the author of his Chinese biography as a Kereit, and he was 
definitely drinking with Temujin at Baljuna after the Battle of Qalaqaljit-Elet 
as a "chun-wu-chang" (army patrol leader). Hasana might have been the 
Sartayul Asan (Hasan) in SH  §182, who was buying pelts of sables and 
squirrels and then rested at Baljuna —  apparently he was a Central Asian 
merchant. YS relates that he had fought Toyoril with Temujin.
Were Chinqai and Hasan Kereits? We shall consider the life style of 
a highly mobile society. As for the Kereit identity of Chingqai, it was possible 
for an intelligent person to travel around and join with other nomads, or, to be 
in service of Turkic courts as a scribe, with his knowledge of Turkic language 
and Uighur script, no matter what his ethnic origin was. Even a noble bom 
Taichiyut could be in service of the Kereit Ong-Qan Toyoril, if JT  is not 
mistaken. The eldest son of the Taichiyut elder Todd5en was in the company 
of the Kereit Ong-Qan (Toyoril) and passing messages between Temujin and
4S JT  pp. 122-123. According to JT, Quidu had twenty-four sons and the source mentions 
only the eldest Tukur-Bitikchi who was the father o f Alinaq. There is also a Quidu in YS 124 
chuan 11 p.3051, who had drunk with Temiijin at Baljuna. This is recorded in the biography
o f  his son Siige. These two Quidus could be the same person, who has been recorded in the
two sources with different approaches. JT  may relate Quidu with one o f  his son Tukur because 
Tukur was a bitikchi in the service o f  Hiilegii-Qan, while YS relates the accomplishment o f  
Siige because his achievements were mainly in China proper. If these two Quidus were the 
same person, he had been rewarded for his allegiance at Baljuna with a privilege to gather 
together "the Kereits and Dongqayits o f his own tribe" which made up a Thousand. The
making o f  a Thousand should have happened after Temiijin had overthrown Toyoril.
49 YS 120 chuan 7 the biography o f Cheng-hai, 122 chuan 8 the biography o f Ha-san-na.
50 "His precise ethnic affiliation is in doubt due to apparent contradictions in the sources." 
(Buell, "Cinqai", pp.96-97.) In YS he was a Kereit, according to JuwaynT he was an Uighur, 
and a third possibility a Kereit(?)-Onggut, see Buell’s analysis o f the contradictions.
147
Ong-Qan (Toyoril).51 A reporter who did not have enough knowledge about 
the facts behind the scene would take down only what had "appeared" to him.
As for Hasan, the Central Asian merchant, he might have been 
described as a Kereit in some records because he came to central Mongolia 
from that direction, or probably because he communicated in a Turkic 
language. To the Mongols at that time, the knowledge of what was beyond the 
Kereit territory was limited. This uncertainty of Hasan’s ethnic identity is 
reflected in S H  s usage. The SH  does not relate him as a Kereit, but a 
"sartayul", which is a general term designated to his quality, not his tribal 
identity. Therefore, Chinqai and Hasan, two friends who had come to central
Mongolia from the Kereit territory, may have been referred by less careful 
reporters as "Kereits", although they may not have been Kereits ethnically.
Even if Chinqai and Hasan were not Kereits, they stayed with the 
defeated Temujin at Baljuna and their subsequent affirmation to Temujin32 
showed that at the same time when some of Temujin’s Mongol subjects 
decided to withdraw their support, he won some new support from non- 
Mongols. The power structure in central Mongolia was being transformed: not 
only had the supporters of Temujin been reconstructed, a few Kereits and some 
other people of Turkic origin might have joined this Mongol leader after the 
battle, at the same time the anti-Temujin tribal/clan leaders lost confidence in 
Toyoril and rebelled and were expelled. The whole situation was reversed.
As for the impact of this battle to the Temiij in-Toyoril relationship, 
although Temiijin had been beaten at Qalaqaljit-Elet, he was not defeated. The
opposition of the Kereit force made their intention public —  they wanted
Temujin dead. Temujin also realised that a group of Mongols intended to
51 His name was the same as Ong-Qan, and Temujin called him Toyorii-De’u.
52 According to YS, Hasan had fought Toyoril with Temujin, and later he went with him 
on his Central Asian campaign. Chinqai had attended the enthronement of Temujin, later 
fought with Naiman, Qipchaq, Tangyut and Jurchen.
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usurp his rulership.53 In spite of their previous friendship and assistance, 
"misunderstanding" and reconciliation, the now hostile Kereits could not be 
forgiven especially when they were collaborating with those Mongol rebels, 
who challenged Temujin’s claim to the sovereignty of the Mongol tribes. 
Therefore, when the Mongol rebels turned against Toyoril and were expelled, 
Temujin took advantage of the sudden weakening of Toyoril’s power and took 
the initiative. As the phenomenon of support shifting was predominant, he in
return played a trick on Toyoril, by a faked defection of his younger brother 
Jochi-Qasar —  this would be very appealing to Toyoril when he had just lost 
the support of "the majority of Mongols" —  then Temujin fell upon the
Kereits in a raid which brought the regime to its end.
Toyoril and Senggiim escaped — however, this did not matter much 
to Temujin. Temujin had taken possession of the whole Kereit territory and
troops and people.34 The huge population of the Kereit ulus, excluding the
hereditary subjects of Jaya-Gambu because of his in-laws’ relationship with 
Temiijin’s family, was distributed among the Mongols "so that nobody went
short of them".55 Moreover, the brave Jirgin Kereits who had fought Temujin 
at Qalaqaljit-Elet and looted Jochi-Qasar at Qarayun-Jidun submitted to 
Temujin when the Toyoril regime collapsed.56 The abundant wealth and 
strength that Temujin obtained from this victory, not to mention the reputation, 
undeniably further consolidated his status as a great potentate, and this sudden 
increase of acquisition should not be underestimated in studying the process of 
Temujin’s triumph.
53 SH  § 166, Altan and Quchar said that they will "kill the elder brother" and "do away with 
the younger brother" (= slay aqa wa ini), Ebugejin and Muqur-Quran said that they will seize 
Temiijin’s hands and feet, Toyoril the descendent o f Siige suggested a ruse capture o f  
Temiijin’s people, and Qachiyun-Beki promised to go with Senggiim’s plan "to the farthest 
limit" and "to the bottom o f  the deep". These words show different aims, nevertheless, their 
wish to destroy Temujin is the same.
54 JT  p.396.
55 SH  §§186-187.
56 JT  p.l 13 records some Jirgins came to Temujin after he defeated Toyoril. SH  §186, 
Temiijin distributed the Jirgin people.
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The sudden accession of strength after the termination of the Kereit 
regime made the Mongols simple-mindedly risk themselves in making an 
attack on Tayang-Qan. Perhaps the Mongols were beloved by Heaven, 
fortunately they did not lose the battle. The expansion of Temiij in-Mongol 
after the end of Kereit regime is not going to be related in this part, but the
hardest struggles for both Temujin and Toyoril have been related in the last 
three chapters. This reconstruction of the Kereit history from the 1130s to 
1203 has assisted in explaining many obscure events in relate to Temujin’s 
expansion, in this way, it provides a broader scope of examination of 
Temujin’s early career from the perspective of his "partner".
Part Two
The Network of Expansion
Chapter Four
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Aqa wa ml: Genealogical Connections among the Mongols
Genealogy provided the framework of social relations among the 
Mongols in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The contemporary Persian 
historian Rashid al-DIn observed that the Mongol population of this branch 
(sha 'b)\ which had originated from the progeny (nasi) of Alan-Qoya, had 
more than a hundred tiimen. Such a multitudinous population consisted of 
many tribes/clans (aqwam)\ all these clans had a clear and manifest 
genealogical tree.
It is the Mongol custom to observe the genealogy (,nasab) of 
fathers and forefathers, [to] each offspring who is born [to this 
clan], they teach and instruct him in the genealogy. In such 
manner, the others [family kinsmen] made faith (millat) out of 
that [teaching]. For this reason, everyone of them would not be 
ignorant of with [their] own line (qabUa) and descent.2 
Rashid al-DIn further remarked that "besides the Mongols, this custom is not 
[practised in] other tribes, except for the Arabs who observe [their] own 
affinity".3
Apparently, the genealogical connections among the Mongol tribes/clans 
supplied them with a sense of integration into the general Mongol nationality, 
also an independent identity for each branch or clan. It is essential to 
understand this social framework in the study of medieval Mongol history,
1 The Persian text does not use plural for the word "branch", therefore I have interpreted 
the sentence as "the branch and many tribes/clans which originated from the progeny (nasi) 
o f  Alan-Qoya", where the "branch" designates the genealogical tree which starts from Alan- 
Qoya.
2 JT  p.223.
3 JT  p.223.
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especially when the study focuses on the career of Temujin, where this 
background knowledge appears indispensable.
At the first stage of power consolidation in Temujin’s world conquering 
career, which is commonly named "the unification of Mongolia", Temujin had 
acquired all his Mongol kinsmen, and also incorporated the Turkic people who 
inhabited Mongolia. His battles against the Turkic tribes are clearly narrated 
in the sources, however, his effort to obtain a general recognition from his 
kinsmen for the Mongol sovereign is less explicit. Accordingly, an 
investigation into this endeavour would help to present a clearer picture of the 
factors contributing to Temujin’s rise to power.
This examination of the Mongol genealogical connection can also help 
in explaining many historical events, crises and turning points, which brought 
about the ups and downs in the course of Temujin’s power building. These 
disputes between the Temiijin-Mongol and his kinsmen appeared to be 
"domestic affairs" among the Mongols. Since Temujin could not, or should 
not, exterminate all his kinsmen by force, his skill and intelligence in handling 
these in-tribe crises ought to be valued more highly than his military conquest 
of the non-Mongols.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to make a close analysis of the 
strategy by which Temujin managed to win himself recognition from all 
Mongols, via the kinship network of the Mongol genealogy. The discussion 
falls into two sections. The first section is an introduction of the Mongol 
concept of their genealogy, plus a diagram of the SH  version of the Mongol 
genealogy, which will be used as the basis of discussion. The second section 
investigates several historical events by way of a chronological approach, 
which have a special significance in revealing how the genealogically 
associated clans/tribes affected the early stage of Temujin’s expansion. Two 
major principles of the Mongol kinship practice in the second half of the 
twelfth century have been extracted from these incidents. Observing or
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violating these principles caused a rapid change of attitude of Temujin’s 
kinsmen towards him, as also of Temujin’s towards his kinsmen.
I. The structure of Mongol genealogy
JT  and the SH  presented two slightly different versions of the Mongol 
genealogy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Since it is difficult to 
determine which one is more reliable when there is no a third version available 
to compare them with, and a reckless comparison may result in a less fruitful 
dull discussion even leading to further distortion, it would be more practical 
to select one version and follow it. Therefore, discussion in this thesis will be 
based on the SH  version of Mongol genealogy regardless of its lack of 
conformity with the JT  version.4 The SH  version of Mongol genealogy is 
supplied in a two-page diagram for quick reference; it starts from the two 
brothers, Duwa-Soqor and Dobun-Mergen. (Table 1)
Then, we enter into an analysis of the structure of Mongol genealogy. 
Several technical terms for the genealogical association are found in the 
contemporary Mongolian and Persian sources, either in Mongolian or 
Persianized Mongolian, each of them appears to designate a well-defined range 
of genealogical connections, or in short, kinship. They are the real examples 
revealing how the twelfth century Mongols classified and identified themselves 
within the Mongol genealogy. Therefore, to work out the definition/coverage 
of these terminologies through a careful comparison of these accounts rather 
than a conventional review of their linguistic element, would suggest a more 
precise understanding of the structure of the Mongol genealogy of this period. 
The terms which will be discussed in this section are aqa wa fm, oboq and
A For example, JT  p. 197 relates that Dorben was a NTrun tribe, the Dorben and the 
Bayarin descended from one root (asl). This is totally different from the genealogy supplied 
by the 57/, even contradictory to its later narration o f the early story o f Mongols, where JT  
p.219 relates that "and they say, the DSrben tribe was from the line (nasi) o f  them [four sons 
o f  Tamacha]". Tamacha in SH  §2 was a very early ancestor o f Dobun-Mergen.
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qawm (pi. aqwam), Derelkln and NTrun, Borjigin, Qiyan and Negus, also a 
study on the horizontal and vertical kinship relations among the genealogical 
"branches".
aqa wa mi
Aqa wa in i  is the most frequent encountered term in JT  which was 
used to describe genealogical kinship. Aqa is the Mongolian word which 
means "elder brother", while fm, according to a comparison of the accounts 
in JT, means "younger brother".5 Literally, the phrase can be correctly 
translated as "elder brothers and younger brothers", although in fact the phrase 
has a broader meaning that it is not confined to the blood brothers born to the 
same parents.
Aqci wa mi is extensively used in JT  to designate "tribal/clan kinsmen" 
in general. For instance, the phrase appears twice in the words of the 
legendary Kereit Sariq-Qan, simply used as a description of one’s "kinship 
association" with no specific ethnic indication or genealogical connection in a 
hierarchic sense.6 The phrase can be used to describe the kinsmen within the 
Mongol genealogy, also the kinship relation within one Turkic tribe. For 
example, when Yesuliin, one of Temujin’s Tatar wives, petitioned for two 
Tatar brothers to collect their kinsmen, she said that "of their aqa wa in i and 
[their] tribe (qawm), they are [scattered] everywhere".7 Aqa wa in i  here 
apparently designates the kinsmen of the Tatar tribe. Therefore, in its broadest
5 According to J T p.93, the Persian text parallelled the phrase "baradaran kuchikm" (little 
brothers) to the term "InTan" (im  plus Persian plural ending).
6 The term appeared in JT  p.92 is in an idiomatic sentence which I understood, with 
reference to Muller’s translation, as "to kill a fly would shame oneself in front o f  his aqa wa
im \ but if not kill, [the annoyance o f  the fly] is unbearable." The second appearance is in JT  
p.93, where Sariq-Qan suggested the Mongols to become sworn brothers (anda) and to be aqa  
wa m f  to each other. I understood the latter suggestion as "to have a close affinity to each 
other as to what kinsmen should do."
7 JT  p.88.
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sense, the concept of aqa wa in i was widely employed by the steppe society 
of twelfth century Mongolia where tribes/clans were the basis of social 
relations; it designates the kinsmen who shared the same tribal identity and 
affiliation.
As for ethnic Mongols, aqa wa in i can be applied to every person who 
was bom to a Mongol identity regardless of the genealogical subdivisions of 
their clans or branches. However, when it is used in a narrower sense, the 
term has a limited and specified coverage in these kinsmen’s genealogical 
connections. JT  p. 163 explains that although "they quarrel and fight with one 
another all the time", the tribes of Qorulas and Qonggirat and Ikires were all 
aqa wa in i  The usage here does not suggest only their common ethnic 
feature as Mongols, but also emphases a specific genealogical association 
between these tribes because the ancestors of Qorulas, Qonggirat and Ikires 
shared the same origin from Altan-Quduqa (Golden Vessel), an origin which 
the other Derelkin Mongols did not have a claim to.
Aqa wa in i  can also be applied in a restricted coverage to the tribes 
within the NTrun Mongols. JT  p. 187 describes the major clans which stemmed 
from Qaidu, including the Qabul-Mongol, the Taichiyut-Mongol even the 
Chinos, as aqa wa in i  This is another example of the term being used to 
designate the kinship within a big branch which consisted of several sub­
branches, besides the term’s general "tribesmen" connotation.
Sometimes, the usage of aqa wa in i implies the exclusion of the 
Mongol kinsmen outside one’s own branch, along with its inclusive sense of 
affinity. Temujin had once spoken to the Mongol Saljiyuts that "we, who are 
aqa wa in i  and blood [kinsmen to] each other".8 The aqa wa in i  here might
mean the exclusive designation of their clan affiliation as the NTrun-Mongols, 
because at the same time, Temujin says that the DerelkTn-Mongol Qonggirat
8 JT  p .185.
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and Dorben9 "had no relation (ta'alluq) to us". The Saljiyut tribe is an elder
brother branch to the descendants of Bodonchar, they were both the offspring
of Alan-Qoya and the "spirit", while Qonggirat and Dorben were not. When 
Temujin emphasised on the "blood" connection between the Saljiyuts and his 
clan, he separated the Derelkln Mongols from the NTrun Mongols.
When it come to a special clan, aqa wa ini has a further limited 
indication. JT  p.211 recounts that at the time when the two Besiits called 
Degei and Kuchiikur were with the Taichiyuts, the Taichiyuts killed their 
father (pidar) and aqa wa ini. According to the Mongol genealogy, the Besut 
tribe was the immediate brother branch to the Taichiyut tribe; both of them 
stemmed from the two sons of Charaqai-Lingqu. Therefore, the aqa wa in i 
who had been killed by the Taichiyuts in this paragraph were only the kinsmen 
within this specific clan of Besiit; the term does not extensively cover also their
Taichiyut kinsmen.
Probably the narrowest range which the phrase aqa wa in i might have
covered is the kinsmen associated to "one of the clan princes". As for the
Derelkln Mongols, an example is found in JT  p.79, where the aqa wa in i  of
Sayin-Tegin, who were the Qonggirats, went and killed the Tatar shaman
CHROL because the shaman failed to cure the illness of Sayin-Tegin. As for
the NTrun Mongols, one of the Taichiyut princes accused the other prince that 
"he had taken my property and flock and herd, and aqa wa ini."10 The aqa
wa in i  in this sentence could not be anybody but his kinsmen.
9 The sentence in JT  p. 185 reads many tribes like Qonggirat, Tatar and DerelkTn(?) 
"which have had no relation to us [have recently] all agreed with us and become friends". The 
Derelkln here does not make sense. This Derelkln (DRLKYN) might have been a copying 
error from Dorben (DWRBAN, 7DRBAN), which was a Mongol tribe but had certain 
relationship to the Tatars.
10 "u mal wa gala wa rama-i mara wa aqa wa TnT sitda" (he, my property and flock and 
herd, and aqa wa TnT, had taken.) The sentence may be understood in two ways, first, 
Tarqutai had taken Bayachi’s possession and his own kinsmen, second, Tarqutai had taken 
Bayachi’s possession and the Taichiyut kinsmen. The first reading appears more reasonable 
because the Taichiyut kinsmen did not belong to Bayachi either.
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Summarizing the above analyses, aqa wa in i is a usage which the 
steppe people used to describe a person/tribe’s relation to their genealogical 
associated kinsmen/tribes. It can have a wide range of coverage according to 
the genealogical ramification, from its broadest meaning of "aqa wa in i — 
tribesmen”, to the kinsmen of a specific descendence in the general genealogy. 
The varied stages of its ramification can be a person’s association to his 
kinmen within a genealogical branch, a sub-branch, an individual clan/tribe and 
even one of the princes in the clan/tribe. "Blood-related relatives" may be 
good explanation of the term,11 but since its genealogical coverage varies, this 
makes a precise definition of the term difficult.12
oboq and qawm, and the horizontal and vertical 
kinship relations within "branches"
The varied coverage of aqa wa in i suggests also the Mongols’ attitude 
to their genealogical identification in the twelfth century. Their distance or 
closeness is decided by their position in the genealogy, and functions through 
the groupings of Derelkln-Mongol and NIrun-Mongol, the big branches and 
its sub-branches, and the basic concept of a clan/tribe (Mong. oboq).
The primary unit in the Mongol genealogy is an oboq. The term 
appears in Chinese sources as chimg (variety) or hsing (surname) or pu  (tribe) 
or shih (clan), depending on the context, and in Persian sources as qawm, 
meaning people, tribe, family or sect. Each Mongol oboq has its specific 
appellation, some of these appellations deriving from the name of their
11 This term ("elder brother and younger brother") is always used in a collective sense and 
never been used in naming the immediate brothers born to the same parents.
12 The examples quoted here are found in JT because the term aqa wa in i  is a Persianized 
Mongolian term used in JT. Its designation after Temttjin’s unification o f  the Mongol tribes 
was almost the nm q  o f Chinggis-Qan, the discussion o f this part is thus omitted.
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ancestors, such as the Qatagin oboq from Buqu-Qatagi.13 Some of the oboqs 
were numerous and some of them were not. The concept of oboq is usually 
rendered in English usage as "tribe" or "clan" in modern researches. However, 
when several sub-groupings of people have stemmed out from a large Mongol 
oboq, the large oboq has a similar meaning to the English usage of "branch". 
The Taichiyuts are always described in JT  as aqwam (tribes/clans), which 
suggests that there were several groupings of people under this general oboq 
title; in this sense, the Taichiyut oboq was a "branch".
There is another possibility: the descendants within a large genealogical 
branch might have their separate oboq identification when the large branch had 
no specific oboq identification. For instance, the offspring of three sons of 
Qaidu had developed into individual genealogical lines, and each of them had 
their own sub-o/?o<ys (clans). For narrative convenience, the vertical 
genealogical linkage (Pers. qabila) of these clans or branches will be 
designated with a compound term in this thesis. This term is made up of the 
common feature of the people, such as the name of their founder/leader or their 
oboq appellation, and its specific ethnic identification. According to this 
approach, the clans of Jiirkin and Temujin were among the "Qabul-Mongol", 
the "Qabul-Mongol" and the "Taichiyut-Mongol" were among the "Qaidu- 
Mongol", the people under the family (uruq) of Temujin will be indicated as
"Temiijin-Mongol", while "Qadayan-Taichiyut" means a group of the 
Taichiyut-Mongols who were under or descended from Qadayan-Taishi.
The oboqs which stemmed out from the same ancestor would have a
closer relation to each other than the other Mongol oboqs. For example, the
oboq of Besiit was the younger brother oboq (clan) to the oboq (branch) of
Taichiyut; their closeness is clearly reflected in the sources which show that 
some Besiits were in attendance to the Taichiyut princes, for instance,
13 SH  §42. Many o f the oboq  appellations can be identified with their ancestor names, 
which were in an adjective form (end with -dai/dei or -tai/tei), while some others has their 
appellations definitely irrelevant to the founders’ name, such as the famous oboq  o f  Taichiyut. 
Cf. SH  §47.
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Balaqachi to the Taichiyut leader Hambaqai and Jebe to the Taichiyut elder 
Todo’en.14 Occasionally, the vagueness of one’s genealogical linkage to its
brother oboq would affected their affiliation when the clan has only either
maternal or paternal connection to the other. This vagueness had played an
important role in Temujin’s early expansion via his genealogical network.
When there were so many lines of descent (Pers. qabila) in the same
genealogy (Pers. nasab), the horizontal kinship connection between the
kinsmen from different lines of descendence also needs to be specified. The
idea of "cousin" applies here, but in a genealogical approach. The kinship
relation between the descendants from the different lines of a large branch is
described by Rashid al-DIn as Q'DWD.15 JT  p. 187 recounts that
SWRQDWLW-Chino was a Q‘DWD to Tumbinai-Qan, Hambaqai-Qan was a
Q'DWD to Qabul-Qan. Qadayan-Taishi was a Q‘DWD to Bartan-Bayatur. 
The "cousin" kinship relation implied in this description is, Hambaqai (a
Taichiyut) was a kinsman in the same genealogical hierarchy to Qabul (non- 
Taichiyut), and his son Qadayan-Taishi was a kinsman in the same 
genealogical hierarchy to Bartan-Bayatur, who was the son of Qabul and a 
brother to Qutula (non-Taichiyut). In short, they were "genealogical peers" to 
each other.
The concepts and terminologies for clan/tribe, branch and "cousin"
reviewed above can be summarised and presented in the following description:
the Qabul-Mongol (term in nruq sense) and the Taichiyut-Mongol (term in
oboq sense) were two great branches of the Qaidu-Mongols. Qabul of the
Qabul-Mongol was a peer to Hambaqai of the Taichiyut-Mongol; their sons, 
Bartan-Bayatur of the Qabul-Mongol and Qadayan-Taishi of the Taichiyut- 
Mongol were peers to each other. The Bartan-Mongol (Bartan and his
14 Balaqachi, SH  §53, who Hambaqai-Qan had instructed to report the news o f  his death 
to the Qaidu-Mongols. Jebe, a Bestit in JT, was a ndker to Tddb’en and fought Temtijin in 
the battle (SH  §§146-147).
15 Meaning unknown. It may have a relation to the Arabic stem: Q‘D, bearing a meaning 
o f  "with equivalent in seating".
160
offspring) was a brother uruq to the Qutula-Mongol (Qutula and his 
descendants), and the son of Bartan, Yesiigei, was a "blood nephew" to Qutula 
and Qutula’s son Altan a "genealogical uncle" to Temujin.
Derelkm and Nlrun
The concept of progeny (Pers. nasi) works for a broader classification
of the Mongol genealogy in the twelfth century. According to the narration
of the genealogical tribal relationship in JT, all Mongol tribes/clans were
descended from the two common ancestors Negiiz and Qiyan, but they were
then put into two catalogues as the Derelkm Mongols and the NTrun Mongols,
based on their association to the progeny of Alan-Qoya. The criteria of 
classification begins from the three sons of Alan-Qoya who were pregnant by 
the divine light, not by her husband Dobun-Mergen.16 For those Mongols
who descended from these three brothers: Buqa-Qatagi, Buqatu-Salji and 
Bodonchar are called NTrun, literally "waist", respectively the branches of 
Qatagin, Saljiyut and Borjigin; and for the Mongol tribes existing before them 
are called Derelkln Mongols.17
The principal evidence for the distant kinship between NTrun and 
Derelkln Mongols is the freedom of inter-marriage. Many examples can 
positively support this practice: Dobun-Mergen married Alan-Qoya who was 
a Qorulas, Yesiigei took Ho’eliin who was an Olqunayut, and Temujin’s senior 
khatun Borte was a Qonggirat. Qorulas, Olqunayut and Qonggirat were all 
Derelkln tribes. On the other hand, the forbiddance of inter-marriage between 
the NTrun tribes shows their "blood-related"18 intimate kinship. When the 
Qatagin tribe was annexed by Temujin, he instructed his people not to take
16 JT  pp.223-224. Dobun-Mergen is the SH  appeared as Dobun-Bayan in JT.
17 J T p A 5 2 .
18 See the example o f  Temujin’s invitation to the Qatagins.
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their girls nor give because the Qatagins were kinsmen. Also, they should be 
"distinct and manifested from the other Mongol tribes."19
Here a question arises. If only the offspring who Alan-Qoya begot 
from the "light" are the Nlruns, then, what will the sons by her husband be?
Rashid al-DIn relates that some people counted them as NTrun, because of
their maternal connection with Alan-Qoya.20 Then, what was the Mongols’
attitude to their genealogical association in the twelfth century? Was the
affiliation between their clans and their genealogical kinship based on their
maternal descent, or paternal descent, or both, or either? This vagueness
supplies the key explanation of Temujin’s early alliances to his "ambiguous"
kinsmen of Jadaran/Jajirat, Je’iireit and Chinos, in various stages of
genealogical ramification.
Borjigin, Qiyan and Negus
Other than NTrun, Borjigin is also a usage which Temujin’s family used 
to identify themselves. This term appeared quite late in JT, in the time of 
Yesiigei.21 However, its coverage is very clear in SH  §42 that Borjigin was 
the branch which consisted of the descendants of Bodonchar.
Two questions may be asked about this definition. First, what is the 
validity of the SH  description of the coverage of Borjigin? Second, what was 
the extent of the Borjigins, since Bodonchar had so many "women"?
The first doubt can be clarified by an account of the genealogical 
hierarchy, ironically, found in JT. In JT  pp.292-293, Rashid al-DIn carefully 
relates the direct ancestors of Temiij in-Mongol, also their Mongolian titles
19 JT  p. 186.
20 JT  p.220.
21 See the discussion o f Qiyat-Borjigin below.
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(laqab) which indicated their rank of generation in the genealogical hierarchy. 
Temujin’s father Yesiigei was called echige, his grandfather Bartan was called 
ebiige, his great grandfather Qabul was called ALYNCHYK (elenchiq), his 
great great grandfather Tumbinai was called BWDTWR, then Bai-Singqor 
BWDAWKW, Qaidu BWRQY, Dutun-Menen (Menen-Tudun in SH) 
DWTAQWN. When it came to one generation earlier than Menen-Tudun, it 
should have been Bodonchar,22 curiously no special title was attached to him. 
Rashid al-DIn recounts that "all [Bodonchar and ancestors before him] are 
called AYCHYGYN ABWGH" (echige-yin ebiige).
Does this suggest that the remotest ancestor Temujin could trace
himself back to was Menen-Tudun, the first descendant from the "proper"
marriage of Bodonchar? The idea of "the first descendant" will be discussed
first. There is a coincidence in the trace of origin when we look into the
example of "Soge’etei Toyoril". Toyoril was a hereditary slave in the time of 
Temujin, but he was referred as "Soge’etei" Toyoril because people identified 
him as "of Soge’e". As analyzed in Chapter Three, Soge’e (*Soge) is not a
tribe but a proper name of one of Toyoril’s direct ancestors. Although the 
beginning of this slave family can be traced back to the capture of Soge’s 
father Oqda, Soge was the first slave of this line born in this Mongol camp, 
and obviously the Mongols identified his offspring by him, not the captured 
one. If the assumption of the meaning of "Soge’etei" is acceptable, it 
apparently suggests a sense of "pureness" of the line. When we compare this 
with the above example of Menen-Tudun, will only the "pure" descendants 
who descended from Bodonchar and his legitimate wife,23 not his other 
"women", have the right to call themselves the Borjigins? The first descendant 
of Bodonchar and his legitimate wife was Menen-Tudun (or Qabichi according 
to SH), therefore, he was the first Borjigin.
22 SH  §43 has another version o f  the generation o f succession. There was a Barim- 
Shiyiratu-Qabichi (also called Qabichi-Bayatur) between Bodonchar and Menen-Tudun.
23 SH  §43, "the wife Bodonchar him self had taken".
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The concept of the only direct and legitimate branch which descended 
from a "proper" relation of marriage is very important in the kinship practice 
within the genealogy. According to this assertion, Temujin was a direct and 
legitimate offspring from Bodonchar, he had the right to regard himself as a 
Borjigin, while the other offspring of Bodonchar who were born of the other
women, adopted their separate clan appellation as Bayarin and Je’iireit. The 
Bayarin and Je’iireit clans had only a paternal connection to the Borjigins; they 
were half-brother branches to the Borjigins. Paternal half-brothers obviously 
have no claim to the "proper" line, as suggested in the peace relationship 
between Belgiitei and Temujin, also a possible conflict over the clan leadership 
between Qasar and Temujin.24
The genealogical legitimism bestowed on Temujin an unsurpassable 
advantage in his competition with other candidates over the leadership of 
Borjigin branch or NTrun Mongols; some non-legitimate lines which were 
partly related to the Borjigin branch also provided Temujin with a chance to 
build up his strength under excommunication by his legitimate kinsmen. 
Details of this impact will be given in the following section, especially in 
Temujin’s selection of his targets among his genealogically related tribes, for 
friendship together with their support.
Qiyat/Qiyan/Kiyan is also an ambiguous term which needs clarification. 
The coverage of the term is obscure, especially when it was mixed with 
"Borjigin", therefore, we need to follow every account Rashid al-DIn provides 
for its exact coverage:
(1) JT  p. 146 relates that those who were Niruns also from the branches of
the line (nasi) of Qabul were called Qiyat.
24 SH  §244, Teb-Tenggeri said that the Eternal Heaven once foretold that Temujin will 
hold the nation and once Heaven said Qasar, he advised Temujin to strike at Qasar by surprise 
in order to prevent any unpredictable result. If Qasar, also a son o f Hb’elun, did not have a 
claim in the clan leadership, this threat would not have been considered so seriously by 
Temujin. This example shows that the maternal line o f descent is considered when it comes 
to the legitimate position in the family, branch or genealogy.
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(2) JT  the same page, those who were from the tribe of NTrun and Qiyat, 
and from the pure line of Alan-Qoya and her sixth [generation of] 
posterity Qabul-Qan, were called Qiyat-Borjigin. It started from
Y estigei-Bayatur.
(3) JT  p. 148, the common ancestors of Mongols were Negus and Qiyan, 
and Qiyat is the plural of Qiyan, which designates a group of ancient 
Mongol people.
(4) JT  pp. 149-150, Dobun-Mergen, the husband of Alan-Qoya was from 
the line of Qiyan, the genealogy of Temujin came from them.25
(5) However, after Dobun-Mergen, his offspring adopted various 
appellations for their own clans; therefore the title (laqab) of Qiyat was 
withdrawn.
(6) When the outstanding era of Qabul came, the title was restored to them.
(7) Particular to the descendants Bartan-Bayatur, they were called the 
Qiyat, for instance, the eldest son of Bartan was called Monggetii-
Qiyan.
(8) Yesiigei-Bayatur and his sons were labelled as Qiyat-Borjigin, which 
means they were both the Qiyat and the Borjigin.26
In brief, what JT  relates is, Qiyat was a general title to the Mongols 
who descended from the ancestor Qiyan, it had once faded out, but during the 
time of Qabul, the title was resumed and applied only to the "Qabul-Mongol", 
especially to its offspring the Bartan-Mongol, then the title passed down to the 
family of Yesiigei and Temujin. This identification was even noticed by non- 
Mongol tribes such as the Tatars: they called Yesiigei "Yesiigei-Qiyan".27
25 This description challenges the theory o f  NTrun Mongols because it mentions Dobun- 
Mergen as Temujin’s ancestor. In the theory o f NTrun classification, Temujin’s line had no 
paternal relationship to Dobun-Mergen —  they were the begotten o f the "light".
26 From the fifth to the eighth, see JT  p. 150.
27 SH  §67.
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Since Qiyan had one broader genealogical coverage and a narrow one,
I would deliberately avoid using the terms in this thesis in order to avoid 
confusion. The narrow coverage of Qiyan will be rendered, respectively, as 
the Qabul-Mongol, the Bartan-Mongol, the Yesiigei-Mongol and the Temujin- 
Mongol. The Chinos receive the same attention in that they will not be related 
by their other name Negiis/Neguz, in order to avoid confusion with the 
descendant of their common ancestor Negus.
As the usages of particular genealogical groupings have been worked 
out, the structure of the Mongol genealogy becomes clearer. The terminologies 
defined and invented here will be used in the appropriate places of the next 
discussion, for a precise coverage and a clear idea of the genealogical kinship 
of the Mongols.
II. Advances and setbacks of Temujin’s expansion through the genealogy
network
(i) Loss of kinsmen’s affection
This phase lasted from around 1172 to 1177, covers the hard life of 
young Temujin, the degree of the harshness and the duration, as well as its 
cause and its consequence, which relates to a dispute between his family and 
their kinsmen: the Taichiyuts.
CCL, JT  and the SH  show great sympathy towards Temujin for his 
difficult teenage years, which commenced shortly(?) after his father’s death. 
Temujin is described, mainly in SH  §§73-74, as a helpless child who was 
abandoned by his arrogant kinsmen, his people gathered by his late father also 
follow the Taichiyuts; this desertion made his mother and his four brothers and
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sisters28 live on fruit and vegetables, and some fish perhaps,29 in miserable 
isolation. Temujin appears firm, brave and able in this period. By his virtue, 
also this moral strength, he overcame the hardship and finally he achieved a 
great career and worldly respect.
Was this suffering exaggerated? If the suffering was heartbreaking, 
why was this brought about? Envy from the other kinsmen30 would be the 
last answer to this circumstance if we can find other evidence in the sources 
which illustrates the real cause. CCL and JT  do not mention much about the 
early life of Temujin, except for the Taichiyut desertion. Therefore, most of 
our knowledge of his early life has to rely on the accounts in the SH.
Temujin enjoyed a happy childhood before the Taichiyut separation. 
Although the limit of Yesiigei's power and strength is not certain because of 
the scarcity of supportive evidence, he apparently had gathered some Mongols 
around him31 and exercised a considerable command over them. Moreover, 
his military strength was demonstrated in his assistance to Toyoril against Giir- 
Qan, also his battle against the Tatars, in which he won and captured a number
of them.32 It is reasonable to assume that Yesiigei sustained a certain degree 
of popularity and power during his lifetime. Therefore, Temujin, the eldest 
son from Yesiigei’s senior khatun, would have grown up in a prestigious and 
harmonious atmosphere before the separation of the Taichiyuts.
28 SH §60, H o’elun had five children from Yesiigei, however, it is obvious that the half- 
brothers o f  Temiijin were living with them as well. (SH  §76)
10 SH  §75 relates that when the children grew up, they went for fishing. However, the 
description o f  their fishing appears more like a kind o f child’s game than serious food- 
gathering.
30 The main argument o f  JT, which starts from p.325 and throughout.
31 SH  §73.
33 SH  §59.
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Temujin’s merry life remained uninterrupted even after the sudden 
death of Yesiigei. SH  §116 relates that Temujin and Jamuqa became anda to 
each other when Temujin was eleven years old, that is 1173. Then, "after this, 
in the (next?) spring" when they were practising shooting, they exchanged gifts 
and confirmed their anda friendship again. This event can be dated in 1174 
if the "spring" was not the one of two years later or so. This account of 
children’s friendship confirms firmly that Temujin was not in a situation of, 
best described by his mother’s words, "our shadows are our only friends, our 
horses’ tails our only whips",'5'’ in early 1174.
Ratchnevsky suggests that Temujin got married when he was fifteen.34
If it was so and the Taichiyuts had abandoned his family immediately after the 
death of Yesiigei,35 Temujin’s "hard" youth would have lasted only a
maximum of six years/6 and was less miserable than expected because the
presence of Jamuqa proves that there were still some Mongols remaining
nearby after the Taichiyuts left.
That this period of hard life was rather short can also be supported by 
the records regarding Temujin’s private life. In SH  §§72-93, during the 
"hardship", Temujin killed his half-brother Bekter because of a shiny minnow, 
became wanted by the Taichiyuts, was captured but managed to escape shortly
33 SH  §78.
34 Ratchnevsky, ibid., English translation, p .3i. The age o f fifteen appears an important 
age for the Mongols. Some later eminent persons showed their acclaimed character when they 
were fifteen. For instance, Shigi-Qutuqu had pursued and killed a herd o f deer (ahu) on his 
own in a severe winter, and Temujin was impressed with this young Tatar (p.85). Another 
example is Uchtigen, a Tangyut. Temiijin acquired him when he was fifteen years old, he 
brought him up as his own son, calling him his fifth son, and put him in charge o f the qan’s 
personal Thousand (p. 136). This age might have been considered by the twelfth century 
Mongols as the age o f maturity. As for Borte the Qonggirat girl, it was acceptable for her to 
get married when Temujin was fifteen because she was one year older than him (SH §66) and 
both o f them had become mature.
35 SH  connects the events o f Temujin’s returning from the Qonggirats (§69) and the 
Taichiyut separation (§70) with the phrase: "that spring".
36 In JT, Yesiigei died when Temujin was thirteen. If we follow this version, the hardship 
o f his youth is even shorter.
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afterwards by hiding his small body in a cart of wool; then, he met Boyorchu 
on the way chasing eight stolen horses and formed a good relationship with
him. All this behaviour reflect just a very young teenager who acts
straightforwardly with his premature recklessness and sincerity.
Such a simple-minded under-fifteen young man, although he was a 
legitimate heir to Yesiigei, did not seem likely to provoke envy or jealousy 
from his powerful Taichiyut kinsmen, neither appeared as a threat to them. 
Therefore, a more convincing reason is needed to explain Taichiyuts’ 
abandonment of Temujin and his family. An alternative explanation can be 
established if we examine this event through the perspective of a principle of 
kinship practice.
The immediate cause of the abandonment is described in SH  §§70-72 
as follows. One spring after Yesiigei had passed away, some Mongols were 
performing a sacrifice ritual to their ancestors. Ho’eliin also went but she had 
been denied a share of the offerings because she was late. She told off the 
khatuns of Hambaqai-Qan saying that they denied her because they said to 
themselves that Yesiigei was dead and her sons were not grown yet. These 
words were obvious very unwisely spoken and the khatuns replied that she had 
been denied because of her own fault (being late), and answered back to her 
insult: "Is it because you tell yourself that Hambaqai-Qan is dead, that you 
abuse us like this, Ho’eliin?" Then the khatuns turned to their kinsmen and 
said: "The best plan would be for you to leave these mothers and children in 
the camp and move on without them."37 Next morning, the Taichiyuts 
carried out the instruction of their seniors. They moved downstream along the 
Onan, and left behind Ho’eliin and her children.
37 SH  §72. This sentence, as seen in the changing o f subject and object, is apparently 
addressed to the Taichiyuts, not as a part o f  their comment to Ho’ellin.
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When Charaqa, a Qongqotan, tried to stop them, Todo’en, an elder38
of the Taichiyuts, told him: "The deep water has dried up, the shining stone 
has crumbled."39 This is the key sentence which explains the situation and
reveals the underlying cause of their separation. The meaning of this idiom
has been translated into Persian as "I am determined in the decision and [there
is] no alternative. An opportunity of hesitation is impossible."40
The separation can only be understood from a genealogical point of 
view. Although the account did not supply the function or meaning of the 
sacrifice ritual, the genealogical background of the participants reveals that this 
ritual might have related to Qaidu, the common ancestor of the Qabul-Mongol 
and the Taichiyut-Mongol, where Ho’eliin was identified with the Qabul line. 
In such a meeting of some genealogical closely related kinsmen, the khatuns 
of Hambaqai-Qan, who was in the same genealogical generation of Qabul, 
could have been reasonably rated a higher rank than the khatun of Yesiigei, 
who was two generations younger than Hambaqai. In this offence in which 
both sides felt offended, Ho’eliin had challenged the genealogical seniority, 
which was also the social status in twelfth century Mongolia, of her
"grandmothers". By this way, the Taichiyut decision to separate from their 
offensive kinsmen appeal's just and reasonable.
As for the meaning of the quotation, the genealogical connection 
between these two brother branches which were both descendants of Qaidu was 
as hard as the core of stone ("the shining stone") and their affection profound 
as deep water. However, with this insult, it was spoiled. The Taichiyuts 
described their affection as having been ruined by this offence as the deep 
water dried up and the core of stone crumbled. This shows how seriously the
38 JT  p.326, aqd-yi hama, but according to JT  p.325, the Taichiyuts were under the 
command o f Tarqutai and Quril then.
39 SH  §72.
40 JT  p.326.
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Taichiyuts had been offended, and how badly Ho’eliin had violated one of the 
principles of kinship practice: "to respect genealogical seniority".
Thus, utilising an explanation from the genealogical point of view, the 
separation was not caused by jealousy, but explicitly by the offensive manner 
of Hd’ellin.
Besides the Taichiyuts, the people gathered under the banner (tuq) of
Yesiigei also left Ho’elim and followed the Taichiyuts. These Mongols would 
have had no social or military obligation to stay with Yesiigei’s family,
because their freedom in choosing their adherence is revealed in this incident,
in which they left by their own will.41 Interestingly enough, JT  p.326
supplies the detail that these people were "the other kinsmen and their troops".
That is. they were Mongols, and kinsmen to Yesiigei. Did their leaving show
also their disapproval, as kinsmen, of Ho’eliin’s offensive manner to her
genealogical seniors?
If these "kinsmen" did leave the family of Yesiigei for this reason, we 
may conclude that the abandonment of Ho’eliin and her family was considered 
as a proper punishment to an offender against kinship practice, and this 
punishment was agreed by not only the offended kinsmen, but kinsmen in 
general.
Such a strong reaction to a kinship offence is not unique to Ho’eliin but 
universal, as seen in Temujin’s later two violations of this principle towards 
his kinsmen within the Qabul-Mongol: the Jurkins and two uncles and one 
cousin. The violent reaction they brought about had put Temujin in an 
embarrassed or even dangerous situation. Upon the offence to the Jurkin clan 
which was the eldest branch in the Qabul-Mongol, after a conflict started by 
Temujin’s ndkers and the capture of two Jiirkin khatuns, the whole tribe of
41 SH  §73, Ho’elUn had tried to bring back half o f them by raising Yesiigei’s banner (tuq), 
however, these people "did not stay either, but followed the Taichiyut".
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Jiirkin separated from Temujin42 —  exactly the same reaction as the 
Taichiyuts. In the latter incident, his kinsmen turned treacherous to Temujin.
The transgression of the principle this time, by Temujin’s mother, did
not just cause their individual sufferings which was a just punishment as
acknowledged by the Mongols; it also damaged the friendship between the two
genealogically closely related clans: the Taichiyut-Mongol and Temujin’s 
family. Later when Temujin obtained recognition and the support of some
kinsmen of the Qabul-Mongol, the Taichiyuts showed no affection to this 
leader of their brother branch, and appeared to have no interest in having an 
intimate relation with this "qan". The breach was apparently irrecoverable, and 
this laid a great obstacle in the way of Temujin’s road to success.
(ii) Winning kinsmen’s affection by courtesy
This phase covers a period from 1177 to early 1190s, when Temujin 
was in his youth.
After obtaining an in-laws’ relationship from the Qonggirats, which was
a huge tribe and strong enough to harass the Jurchen realm (see Chapter Six),
Temujin began to resume his role as the successor of Yesiigei. However,
because the imprudence of his mother, Temujin had lost the affection of the
Taichiyuts also the other kinsmen who were attached to Yesiigei. He started 
his career in a hard way. The damage caused by that offence became evident
when Temujin started to build up his power, since many Mongols would no
longer befriend with him.
Summarized from the sources, under such unfavourable circumstances, 
Temujin tried to seek friendship from some non-Borjigin Mongols, and non- 
Mongols. His first three beneficial connections which were created before his
42 JT  p.336, "juda shudan".
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ascendance as the qan of Qabul Mongols are all in this ethnic and genealogical
catalogue: the revival of old friendship with the Turkic Toyoril-Kereit, his in­
laws’ relationship with the Derelkln Qonggirats and an alliance with Jamuqa.
The first and the second of these will be related in Chapter Five, and his
relation with Jamuqa will be discussed here.
After his separation from Jamuqa, Temujin acquired a certain number
of Mongols and was elected as their leader. His strength as a multi-clan leader
as well as the allegiance of his Mongol supporters were first put to the test in
the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en (1193). A particular principle of genealogical
kinship is revealed by two incidents in the battle. The disappearance of his
Bayarin supporters and the disaster which fell upon the Chinos kinsmen warn: 
"never confront your kinsmen with a sword".
Temujin did not give up his attempt to seek friendship with his Mongol
kinsmen. An earlier invitation to the non-Borjigin kinsmen: the Qatagins and
the Saljiyuts and a later temptation of the Je’tireits, who were under the banner 
of the Taichiyuts confirm this. A review of these incidents reveals his strategy 
of gathering support at this stage: by a gesture of courtesy, and his targets were
selected after a careful consideration of the genealogical connections of those
clans.
Temujin’s friendship with Jamuqa 
and Temujin’s ascension as a qan
Before Jamuqa became Temujin’s major rival, he had a sworn-brother 
friendship with Temujin. Their closeness reached its climax with Jamuqa’s 
assistance in rescuing Temujin’s wife from the Merkits, in the SH  version of 
the incident of Borte. They renewed their anda relationship the third time with 
the Merkit booty, "enjoyed themselves revelling and feasting, and at night they 
slept together, alone under one blanket".43 Temujin had stayed with Jamuqa
43 SH §117.
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for one and a half years during the best time of their friendship, then, he broke 
away from his anda, and some Mongols who had previously followed Jamuqa 
now followed Temujin. It appears that Jamuqa had lost his affection to 
Temujin since then, because Temujin was elected by those Mongols as their
44qan.
In the course of the rapid change of the Jamuqa-Temiijin relationship, 
three points are worth notice. First, the assistance and closeness between these 
two youths seems natural because they have an old anda relationship dating 
from their teenage years. However, if the above assumption of Temujin’s 
family having been condemned by most of its Mongol kinsmen is correct, the 
continuing closeness of Jamuqa and Temujin attracts particular attention. 
Second, during their staying together, they together invited friendship from the 
Mongol Qatagins and Saljiyuts, although this was unsuccessful. The reason 
for choosing these two tribes implies Temujin’s strategy of expansion: via the 
genealogical network. Third, Temujin was elected a qan after their separation. 
What is the nature of this qanship, and what was the situation which allowed 
him to become the qan, not Jamuqa? All these questions can be properly 
answered by a study from the perspective of genealogical connections.
First, the genealogical connection of Temujin and Jamuqa. Jamuqa was 
a Jadaran, or Jajirat.43 The tribe was descended from Jajiradai, who was born
to Adangqan-Urangqajin of the Jarchiyut tribe, a woman who was captured by 
Bodonchar when she was already pregnant with this son.46 Since this woman 
was later possessed by Bodonchar, her children and the clans stemming from 
these children would have a kinship with the legitimate descendant of
44 SH  §127. See discussion below.
45 The tribe/clan name is occasionally related as Jajirat probably because its ancestor was 
called Jajiradai, a common way of designating clan titles, such as Bayarin tribe had their title
from their ancestor Bayarindai, Je’iireit tribe had their title from their ancestor Je’tireidei. 
However, I cannot find a convincing reason to explain why Jamuqa is related as a Je’ureit in 
JT.
46 SH  §38 and §40.
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Bodonchar, that is the Borjigin branch which the Taichiyut-Mongol and 
Temujin’s family descended from —  but the genealogical relationship is very
ambiguous, especially when the father of Jajiradai was not Bodonchar. This
equivocal genealogical relation might have prevented Jamuqa from being
condemned by his NTrun kinsmen for his friendship with the condemned
Temujin family, and also provided Temujin with a chance to maintain a
friendship with his "kinsmen".
The invitation from Temujin and Jamuqa to the Qatagins and the
Saljiyuts partly justifies this hypothesis. The incident is recorded in .77’p. 185
alone. After consulting with Jamuqa, Temujin sent a messenger to the
Qatagins and the Saljiyuts, saying: "Many tribes like Qonggirat and Tatar and 
Derelkln (?Dorben) which had no relation (ta'alluq) with us [have recently]
all agreed with us and become friends. We are aqa wa in i and [in] blood
[related] one another, [let] us unite and become friends."
The only occasion when Temujin and Jamuqa stayed together was the 
merry period mentioned in the SH, the one and a half years when they "slept 
under one blanket". Therefore, this invitation must have been made during this 
period.
It is interesting to see Temujin and Jamuqa making the decision to 
invite the Qatagins and the Saljiyuts to join them because from a genealogical 
point of view, the Qatagin and the Saljiyut were two elder brother branches to 
the Borjigin. They were the only three branches direct descended from the
same progeny of Alan-Qoya and the "light", that is, the starting branches of 
NTrun-Mongol, and Temujin was a descendant from the youngest branch. In
this invitation, Temujin, a legitimate Borjigin descendant who had been
condemned by his kinsmen, discussed with Jamuqa, a non-legitimate but to
certain extent "related" descendant to Bodonchar, an attempt to win the
friendship of these two senior NTrun branches. This may be evidence for the
above assumption that Temujin had been condemned by many of his Borjigin
175
kinsmen, thus, he had to seek friendship from outside the Borjigin branch, or 
from those non-legitimate Borjigin clans.
The unity of Jamuqa and Temujin provided an opportunity for them to
make themselves the leaders of non-Taichiyut NTrun Mongols. Jamuqa 
possessed a certain amount of support from the Mongol kinsmen, and from the
list of the tribesmen who left Jamuqa and followed Temujin after the
separation, we can tell there were plenty of Mongols, from various tribes,
under the banner of Jamuqa before the separation. According to SH  §§120-
122, these people were from:
A. Turkic tribes:
the Jalair, the Tarqut;47
B. The Derelkln-Mongols:
the Uriangqan, the Suldus. the Olqunuyut and the Qorulas from the 
Qonggirat;48
C. The Nirun-Mongols:
the Barulas, the Mangqut, the Siikeken, the Dorben, the Noyankin, the
Jadaran, the Bayarin;
1. Descendants of Charaqai-Lingqu:
the Bestit, the Negus (/Chinos)
2. Descendants of Chaujin-Ortegei:
the Arulat, the Qongqotan, the Oronar (and the Niinjin)49, the 
Geniges
3. Qabul-Mongol:
(1) Descendants of Okin-Barqaq: the Jiirkin
(2) Descendants of Bartan-Bayatur:
47 A Turkic tribe which had a qnda relationship to Qabul-Mongol. The wife o f Bartan- 
Bayatur who was the grandmother o f Temujin was from this tribe. JT  p.99.
48 Qorulas and Ikires were derived from the Qonggirat tribe. See the discussion o f the 
"Golden Vessel" in section I.
49 JT p.172, Niinjin is a branch o f the Oronar-Kelegeniit, a cousin branch o f Qongqotan 
and Arulat. QWNJYN, an error from NWNJYN. Unjin <  Niinjin, the same pattern as Ilqa- 
Senggiim < Niiqa-Senggum.
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a) the clan of Monggetu-Qiyan and their Changshiyut 
and Bayayut people
b) the clan of Nekiin-Taishi: Quchar-Beki
c) the clan of Dayaritai-Otchigin
(3) Descendants of Qutula-Qan: Altan-Otchigin
No legitimate Taichiyut descendants appear on the name lis t  that means
both Jamuqa and Temujin did not have Taichiyut supporters. The absence of 
supporters from the Taichiyut tribe may also confirm the irrecoverable breach 
between the Taichiyuts and the family of Temujin.
Temujin’s separation from Jamuqa is mysterious. They were sworn 
brothers since childhood, they had sworn their friendship three times, which 
suggests their personal bondage was firm and strong. It is curious to see them 
separated just one and a half years after their third affirmation of their 
relationship, especially when the reason is obscure. The reason supplied by SH  
§118 is that Jamuqa uttered something which Temujin could not understand. 
He listened to his wife Borte’s interpretation of those words and believed that 
his cindci had "tired" of him. Thereupon, he separated.
This separation was beneficial to Temujin because when we look into 
the subsequent development of Temujin’s career, plenty of followers who were 
previously gathered around Jamuqa changed sides and came to Temujin. These 
people came with a purpose: if we look into the personal association of these 
people, we discover that some of them came individually because their 
relatives were with Temujin50, and some came as a whole clan because they 
were close kinsmen to Temujin. Most of them came not because of virtue 
attraction but kinship connection.55
50 SH §120, OgOlen o f  the Arulat came to join his cousin Boyorchu, Chayurqan and 
SUbe’etei o f  the Uriangqan came to join their elder brother o f Jeime, Butu (Botu) of the Ikires 
was performing his bridegroom duty (giiregen) there.
51 The Besiits had a paternal connection to Charaqai-Lingqu but a maternal connection to 
the wife o f Bai-Singqor, that is, they were paternally related to the Taichiyuts but maternally 
related to the descendants o f Bai-Singqor —  Temujin was one o f  them. The Chinos has also 
an ambiguous position in the genealogy, see below.
I l l
Temujin did have an advantage in his genealogical position which 
Jamuqa did not have: he was born the legitimate heir to Yestigei, a leader who 
was once strong and popular and had many kinsmen followers. This position 
did attract kinsmen followers, and its significance worked to its maximum 
when these newly-arriving supporters elected him a qan shortly after his 
separation from Jamuqa.
It was the kinsmen from the Qabul-Mongol who made Temujin their 
qan. In SH  §123, it was Altan, Quchar and Sacha-Beki who made Temujin the 
qan; in SH  §179, it was Temujin who proposed to elect a qan; after Altan, 
Quchar and Sacha-Beki all declined his kindly offer, he himself was made the 
qan. No matter which account is correct, from the participants in this decision­
making, we can tell that this qan was a qan for the Qabul Mongols, not an all- 
Mongol qan.
Jamuqa had a sharp observation to make of this circumstance. He 
asked the shifting supporters: "Why did you not make sworn brother Temujin 
qan when we were together - when the sworn brother and I had not yet been 
separated? What did you have in mind now, when you made him qan?"52 
Apparently, the genealogical position of Jamuqa was not strong enough to 
convince these legitimate Qabul-Borjigins to make him their qan. Although 
Jamuqa did not tell Temujin frankly that he was unhappy with this news of his 
ascension, his reprimand to those "migratory larks"53 shows that he was not 
rejoicing at his anda 's ascension as a formal recognized leader of some 
Mongols, and he was even irritated by this because this election was taken 
place after Temujin’s separation, that is, after so many of his previous 
supporters had "migrated" over from him — those Mongol kinsmen had
52 SH  §127.
53 This is the phrase which Jamuqa used to describe the uncertainty o f Temiijin in SH  
§160. I think the action o f these kinsmen suggested the real meaning o f  this idiomatic steppe 
usage: they did not stay like "skylark".
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decided to leave a leader who could not have a proper genealogical position 
confirmed, to a thief who stole people from his banner.
Altan, Quchar and Sacha-Beki’s decline of the offer of qanship is 
peculiar. According to genealogical seniority, Altan was the youngest son of 
Qutula-Qan (Altan-Otchigin) and an genealogical "uncle" to Temujin, Quchar 
was a son to Nekiin-Taishi who was Yesiigei’s elder brother, therefore Quchar 
was a cousin (from an elder branch) to Temujin; as for Sacha-Beki, he was in 
the same genealogical generation as Temujin but a descendant of the eldest 
branch in the Qabul-Mongol. They all had a better claim than Temujin to the 
leadership of the Qabul-Mongol.
It does not appear sensible for them to have refused to take up this 
offer, unless they wished somebody else to become the target of hostility for
Jamuqa, or for the Taichiyuts. These Qabul-Mongol kinsmen had left Jamuqa, 
therefore, it was embarrassing for them to take up the offer to become a 
competitor to Jamuqa. On the other hand, they might also have disagreed with 
"the insult of our Taichiyut brothers"54 upon their legitimate descendants. 
Therefore, Temtijin was peculiarly recognised by them as their qan.
Summarized from the above, the examples of Jamuqa, Qatagin and 
Saljiyut, also the making of a Qabul-Mongol qan, all suggest that the 
genealogical connections had a great significance in the early career of
Temujin. Temujin did desperately need supporters —  but he did not hunt
around for every chance. He set his targets after careful thought, and his
supporters came to him also after careful thought. Temujin’s interest in the
tribesmen who had a distant genealogical relation to him might be explained
by the influence of the Taichiyuts: most of Yestigei’s previous kinsmen 
followers stayed with the Taichiyuts, but Temujin was not strong enough to 
challenge the Taichiyuts for the moment. Finally, by his born privilege in the
“  SH §78.
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genealogical network, Temujin won himself the essential support of the Qabul- 
Mongols, under peculiar circumstances.
K in’s peace
The above examination of Temujin’s strategy for expansion in its early 
stages has revealed that Temiijin attempted to reach his goal by a peaceful 
alliance among his genealogical connections, not by violent confrontations. 
The early development of Temujin’s friendship with Jamuqa and the attempt
to win a friendship from the Qatagins and the Saljiyuts indicates that he was 
trying to seek associations with his genealogical kinsmen from non-Taichiyut 
Mongols and non-Borjigin Mongols. After he ascended as the qan of Qabul- 
Mongols, he had secured certain recognition within the Borjigin and his direct 
line of Qabul-Mongol, however, this progress was not achieved by his 
intelligence, but resulted from the decline of other eligible candidates. After 
a carelessness which caused the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en, Temujin continued 
his policy of attracting kinsmen to join him —  but this time, he carelessly
stepped on the tiger’s tail that he annoyed the Taichiyuts by attempting to lure 
the Je’iireits from under their banner. The setbacks are going to be discussed
as follows.
Upon Temujin’s separation, some Bayarin left Jamuqa and followed 
Temujin. It is curious to see these Bayarins come because in genealogical 
sense, the Bayarin tribe has a close connection to the Jadaran tribe, they are 
brother branches who shared the same maternal ancestor: Adangqan-
Urangqajin.55 Their different paternal ancestor might explain this move: 
while sharing the same maternal line with the Jadaran, the Bayarin tribe shared 
the same paternal line to the Borjigin —  they also had a brotherhood
affiliation to the legitimate descendant of Bodonchar.
55 SH  §41.
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The Bayarin Qorchi was aware of their kinship connection to Jamuqa 
and he knew that they should not have left him.56 However, Temujin did 
need their support, from a genealogical point of view. The support of the 
Bayarins could be a replacement for losing the friendship of the Jadaran. With 
the coming of some Bayarins, Temujin still had the companionship of the 
Mongol kinsmen who descended from the Jarchiyut Adangqan-Urangqajin. In 
this way, the power foundation of Temujin —  in a genealogical sense —  was 
not shaken by his separation from Jamuqa. Therefore, for his pain in this 
separation, Temujin promised Qorchi the position of a commander of Ten- 
Thousand.57
These Bayarins might have stayed with Temujin from then on, and this 
can be confirmed by the appearance of the Bayarin Usun-Noyan in his 
protection of Temujin from an unsuccessful conspiracy in 1200.58 However,
they might have disappeared from the banner of Temujin during the Battle of
Thirteen Gure’en (1193) in which Temujin suffered his first defeat. SH  §120
relates that these Bayarins, together with Menen-Bayarins, came to Temujin 
in one giire 'en. If  they had supported and assisted Temujin in this battle, the
defensive power of Temujin would have increased to fourteen gure’en.
The fact is, when we compare the name list of the people who
separated from Jamuqa and the people who fought for Temujin in this battle,
the Bayarins under Temujin were missing. Their absence can only be 
explained by their reluctance to confront their clansmen in the enemy camp:
the Bayarins who came with the punitive force.59
56 SH  §121.
57 Qorchi was not satisfied with this position. According to SH  §121, he demanded a 
further right to take thirty o f  the most beautiful girls as wives, and, "listen closely whatever 
he said". This is racketeering. Qorchi did not come because o f  affection but for privileges.
58 See Chapter Three, Toyorifs attempt against Temujin in the spring feast in 1200.
50 CCL p.6a. There may be another possibility that those Bayarins who came to Temiijin 
had shifted their affiliation again, but this is not a sound assumption because the accounts in 
the SH  recount Temujin’s kindness to Usun-Ebiigen and Qorchi after his "unification o f  
Mongolia". Temujin would never treat betrayers with benevolence.
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The absence suggests another general acknowledged principle in kinship 
practice which prohibits military confrontations among kinsmen, especially 
within their own clan and among the closely related brother clans. This 
principle of "kin’s peace" is clearly demonstrated in the Battle of Thirteen 
Gure’en, where two examples are found: the Bayarins’ reservation in offering 
military assistance to Temujin against their kinsmen, and the devastation of the
Chinos.
In the battle, the punitive troop which was made up of Jamuqa and the
Taichiyuts and the other allied tribesmen completed their revenge for the death 
of Taichar by forcing Temujin to escape into the Jerene Gorge.60 However,
when the troop was about to return, Jamuqa "had the princes of the Chinos 
boiled in seventy cauldrons" and "cut off the head of Chaqayan-Uya of the 
Ne’iis (*Negiis)", dragging it on his horse’s tail.61 This massacre was
unreasonable, especially when the life of their major enemy, Temujin, had been 
pardoned.
To rediscover the background of this event, we have to look into the 
identification of the Chinos and the Negus, also the genealogical connection of 
this clan to the tribesmen of both sides in this military confrontation. The SH  
records the event but does not supply the genealogical identification of the 
Chinos or Negiis. The identity is found in JT.
JT  pp. 151-152 recounts that the various tribes of Derelkm Mongols 
stemmed from NKWZ (*Negtis) and Qiyan, as the people are called. Later, 
a NIrun clan is also called Negiis. It is descended from Gendti-Chino and 
ALKCHYN-Chino, two sons of Charaqai-Lingqu. Their line and uruq are
60 SH  §129, Jamuqa said: "we have forced him to take refuge in the Jerene by the Onan" 
then prepared to return.
61 SH  §129. The execution o f the Chinos is distorted in JT  into a celebrating deed o f  
Temujin. JT  p.331. The name and the clan identity o f his enemy is not mentioned in this 
account, but the "seventy cauldrons" are the same.
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called "Chino", also "Negus". The Mongols who have a clear idea of their 
own genealogy are able to distinguish these two Negiis people.
According to this description, the clan of Chinos was the clan of Nirun 
Negiis, and Chaqayan-Uya, the leader of the "Ne’us" in SH  §129, was the 
leader of the Chinos.
The Chinos leader was killed with many of his Chinos princes in the 
after-battle clearance. Why were they killed?
After giving the genealogical identity of the Chinos, JT  continues to 
give the genealogical connection of the clan. The Chinos were from the
Taichiyut tribe but allied with Temujin when the Taichiyuts were confronting 
Temujin. This branch came from the two sons of Charaqai-Lingqu, who were 
born to the wife of his elder brother,62 when Charaqai-Lingqu took her after 
his elder brother passed away.6j The practice of this Mongol custom 
inevitably caused a vagueness in Chinos’ genealogical connections.
JT  further supplies that "that Negiis which is [descended] from the 
offspring of Gendti-Chino and ALKCHYN-Chino and(?which is) another uruq 
of Charaqai-Lingqu which [is/are born] to the other khatuns are all ancestors 
of the Taichiyut tribes."64 This description is more confusing. No matter if 
the clan was a part of the Taichiyuts or not, there is no doubt that the Chinos 
had a paternal kinship to the Taichiyuts, that is the uruq of Hambaqai-Qan, and
at the same time, they had a maternal kinship to the Qabul-Mongols, which 
Temujin was descended from.
b2 According to the SH , this elder brother should be Bai-Singqor but in JT p . \5 \ ,  she was 
the khatun o f Tumbinai.
63 JT  p. 192.
64 JT  p. 152. The separation between sentence clauses is unclear. If the wa  after 
ALKCHYN-Chino could be a copying error o f ki, the sentence would not be so confusing and 
would become comprehensible.
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Perhaps the Chinos left Jamuqa and joined Temujin under this kinship
consideration. However, when the Taichiyuts came with Jamuqa in the Battle 
of Thirteen Gure’en, the Chinos had been being put in a dilemma by their
genealogical connections — they should not fight their paternal kinsmen, but
they were also obligated to assist the leader who they had selected to attach
themselves to. Their decision to confront the Taichiyuts violated the principle 
o f "kin’s peace", and the offence might have resulted in the slaughter launched
by the irritated Taichiyuts (not by Jamuqa), in return for their opposition to 
their brother clan.
The examples of the absence of the Bayarins and the slaughter of the 
Chinos confirm that the Mongols observed a principle of "kin’s peace"; also
the principle of respecting genealogical seniority. In the subsequent interaction
of Temujin and his kinsmen, a conflict between his expansion and these
principles became more striking, which eventually led to a change of
Temujin’s strategy of expansion: from peace to violence.
This conflict and change occur in Temujin’s temptation of the Je’iireits. 
The Je’tireit incident appears quite abruptly isolated in CCL and JT  — no 
dating, no notable significance (although dramatic), the only clue which 
suggests an approximate dating is J T s mistaken narration of the Battle of 
Thirteen Gure’en. In that paragraph, JT  relates that when Temujin boiled his 
enemies in the cauldrons, the Je’ilreits also submitted and came to Temujin "at 
that time". They moved their houses (khanaha) into the neighbourhood of 
Temujin’s yurt, and again, some of them turned into enemies.65 Since in 
CCL the coming of some Je’ilreits also came after the account of the Battle of 
Thirteen Gure’en, it would be reasonable to consider that the temptation of the 
Je’iireits happened after the battle and before Temujin’s victory over the 
Tatars.
65 yrp.331.
184
According to the description in both sources, the Je’ureits lived next to 
Temujin, they occasionally met each other in hunting. Temujin represented 
himself as a thoughtful and generous leader, sharing provisions with the 
Je’ureit hunters and allowing them to carry away more prey than they deserved 
—  this generosity won gratitude from them. Then, according to CCL, 
Temujin sent over a messenger and asked: "would you come to ally [with 
us]?"66 Ultik-Bayatur discussed this matter with another Je’ureit leader 
Mayu(i)-Yadayana.67 The latter disapproved of this move, therefore, Ultik- 
Bayatur himself separated from Mayu(i)-Yadayana and came to Temujin with 
some of the Je’iireits who lived nearby and were related (muta'allaq).tz
The event is not so simple as it seems. When we look into the role of 
genealogical connection in this matter, also the recent lord of the Je’iireits, the 
movement is full of significance.
First, the genealogical issue. It is interesting to see that the Je’iireits 
also had a vague position in the Mongol genealogy which relates to the 
Borjigins, The ancestor of the Je’iireits was called Je’tiredei, who was born to 
Bodonchar and his concubine. In the early days, Je’iiredei was allow to 
participate in the sacrifice ritual as a family member, but after Bodonchar’s 
death, he was excluded from it.69 Thus, the Je’iireit clan was a half-brother 
clan to the legitimate Borjigin branch (Temujin’s) because they shared the 
same paternal origin.
66 JT  account o f  this event relates that Uliik-Bayatur suggested that the tribesmen move 
over.
bl JTp.204, MAGHWY W YADAGHAYA, variations YADAGHA/YADAGHANA, p.332, 
MAGHWY YADAQAYA, CCL p. 13b Ma-wu-ya-ta-na. CCL p.13b, Mayu-Yadayana was the 
Je’ilreit tribal leader. JT  P.332, Both Ultik-Bayatur and Mayu(i)-Yadayana were Je’iireit chiefs 
{sarwaran).
68 J r p p .3 3 1-332, CCL p.l3ab.
69 SH  §§43-44.
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As a half-brother clan to the legitimate Borjigin, the Je’ureit clan had
no obligation to either the Taichiyut-Mongol or the Qabul-Mongol, the two 
great branches in the Borjigin. Its genealogical position is similar to the
Bayarin clan, both of them are half-brother clans to the Borjigins by a paternal 
connection. From a genealogical point of view, Temujin’s effort to win
friendship from the clans of Jadaran, Bayarin and Je’ureit, which all have a 
vague genealogical connection to the Borjigin, even the tribes of Qatagin and
Saljiyut, which were the brother clans to the Borjigin, suggests a careful design 
of Temujin’s early expansion: to seek companionship from those Borjigin- 
related but genealogically ambiguous kinsmen, and the most distant clans 
within the Nirun-Mongol, by peaceful means.
This strategy worked well until his careless attempt upon the Je’iireits 
under the Taichiyut sphere of influence. The Je’ureits were staying with the 
Taichiyuts at that time.70 The reasons of Mayu(i)-Yadayana’s disapproval to 
move away from the Taichiyuts reveal his consideration of the present 
situation: first, the Taichiyuts did not treat them badly, second, they were also 
"aqa wci inP'T Mayu(i)-Yadayana could not see any point sufficient to
justify a shift of their support to Temujin.
Is it appropriate to lure a clan of kinsmen to abandon their
companionship with another kinsmen, in favour of joining himself?
Apparently what Temujin was doing in this temptation was to snatch the
supporters of the Taichiyuts for himself. It is true that the Taichiyuts had 
possessed a vast territory, plenty of people at this time but loosely
disciplined72 —  a great chance to take advantage of. If the temptation is
inappropriate, were the Taichiyuts totally ignorant of this intrusive attempt?
70 CCL p. 13a describes the "Je’ureit tribe" as a tribe of/to the Taichiyuts —  if  this is not 
in a genealogical sense, at least it shows their present attachment. The Je’ureits had 
complained, in JT pp.331-32 and CCL p. 13b, about the inconsiderate treatment they suffered 
from the Taichiyuts. The certifies the Taichiyut leadership over the Je’ureits during this time.
71 JT  p.332. CCL mentions twice in p.13b and p.14a that the Taichiyuts were "brothers" 
(hshing-ti, lit. elder brother [and] younger brother) to the Je’ureits.
72 CCL p. 13a.
186
The Taichiyuts were not ignorant of this attempt. The Je’ureits under 
Uliik-Bayatur came to Temujin fearing a danger of extinction. Explicit 
evidence cannot be found in the sources, but we learn of the tension from the
words of Uliik-Bayatur: "the children of the senior khatun were killing us!"73 
This sentence, as it appears in JT , does not tell who these pisaran 
(sons/children) were, but in the same sentence in CCL, these pisaran were 
definitely "the son(s) of the Taichiyut senior mother(s)".74 If "the Taichiyut 
senior mother(s)" can be identified with the two khatuns of Hambaqai-Qan, and 
their sons/children the contemporary Taichiyut leaders Tarqutai and Quril, this 
sentence would mean that these Taichiyuts had been offended by the leaving 
of these Je’ureits and they were thinking of exterminating them. When the
shift of the support of Uliik-Bayatur could result in such a severe consequence, 
or punishment, Temujin’s attempt can certainly be considered an intrusion into 
the power base of his Taichiyut kinsmen, in which Uliik-Bayatur appeared as 
a betrayer to the Taichiyuts.
A separation from one’s aqd wa in i  is not always counted as a
betrayal, but turning away from a previous leadership to its rival is totally
different. The Taichiyuts had separated from Temujin’s family, but with a just 
cause. Temiijin had separated from Jamuqa, but not in order to turn to a
competing leadership —  although Jamuqa did show his anger when Temujin
made himself a competing leader. However, when Temiijin attempted to lure
the Je’iireits, he had already established himself as the leader of Qabul-Mongol
and eager for the support of his genealogical kinsmen in order to compete with
the leadership of his brother branch, the Taichiyut-Mongol. Je’iireit’s changing 
sides under such circumstances would mean a loss to the Taichiyuts, and an 
reinforcement to the "villainous" dqa wa in i  who had a very bad record in
violating the principles of kinship practice: his mother’s arrogance, his murder
of his half-brother, and his recent punishment because his fellowman killed a
kinsman of Jamuqa.
73 JT  p.332, "pisaran ki az khatun-i buzurgand ma-ra mlkishand".
74 CCL p. 14a.
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Temujin was not unaware of the social judgement of this kind of 
offence, and he also demanded the same loyalty from his supporters. He was 
furious when his kinsmen Altan, Quchar and Dayaritai separated from him and 
turned to his prime rival: the Toyoril-Kereit in 1202/03. He responded in the 
same manner, and had Altan and Quchar done away with at the end. When 
kinship affinity and the leadership supremacy came to a conflict, as seen from 
the above example, Mongol society at the end of the twelfth century inclined 
to give priority to allegiance.
Before allowing himself to engage in an open military conflict with the
Taichiyuts, Temujin had succeeded in securing a number of kinsmen 
supporters and had become the recognized leader of Qabul-Mongol. Young
Temujin was successful in his power-building through the existing genealogical
network. In his thirties (1193-1203), Temujin’s expansion became rapid
because he adopted an aggressive manner towards his career —  subduing by
the sword.
(iii) Winning kinsmen’s recognition by the sword
This phase covers a decade from 1196 to 1206, in which Temujin 
expanded rapidly and unified the Mongols.
From peace to violence
Temujin had achieved many victories after his first trial of his sword 
on the Tatars in early 1196. The subsequent conquests were quick, forceful 
and determinative, and by adopting this style, Temujin had been acknowledged 
as a world conqueror.
If the observation of his strategy of a smooth expansion through the 
genealogical network is correct, it is astonishing to see Temujin suddenly
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changing his manner from a courteous leader to a war-fond exterminator. 
Thus, a study of the change of Temujin’s strategy is necessary.
We have reached the point in the previous discussion at which Temujin 
had become an established leader of the Qabul-Mongol, and possessed at least 
the support of thirteen gure’en of manpower in 1193. He still attempted to 
expand his power by attracting other Mongols to join them. This intention was 
recently shown in the temptation of the Je’ureits by generosity on the hunting 
ground. However, the changing sides of some Je’ureits had provoked the 
Taichiyuts, and they had been threatened with extermination.
Temujin came to a deadlock. He wished to expand his influence and
build up his power by attracting other genealogically closely-related Mongol
tribes to join him, however, would these Borjigin tribes, especially those who
were staying with the Taichiyuts, risk the threat of extinction which would 
accompany their acceptance of Temujin’s goodwill? The Qabul-Mongol and
the Taichiyut-Mongol were both great branches in the Borjigin-Mongol, and 
their genealogical kinsmen overlapped. Apparently the spheres of influence of
Temujin and the Taichiyuts were meeting each other, and their contact, or 
conflict, seemed inevitable.
The coming of the Je’ureits who were commanded by Ultik-Bayatur is 
significant in two ways in the development of Temujin’s career: one concerns
his strength-building, which was related in previous discussion, the other
Temujin’s modification of his strategy of strength-building. Regarding the
second point, it was this kinsman, Uliik-Bayatur, who encouraged Temujin to 
use force against his rival kinsmen.
"The children from the senior khatun were killing us! We together, for 
your friendship, we strike with a sword and slaughter your enemies!" Uliik- 
Bayatur said to Temiijin.75 These words opened a new gateway for Temujin
75 JT  p.332.
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—  Temiijin suddenly realized the essence of his previous failure. Regarding 
this inspiration, Temujin himself commented that it was like awaking him from 
sleeping by pulling the hair on his forehead, and raised him from sitting by 
pulling [him up by] the chin.76 This sentence is idiomatic but the astonishing 
excitement is clear: Uliik-Bayatur suggested to Temujin an approach which he 
had never thought of. This was the turning point of Temujin’s strategy in his
expansion, when a competing enthusiasm was stirred up in Temujin.
This change of attitude can be proved by a review on the chronology 
of the major events in Temujin’s early expansion. In JT, this account of the 
temptation of some Je’ureits and their separation from the Taichiyuts is placed 
soon after the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en, while in CCL, after the narration of 
the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en and before Temujin’s feast with the Jiirkins and 
his subsequent attack against the Tatar Megujin-Se’ultti. Although no exact 
dating is supplied, we can still reconstruct a reliable sequence of Temujin’s 
career up to the attack of Megujin-Se’ultu by the narrative order in the sources:
(1) the birth of Temujin (1162)
(2) the betrothment of Borte (1171)
(3) the death of Yesiigei
(4) the separation of the Taichiyuts
(5) a qitda relationship with the Qonggirats (1177)
(6) the revival of a friendship with the Toyoril-Kereit
(7) good relationship with Jamuqa; stayed together
(8) an invitation to the Qatagins and the Saljiyuts, unsuccessful
(9) separated from Jamuqa and the coming of some Bayarins
(10) the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en (1193), defeated
(11) attracting the Je’ureits to join
(12) the quarrel with the Jiirkins, Jiirkins’ separation from Temiijin and 
Temujin’s attack on the Tatar Megiijin-Se’iiltii (1195/96)
(13) the destruction of Jiirkins and the coming of the Kereit Toyoril (1196)
(14) two plunderings of the Merkits
76 JT  p.332. CCL p. 14a has a similar speech with the second sentence reads "drawing the 
beard to raise [him] up".
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(15) the Kereit battle against the Buiruq-Naiman (1199)
(16) Temujin’s attack upon the Taichiyuts (1200), and a series of battles in
eastern Mongolia
Undeniably, Temujin had turned "aggressive" towards his kinsmen and
the Turkic tribes after the Je’ureit incident: first he quarrelled with his senior
kinsmen and fought with them, in which struggle Temujin’s nokers won, then
he set out to assault the fleeing Tatars, and won the battle. He returned,
attacked the Jiirkins and later he killed their clan leaders. For the next three
years, he plundered the Merkits, and assisted Toyoril in his restoration. After 
this, he launched a series of attacks, starting with an open challenge to the
Taichiyuts.
Before all these aggressive movements, Temujin seemed to be trying
to live peacefully with the other tribes, and in his capture by the Taichiyuts,
his wife’s abduction by the Merkit and the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en, Temujin 
kept a low profile and remained in a self-defensive position. Therefore, the 
suggestion of Uliik-Bayatur might have been the turning point of his attitude, 
not only towards kinsmen but for his personal career: Temujin had to 
reconsider his strategy when he had come to such a deadlock: either to remain 
weak, or to challenge his rivals.
Using the sword is definitely more efficient in time than attracting by 
courtesy. Comparing with his peaceful life before his thirties, the subsequent 
thirty years were in a turmoil. In ten years’ time (1196-1205), Temujin 
defeated a division of the Tatars, the Jiirkins, the Merkits, the Buiruq-Naiman, 
the eastern tribes, the Kereits, the Tayang-Naiman and made himself the sole 
ruler of Mongolia, For another thirteen years (1205-1218), he subdued part of 
the realms of Jurchen and Tangyut, also the western steppe to the fringe of 
Transoxiana. The following seven-year expedition in Transoxiana laid the
foundation of his world empire, which allowed his successors to advance 
towards Persia, the Russian lands and even eastern Europe.
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However, the sword should not be laid on everybody, particularly his 
own kinsmen. Temujin provoked a strong anti-Temujin sentiment among his 
Borjigin kinsmen when he violated some principles in kinship practice by this 
aggressive policy, and their resentment interrupted his speedy unification of 
Mongolia.
The attack on the Taichiyuts
The history of the Taichiyut tribe in the time of Temiijin is obscure in 
the sources, probably because of its complexity in reality. The leadership of 
the Taichiyuts is the most confusing subject. In the sources, we find Tarqutai- 
Kiriltuq, Quril-Bayatur, Anqu-Huquchu and Quduyudar-Beki all exercising a 
certain degree of leadership. Altogether with their elder Todo’en and the
khatuns of Hambaqai, it seemed that many people were giving orders in 
Taichiyut affairs.
Regarding the Taichiyut leadership in the youth of Temujin, JT  p. 189 
reports the earliest available information. Before the death of Qadayan-Taishi, 
he was "acting as" the general leader of all the Taichiyut tribes in special 
occasions. After his death, the tribe fell into a chaos of leadership competition.
Three Taichiyut princes, namely Tarqutai-Kiriltuq, Quril-Bayatur and Bayachi, 
were all interested in this general leadership, however, no one had obtained
consent from the others. For some untold reason, Bayachi seems to have 
withdrawn from the competition; then, Tarqutai and Quril were left in charge
of the tribal affairs.77
The prologue of CCL also supports Tarqutai and Quril’s leadership over
the Taichiyuts. It recounts that "in the very begimiing, [our] kinsmen 
Taichiyuts lived in another forest. In the old days, they had no enmity to us. 
Later, because of having a "regret" with the two sons of their leader A-tan k’e- 
han (Adal-Qayan), T ’a-erh-hu-t’ai (Tarqutai) [and] Hu-lin pa-tu (Quril-
77 JT  p.325.
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Bayatur), [the friendship] came to an end."78 JT  relates that Tarqutai was a
son of the Taichiyut Adal-Qan, and in the genealogical hierarchy, he was in 
the grandson generation to Qabul-Qan.79 The record coincided with his
family background in this CCL quotation, and to Temujin, Tarqutai was his
"genealogical uncle".
His leadership was seen in the SH  as well, in which Tarqutai gave the 
order to capture Temiijin.80 With confirmation from each of the main 
sources, Tarqutai is unquestionably a leader of the Taichiyuts. However, in 
Temujin’s attack on the Taichiyuts in 1200, the "chief and elders" (pishwa wa
buziirg) of the Taichiyuts were Anqu-Haquchu, Quril, Quduyudar, "with some 
other kinsmen emirs such as Tarqutai-Kiriltuq".81
Anqu-Haquchu appears to be an important Taichiyut leader at least 
from 1200 on, and he is the key person in recounting a confusion in the
sources of two Temujin’s campaigns against the Taichiyuts. According to JT  
pp.371-372, in the 1200 attack on the Taichiyuts on the Onan, Temujin’s troop 
killed Tarqutai-Kiriltuq and Quduyudar at Ulengtit-Turas.82 The other
Taichiyut "chief and elders" fled, Quril went into Naiman, and Anqu-Haquchu 
fled into Barqujin with Qodun-Orcheng,83 who was a brother to the Merkit
73 CCL p.2ab.
79 JT  p.325.
30 SH  §79.
31 JT  p.371. Anqu-Haquchu, JT  P.371 ’NKQW HWQWCHW, variations ’NKAQ  
HAQWJW/’NKAQW HAQWJW, or ’NKQW-HAQWJW, SH  A ’uchu (a’uchu-ba’atur = 
(H)Ayuchu-Bayatur), CCL p.31a Hang-hu-a-hu-chu (*(H)an(g)qu-(H)aquchu). Quril [and] 
Quduyudar, JT  p.371 and variations QWRYL QWYLDAR/QWDWDAR/TWDWDAR. CCL 
p.31a Hu-lien hu-tu-ta-erh-peh-chi (*Quril, *Qududar-Beki).
32 jrp .3 7 2  ’LNKWT-TWDAS, variation ’LNKWT-TWRAS/’NKWT-TWRAS. CCXp.3 la  
YUeh-liang-wu-f u-la-ssu (*Ulen,u[t]-Turas < (H)iilengut-Turas).
33 This person cannot be definitely identified. First, his tribal identification. In this 
account o f  JT, he was a Merkit representative sent by his brother Toqtoya, and the story 
became reasonable when he accompanied Anqu-Haquchu to return to Barqujin after the latter 
had been defeated. However, he appears in every account in the SH  as an important Taichiyut, 
also, CCL p. 14b recounts that when the Je’ureits broke their promise o f  staying with Temiijin
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leader Toqtoya. Toqtoya had been settled in Barqujin since his defeat by 
Toyoril in 1198.
An account in SH  §§144-149 tells a similar story, in which Temujin
pursued the Taichiyuts in the direction of the Onan. They fought at Hule’iit- 
Turas (*Hulengiit > Ulengiit) on the other side of Onan, and "on that
occasion", Temujin "exterminated" the Taichiyut clansmen Ayuchu-Bayatur, 
Qoton(/Qodun)-Orcheng and Quduyudar, while Tarqutai-Kiriltuq was seized 
by some Bayarins but later released. The location of the battlefield and the 
persons involved coincide with the JT  account of the 1200 attack; however,
this SH  account followed after the battle of Koyiten, so the date should be in
or after 1202.
The confusions may be explained in this way. Assuming that Temujin
had fought the Taichiyuts twice, one in early 1200 which was a full-scale 
attack on the Onan, in which he killed Quduyudar and possessed the Taichiyut 
people, and one in late 1202, the pursuit after the Battle of Koyiten in which
he exterminated the line of Ayuchu-Bayatur, the accounts will not severe 
contradict each other. In order to prove this assumption, we must look into the
identity of the key person Ayuchu, who appears in both sources on both 
occasions.
First, the Ayuchu-Bayatur in the SH. He appears in the Battle of 
Koyiten (1202) as in the vanguard of the enemy troop, and he is recorded as 
"Ayuchu-Bayatur of the Mongols" (SH  §142). The second time, he appears
and left, "kinsman Hu-tun-hu-erh-chang (Qodun-Orcheng) was resented with the inconstancy 
o f T ’a-hai-ta-lu (Taqai-Dalu, a Je’ureit leader) therefore [he] killed him." If Qodun-Orcheng 
was a "kinsman" to whoever the Taichiyuts or the Je’ureits? he could not be a Merkit. In the 
same account o f  the finale o f Je’ureits in JT  p.332, Qodun-Orcheng is definitely mentioned as 
"from the Merkit tribe". Here, I follow JT  for his tribal identification.
Second, the name may be separated and probably be assigned to two persons. JT  
p.372 uses the plural noun "brothers" (baradaran) to designate QWDW W ’WRCHANG. I 
take the name as one person, because its Chinese transcription in CCL p.3 lb is Hu-tun-hu-erh- 
chang (*Qudun/Qodun-(H)orchang/(H)brcheng), and the name appeared in JT  p.332 is 
QWDWN ’WRCHANG. These two examples suggest that "QWDW W" in p.372 should be 
QWDWN, where the last letter is a copying error which mistakes /n/ for Av/. The plural noun 
baradaran  might be rendered according to this mistake.
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as the person being pursued in the direction of the Onan, and he is recorded 
as "Ayuchu-Bayatur of the Taichiyut" (SH  §144). These two Ayuchu-Bayatur 
were the same person, he was a Taichiyut leader, also in tribal identity, a 
Mongol.
Second, the Anqu-Haquchu in JT. The Taichiyut Anqu-Haquchu fled 
into Barqujin in 1200, after Tarqutai and Quduyudar were killed and Quril fled 
to Naiman. Then, in the autumn of 1202, he appeared in the alliance troop of
anti-Temujin tribes to attack Temujin. These two accounts are logically related 
because Anqu-Haquchu had fled into Barqujin where the settlement of Merkit 
Toqtoya was, then it would be reasonable for him to come out two years later 
with his protector Toqtoya to attack their common foe.
The identity of the person agreed in the individual sources, and from 
a linguistic perspective, the Ayuchu-Bayatur in the SH  can be identified with 
the Anqu-Haquchu in JT  and CCL, where Ayuchu>(H)ayuchu = 
Aquchu>(H)aquchu.
The SH  does not relate Temujin’s 1200 attack against the Taichiyuts. 
However, an account in the SH  suggests that the 1200 attack did occur. SH
§141 recounts that Tarqutai-Kiriltuq, Qodun-Orcheng and Ayuchu-Bayatur had 
attended the meeting in the Year of Hen (1201) to decide electing Jamuqa as 
the Giir-Qan.84 Apparently, Quduyudar, who was killed in 1200 according 
to JT, was not on the name list. Tarqutai was also "dead" in JT but according 
to SH  §149, he was released after temporary capture, before he had been 
delivered to Temujin. Therefore, Tarqutai could have attended this meeting in
1201. As for Qodun-Orcheng and Ayuchu-Bayatur, they fled together in the 
previous year, and it is not surprising to see them come back together this year.
In this way, even the account in the SH  confirms the 1200 dating of
84 This account is another confusion in participators and locations for two events.
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Taichiyut’s destruction. There is no severe contradiction among the sources, 
just some "acceptable variations" and "conflations".85
Therefore, the situation of the Taichiyuts is clear when the confusion 
of the accounts has been clarified. Temujin did attack the Taichiyuts in 1200 
and fought on the Onan, the Taichiyuts were defeated and many leaders killed, 
captured or fled. The battle was so fierce that Temujin was wounded in the
neck artery.86 After his victory, the remaining Taichiyut leaders had attended
an anti-Temujin meeting, but how much strength they still retained is in
question. In 1202, one of the Taichiyut leaders, Anqu-Haquchu, joined the 
multi-tribal alliance and confronted Temujin at Koyiten. Probably when the 
enemy dispersed at the end of the battle, Temujin pursued this leader and had 
his line exterminated.
The 1200 victory over the Taichiyuts should be counted as a great 
victory for Temujin, because he annexed this huge brother clan, probably the
strongest Mongol branch at that time. There ought not to have been any more
resistance to his supremacy over the Mongol tribes when the Taichiyuts could 
not challenge him any more in strength, however, the consequence did not turn 
out this way. Many Mongol tribes solemnly united to fight him, just because 
his annexation of the Taichiyut tribe.
The anti-Temiijin sentiment among the Mongols, 1200-1203
The 1200 incorporation of the Taichiyut tribe did not have only a 
significant impact on both the Taichiyut-Mongol and the Temiijin-Mongol, it 
also started a series of internal disagreements among the Mongol tribes/clans.
Some Mongol tribes, for the first time, formed a rival coalition against the
Temujin. The NIrun tribes of Qatagin and Saljiyut gathered together, with the
85 CCL p.3 la  says Tarqutai and Quduyudar were captured. This account might be correct, 
and the JT  account o f killing Quduyudar might not be wrong, if  Quduyudar was executed after
capture. This is very possible, because his position in the tribe is a beki. (Ibid.) Beki, as 
explained by Temujin, is the "tribal chief' in Mongol tradition. See SH  §216.
86 SH  §145.
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tribes of Dorben, Dorben’s ally Tatar87 and Qonggirat, they made the most 
solemn oath among the Mongols88 to march against Temujin.
This coalition does not seem to have been a self-defensive alliance.
Although the Qatagins and the Saljiyuts had declined his friendly invitation 
before, Temujin had no deep hatred of these Mongol tribes, unlike his hatred
of the Taichiyuts. The sources do not clearly explain the purpose and claim 
of the coalition, but apparently the coalition was hostile to Temujin.
According to JT , the coalition was formed soon after Temujin’s defeat 
of the Taichiyuts, that is, -no later than the winter of 1200. Besides, the 
backbone of the coalition, the Qatagins and the Saljiyuts, were old allies to the 
Qadayan-Taichiyut.89 This timing and participants’ information supports the
assumption that the formation of this coalition might have been related to the 
event of the Taichiyut’s devastation by Temujin.
To confirm this assumption, it is necessary to review the past 
confrontations among the Mongol kinsmen. In the earlier capture of Temujin, 
the Taichiyuts "wanted" Temujin but not other children of Yestigei perhaps 
because of his imprudent killing of his half-brother. Later in the Battle of 
Thirteen Gure’en, Jamuqa had a just claim to attack Temujin because one of 
Temujin’s subjects had killed Jamuqa’s tribesman/kinsman Taichar. The 
Chinos was exterminated after the battle, because they raised their sword 
against their brother clan of Taichiyut. Now, Temujin happened to be
87 SH  §141, Qachiyun-Beki, the leader o f  Dorben is mentioned together with the Jalin- 
Buqa o f the Alchi-Tatar, and the account recounts that the Dorben "having made peace with 
the Tatar".
88 JT  p.373, an oath which "among the Mongols, no oath is greater than that", ("az an 
buzurgtar sawgand nlst")
89 JT  p.373. The branch was headed by Todo’en, Quril and Tarqutai-Kiriltuq at that time.
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behaving similarly: he laid the sword on his brother clan, without a satisfactory
90cause.
The Temiijin-Mongol and the Taichiyut-Mongol were two Borjigin 
groupings; both of them were the descendants of Qaidu and they had been
together for a long period, even once under the common leadership of Qutula
for special campaign. Although the Taichiyuts had separated from the family 
of Temujin because of Ho’eltin’s offence to the Taichiyut elders, the 
Taichiyuts were still genealogically close to Temujin. Tarqutai, a 
"genealogical uncle" to Temujin appeared acting as a guardian to this reckless 
heir of his brother clan. In the early youth of Temujin, Tarqutai had instructed 
and taught him just as if he had been a two or three year old new colt he had 
been training.91 If the extermination of the Chinos had been accepted by the 
Mongol kinsmen as a proper punishment for their violation of kinship rules, 
would Temujin be sentenced to the same for his attack on the Taichiyuts?
In the punitive separation from Ho’eliin’s family, the Taichiyuts did not 
destroy the offensive kinsmen. In the later punitive capture, Tarqutai also did 
not, or seem to have planned, to execute Temujin. In Jamuqa5s punitive attack 
on Temujin, that is the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en, he completed his revenge 
by putting Temujin to flight. Temujin had survived miraculously through all 
the disastrous punishments which were carried out by his Mongol kinsmen, 
undoubtedly because of their kinship affinity in the same genealogy. However, 
in Temujin’s attack upon the Taichiyuts in 1200, he engaged in slaughter. SH  
§146 recounts that when Temujin was bringing back the fleeing Taichiyut
90 His attack and annexation of the Jiirkins may be counted as an internal affair among the 
Qabul-Mongols. Since the Jiirkin leaders had given their word to support Temujin, Temujin 
has a just claim to punish them because of their disobedience to his summons — although the 
punishment was unexpectedly severe.
91 SH  §149. I incline to agree that Tarqutai’s capture o f Temiijin and showing him around 
in the Taichiyut camp is a punishment to Temujin for his wrong-doing in killing his half- 
brother Bekter. In SH  §149, Tarqutai said that he had brought Temujin back from a deserted 
camp and instructed him this way. This camp can be associated with to the camp where the 
Taichiyuts and Ho’eliin’s family had stayed together because Temtljin "had been abandoned" 
there. Tarqutai’s comment to the adult Temujin when he was captured recounts Temujin’s 
recklessness in his youth: Temujin was not "thoughtful in his actions" and his mind not "open".
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people, the daughter of Sorqan-Shira cried loudly for his help because "the
soldiers here caught my husband and were going to kill him. As my husband
was being killed, I cried and shouted, and called Temujin that he should save
my husband." When Temujin received this report and rode to her, "her
husband had already been killed by our (Temujin’s) troops." Apparently
Temujin was not there to comfort the fleeing Taichiyuts and their followers, 
but massacring every male adult.92
Would this be a proper resolution for an attack upon his brother clan,
or, could the attack be proper? We learn from the examples of the Bayarins 
and the Chinos that the Mongols observe a principle of kinship practice which
forbids a clan to confront its genealogically close-related clans. According to
this principle, Temujin’s destructive attack upon the Taichiyuts without 
providing a satisfactory cause would be seen as an evil deed in the eyes of 
other Mongols, especially those old allies of the Taichiyuts. The first Mongol 
coalition was thus formed to fight for the principle of "kin’s peace": these 
NIrun and DerelkTn tribes, except for the Turkic Tatar who came as an ally 
to the Dorben, swore solemnly to take revenge for their ravaged kinsmen and 
to punish their evil kinsmen. A civil war then started among the Mongols 
from 1200.
Although the first anti-Temujin Mongol coalition had been defeated at
Buyur-Nayur, these kinsmen did not give up. They assembled again to form 
the second coalition, this time with Jamuqa at their head.
Why Jamuqa, not other tribal leaders?
Jamuqa is a famous character in every narrative of Temujin’s legend. 
He has always been portrayed as witty and cunning, jealous of Temujin’s 
ability and attempting to interrupt Temujin’s success with his evil mind. His 
notorious reputation in the sources might have resulted from his position as a
92 The same was done to the Tatars, see SH  §154.
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competitor to Temiijin. In fact, as revealed in the relevant accounts, Jamuqa 
did possess a remarkable capability to be a brilliant leader: he was intelligent 
and competent in military affairs. His cleverness won for him the nick name 
of Jamuqa-Sechen (Jamuqa the Wise), and his military talent and strength was 
made known very early in his teenage years, notably in the rescue of Borte93 
and the Battle of Thirteen Gure’en.
The fact that he had prestige sufficient to compete with Temujin in the
leadership of the Mongols was not due to his intelligent mind and wicked
personality, but his position in the Mongol genealogy. Sorqan from the
Derelkln Bayayut tribe, a wise old man and a master of judgement in that era, 
mentioned three persons who were eager to take the overlordship [of
Mongolia]: Sacha-Beki, Jamuqa-Sechen and Alaq-Udur of the Tatar tribe.94
In the other account, the number of competitors is increased to five, including
Jochi-Qasar and his elder brother Temujin.95 An examination of the
background of these candidates from a genealogical perspective reveals the
unique identity of Jamuqa: Sacha-Beki was killed early by Temujin, Jochi-
Qasar was unable to surpass his elder brother’s competence, and Alaq-Udur
was a Tatar, not a Mongol. Jamuqa of the Jadaran was hence left as the only
candidate capable of challenging Temujin’s supremacy within the Mongol
tribe, also his genealogical position96 had made him the only alternative to
Temujin in the Mongol leadership.
93 Based on the SH  version o f the story of Borte. In that account, Jamuqa worked out the 
situation and location o f  the Merkits, set the attacking plan and timetable, where Toyoril and 
Temujin appeared to act passively according to his design. When the troops set forth to the 
meeting point, only the troop o f Jamuqa arrived in time. This shows the discipline o f the 
forces under his command.
94 JT  pp.l 80-181.
95 J T p.376. Alaq-Udur is mistaken for a Merkit in this account, see Chapter Three section
III.
96 Jamuqa’s genealogical background, see previous discussion.
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Jamuqa’s prominence was noticed by the Mongols at a very early stage.
First, Temujin himself had decided to stay with Jamuqa until their separation.
Second, when Temujin separated from Jamuqa, some Mongols chose to go
after Temujin, but obviously "the others" had decided to stay with Jamuqa.
Third, the Mongols under Temujin’s qanship were mainly from the Qabul-
Mongol, but Jamuqa had a better relationship with the other Mongol branches,
such as the Taichiyuts, the Ikires, the Uruyuts, the Noyakins, the Barulas and 
the Bayarins who had assisted him to take revenge on Temujin in the Battle 
of Thirteen Giire’en.97 At the turn of 1200/01 when a division of Qonggirat
people which befriended with Temujin was plundered by Qasar (by mistake),
they decided to go to Jamuqa.98
When most of the Taichiyuts had been secured by Temujin,99 it must 
have seemed that no power could counter-balance the mighty Temujin unless 
the rest of the Mongol kinsmen united under a capable leader. Therefore, in 
spite of Jamuqa’s vague genealogical position, the DerelkTn and NTrun anti- 
Temujin Mongols still turned to him as their last hope. Jamuqa was once 
again being "exploited" by his kinsmen by being elected as the Mongol Gtir- 
Qan.100
97 CCL pp.5a-6a. According to SH  §129, Jamuqa and his allies made up the number of 
thirty thousand, on the other hand, Temujin mobilised also three tiimen o f  his people to 
confront them. CCL  does not supply the amount o f the defensive force o f  Temujin but it 
confirms that Jamuqa had thirty thousand people in the punitive troop. If these figures are 
reliable, they show that Jamuqa and Temujin possessed a similar degree o f support from their 
Mongol kinsmen at that time.
98 They disclosed the news o f  the coming attack o f the first Mongol coalition to Temujin 
and made their alliance lose the battle. Then they went to Temujin but on the way they were 
mistakenly plundered by Qasar.
99 SH  §148, when Temiijin exterminated the Taichiyut clansmen, he "carried their people 
o ff  with him".
100 Last time, Jamuqa was exploited by Temujin, who stole many Mongol supporters from 
under his banner.
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Such a distinguished kinsman must have appeared to Temujin as "the 
louse in his collar" and "the thorn in the inner lapel of his coat".101 Although 
Jamuqa had been his anda since his childhood and he had not committed any 
serious offence against him, Temujin had to wipe out this potential opponent 
who had a challenging capability as well as a position in his genealogy. The 
capture and execution of Jamuqa is treated at an unusual length in 577 s 
narration. This suggests the importance of this matter. The trouble which 
Temujin had taken in finding a sensible excuse for executing Jamuqa also 
marks Jamuqa’s guiltlessness in this power struggle. In reality, Temujin had 
not been proclaimed Chinggis-Qan102 until 1206 —  this might have been 
partly related to Jamuqa’s existence before that date.103
The second coalition of anti-Temujin Mongols failed, too. Their 
members continued their struggle against their evil kinsmen in the Battle of 
Koyiten, in which they allied with the Buiruq-Naiman and the Merkit Toqtoya. 
When the battle was over, Jamuqa went over to the Kereit camp to stir up their
hostility towards Temujin.
Meanwhile, Temujin had made a jurisdictional decision which at the 
same time offended his genealogical seniors. This made some of his closest 
Qabul-Mongol kinsmen turn treacherous. This unexpected incident in which 
they changed their role from supporters to antagonists had put Temujin’s
101 SH  §201.
102 To the Mongols, the reconfirmation o f Temujin’s leadership in 1206 might have a sense 
in recognising him "the sole ruler of the Mongols", since the title was given by the people of 
"the felt-walled tents" including every Mongol.
103 The SH  account o f the making o f Chinggis-Qan follows immediately after the account 
o f the execution o f Jamuqa, respectively §202 and §201. Jamuqa was last seen in the camp 
o f  the Naiman Tayang-Qan, and when he was captured and sent to Temiijin, Temujin had 
already "annihilated the Naiman and the Merkit" (SH  §200). Referring to the chronology in 
CCL, Temiijin defeated the Tayang-Naiman in the autumn o f 1204, and set out against the 
Merkits in that winter. Therefore, Jamuqa might have been captured in 1205, or no earlier 
than the winter o f 1204/05. This timing coincides with the recording order in the SH, that is 
the execution o f  Jamuqa took place just a short period ahead o f Temujin’s enthronement as 
Chinggis-Qan.
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leadership in danger —  betrayal by the kinsmen of his own clan was worse 
than a civil war with the other Mongol clans.
The cause of this betrayal lay in Temujin’s battle against the Tatars. 
In the autumn of a Dog year (1202, CCL year jen-hsii), Temujin defeated the 
Alchi-Tatar and the Chaqayan-Tatar under strict military discipline (jasaq). 
As revealed in the subsequent slaughter which was decided on in the post-war 
meeting,104 the objective of this battle was the annihilation of the Tatars, not 
plundering. Therefore, from a strategic point of view, it was reasonable for 
Temujin to order his troops not to pick up booty on the way during the battle.
However, both CCL/YS and the SH  mention that some of the close
kinsmen of Temujin, namely Altan, Quchar and Dayaritai, did not obey this 
jasaq. As a result, Temujin sent Qubilai and Jebe to these kinsmen to carry
away the picked-up booty, mainly horses, and divided it among his troops. No 
sooner than the spring of 1203, Altan, Quchar and Dayaritai left Temujin and 
went to the place of Senggiim, the son of Toyoril, and persuaded the Kereits 
to subdue the Temujin-Mongol.105 They promised Senggiim that "as to the 
sons of Mother Ho’eliin, for you we will kill the elder brother, we will do 
away with the younger brother".106
Was this change of attitude motivated by their resentment towards
Temujin because of his punishment of their disobedience? In an administrative
sense, Altan, Quchar and Dayaritai should have obeyed Temujin’s command 
because they had promised to do so when they made Temujin their leader.107
Nevertheless, from a genealogical perspective, they might have been offended
by Temujin because as a "genealogical uncle" (Altan), the "blood uncle"
104 SH  §154.
105 SH  § 166.
106 Translation by Igor de Rachewiltz. PFEH 13 (1976), pp. 54-55.
107 SH  §123.
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(Dayaritai) and a cousin from an elder branch within the Bartan-Mongol 
(Quchar),108 they were disgraced by Temujin.
Would Temujin’s action have been understood by these kinsmen as a 
great offence? Temujin’s last carelessness in being attentive to kinship 
seniority was around ten years earlier in a friendly feast of the Bartan-Mongol 
and the Jurkin-Mongol, where Temujin’s steward poured a jug of kumis for a 
concubine of the late father of Sacha-Beki, before pouring for the khatuns of 
the recent clan leader Sacha-Beki. This improper practice had annoyed the 
khatuns so that they thrashed the steward.109 The steward reacted 
irrationally, exactly as Ho’eliin had; he blamed the khatuns for thrashing him 
with no respect "because Yesiigei-Bayatur and Nekun-Taishi are dead".110 
However, Temujin and Ho’eliin both kept silence regarding this.111
Their silence reflects that they might have learnt a lesson from the last 
offence, and that they admitted that they did not pay full attention to the 
complicated hierarchic seniority in their kinship practice.112 Even before this 
incident, Temujin himself had observed seniority well in important tribal 
decisions. Before Temujin ascended as the qan of the Qabul-Mongols, he had 
consulted Quchar, the son of Nekun-Taishi, Altan, the son of Qutula-Qan, plus 
Sacha-Beki and Taichu, who were the descendants of Barqaq "from the senior 
line" for their opinion on the matter.113 Compared with his high regard last
108 Their genealogical position had been discussed in the paragraphs concerning Temujin’s 
ascendance as the Qabul-Mongol qan.
109 SH  §130. JT  p.335 has a different story that the dispute started with kumis containers.
110 SH  §130, JT  p.336, the sentence exactly the same.
1,1 JT  p.336.
112 The subsequent clash of Belgutei and Buri-Boke (/Boko) in the SH  should not be 
confused with this event. Although Buri-Boke was in charge o f the Jiirkin’s side in this feast,
he was a cousin to Temujin from the branch o f Yesugei’s younger brother (SH §50, but a 
Taichiyut in JT  p.336). He was not one of the Jiirkins.
113 SH  §179, CCL p.54ab.
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time, the punishment for disobedience this time might have embarrassed these 
senior kinsmen, although it was their own fault. They were disgraced, so that 
they even offered themselves to a non-Mongol tribe for exterminating the line 
of Temujin.
The departure of Altan, Quchar and Dayaritai had caused a crisis in 
Temujin’s leadership and also damaged the friendship between the Temiljin-
Mongol and the Toyoril-Kereit. The relevant discussion has been related in 
Chapter Three. Later, because of their dispute with the Kereits, Dayaritai 
returned to Temujin first, sometime between the spring and the autumn of 
1203.1,4 Altan and Quchar left the Kereits and fled to the Tayang-Naiman, 
where they were caught and executed after Temujin defeated Tayang-Qan.115 
Dayaritai was not executed, not because he returned earlier, but because of his 
"blood" relation to Temujin.
As described in the SH, Dayaritai was a careless man. He had been 
punished by Temiijin twice in the battle against the Tatars, the first was 
because of his disobedience of Temujin’s jasaq  during the battle, the second 
time he disclosed an important decision to a Tatar which caused more 
casualties to the Mongol troops.116 Moreover, he betrayed Temujin and went 
over to the Kereits in 1202/03 —  this action was described by Temujin’s 
ndkers as "without thinking". However, for his careless disclosure of 
information, he had been punished only by being forbidden to attend important
114 The Battle o f  Qalaqaljit-Elet was fought in the spring o f 1203, and Temujin’s assault 
upon Toyoril took place in the autumn of 1203. The Mongols who were in the Kereit camp 
conspired to overthrow Toyoril after the battle and before the assault. Toyoril dispersed them, 
and Dayaritai returned to Temujin on this occasion.
115 JT  p.270. The account on J T p .271 relates that Dayaritai was killed together with Altan
and Quchar. This is a mistake because, first, as seen in the SH, his life was pardoned by 
Temiijin, second, as seen in YS, his iiruq had a manifest succession in subsequent generations. 
The story described in the lists o f offspring in JT  is often less reliable than which revealed in 
the narrative o f  history, except for the detail o f  family lines.
1,6 SH  §154.
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discussions (Mong. y e k e  e y e )  of clan affairs from then on.117 As to his later 
offence, Temujin was thinking of executing him because of his betrayal, but 
finally his life was pardoned and his offspring enjoyed high prestige in the 
later empire.118 This treatment must have made Altan and Quchar envious 
of him.
Dayaritai did not receive harsh punishment for his offences because he 
was the younger brother of Yesiigei, a "blood uncle" to Temujin. Temujin’s 
n d k e r s  interceded for Dayaritai by saying "this action would be like 
extinguishing one’s own hearth-fire, like destroying one’s own tent" because 
"as a reminder of your good father, only your paternal uncle is left". Also, if 
he was killed, his clan would terminated, and it is right to "let the smoke of 
their camp swirl up!"119 Temujin’s hesitation to execute Dayaritai and his 
previous relatively light punishment to his undiscerning offences reflect that 
Temujin was also in a dilemma between carrying out discipline and respecting 
kinship seniority: Temujin was offended as the tribal chief, but forgave as a 
nephew. As history went on, this practice was repeated many times in the 
struggles for the qanship of the Great Mongol Empire. The life of the loser 
was always spared because he was a close kinsman to the winner, but all his 
supporters were executed. This practice is well illustrated in Mongke-Qan’s 
succession and the conflict between Ariq-Boke and Qubilai.
As for Altan and Quchar, although they met their end like the Jtirkin 
Sacha-Beki and Taichu, the guilt they were charged with was different. In SH  
§136, Sacha-Beki and Taichu admitted that they did not keep their promise to 
assist Temujin and accepted their execution: "we did not keep our given words. 
Now you make us comply with our words!" Nevertheless, Altan and Quchar
117 SH  §154. This punishment shows clearly that Dayaritai had been allowed in, and had 
a right to the clan meeting, as a blood uncle.
118 Five generations descend from Dayaritai in YS 107 p iao  2 the Table o f  the Family o f
Princes, pp.2709-2710, in which Dayaritai appears in his modified Chinese name Ta-li-chen.
1,9 SH  §242.
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had attempted to depose Temujin with foreign help. This was not a matter of 
"keeping promise" but "treachery". Temujin understood their intention well: 
although Altan and Quchar persuaded the Kereit to overthrow Temujin, 
Temiijin knew that "Altan and Quchar are certainly not going to let anybody 
else govern my people!"120 Therefore, they should not receive the same 
penalty as Temujin’s careless uncle or the Jiirkin cousins —  they were to be 
condemned because they intended to take over their kinsmen’s leadership and 
to destroy his clan. Their failure in usurping his leadership was used by 
Temujin as an example to Father Monglik on a later occasion, showing 
Monglik that "if I had known that you had such a nature, you would have been 
dealt with like Jamuqa, Altan, Quchar and others."121
As seen in the above examples, apparently, Temujin believed that 
Altan. Quchar and Jamuqa who intended to destroy his clan by force had been 
justly executed and condemned. Then, how should we judge Temujin’s
"conquest" of his brother clan the Taichiyuts in 1200, in which Temujin 
plundered and carried off the dispersed Taichiyut people, exterminated the 
Taichiyut clansmen, had them blown "to the wind like hearth-ashes, even to 
the offspring of their offspring"?122
This question echoes the discussion in the very beginning of this sub­
section. Temujin’s anger towards the treacherous kinsmen confirm that the 
anti-Temujin sentiments among the Mongol kinsmen since 1200 was a result 
of Temujin’s violation of the principle of "kin’s peace" on his attack and
destruction of the Taichiyut tribe, which was their closest brother branch in the 
Qaidu-Mongol of the Borjigin-Mongol of the NIrun-Mongol.
120 SH  §180.
121 SH  §246.
122 SH  §146 and §148.
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Later, these kinsmen elected Jamuqa of the Jadaran as the commander- 
in-chief of this anti-Temujin Mongol coalition, because Jamuqa was capable 
enough also genealogically related to the Borjigin (although ambiguously) that 
he was the only available person who could challenge both Temujin’s strength 
and his genealogical position for an all-Mongol leadership. A civil war within 
the Mongols carried on, which provided the other Turkic tribes an opportunity 
to take advantage in the situation.
Finally, when Temujin had the betrayed kinsmen from the Qabul-
Mongol done away (except for his blood uncle) after he defeated their
protectors the Turkic Toyoril and Tayang-Qan, and executed Jamuqa, the only 
potential competitor to his Mongol leadership, Temujin had achieved his
"unification of the Mongols" because his position at the top of all the Mongols
had become unchallengeable.
4= ?{i 4=
Temujin’s "unification of the Mongols", a major task in his "unification 
of Mongolia", was completed with a general recognition of his supremacy over 
the genealogically-related Mongol tribes by his kinsmen. The way to success 
was long. He was first abandoned by his brother branch the Taichiyuts 
because they were insulted by his mother. When Temujin grew up, he had 
tried very hard, with a previous criminal record, to attract kinsmen by his 
superior position as a legitimate heir to Yesiigei, also to win support by a 
gesture of generosity, until his sphere of influence clashed with his brother 
branch the Taichiyut-Mongol.
Inspired by the Je’iireit Uliik-Bayatur, Temujin appeared to abandon his 
peaceful policy of making use of the genealogical affection and adopted an
aggressive strategy towards his kinsmen. His neglect of the existing principle
of "kin’s peace" brought him rapid successes in his expansion, notably the
extermination of the clans of Jiirkin and Taichiyut, but at the same time, his
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T a b l e  1 T h e  M o n g o l  G e n e a l o g y
{SH's  v e r s i o n ,  b a s e d  o n  § 7 - § 6 0 ,  §76  w i t h  m o d i f i e d  t r a n s c r i p t i o n )
r- D u w a - S o q o r (Dorben)
D o b u n - M e r g e n
A l a n - Q o y a
(?) ( ? )
- J a j  i r a d a i  
(iTadaran)
B u g i i n u t e i  (Biigunut )
B e l g u n i i t e i  (Belgi inuC )
B u q u - Q a d a g i  ( Q a t a g i n )
B u q a t u ^ - S a l  j  i  { S a l j  i y u t )
B o d o n c h a r ( - M o n g q a q 2) (B o r j i g i n )
C  T u g i i '  i i d e i  ■
I------------------------
•— Buri-Bulchiru —I
I------------------------
L  Q a r a - Q a d a y a n  —i
I ...............
J a m u q a
—  B a y a r i d a i  (B a y a r i n ) C h i d u q u l - B o k o
(Menen- B a y a r i n )
A d a n g q a n - U r a n g q a j i n  o f  J a r c h l y u t
-  B a r i m - S h i y i r a t u - Q a b i c h i  
( w i f e  ?)
-  J e ' u r e d e i  { J e ' u r e i t )  
( w i f e  ?)
N o m o l u n
L  M e n e n - T u d u n
Q a c h i - K i i l u k  
Q a c h i n  —
Q a c h i y u  —
Q a c h u l a  —
Q a c h i y u n  —  
Q a r a l d a i  —
N a c h i n - B a y a t u r
Q a i d u
N o y a g i d a i  (N o y a k in )
B a r u l a t a i  (B a r u l a s )
? ( E r d e m t u - B a r u l a , T o d o ' e n - B a r u l a )  
A d a r k i d a i  (A d a r g i n )
? (Budayat)
—U r u y u d a i  {Uruyut)
—M a n g q u t a i  (Mangqut)
S h i j u y u d a i  ( S h i j u y u t )
L D o q o l a d a i  (D o q o l a t )
1 §42 Buqutu-Salji.
2 SH  §17 mungqaq, Chinese transliteration "meng-he-hei". The same Chinese character "meng" is 
reconstructed as "mtjng" by the Index in §46 and §68.
209
— B a i - S i n g q o r - D o q s i n  —  T u m b i n a i - S e c h e r i ' -i—  Q a b u l ( - Q a y a n )
'—  S e m - Q a c h u l a 3—j
r B u l t e c h i i - B a y a t u r
C h a r a q a i - L i n g q u S e n g g i i m - B i l g e ' 1
( T a i c h i y u t )
H a m b a q a i ( - Q a y a n )
-  ? ( Q a d a y a n - T a i s h i )  
■?
J
7 
_ 7 
7 
7
1_  7 
? 
_  7  
— ■?
I— B e s i i t e i  ( B e s i i t )  ( f r o m  e l d e r  b r o t h e r ' s  w i f e )
-  C h a u j i n - O r t e g e i { Oronar)  
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( Q a h tu r q a s ) 
( G e n i g e s )
O k i n - B a r q a q
B a r t a n - B a y a t u r
Q u t u q t u - Y i i r k i 5
M o n g g e t u - Q i y a n 7
N e k i i n - T a i s h i
H o' e l i i n
-  Y e s i i g e i - B a y a t u r
L
S a c h a - B e k i  (J i i r k i [ n ] )  
T a i c h u
Temii j  i n  
( J o c h i - ) Q a s a r  
Q a c h i y u n  
T e m i ig e
T e m i i l i i n  ( f e m a l e )
B e k t e r
B e l g i i t e i
Q u t u q t u  -  M o n g g i i r  
Q u t u l a ( - Q a y a n )
Q u l a n ( - B a y a t u r )  • 
Q a d a y a n
T o d o ' e n - O t c h i g i n
D a y a r i t a i - O t c h i g i n 0
B u r i - B o k o
J o c h i
G i r m a y u
A l t a n
Y e k e - C h e r e n
3 Sem-Sechiile in §48, but, as the reason discussed in chapter two, this name is rendered as Sem-Qachula 
in this thesis.
4 SH  §47, "Caraqai-lingqu-yin ko’iin senggiim-bi!ge-ambaqai-tan, tayici’ut oboqtan bol<u>ba". According 
to SH  §52, Senggiim-Bilge and Hambaqai are two persons, and Hambaqai is a son to Senggilm-Bilge.
5 Yiirki = Jiirki.
6 plural form o f Yiirki or Jiirki.
7 SH  §50, "mang-ke-tu"(*menggetu). "Mang" (i[t) usually reconstructed as "mang/meng", such as Mangqut 
Of-t 7t»). "Mong/mong" is usually transliterated by the character "meng"(^.). The character o f "mang" has also 
be reconsturcted as "mong" in "mongqol". § 50 "kiyan", = qiyan.
8 SH  §50 Daritai, < Dayaritai.
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action provoked the disapproval of the other kinsmen who abided by the 
principle. In this way, Temujin turned some of his kinsmen into his enemies.
The destruction of the Taichiyut-Mongol had made some non-Qabul 
Mongol tribes ally together to fight against Temujin, again and again. The
situation was getting worse when Temujin embarrassed some of his Qabul-
Mongol seniors which made them hostile to him. Unable to crush Temujin,
these anti-Temiijin Mongols eventually turned to non-Mongol powers for
assistance. The Kereit and Naiman involvement in these Mongol internal
disputes made the situation more complicated. Nevertheless, Temujin was able
to annihilate all these rebellious kinsmen, after he had annihilated the Toyoril- 
Kereit and Tayang-Naiman regimes.
In the course of winning friendship from his kinsmen as well as 
destroying his hostile kinsmen, Temujin had also set out against some Turkic
tribes and even the Tangyut nation. By the time when he had almost 
succeeded in removing these obstructive Mongol kinsmen, the Turkic tribes in 
Mongolia had mostly been annexed or subdued. Thereupon, in the spring of 
1206, Temujin ascended the throne of Chinggis-Qan as "the fierce ruler",123 
and became the overlord of all "felt-walled people". To Temujin’s triumphal 
ascent to such a high position, his interaction with his genealogical kinsmen 
had contributed a great deal, beneficial or disastrous. Hence, the factor of 
genealogical Mongols should not be ignored, and it should receive proper 
attention in the study of Temujin’s road to power.
123 Suggested by Igor de Rachewiltz by relating "Chinggis" to the Turkish word dirjiz, 
meaning "fierce, hard, tough". De Rachewiltz, "The title (Jinggis qan/qayan re-examined", 
p.288. It is not surprising if this title is really o f Turkic origin when the Kereit Ong-Qan and 
Naiman Tayang-Qan were known by their non-Turkic titles.
Chapter Five
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Quda: In-laws’ Relationship beyond the Kinsmen
The in-laws’ relationship is an important social connection on the 
Mongolian steppe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries among people from 
different genealogical and ethnic clans/tribes. Through marriage, a sign of 
intimacy and affection, two families become related and they become quda (in­
laws) to each other. This bondage of two individuals establishes an association 
of two families, or two clans/tribes when the marriage bondage was formed 
between the tribal ruling families. Therefore, politically, this relationship has 
a significant impact on intertribal affairs and is worth a close examination 
where the career of Temujin is concerned.
Because of the practice of exogamy, the steppe quda relationship often 
links up two unrelated families from separate genealogies. This connection, 
like the genealogical relation discussed in Chapter Four, carried an obligation 
of mutual-assistance and worked with certain principles. These obligations and 
principles, like their counterpart in genealogical kinship, were critical issues 
which influenced the process of Temujin’s incorporation of steppe tribes and 
the Derelkin Mongols.
Compared with the born kinship affinity among the genealogically 
related clans, the making of "relatives" by in-laws connection is artificial, but 
the affection is still genuine. The in-laws relationship in the early stage of 
Temujin’s career conformed to this nature and worked as an affine connection. 
After Temujin had established himself an powerful steppe leader, in-laws 
relationship with his family were mostly initiated in an administrative way. 
The "relatives’" association with his family was granted in benevolence, to 
submissive tribal leaders and subjects who had made great contributions.
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Being associated as a quda, son-in-law or daughter-in-law, non-NTruns, 
even non-Mongols, may enter the family of Temujin. They are allowed to 
participate in the decision-making gatherings as family members. The practice 
then has a broader implication in sharing the ruling power of the Mongol 
empire by enlarging the uruq of Temujin. By taking from and giving girls to 
each other, Temujin applied his "family members" to every corner of his 
empire. In an administrative sense, this network which linked up him and the 
ruling families o f his subjects can be regarded as the framework of a Pax 
Mongolica, also the preliminary structure of the steppe empire of Chinggis- 
Qan. Temujin built his steppe empire on associations, not constitutions.
The study of in-laws’ linkage in this chapter starts with a clarification 
of the meaning and coverage of the quda relationship, by comparing the 
evidence obtained from the contemporary sources. Then the discussion 
proceeds to a careful investigation of the nature of its formation during this 
period and how it influenced the development of Temujin’s associations. This 
investigation explains how the traditional steppe in-laws’ relationship worked. 
As for the second stage of Temujin’s career, the study focuses on the examples 
of the tribal leaders of the Uighur, Onggut, Oirat and Qarluq and explains 
Temujin’s strategy of extending his authority westward up to the Qipchaq 
steppe. The third section of this chapter examines the in-laws’ relationship on 
an individual basis, which reveals the ingredients of the constitution of 
Temujin’s Great Mongol Empire.
I. The definition of andaqudai
Quda is a Mongolian phrase which means in-laws in general.1 The 
noun was quoted and Persianised in JT  as andaqudai’ a phrase which consisted
1 The usage is seen in the dialogue between Dei-Sechen and Yestigei in SH  §§62-65 and 
means "in-law". The way they called each other in-laws is apparently retrospective because 
they have no in-laws’ relationship before Temujin’s marriage.
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of anda and quda, two kinds of Mongolian personal linkage with an adjectival 
ending, which means "with a relationship as sworn brothers (anda) and in-laws 
(quda)".
Anda is a kind of individual affiliation which occurs among two well- 
acquainted friends on an equal level. Yesugei and Toyoril, Jamuqa and 
Temujin were famous andas in the Mongolian legend.2 This pseudo­
brotherhood friendship is based on affection and mutual-assistance of the two 
individuals, its formation or break-up do not involve the clans or family the 
individuals belonged to, also the "personal obligation" in andaship does not 
extend to each other’s family members.3
The quda relationship is also based on affection and mutual-assistance, 
however, it is between two families, not just individuals. A piece of advice 
from the Turkic Kereit Sariq-Qan explains the difference between these two 
relationships:
Aye, my little brothers the Mongols, never become "quda" 
(quda) to each other, for a man who carries that part of burden 
he distances. But, become "anda" (anda) and be aqa wa mi to 
one another.4
The meaning of second sentence is not clear but comparing it with the former 
sentence, it would mean "you will enjoy a closer affiliation when you are
2 Temujin also called Quildar-Sechen of the Mangqut tribe anda because he stayed when 
the rest o f his tribesmen followed the Taichiyuts. (JT p. 193, the text mistaken Quildar as an 
Uruyut. He was a Mangqut, see SH  §171.) However, no evidence shows this calling was 
based on a formally sworn anda relationship.
3 Qutula-Qan’s objection to Yesiigei’s intention to become an anda to Toyoril shows that 
a formation o f the swom-brotherhood relationship might have taken place even when it is 
disapproved by one’s family members or his tribal leader, which means the relationship is 
simply between two individuals. The Temujin-Toyoril relationship validated after their 
declaration o f pseudo-father-and-son to each other at Black forest also confirms the limit o f  
the early andaship between Yesugei and Toyoril. The affinity did not extend to the anda's 
family members automatically but served merely as an introductory agent. See discussions in
Chapter Three.
4 JT p.93.
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sworn-brothers or genealogical kinsmen". The description in the first sentence 
suggests that a quda relationship is more distant than the relationship of sworn- 
brothers (individual bondage) or genealogical kinsmen (born bondage), and 
with the "relatives’ obligation", one’s devotion of his affection was divided to 
another non-genealogically related clan/tribe.
This observation of the "relatives’ obligation" is confirmed by several
pieces of evidence found in the sources. In the anda relationship, the mutual-
assistance was restricted to two individuals. For instance, Toyoril benefitted 
from his andaship with Yesugei by receiving personal help in a personal cause,
rescuing Borte was also personal assistance from Jamuqa in a personal affair
of Temujin. The obligation of qudas is as simple as the anda's, however, it
works on a larger scale and has greater impact because the basis of the
formation of the relationship is different.
The "relatives’ obligation" is observed by two in-laws’ families, not just 
between the married couples. Essentially the association was not personal but 
between two families. Therefore, a family/clan/tribe might get involved into 
an unrelated conflict because of its quda family/clan/tribe, and become an 
enemy with the enemy of its quda family/clan/tribe, just because of the 
obligation to back up its in-laws. This limitless help-and-enmity is best 
illustrated in the relationship between the Qabul-Mongol, the Qonggirats and 
the Tatars. According to JT, the long-lasting and bloody enmity between the 
Qabul-Mongol and the Tatar tribe started with a conflict between one of 
Qabul-Qan’s in-laws and the Tatars. In the time of the Mongol Qabul-Qan, 
a Tatar shaman failed to cure the illness of Sayin-Tegin, who was a Qonggirat, 
so that the aqa wa ini of Sayin-Tegin went and killed the shaman, and a 
friction occurred between the Qonggirats and the Tatars. This incident was 
apparently irrelevant to the NTrun Qabul-Mongol, however, the sons of Qabul- 
Qan were obliged to assist the Qonggirats in this matter "on account of the 
andaqudai of Sayin-Tegin" because Sayin-Tegin was the brother to a wife of
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Qabul-Qan (a brother-in-law to Qabul-Qan).5 In this way, the enmity between 
the Qabul-Mongol and the Tatar tribe started, and the subsequent scene of 
revenge and murder was splendid and impressive.
Therefore, with the brief examination of the common ground and the 
differences between anda and quda relationships above, the adjective phrase 
andaqudai in JT  should be understood as a description of the common feature 
of anda and quda bondage: both of them are formed out of affection and 
obligated to mutual-assistance, regardless of the difference in the size of the 
parties involved in the relationship.
Although the phrase represents the common feature of anda and quda 
relationship, according to the comparison of available pieces of evidence, when 
the phrase appeared in JT, it implies the quda relationship only. The following 
examples confirm that andaqudai implied only the in-laws’ relationship 
between clans/tribes. JT  p.97 relates that the Turkic *Kurlayut (KWRLAWT) 
tribe "observed the way of andaqudai' with the Derelkm-Mongol Qonggirat 
and Eljigin, also the Turkic Barqut, "they claim [to be] relatives and with one 
another, they maintain the way of son-in-law and daughter-in-law." This 
connection is apparently irrelevant to sworn-brotherhood association. JT  p. 165 
relates that two tribesmen of the Derelkln Eljigin tribe had been assigned to 
Tolui-Qan, in the Thousand of Jedei-Noyan. Then, the Eljigin "become 
anddqudd with the tribe of Mangqut". Tribes cannot become andas to each 
other, and it was possible for the Eljigin to have an in-laws’ relationship with 
the Mangqut because the former belonged to the Derelkln-Mongol and the 
latter belonged to the NIrun-Mongol. Third, the example of Sayin-Tegin and 
the Qabul-Mongol is clearly stated as an in-laws’ relationship.
This association of affection was described once in the sources as "in 
the same uruq" (family), when the personal anda relationship was described
5 JT  pp.79-80.
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as "sworn-brother". When two Derelkln Mongol Eljigin brothers made the 
leader of the Turkic Barqut tribe submit to Temiijin, they swore an oath 
together: ""Let us become like uruq and brother to one another! Since the 
Mongols do not ask each other for girls, we also do not ask. [Shall] any of us 
ask a girl from another tribe, to each other [with that another tribe], we 
observe courteously to the way of son-in-law and daughter-in-law."6 As 
described in the last sentences, this bondage of a Derelkln-Mongol clan with 
a Turkic tribe is an in-laws’ relationship, therefore, the uruq and "brother" 
mentioned in the first sentence show their wish to have a degree of deep 
affection which is comparable to aqa wa in i and anda.
The meaning and nature of a quda relationship, then, can be extracted 
from the above comparison based on the usage in contemporary sources, A 
quda relationship in essence is a bondage between two families, in which 
relatives’ affection and relatives’ obligation are observed. When the married 
families are the ruling families, the whole clan/tribes then entered the compact 
of affection and obligation. To fulfil the obligation would be disastrous when 
the family had to comply with it but even so, the principle could not be 
overlooked.
Since the Mongols practice exogamy, their kinsmen clans are excluded 
from having a quda relationship. The NTrun-Mongol tribes definitely cannot 
become a quda to each other, as discussed in Chapter Four, but the Mongol 
clans outside the genealogy of NTrun-Mongols are allowed to seek marriage 
with the NTrun Mongols, In this way, the distance of the kinsmen relationship 
(aqa wa ini) among the NTrun and Derelkln Mongol clans can be 
compensated for by their closeness in their relatives’ relationship (quda). The 
most famous Derelkln Mongol clan which enjoyed the most prestigious quda
6 JT  p. 165. The relationship between the Barqut tribe and the Eljigin tribe was mentioned 
also in JT  p. 154, "although they [the Eljigin] are not from their [the Barqut’s] bone and 
branch, they claim [to be] relatives and unite, hence they ask and give girls from/to each other 
in marriage."
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relationship with the family of Temiijin was the Qonggirats. Their connection 
will be discussed extensively in the following section.
II. quda relationship in steppe politics
quda relationship can be formed between two common families or two 
ruling families, where the latter has its significance in politics because of the 
accompanying affection and obligation. This section concentrates on the 
marriage of important persons in order to reveal the importance of this 
bondage in steppe society, in a political sense.
Traditional quda relationship
Temujin and his NTrun ancestors made two renowned attempts to seek 
marriage from the ruling families of strong Turkic tribes. In the 1130s, 
Hambaqai-Qan of the Taichiyut branch had arranged a marriage for his 
daughter with a Tatar, and he was caught and murdered on delivery.7 In
1202/03, Temujin of the Qabul-Mongol had proposed an in-law’s relationship
to the Toyoril-Kereit, where he was turned down because of the excessive 
demands in the proposal.8 On the other hand, their proposal to the Derelkln
Mongols received a positive response: Temujin’s marriage with Borte was
agreed in a harmonious atmosphere, as seen in SH  §§61-66. It seems that the
Derelkln Mongols were more keen on creating a connection with the NTruns,
especially between their clans’ ruling families.
These three examples reveal that marriage between the ruling families 
usually carries an expectation of benefit. In the marriage of Borte and 
Temujin, according to the SH, Dei-Sechen himself stopped Yesugei on his way
7 SH 's version, §53.
8 SH  §165.
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to another Qonggirat clan seeking for a daughter-in-law, and offered him his 
own daughter instead. In the light of his later reluctance to hand over the 
daughter when Temujin lost all his supporters and followers, it is obvious that 
this marriage arrangement was generated with a political purpose. Dei-Sechen 
was a leader of a band of the Qonggirats, and Yesugei was a strong Mongol 
leader. It was assumed that Temujin would succeed to the leading position of 
his father, but when Temujin came for the bride without any supporter, he 
failed in meeting Dei-Sechen’s "expectation".
Temujin’s attempt on the Toyoril-Kereit had a similar purpose. He 
asked for ToyoriTs daughter who was born of the same mother of Senggiim 
for his eldest son Jochi, in return he would marry his daughter to Toyoril’s 
grandson.9 Supposing that the marriages proceeded, when Senggiim’s son
took Temujin’s daughter, Temujin would become the father-in-law of
Senggiim’s son and a brother-in-law to Senggiim. This connection would
mean an in-laws’ relationship with the next two generations of Kereit rulers.
Nevertheless, the marriage of Temtijin’s daughter would have lowered the
position of Senggiim when he became a brother-in-law to the children of
Temujin. This request was not mutually beneficial therefore it was not
successful.
Dei-Sechen’s rejection, Temujin’s proposal even Hambaqai’s attempt 
to create a connection with the Tatars suggest that long-term mutual-benefit is 
an important consideration in the formal marriage among the ruling families. 
An association between the ruling families of powerful tribes would guarantee 
security and strengthen their existing status.
Besides, some of these marriages among the ruling families were 
arranged in a hurry, expecting an immediate benefit from their powerful quda
9 SH  §165, Temiijin him self offered the exchange. JT  p.381, Temujin and Toyoril asked 
girls from each other. JT  p.119, Toyoril’s daughter Chayujin-Beki in this exchange was 
SenggUm’s sister from the same mother.
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tribe. After the Tatars took over the Kereit ulus, it was arranged that the 
Kereit Qurjaqus would marry Tore-Qaimish, the daughter of the Betekin 
leader.50 Upon the creation of this in-laws’ relationship, the brother-in-law 
of Qurjaqus then assisted the Kereit Sariq-Qan to recover the ulus. Several
years later, the Kereit Toyoril gave his daughter to the Merkit Toqtoya when 
he had been forced to escape into the Qarayun gorge on the Selengge.11 
Before he came out from the gorge to seek revenge upon his uncle Giir-Qan, 
he should have enjoyed a secure life under the protection of the Merkits
because he had become the father-in-law to the Merkit leader. Jaya-Gambu 
married his youngest, and prettiest daughter to the Tangyut ruler52 when he 
was in exile, in return for a prestigious status in the nation.13 These three 
examples have been discussed in Chapter One and Two, and all of them 
suggest that a marriage might have been arranged for immediate protection or 
military assistance from the in-laws.
Either for long-term association or immediate assistance, the motivation 
o f creating a quda relationship among the steppe ruling families shows that the 
relation was based on "expectations". The obligation of mutual-assistance in 
qudaship practice works for both the bride family (Toyoril, Jaya-Gambu) and 
the bridegroom family (Qurjaqus, Temujin), in which Temujin benefited a 
great deal from his marriage with Borte.
Before the marriage, Temujin had no followers after the separation of 
the Taichiyuts although he was heir to Yesugei. The quda association with the 
uruq of Dei-Sechen did not just bring him a wife, which was essential for
!0 JT  p.91. The sentence: "dukhtar khud-ra bi qurchaqus bulruq-khan dad" should read 
as "[The Betekin] Buiruq-Qan gave his own daughter to Qurchaqus", not "[Sariq-Qan] gave 
his own daughter to Qurchaqus-Buiruq-Qan" as some translations suggested, although Qurjaqus 
also bore the title o f  "Buiruq". This girl was a Betekin princess, not a daughter o f Sariq-Qan.
11 SH  §177.
12 JT  p.361.
13 JT  p.962. Also see p .117 and p.361.
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increasing family members and to start his own family line, but also a quda 
relationship to a band leader of the Qonggirat which meant the friendship of 
a strong and wealthy Derelkln-Mongol tribe in eastern Mongolia. Temujin 
began to attract followers after obtaining this connection: he sent for his first 
noker Boyorchu soon after the Qonggirat bride arrived in his camp.14 Also 
benefitting from this marriage, Temujin was able to revive the old friendship
between Yestigei-Mongol and Toyoril-Kereit by taking the wedding present 
a precious black sable coat —  to Toyoril, who at this time was a strong 
Turkic potentate on his west side.15 It would not be an exaggeration to say 
that this marriage was the starting point of his career, for Temujin was able to 
produce offspring, a Derelkln tribe provided him a formal association, or 
recognition, outside of his family, and the dowry helped materially in 
developing further relations.
The Qonggirat tribe belonged to the Derelkln-Mongol, therefore, they 
could have qudaship with both the Turkic tribes and the Mongol Nirun tribes. 
As described by Dei-Sechen himself, they had never fought for steppe 
dominion since "the old days" but sent their beautiful girls to "those who have 
become Qayan" for marriage.16 Its quda relationship to various tribes brought 
the Qonggirats a considerable prestige and respect among the steppe tribes.
The uruq of Dei-Sechen was the most prestigious quda tribe from the 
point of view of the Temiijin-Mongol. Persuaded by Alchi, the younger 
brother of Borte, Dei-Sechen finally agreed to marry Borte to the isolated 
Temiijin.17 This relationship brought his uruq a great fortune when Temujin 
eventually broke away from the isolation and achieved his ambitions. Dei- 
Sechen had a daughter, Borte, two sons, Alchi and Hoqu, and a brother called
M SH  §95.
15 SH  §96.
16 SH  §64.
17 JT  p. 159. Dei-Sechen was called Dei-Noyan in JT.
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Dayaritai.18 Borte gave birth to Temujin’s four senior sons, the later leaders 
of the Great Mongol Empire. The successor of Jochi, his second son Batu, 
was bom of Oki who was a daughter of Alchi noyan.19 Qubilai’s four senior 
sons20 were born of Chabi khatun, who was also a daughter of Alchi noyan. 
Chayatai’s most favoured second son Mo’etiiken, the one who was shot at 
Bamiyan castle in Temujin’s Transoxiana expedition,21 was born of Yesuliin,
a paternal granddaughter of this Dayaritai.22
There were many other famous in-laws’ ruling families on the steppe.
The marriages between the daughters of Jaya-Gambu and the sons of 
Temiijin,23 the ruling families of the Turkic tribes Onggiit and Naiman,24
and the Ikires Botu, the later leader of this clan, with the only sister and the
18 jr p .1 5 9 . Dayaritai (DARYTAY), BSrte (BWRTH), Alchi (ALCHY), Hoqu (HWQW).
19 The first son o f Jochi was bom to a Qonggirat khatun whose family lineage is not 
supplied in the sources. JTp.710, Boyle trans., Successors, p.99.
20 The mother o f Jim-Gim (Chin. Chen-Chin) was a Qonggirat called Tal-khu in JT. 
Boyle annotates: "t'ai-hou  was, in fact, the title given to an empress dowager". (Successors, 
p.242) Indeed this is an accurate observation and furthermore, this usage confirms that the 
original source which Rashid al-DTn used for this paid o f narration was dated in the reign o f  
the Mongol Qan Toq-Temiir. Jim-Gim’s mother was the clever Qonggirat Chabi according 
to YS 115 chuan 2 p.2888 and 114 chuan 1 p.2871.
21 JT p J 5 2 . My edition of JT  relates that M o’etuken was the first son o f Chayatai but the 
edition which B oyle’s translation is based on has an additional paragraph on the lineage o f  
Mochi-Yebe, in which this Mochi-Yebe was Chayatai’s first son, he was born to a slave girl 
therefore his father did not hold him of much account. See Boyle trans. Successors, pp. 136- 
137.
22 According to JT  p.751, the family linkage o f  this Yesuliin was "the daughter o f  Qata- 
Noyan, the son o f DarTtaT (*Dayaritai), the ruler o f Qonggirat. Bbrte-Fujin the senior khatun 
o f  ChlnggTz-Khan and the father o f YTsulun khatun were cousins." According to the list o f  
family members o f Dei-Sechen’s uruq, the description should be understood as Yesuliin was 
"the daughter o f Qata-Noyan [who was] the son o f DarTtaT (*Dayaritai) [who was a brother 
to] the ruler o f Qonggirat (ie Dei-Sechen)", or Borte could not be a cousin to the father o f  
Yesuliin in the same generation. The edition which Boyle based on describes Dayaritai as a 
brother o f the Qonggirat ruler, Successors, p. 135.
23 JT  p.361.
24 JT  p.366.
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eldest daughter of Temiijin25 are some of them, and the in-laws’ relationship 
between the ruling family of the Merkit and the Naiman explains their joint 
attack against Toyoril and Temujin at Koyiten in 1202.26 Some less famous 
marriages mentioned in the sources include the in-laws’ relationship between 
the Kereit Jirgin branch and Teb-Tenggeri who was a Mongol Qongqotan,27 
and a proper quda relationship between the NTrun Mangqut tribe with the 
Turkic Barqut tribe.28
When an in-laws’ relationship is described as proper or formal in this 
chapter, it means the marriage was arranged according to traditional ritual and 
agreement. A marriage could also happen without proper arrangement. 
Yesiigei’s abduction of Hd’eliin is a well-known example. Ho’elun was 
originally betrothed to the younger brother of the Merkit leader Toqtoya and 
she was abducted in the final stage of proper marriage arrangement: carrying
the bride home.29 Yesiigei’s interruption of the proper procedure inevitably 
irritated the Merkits and they took their revenge later in abducting Borte.30 
The relationship of the Merkits and Temujin had never been in accord, this
25 YS 108 p iao  4 the Table o f Princesses, p.2757-58. Botu was apparently not "the brother 
of the mother" o f  Temujin (JT  p. 119) in a strict sense, but a close genealogical kinsmen to 
Ho’eliin.
26 SH  §198 relates Toregene was the khatun o f Toqtoya’s eldest son Qodu, JT  p.96 relates 
that she was the khatun o f  Dair-Usun, the leader o f the Hoyas-Merkit. No matter which 
Merkit was her husband, a wife to a Merkit should not be o f Merkit origin. YS 114 chuan 1 
p.2870 records that she is a "Naimajin", that means o f a Naiman origin. The marriage o f  
Toregene and the Merkit prince shows a Naiman-Merkit in-law’s relationship did exist during 
the time o f  Temiijin.
27 JT  p.120. The Kereit girl was called QADAN-BHADR (*Qadayan-Bayatur), a manly 
name.
28 JT  pp. 193-194. Jedei-Noyan was born o f a Mangqut and his Barqut wife. His father 
was killed at the Taichiyut separation from Temujin’s family. Therefore, this marriage was 
contemporary to the time o f  Temiijin.
29 SH  §§54-56. Ho’elOn came from the Olqunuyut, a sub-clan o f  the Qonggirat. She was
betrothed to Toqtoya’s younger brother Yeke-Chiledii. See SH  §54, §111.
30 SH  § 111.
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might have resulted from Yesugei’s spoiling of the Merkits’ association to the 
Qonggirats.
Other than the purely political marriages which were made for exchange 
of immediate protection and military assistance in crises, marriages between 
these leading families or eminent persons formed an affection network among 
themselves. The network can also be described as the inter-tribal political 
framework of steppe society. They served as "ears" and "eyes" for their quda 
political leaders, passing information which often caused dramatic changes in 
political situations.
Many historical events justify the usefulness of qudasJ "ears" and 
"eyes". First, in the eve of Battle of Thirteen Giire’en, Nekiin, an Ikires who 
lived among the Taichiyuts, passed on the news of the coming attack because 
his son Botu was staying with Temiijin as a giiregen (son-in-law).jl Second, 
on the eve of the first Mongol coalition attack, the Qonggirat Dei-Sechen 
among the coalition clandestinely informed Temujin, his son-in-law, of their 
movements.32 Third, on the eve of the second Mongol coalition attack in
31 The account o f this event is confusing in the sources. First, in JT  p.328, Botu was in 
attendance with Temujin; according to SH  §120, Botu was staying with Temujin for his 
giiregen  duty. Thus, there is no problem o f Botu’s presence in the camp o f  Temiijin. Second, 
the story in JT  p. 328 tells that Botu(BWTWN)’s father Nekiin was in the camp o f the 
Taichiyut in the eve o f the Battle o f Thirteen Giire’en. He asked two Qorulas tribesmen to 
pass this information to the camp o f Temujin —  apparently he was concerned about his son, 
not Temujin. CCL p.7a and FIS' 118 chuan 5 p.2921 the biography o f  Botu relate that Botu 
sent the messengers to inform Temujin. SH  §129 mentions only two messengers "from the 
Ikires". The assumption o f the importance o f quda's "eyes" and "ear" can only be confirmed 
when Botu was definitely staying with Temiijin, and when the information came from Nekiin. 
An analysis o f  the location o f  these persons shows that the news was from Nekiin. Temujin 
received the news when he was at Dalan-Baljus. (JT, CCL) The message should have reached 
him at GUrelgti, the location which the SH supplies, before it was passed on to Dalan-Baljus. 
Giirelgii was an important site to Temujin, probably the site o f his base camp during his early 
life. His family moved to the place and lived there after he escaped from the Taichiyut camp 
(SH  §89), he got married there (SH  §94), and he camped here after he separated from Jamuqa 
(SH  §122). He appeared at Giirelgii even as late as 1201 when the Mongol Gtir-Qan marched
against him (SH  §141). As nomads, it was possible for him to leave temporarily to Dalan- 
Baljus while Botu remained in the base camp. The event then can be restored as: Nekiin sent 
the message to his son Botu; Botu was staying in Temiijin’s base camp at Giirelgii while 
Temiijin was away to Dalan-Baljus; from Giirelgii, Botu redirected the message to Temujin.
32 CCL  p.32a.
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1201, Qoritai informed his Qorulas son-in-law about the preparation of the 
campaign then the news was passed to Temiijin.33 Fourth, the Kereit Toyoril 
had sent a messenger to ask Teb-Tenggeri, a Kereit son-in-law, to co-operate 
in his plan of seizing Temujin. Unexpectedly, Teb-Tenggeri informed Temujin 
about the trap and saved his life.34 Another similar incident happened in the 
Onggut-Naiman qudastiip, that the Onggiits learnt about Tayang-Naiman’s 
preparation to attack Temujin because of their qudaship35 but decided to pass 
this secret to Temujin. This disclosure of information was of considerable 
value to Temujin but it was really disastrous to the betrayed in-laws.
Since quda relationship is a relation between families, not just the
married couple, the blood related family members of the bride and the
bridegroom were counted as "in the same uruq11. The affection between these
relatives was manifestly precious when the general political situation changed
radically. When Toyoril turned hostile to his Merkit son-in-law Toqtoya and 
plundered him before 1199,36 he put Toqtoya to flight, killed his eldest son
while the other son Chilayun was allowed to submit with his people. This 
special treatment is hard to explain until his maternal lineal identity is 
rediscovered: Chilayun was born of Toyoril’s daughter who he offered to
33 JT  p.377.
3,4 JT  p. 120. This incident can be identified with the event o f  "the betrothal feast" in SH  
§168. (cf. §204) Temiijin had stayed in the tent o f Monglik on the way to the betrothal feast, 
then he turned back the next morning. The SH  relates that Monglik felt suspicious o f  the 
Kereit intention therefore he advised Temujin not to go forward. J T s version is also possibly 
correct because since Teb-Tenggeri was a son o f Monglik, he might have greeted him that 
night as well.
35 The reason o f  Tayang-Qan’s invitation to the Onggiits for ajoint-attack against Temujin 
is not supplied in the sources. An account in JT  p.366 relates that the ruler o f Naiman tribe 
had once married a girl from the ruling family o f the Onggiit tribe and feasted at Baidaraq- 
Belchir. The in-laws’ relationship between two ruling families might be the main reason of 
Tayang-Qan’s invitation.
36 SH  §157 dates this event in 1202 a Dog Year but this attack appears in JT  and CCL 
before the 1199 attack against the Naiman Buiruq-Qan. J T s  dating is correct because a later 
account records that Qutu and Chilayun who submitted in Toyoril’s attack upon the Merkits 
"left" Toyoril in his restoration war in 1199. It is illogical if  they left before they were 
brought to submission.
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Toqtoya,37 therefore, he was "welcomed home" in spite of the break-up of 
this in-laws’ relationship. Respect was also guaranteed to the father-in-laws. 
Jaya-Gambu who had married his three daughters to Temujin’s family was 
allowed to keep his own subject people under his leadership after Temujin’s 
destruction of the Kereit regime, when the rest of their tribesmen were 
distributed.38
Submissive tribal leaders
The traditional gudaship practice acquired a new dimension from 1203, 
when Temiijin encountered a band of the Qonggirats after the battle at 
Qalaqaljit-Elet.
In this event, Temiijin sent Jiirchedei to this band of Qonggirat with 
troops and his message: submit, or fight. SH  §176 reports the result that these 
Qonggirats submitted without fighting, in return, Temiijin "did not touch 
anything of theirs." A supplementary consequence of this event is found in JT, 
which fascinatingly relates that after the submission of this largest Qonggirat 
group, Temiijin offered a daughter/girl {dukhtari) to their leader Terge-Emel 
in marriage. Terge-Emel said: "your daughter/girl being like a frog and turtle, 
in what manner should I take her?" Temiijin was enraged at this reply and had 
him executed.39
The significance of this event is that, began from this incident, the 
creation of an in-laws relationship served a new function. Normally, a 
marriage arrangement should have been agreed by mutual-willingness and the 
friendly desire of being connected from both sides. Therefore, although 
Temiijin was indeed offended when his marriage proposal with the Toyoril-
37 JT  p.95.
38 SH  §186.
39 JT p. 159, bi-yasa-rasanlda.
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Kereit did not work out, he did not or could not take any violent action against 
the Kereits. However, this time, he killed Terge-Emel upon his declining to 
accept his daughter/girl. This action can be explained from the perspective of 
tribal identity and its strength, in that the Turkic Kereit tribe was in a different 
class from a Derelkln Mongol branch; nevertheless, the submissive position of 
Terge-Emel may be more crucial to his execution: how rude is it when a 
submitted subject turned down a marriage offer from his lord?
The incident of Terge-Emel is the first example of Temiijin making use 
of the in-laws’ relationship as a bestowal. Temujin’s offer might have derived 
from a positive thought: "on the top of affection, let there be more affection", 
but he was no longer the young man who desperately needed an in-laws’ 
association with the Qonggirats for power-building. A submissive tribal leader 
appeared inferior to his new lord, therefore, an in-laws’ relationship between 
them should not be considered on an equal basis of affection and mutual 
assistance. From then on, granting a marriage connection as a benevolence to 
his subjects became a main trend in Temujin’s external policy. This strategy 
applied throughout his steppe conquests, and girls were bestowed on the 
distinguished submissive tribal leaders only. Marriage alliance during this 
period was used for purposes of administration and to facilitate the network of 
expansion.
After Temiijin became the dominant power in Mongolia, a qudas\iip 
with the conqueror’s family appeared less and less as a matter of warm-hearted 
affection but more as an instrument of administration. The number of sons-in- 
law greatly increased in the uruq o f Temiijin, and the idea of "becoming a 
son[-in-law]" characterised Temujin’s relation with the tribal leaders of the 
western steppe belt. Some of the tribal leaders came and requested an in-laws’ 
relationship voluntarily and some of them were granted the relationship after 
they had made a distinctive contribution to Temiijin. The following survey of 
the in-laws’ relationship between the Temiijin-Mongol and the tribes of 
Onggiit, Uighur, Oirat, Qarluq confirms that before the Mongol expedition into
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Transoxiana, Temiijin subdued most of the western steppe tribes by peaceful 
means.
Temiijin did not give a daughter to the ruler of the Onggiit tribe, 
Alaqush-Tegin-Quri, immediately when the latter disclosed the secret 
movement of Tayang-Qan to Temiijin in 1203/1204. The decision to give him 
one was made after Alaqush handed over the passes of the border wall of 
Jurchen China.40 The date of this reward must have been a decade later, 
during Temujin’s campaign in Jurchen territory beyond the border between 
1211 and 1216. However, the marriage did not proceed because an in-tribe 
conspiracy occurred which resulted in the death of Alaqush41 and the 
succession of Chengui, the son of an earlier Onggiit leader who was a brother 
of Alaqush. Later, Alaqush’s paternal nephew Chengui,42 or his youngest 
son *Boyoqa,43 married Temujin’s daughter Alaqai-Beki, who was younger 
than Ogetei and older than Tolui. The biography of Alaqush-Tegin-Quri in YS 
recounts that Alaqai-Beki was given in marriage after *Boyoqa returned from 
Temujin’s Transoxiana expedition. If this account is reliable and taken 
together with the hand-over of the wall passes, the Onggtit ruling family did 
not receive Temujin’s favour until they had rendered many services and made 
great contributions to his expansion.
40 JT p . \3 \ .
41 Alaqush did not take the princess before his death. SH §239 recounts that Temiijin had 
given Alaqa(i)-Beki to the Onggiit but the exact person is not mentioned. Alaqush appeared 
in SH  §202 with the title o f giiregen (son-in-law), however, this description may be an error 
similar to the miscorrelation o f Alchi-Giiregen, that is, the narrator mistakes the giiregen 
relationship o f the son to his father. Alchi-Giiregen, see below in the discussion o f his son 
Chigii-Guregen.
42 Cheng-Kuo (*Chengui) is a paternal nephew to Alaqush, according to YS 118 chuan 5 
the biography o f Alaqush-Tegin-Quri p.2924. His name appeared in YS as Cheng-Kuo, in JT  
Chengui (valuations SHNKWY/SBKWY/SHYKWY). He was the husband o f Alaqai-Beki, as 
related in JT  p. 132.
43 YS 108 p iao  4 the Table o f Princesses p.2757-2758 records that the husband o f Alaqai- 
Beki was Po-yao-he. This Po-yao-he (*Boyoqa) was the younger son o f  Alaqush according 
to YS 118 chnan 5 p.2924 the biography o f Alaqush-Tegin-Quri.
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Barchuq of the Uighur was in a similar situation as the Onggiits for 
becoming an in-law to the uruq o f Temiijin. Temiijin did not initiate an in­
law’s relationship with him when this Uighur ruler decided to kill the 
representative of the Qara-Khitai and to send envoys to Temiijin to seek his 
goodwill in 1209. After this, the Merkit fugitive crossed the Irtysh river and 
planning to enter the Uighur territory; Barchuq killed their envoy and fought 
them at the *Chan river. Temiijin was happy with this effort44 and when 
Barchuq came in person to pay his homage in 1211, upon his request, Temiijin 
then gave him a "princess" and made him accordingly "the fifth son".43
The statement of his request was recorded in three sources in the same 
speech: he wished he could "contribute after your Highest’s four sons" by 
becoming "the fifth son".46 "The fifth son" apparently implies a non-blood 
related father-and-son relationship with Temiijin, that is a son "in-law". These 
Turkic tribes had no genealogical relation with Temujin’s uruq, and Temujin’s 
sister and senior children were all married at this time. Therefore, the closest 
relationship they could seek was to become an inferior in-law to the conqueror.
Temiijin did not give his family girls to every leader who submitted. 
The Kirgiz leaders did not come in person to pay homage —  although they 
had sent envoys with gifts in 1207, they did not receive an in-laws’ 
relationship with Temiijin. Temiijin only created an in-laws’ relationship with 
those leaders who had rendered the Mongol empire a distinguished service. In 
the example of this Uighur Barchuq, according to JT , Temiijin did not give the 
princess to him in 1211 but much later when Barchuq had showed his 
obedience in answering to Temujin’s summons in attacking Giichiiliik (the 
Qara-Khitai), Transoxiana, and the Tangyut nation.
44 CCL pp.73a-74b.
45 CCL p.75a, JT  p.441.
46 CCL p.76a. YS 122 chuan 9 p.3000, the biography o f Barchuq-’Ata-Tegin. JT  has a 
similar expression, p.441.
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The betrothal to the Uighur leaders experienced a dramatic course 
comparable to the marriage with the Onggiit leaders. Although Temiijin had 
betrothed a daughter to Barchuq, owing to the sudden death of Temiijin, this 
princess remained behind while Barchuq returned to Besh-Baliq. When Ogetei 
ascended the throne, (at least one year after Temujin’s death) he fulfilled the 
promise by bestowing Altun-Beki upon Barchuq. This time, before Barchuq 
arrived at the court, the princess died. Ogetei then gave him Alaji-Beki 
instead. Before Alaji-Beki was sent over, Barchuq died. Thereafter when 
Barchuq’s son Kesmes succeeded as the Idi-Qut, Kesmes eventually married 
the bride and initiated an in-laws’ relationship with the Mongol ruling family, 
after he presented himself at the court, a confirmation of his homage.47
The Onggiit tribe inhabited along the Jurchen border and the Uighur
nation situated behind the "rebellious" Tangyut country, their submission 
played an significant role in Temujin’s campaigns of expansion in the Jurchen 
and Tangyut territories. By this way, the in-laws relationship granted to them 
could mean a reward to their allegiance, the same as the reward to his loyal
Mongol subjects. Early than Temujin’s expansion outside Mongolia, Temiijin 
had granted a "family girl"48 to the Mongol Bayayut tribe because one 
giire'en of them had fought for Temiijin in the Battle of Thirteen Giire’en.49
47 y T p .H l. Some details supplied here according to the description o f JuwaynT, see Boyle 
trans., The History o f  the World-Conqueror, pp.47-48. Cf. the discussion o f the princess in 
note 17, ibid. Kesmes = KSMAS.
43 JT  p. 179, "urugh dukhtar bi Tshan dahand", variation az urugh, ie from the uruq o f  
Temiijin.
49 There is a confusion in the reading o f Persian text: "an qawm-ra NAM ’WTGW 
farmuda". NAM  ’WTGW has variations NAM ’WRQAKW, NAM  TKW, BKKW, 
’WRQAKWRKAN. I cannot see any reason that the confusing word/phrase should be 
"corrected" as ’WTGW (Mong. otegii), as suggested by some translations. If the word shall 
be interpreted as otegii, this paragraph would have another implication in the in-laws’ 
relationship during this period. Since the Bayayut giire'en which was in the eighth wing of  
Temujin’s troop in the battle was commanded by Onggur, I would incline to assume the 
reading is simply "that tribe was commanded by Onggur" ("an qawm-ra TKW/BKKW  
farmuda"). The variations NAM ’WRQAKW and ’WRQAKWRKAN appear in the same 
group shall be separated from the NAM TKW and BKKW group. This ’WRQAKW or 
’WRQAKWRKAN shall be related to the proper name o f a person in a later paragraph on the 
same page: "in the time o f  ChlnggTz-Khan, there had an emir among the emirs o f Left Wing,
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Later Qubilai acquired a khatun called Hiishijin,50 her father Boroyul was one 
of Temujin’s two most important nokers. These two examples of an in-laws’ 
relationship with the Mongol subjects who had rendered a great service show 
that the prestige came after effort, and the contribution of the Oirat leader in 
Temujin’s expansion to the western forest won his uruq the most favourite 
Turkic quda relationship to the Temuj in-Mongol.
The Oirat ruling family had a relationship of anddqudai with Temujin’s 
uruq, their uruqs took girls from each other51 and their in-laws’ relationship 
lasted for generations. The tribe had no enmity to Temiijin or Toyoril since 
the old days, at least it is not found in the sources. Although their leader
Quduqa-Beki did once appear in the enemy camp in the Battle of Koyiten in 
1202, he might have been invited by the Naiman Buiruq-Qan as an ally to 
jointly conduct the magic storm.52 After the storm reversed, Quduqa-Beki 
retreated towards the Shisgis/Shiqshit, making for "forest",53 his residence.
The Quduqa-Temiijin quda relationship should have started after the 
submission of Quduqa, but here there is a textual confusion regarding the date 
of his submission. JT  p.422 relates that Quduqa submitted to Temujin’s 
pursuing troop against Toqtoya and Guchuliik in 1208. This account coincides 
with another paragraph in p. 103, which records that Toqtoya did not resist the 
Mongol troop in the final battle but that the Oirats charged and exterminated
his name [is] BWQA-KWRGAN (Buqa the Son-in-law). [A] girl had been given to him and 
he was from the Jedei-Bayayut".
50 AT p .173, Qubilai-Qan’s khatun AWSHJYN was the daughter o f  Boroyul-Noyan o f  the 
Derelkln HUshin tribe. The lady was called HWSHYJYN in JT  p.867, who gave birth to a 
son called Ayachi. AWSHJYN (Oshijin) <  HWSHYJYN (Hiishijin), means a female belongs 
to the Hiishin (> Ushin) tribe.
51 JT  p.99.
52 SH  §143, "those very same Buiruq-Qan and Quduqa, knowing how to produce a
rainstorm by magic, conjured up a storm".
53 SH  §144.
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him —  apparently, the Oirats were acting on behalf of the Mongols as 
subjects in this attack.
The SH  has another version of his submission. SH  §239 recounts that 
Quduqa submitted to Jochi’s expedition troops against the "people of the 
forests" and acted as their guide. When the conquest was completed, Quduqa 
came to pay homage and Temiijin initiated an quda relationship with him. 
Paul Pelliot suggested that the SH  version is a conflation of Quduqa’s earlier 
submission with the 1218/19 Mongol expedition against the forest tribes.54
Many pieces of evidence confirm that Quduqa had submitted to the 
Mongols before the 1218/19 Mongol expedition. First, the Tumat tribe
rebelled when Temuj in "was absented for Khitai", and Temiijin sent Boroyul 
to subdue it in 1217.'' Therefore, the forest people must have rebelled in the 
period of 1211 to 121656 and they must have submitted before they rebelled. 
Second, Quduqa was held in captivity on behalf of the Mongols by the Tumat 
tribe and released by the 1217 punitive troops. This seizure shows Quduqa 
was in the service of Temiijin before 1217.57 Third, the sons of Toqtoya 
were finally exterminated at the *Chan river by Siibe’etei in 1217.58 The
54 Annotation o f De Rachewiltz, PFEH 26 (1982) p.64, referring to Paul Pelliot’s 
annotation in Notes critiques d ’histoire kalmouke.
55 JT  pp.456-458.
56 JT  p.456, Temiijin did not return from the Jurchen campaign to his ordo in Mongolia 
until 1216.
57 He was captured because he tried to rescue the Bayarin Qorchi. According to SH  §207 
and §241, Temiijin had given the governorship o f the "forest people" to Qorchi and allowed 
him to camp freely up to along the Irtysh where was the inhabitance o f  the forest people. 
Qorchi tried to take thirty fine maidens from the Tumat tribe therefore the Tumats seized him. 
Temujin sent Quduqa over to deal with this matter but Quduqa was also seized by the Tumats.
58 JT  p.457, Temujin supplied SQbe’etei with iron carts to attack the brother and sons o f  
Toqtoya and had them crushed along the *Chan river. As a result o f  this extermination, 
Siibe’etei captured the youngest son o f Toqtoya, Qultuqan-Mergen, and delivered him to Jochi. 
This capture and delivery "in the last war" also found in JT  p.95, but this delivery did not 
necessary mean that Sube’etei was under the command o f Jochi. Sube’etei and Jochi were sent 
separately by Temujin with separate assignments to pursue the Merkits or to punish the Kirgiz. 
SUbe’etei might have sent the captive to Jochi simply because Jochi was nearby.
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Mongol troops were unlikely to find these fugitives in a foreign land and 
arrived at the *Chan river at the speed of storm without the help, or guidance 
of the locals, that is, the Oirats. Fourth, Jochi’s punitive expedition against the 
Kirgiz was launched after the suppression of Tumat tribe because the formerly 
submitted Kirgiz people refused to offer military assistance to this suppression. 
This expedition must have happened after 1217 and it has nothing to do with 
the Oirats.59 Summing up, the 1207/08 dating is a more likely one for 
Quduqa’s submission.
Comparing his usefulness with the great contributions of the Uighur and
Onggiit leaders, the Oirat leader had also rendered a significant service to
Temujin before they became in-laws. Exterminating Temujin’s long-lasting
enemy Toqtoya was an achievement, but submitting to Temujin without 
fighting would be far more substantial. The submission did not just open up
the way to the west for the Mongols, Quduqa also acted as the key person in
Temujin’s management of the forest people to the west of Mongolian steppe
because "Quduqa knows the ways of the people of the forests".60 Therefore,
a close relationship between these two ruling families would be mutually
beneficial.
The situation of Quduqa was slightly different from the one of the 
Onggiit or the Uighur leaders. The uruq of Quduqa had had bestowed on it 
much more marriage linkage than the other submissive tribal leaders, probably 
because of his administrative services. Only the uruqs of the Kereit Jaya- 
Gambu or the Qonggirat Dei-Sechen can compare in this degree of honour of 
in-laws’ relationship to the Temuj in-Mongol. Quduqa had two sons and one
59 JT  pp. 143-144, also in CCL pp.91a-92a, Jochi’s expedition was aimed only at the Kirgiz 
and took place in 1208 (Tiger Year). After subdued the Kirgiz, Jochi went down the Kem 
river and brought the forest people o f Ursut, Qabqanas, Telenggiit and Kesdim to submission. 
Jochi would not have met the Oirats upstream if he went down the Kem river, because the 
Oirats lived in the land o f  "SNGGWR river" from where rivers flowed out and formed the
Kem river. JT  p.99.
60 SH  §241. A comment by Temujin.
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daughter, they all married into Temujin’s uruq. Temujin intended to take 
Quduqa’s daughter Oyul-Qaimish himself but finally this girl was married to 
the later Mongke-Qan.61 As for Quduqa’s sons Inalchi and Torelchi, SH  §239
recounts that Temujin had given Checheyigen to Inalchi and Jochi’s daughter 
Qoluiqan to his elder son Torelchi. The marriage is vice versa in JT, that is, 
Inalchi married the sister of Batu, QWLWY-’YGAJY,62 who must be Jochi’s 
daughter Qoluiqan in SH, and Torelchi married Temujin’s own daughter 
CHYCHAKAN/CHYJAKN who was the Checheyigen in SH. The offspring 
from these marriages carried on the in-laws’ association, two Oirat daughters 
born of Checheyigen married the descendants of Temujin: one of them married 
Qara-Hiilegu who was the grandson of Chayatai and reigned over the Chayatai 
ulus for a period, the other married Ariq-Boke, who was the youngest son of 
the otchigin Tolui, as his senior wife.63 The in-laws’ relationship between the 
Mongol and Oirat ruling families lasted with significance for generations.
The Qarluq leader also received an in-laws’ relationship from Temujin. 
This relationship might have developed in an essence of peace maintenance for 
the political situation on the steppe belt.
When the Qarluq Arslan-Qan submitted without fighting and came to 
pay homage in 1211, Temujin did him a courtesy: "I shall give him a 
daughter.1,64 No significant military or administrative contribution of the 
Qarluq leader has been found in the sources, so this benevolence can only be 
satisfactory explained by the timing of his submission.
61 Jfp.lO O , Oyul-Qaimish called Qubilai and Hiilegu as children (farzand) and these two 
younger uncles paid great respect to her. In JT pp.820-821, this Oyul-Qaimish was Mongke’s 
"another" senior wife, at first being betrothed to Tolui so that she used to call Qubilai and 
Hiilegu "children". However, Mongke’s senior wife in YS was a Qonggirat called Qudu[q]tai 
and later her sister Yesiir.
62 Variations o f the second part o f the name are ’PKCHY/’BKCHY. Unidentified. JT
p.101.
63 J f p . l O O .
64 SH  §235.
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The dynasty of Qara-Khitai was terminated in 1211, the same year as 
Arslan-Qan’s submission. The political situation along the steppe belt was 
strained at this time, especially for Temujin, when the huge Qara-Khitai ulus 
had been seized by the Naiman fugitive Guchiiliik. The submission of Arslan- 
Qan was dated in SH  §235 corresponding to the occasion when the general 
Qubilai was sent to fight against the Qarluqs. This "attack" as related in the 
SH  appeared very unwise under such political circumstances because the 
Qarluqs might turn to the Guchuliik Qara-Khitai when attacked by the 
Mongols, especially when the attack was not supported by a convincing claim. 
JT  p. 144 supplies another version of the description that Qubilai was sent 
(firistdda bud) to the Qarluqs to bring them submit. It would be more 
reasonable if we presume that Qubilai was sent as an armed envoy who bore 
a similar mission as Jurchedei to the Terge-Emel Qonggirat in 1203 —  the 
similarity between these two submissions even extends to the granting of a 
daughter to the submitted leader,65 and Qubilai might have been sent over 
because of political considerations.
The timing explains why Temujin was keen to initiate a quda 
relationship with the Qarluq leader even when they did not contribute any 
service to the Mongol Empire. To Temujin, to attract a possible ally to 
Guchiiluk to join himself was already a great achievement for the Mongol 
Empire. Therefore, he confirmed this connection by making the Qarluq leader 
his in-law.
The above examples of the submission of the Onggiit, Uighur, Oirat 
and Qarluq tribes reveal that the World Conqueror did not conquer every 
steppe tribe by force in the second stage of his expansion. All he demanded 
from these steppe surrenders was a gesture of submission from the tribe
6S The uruq o f  Arslan enjoyed at least three generations o f in-laws’ relationship with the 
uruq o f  TemUjin. According to YS 109 piao  4 the Table o f  Princesses in p.2761, Arslan’s son 
Yeh-hsien pu-hua (*Yesen-Buqa) married Princess T’uo-leh (*Tore), *Yesen-Buqa’s son Hu- 
na-ta-erh (*Qunadar) married Princess Pa-pa, and *Qunadar’s son La-hai-ya-li-na married 
Princess (blank).
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leaders, such as paying homage to the court in person and relinquishing their
"qan" title,66 also concrete contributions to the Mongols either in civil or
military affairs which assisted in the expansion and expressed their allegiance
to tire sovereignty. In return for their loyalty during crucial incidents or
moment, Temujin revived his courteous policy which was previously designed
for his kinsmen and applied it on a larger scale. More than that he "did not
touch" their people, Temujin rewarded them with an in-law’s relationship with
his honourable uruq. In this way, Temujin acquired in-laws’ tribes on the
Jurchen border, the west border of the Tangyut nation, even the forest area 
near to the Qipchaq steppe. The steppe world was then organised by and
administrated via a network of in-laws’ relationship with the Temuj in-Mongol
superior in the centre.
III. Individuals in the in-laws’ relationship
In-laws’ relationship works between two families. When these families 
are the ruling families, the affection and obligation work between the 
clans/tribes. The making or break-up of these ruling-family in-laws’ 
relationship mostly resulted from changes in the inter-tribal political situation.
Nonetheless, the specific individuals in the relationship might 
experience separate treatment when the general relationship of their tribal 
leaders damaged. This opportunity or misfortune might come because of 
his/her position in the relationship or his/her personal capability. Therefore, 
the role of individuals in the in-laws’ relationship, which reveals the details of 
history, is also worth examination. The immediately related in-laws to 
Temujin’s uruq are discussed below, under three sub-categories: the fathers-in- 
law, the guregen and the daughters-in-law.
66 j T  p. 144, Arslan-Qan was renamed as Arslan Sartaqtai, "the Tajik (= "central Asian" in 
general) Arslan". A similar example of depriving a submitted leader o f  his prestigious title is 
the renaming o f  the Tangyut ruler and Jurchen ruler upon their defeat.
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Fathers-in-law
In some cases, Temujin started an in-laws’ relationship by allowing the 
allies to become his fathers-in-law. Two famous fathers-in-law who 
experienced special treatment when their tribes crushed were the Merkit Dair- 
Usun and the Kereit Jaya-Gambu.
In 1204 when Temujin set out against the Uduyit branch of the Merkits 
which was the leading branch of the tribe, the leader of the Hoyas/Uyas67 
branch of the Merkits dedicated his daughter Qulan to Temujin. This offer 
was a gesture of surrender and a request for peace, as recorded in JT. Temujin 
liked the woman very much68 therefore owing to this in-laws’ affection, he 
did not destroy this Merkit branch but kept them in his own ayuruq (base 
camp).69
One year earlier than the incident of the Hoyas-Merkit, Jaya-Gambu of 
the Kereit tribe received the same favour when the Kereit ruler Toyoril was 
defeated. Jaya-Gambu was allowed to keep his hereditary subjects intact 
because of his in-laws’ relationship with Temujin’s uruq: he was one of the
fathers-in-law to Temujin, also to Temujin’s children Jochi and Tolui.
These two examples show that during the period 1203/04, Temujin 
adopted a friendly policy toward his fathers-in-law even when their tribal 
leaders were hostile to Temujin. These fathers-in-law were allowed to secure
67 De Rachewiltz is doubtful o f the spelling o f Hoyas (Ho’as) and he suggests that the 
correct spelling should be Uwas. From a linguistic point o f view, Ho’as > U ’as (= Hoyas > 
Uas). Regarding the /h/ initial, compare with the examples o f  Hambaqai {JT) > Ambaqai {SH), 
Ho’elUn {SH) > Ulun {JT).
68 SH  §197.
09 JT  pp.418-419. The accounts o f Hoyas-Merkit’s submission in SH  and JT  differ in 
timing, also the detail o f the later besiege o f  Taiqan barricade. The offering o f  Qulan and 
Temujin’s acceptance o f  their surrender are the same.
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their own people while the rest of their tribesmen were killed or despoiled.70 
The special favour granted to the fathers-in-law was restricted to non-hostile 
ones only. As for those who surrendered after resistance by sending girls at 
the last minute seeking for peace, such as the Jurchen71 and the Tangyut72 
regimes, their rulers was not treated as respectful fathers-in-law.
However, the distrustfulness of these fathers-in-law made Temujin
aware of the difficulty in continuing this policy. The Hoyas-Merkit revolted 
soon after Temujin shifted his attention,73 and Jaya-Gambu too turned hostile 
later and separated from Temiijin.74 Both of these rebellions were suppressed. 
Temujin "had the Merkit distributed on all sides down to the last person".75
As for Jaya-Gambu, his people were plundered and exterminated and he 
himself was lured, seized and killed by Jtirchedei.76
Temujin’s cruelty to these rebellious fathers-in-law did not apply to 
their daughters, or some of their kinsmen. The Merkit Qulan and the Kereit 
Ibaqa-Beki were allowed to keep their status after the betrayal of their fathers. 
Qulan appeared in charge of the second ordo of Temujin,77 and although
70 Compare the distribution o f the Kereits in SH  §186 and the extermination o f non-Hoyas 
Merkits in SH  §198.
71 SH  §248.
72 SH  §249, CCL p.75a.
73 yrp .419  and CCL p.70ab have the same story that the Merkits settled in the base camp 
(ayuruq) soon looted the camp but the belongings were recovered by Temujin’s guarding men. 
These Merkits then left, moved to Qarayun Gorge on the Selengge and resided there. Temujin 
sent Boroyul and Chimbai (the younger brother o f  Chilayun) with Right wing troop to bring 
them subdue. SH  §198 does not supply the detail o f the course but the result: "The Merkits 
who had submitted earlier rose again in rebellion from he base camp, but our servants in the 
camp brought them under control.... he (Temujin) had the Merkit distributed on all sides down 
to the last person".
74 SH  §208.
75 SH  §198. The sources do not mention the end o f his Merkit father-in-law.
76 SH  §208.
77 YS 106 p iao  1 "The Table o f Khatuns and Concubines", p.2694.
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Ibaqa-Beki had been given to Jiirchedei, her status as Temujin’s khatun was 
not abolished.78
Giiregen: sons-in-law
The unreliability of the fathers-in-law is probably one of the reasons 
which made Temujin cautious in taking girls into his family. On the other 
hand, he was generous in increasing the number of sons-in-law, no matter 
whether they were the submitted tribal leaders, or less influential individuals. 
Temujin seemed to have had great confidence in his giiregen.
An explanation of Temujin’s particular confidence in the faithfulness 
of his sons-in-law can be suggested by referring to the steppe marriage 
tradition. According to the Mongol custom, for a formal marriage, the 
bridegroom should stay in the bride’s family for a period before he could take 
the bride home. This custom is clearly stated in the SH  in its accounts of the 
marriage of Temujin, also of Botu.
In the betrothal of Temujin, Dei-Sechen said: "I will give you my 
daughter, and you leave your son here as my son-in-law", Yesiigei replied: "I 
will leave my son here as your son-in-law ,..".79 Later when Yesiigei sent 
Monglik to fetch Temujin home, Dei-Sechen spoke: "If my quda is longing for 
his son, let him go. But after he has seen [his father] he must come back 
immediately".80 These dialogues show that the stay of bridegroom was 
essential as a part of the procedure of a properly arranged marriage.
78 JT  p.303 lists Ibaqa-Beki as a senior khatun to Temujin after the five most important 
khatuns, Borte, Qulan, Yesiigen, Yesiii and the daughter o f the Jurchen ruler.
79 SH  §66.
80 SH  §69.
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In the example of Botu, he apparently had performed a long-time duty
in the bride’s house. He followed the family of Temujin when Temujin
separated from Jamuqa, because he was "living in this area as giiregen".81
Later when the Taichiyuts and Jamuqa came and attacked Temujin in 1193, 
Botu was still there hence his father sent him the news.
Although the exact duration of the required stay is not clear, it would 
not be less than a few years, as seen in the example of Botu. Living together 
is a good chance for the bride’s family to observe the personality of their 
future son-in-law, also for the young man to understand his in-laws. When the 
duration could last for three to five years,82 a nice relationship and mutual 
understanding must have been firmly established before the real marriage took 
place. Through this practice, Temujin would have had a satisfactory 
acquaintance with his sons-in-law, therefore, he had confidence in those whom 
he knew well.
The word giiregen specifies an identity of son-in-law, however, since 
the marriage linkage was multiple in real practice, a son-in-law could be also 
a brother-in-law to the same person. Botu of the Ikires betrothed and married 
Temujin’s only blood-sister Temiilun,83 later he took Temujin’s eldest 
daughter Qojin-Beki after Temiilun died.84 Hence Botu had the double
81 SH  §120.
82 The details o f  the formalities o f a formal steppe marriage shall be treated in a separate 
section since plenty o f evidence and reference can be found. The approximate duration 
suggests here bases on two evidence. First, according to the SH, Temiijin was left in the 
bride’s family when he was nine, then he asked for the bride when he was fifteen. Second, 
Jurchen’s practice supplies a good cross-reference that "after married, [the son-in-law] stays 
in w ife’s family rendering the attendant services; even for passing wine and serving meals, [he] 
did [everything] in person. Three years, then [he] has the wife taken home." (TCKC 39, p.554) 
In this way, the required duration o f the giiregen service would not be shorter than one or two 
years.
83 Temiilun was eight years younger than Temujin. SH  §60, when Temujin was nine years 
old, Temullin was in the cradle.
84 YS 118 chnan 5 the biography o f Botu p.2921, 108 p iao  4 the Table o f Princesses 
p.2757-2758.
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identity of being Temujin’s prime brother-in-law and then his prime son-in- 
law. Accordingly, the meaning of giiregen would be better defined not on the 
individual basis but as a son-in-law relationship to a particular uruq.
There are plenty of giiregem  in the sources; the survey below will 
concentrate on the immediate sons-in-law to Temujin. According to the "Table 
o f Princesses" in YS, Temujin’s daughter Qojin-Beki married the Ikires Botu, 
Alaqai-Beki was given to the ruler of Onggiit and Tumalun married to 
Chigii.85 Chigii who was the son of Alchi-Noyan of the Qonggirat, a nephew 
to Borte.86
The political marriage with the Onggtit ruling family was not arranged 
according to normal procedure of the marriage custom, therefore, it shall be 
treated as an exception and excluded from examination. As for the other two 
regular sons-in-law Botu and Chigii, they had been granted an extraordinary 
power in command and investiture. Botu had been trusted with two Thousands 
of the Ikires according to SH  §202, or nine Thousands of the Left Wing and 
the right to appoint the leaders of his Thousands according to JT  p.600. Chigii
85 YS 108 p iao  4 p.2757-2758. According to JT  pp.301-302, Borte gave birth to five 
daughters: Qojin-Beki, Checheyigen, Alaqai-Beki, Tumalun and Altalun, Altalun married a 
Taichu-GQregen from her mother’s clan: the Olqunuyut. Not many accounts o f  this Taichu 
can be found in the sources, therefore he is omitted in this discussion.
86 J T s accounts about this marriage are confusing. JT  p. 160, an emir "who had been 
called Alchi-Noyan, his name was DARGH-KWRGAN and he had a son named CHYGW- 
KWRGAN (Chigii-Guregen)" (... U-ra alchT nuyan mlguftiand wa nam-i u DARGH- 
KWRGAN bud wa pisar-T dashta CHYGW-KWRGAN nam). In a latter passage in p. 161, 
Alchi-Noyan had a son, his name was CHYGW-KWRGAN and DARGH-KWRGAN who took 
Tumalun, the daughter o f  Temiijin (nam-i u CHYGW-KWRGAN wa DARGH-KWRGAN ki 
dukhtar-i chTngglz-khan tumalun nam dasht). JT  p.603 confirms that Chigii-Gtiregen was the 
son o f Alchi-Noyan, but the name DARGH-KWRGAN is still confusing. For the passage on 
p. 160, this name o f  DARGH-KW RGAN has variations o f  SHNGGW- 
KWRGAN/SNKKW/SHNKW (P.1619). If we replaced the DARGH-KWRGAN in this 
passage with the variation, Alchi-Noyan may be understood as SHNGGW-KWRGAN and his 
son Chigii was the DARGH-KWRGAN who took Tumalun. Chigii married Tumalun is for 
sure as seen in JT  p.603.
Alchi-Noyan was called Alchi-Giiregen in SH §202 and he had been entrusted with 
three Thousands o f  the Qonggirats. I cannot find any evidence for his personal in-laws’ 
relationship to Temujin except for he was a maternal younger uncle to Temujin and a paternal 
father-in-law to a daughter o f  Temujin. This record o f his giiregen title in the SH  might have 
confused with the marriage status o f  his son Chigii.
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was entrusted with four Thousands of the Qonggirats and the right to appoint 
Thousand leaders.87
According to "the List of the Hundreds and Thousands of Chlngglz-
Khan" in JT, only six out of nearly fifty large or small unit leaders had had
bestowed on them the right of investiture. These six persons are: the Uruyut 
Jurchedei (Kehetei), the Ikires Botu, the Bayarin Nayaya, the Oirat Quduqa- 
Beki, the Khitai Wu-yeh-erh (WYAR) and the Qonggirat Chigii. Jurchedei,
Nayaya, Wu-yeh-erh were great generals and Quduqa-Beki assisted greatly in 
TemiijiiTs northwest expansion, these four persons had won this privilege by 
their contribution. Compared with these four contributors, Botu and Chigii 
were obviously being granted the same privilege just because of their giiregen 
status.
These non-NIrun "imperial" giiregens were not only entrusted with 
troops and power, they were also be treated as family members in Temujin’s 
uruq and were able to attend important meetings of Mongol tribal affairs, such 
as the election of a future Qan.88 Temujin’s confidence in his giiregens can 
be observed in the granting of these privileges, while his daughters-in-laws 
were also allowed to participate in politics.
Daughters-in-law and the "booty" women
The daughters-in-law who joined Temujin’s uruq usually came from 
properly arranged marriages with Derelkln clans or Turkic tribes. 
Occasionally, they were khatuns of the hostile ruler and were taken after a 
destruction of the whole tribe.
87 JT  p.603.
88 SH  §269.
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The Qonggirat tribe which was renowned for beautiful and clever 
girls89 supplied the most favourite daughters-in-law to Temujin’s uruq. 
Besides, the daughters-in-law from famous Turkic tribes also brought some 
interesting women into his uruq. The exalted Sorqoqtani-Beki, the khatun of 
Tolui and the mother of Mongke-Qan, Qubilai-Qan and Hiilegii-Qan, was a 
daughter of a Kereit prince; Ogetei’s khatun Toregene who had reigned over 
the Great Mongol Empire for five years after the death of her husband was of 
Naiman origin;90 Giiyuk’s khatun Oyul-Qaimish acted as a regent running the 
empire for six months after the death of her husband by carrying Shiremun, the 
son of her brother-in-law Koten in her arms —  she was of Merkit origin.91 
It is interesting to see that all these masterly or diplomatically intelligent 
khatuns were Turkic in origin. These Turkic descendants undeniably possessed 
a remarkable political talent. This talent seems to have been inherited by 
Qubilai-Qan, who did bear a physical "maternal likeness"92 to his maternal 
family (the Kereits) also their administrative intelligence in leading the Mongol 
empire to its most prosperous state.
Another source of daughters-in-law, or wives, were the "booty" women 
obtained from warfare. Toregene, a khatun to the Merkit prince Qudu, had 
been given to Ogetei in 1204/05 when the Merkits were almost destroyed.93 
She was not disgraced but became the senior khatun of Ogetei and was in
89 The beauty o f Qonggirat girls, see SH  §64, the cleverness o f  Chabi khatun, see YS 
pp.2871-2872. This biography o f Chabi also mentions her smartness in national affairs which 
she had assisted in for a while when her husband just ascended the throne, but this achievement 
is apparently less striking when comparing with the Turkic khatuns.
00 Her tribal identity has been discussed in the in-laws’ relationship between the ruling 
families o f  Merkit and Naiman.
91 JT  p.96, she was the eldest khatun and gave birth to two sons Qucha (KHWAJH) and 
Naoqu (NAQW).
92 y7*p.864, when Temujin saw the baby Qubilai, he commented that "all our children are
o f a ruddy complexion, but this child is swarthy like his maternal uncles. Tell Sorqoqtani-Beki 
to give him to a good nurse to be reared." (Boyle trans., Successors p.241) Qubilai’s two 
nurses were o f Naiman and Tangyut origin.
93 SH  §198.
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charge of the national affairs in a later period. Another pair of famous "booty" 
khatuns were Yestigen and Yestii, the daughter of Yeke-Cheren of the 
Tatars.94 They enjoyed a high regard in the Temujin’s family such that each 
of them was assigned a separate or do when Temujin’s senior khatun Borte was 
placed in the first ordo?*
Some of these booty women were widows. Since taking a widow was 
a normal practice in Mongolian society, it was not strange for the widowed 
khatun from the defeated ruling family to be taken into the victorious ruling 
family. Temujin himself took the Naiman widow Gurbesii in 1204,96 a 
khatun or the mother of Tayang-Qan whose jasciq was harsh.97 Botoqui- 
Tarqu reigned over the Tumat tribe after the death of her husband.98 She had 
been given to the Oirat Quduqa-Beki after the suppression of the Tumat tribe 
in 1217.99 Temujin even possessed Yestii by making her a widow.100
Apparently Temujin did not have a close in-laws’ relationship with the 
destroyed family of these booty women. Certain kinsmen of these women 
were allowed to enter the service of Mongol qans such as the Tatar Yeke- 
Qutuqut-Noyan, a brother to Yestigen and Yesiii, who had been entrusted a 
Thousand of the Tatars in Temujin’s Left Wing troop.101 However, this 
appears to have been a special case applicable only when the women won the 
trust of Temiijin.
94 SH  §155.
95 /S' 106 p iao  1 the Table o f Khatuns and Concubines pp.2693-2697.
96 SH §196. JT  p,304 relates that Temujin took her in accord o f  the rasm  (Pers. '’custom") 
and yosim  (Mong. "custom") o f the Mongols.
97 SH  §189. JT  p.304, "The first khatun o f Naiman Tayang-Qan".
98 SH  §240.
99 SH  §241.
100 SH  §156, Temiijin killed her husband.
101 JT  p.600.
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*  *  *  *
The importance of the steppe style qudaship as a social connection was 
also observed by its neighbours. The Chinese had been in long term peace- 
and-war contact with the steppe people, they knew well the usefulness of 
sending princesses to the northern steppe tribes when the tribes became strong 
but too tough to be crushed. This tactic of maintaining peace on the border 
was called he-ch’in or he-fan, "[making] peace [via] marriage" or "[making] 
peace [with] the aliens". This connection provided a peace along the border 
at least for a life time, but the practice was considered shameful by Chinese 
officials and historians because it exposed the infirm and defensive weakness 
of the Chinese court.
Although an in-laws’ relationship between the ruling families of China 
and the steppe tribe was usually accompanied with material benefits to the 
nomads,102 when the motivation of this connection is detection and check- 
and-balance rather than affection and assistance, its nature differs from the 
steppe style qudaship. Therefore, this Chinese style "alien marriage" should 
not be confused with the exogamical andaqiiddi practice on the steppe which 
has been discussed above.
From the above discussion, we may conclude that Temujin was a very 
successful steppe ruler. Born as a steppe person, he knew his tradition and 
customs well and was able to make the most of them. He linked up the people 
outside of his genealogy to his clan by an affinity bondage which would work 
for generations, and he opened up the royal family to be shared with his in­
laws. His nonviolent approach in his steppe expansion was successful by a 
careful management of marriage, where the marriage functions as an 
affectionate connection, a welcome of attachment, an offer of a friendly 
association, a ceasefire agreement and in the later period, a reward to the loyal.
102 The dowry, yearly presents to the steppe in-laws, and more trading opportunities for 
common tribesmen would improve life on the steppe.
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As a result of Temuj in’s making use of a tradition which was shared 
by every steppe tribe, most of the steppe tribes inhabiting the steppe belt from 
western Mongolia to the east of Qipchaq surrendered to him without fighting, 
notably not many massacres were perpetrated.103 The steppe belt remained 
peaceful when the non-steppe civilisations such as the Jurchen, the Tangyut 
and the Sartayul (Central Asians) were subsequently being tortured by the 
"Mongol Devils". With this examination of Temujin’s strategy of expansion,
it seems not appropriate to name Temujin a mass murderer or bloody 
conqueror because of his violent treatment of the non-steppe civilisations —  
for they had not responded properly, according to his steppe way.104
Other than the in-laws’ obligation between the tribes/clans in the inter­
tribal political affairs, via marriage, the "proper" sons-in-law and daughters-in- 
law of non-NIrun Mongol origin entered the uruq of Temujin and enriched the 
daily life of the Mongol ruling family. Their ability and talent influenced the 
running and management of their families and of the empire. The practice of 
exogamy and inter-tribal marriage was carried on by their offspring. When the 
melting pot of in-laws’ affection turned the steppe people into "one uruq" 
under the Mongol rule, the elaborate network of their linkages prevented the 
steppe people from stepping back into the old days of tribal rivalry.
Summing up, the investigation of the significance of the in-laws’ 
relationship in Temujin’s career reveals that steppe tradition was the backbone 
of Temujin’s strategy of expansion and miscellany is the essence of the empire 
he created. This characteristic did not exist only in its court or bureaucracy or 
the diversity of the ethnic and cultural component of his empire —  it was also 
found inside the sovereign family. The splendour of the Mongol Empire is
103 The rebellion o f the forest Tumats was due to a mistreatment by Qorchi, see SH  §241.
104 The Sinicised Tangyut ruler eventually decided to submit to Temiijin according to his 
steppe way. JTp.540 recounts that he sent envoys to the Mongols requested for reconciliation, 
made oaths and said: "I am in fear [that if] he [would] grant me [a status] to be a son 
(farzand)." This decision came too late. Temiijin died within one month, and these Tangyut 
"rebels" were exterminated according to his will.
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undeniably moulded on a tolerance of varieties and this is probably the secret 
of its greatness since it is seen everywhere, even in the household of the qan.
Chapter Six
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The Interaction between the Steppe Tribes and Jurchen China
The steppe tribes in Mongolia have a long history of contact with the 
regimes in China, abundant materials are available for studying their 
interactions, and plenty of topics can be discussed. This chapter focuses on a 
rather short period of sixteen years, but the most important period for 
Temujin’s effort in unifying Mongolia before he began to project his influence 
into the neighbouring sedentary and nomadic nations.
This chapter discusses the interaction between the steppe tribes and the 
Jurchens which influenced the development of Temujin’s career. Two major 
events will be related: first, the warfare between Jurchen troops and the steppe 
tribes: the Tatars, the Qonggirats, the Qatagins and the Saljiyuts in 1195-1198; 
second, the creation of the Temuj in-Jurchen comiection in 1196, and the 
breakdown of their connection in 1208.
These incidents created a favourable circumstance for Temujin’s 
expansion in Mongolia. The battles between the powerful Jurchen and the 
fierce Turkic and Mongol tribes in southeastern Mongolia weakened both sides. 
Their exhaustion allowed Temujin to consolidate his power in central Mongolia
at ease. Moreover, Temujin’s Jayut-Quri relationship to the Jurchen sovereign 
guaranteed peace in his south during the period when he was busy with his 
domestic troubles and conquering campaigns in Mongolia. These situations 
provided him with an uninterrupted opportunity for rapid annexation, and when 
the relationship between Temujin and the Jurchen regime began to change in 
1208, Temujin was already an established "fierce qan" who possessed the 
whole of Mongolia. At this time, a conflict between Jurchen China would not 
appear as a threat to his status as a great steppe ruler but merely supplied him 
with an opportunity, or pretext, to further his conquest into wealthy Khitai.
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The accounts consulted in this study are mainly from Chinese sources, 
so the chronology will usually be presented according to the Chinese calendar. 
A cross-reference of the dates is listed as follows:
Chin regime in northern China (1115-1234)
T’ai-Tsu 1115-1123
T’ai-Tsung 1123-1135 (Liao regime ended in 1125)
Hsi-Tsung 1135-1149
Hai-Ling Wang 1149-1161
Shih-Tsung 1161-1189
Chang-Tsung 1189-1208
Wei-Shao Wang 1208-1213 (Wan-Yen Yung-Chi)
Huan-Tsung 1213-1223
Ai-Tsung 1223-1234 (Wan-Yen Shou-Hsti)
Mo-Ti (the last emperor) 1234
The Gregorian calendar and the Chinese calendar
1194.12.31 = 11.17 of the fifth Ming-Ch’ang year Tiger year
1195.12.31 = 11.28 of the sixth Ming-Ch’ang year Hare year
1196.12.31 = 12.10 of the first Ch’eng-An year Dragon year
1197.12.31 = 11.21 of the second Ch’eng-An year Snake year
1198.12.31 = 12.02 of the third Ch’eng-An year Horse year
I. The Jurchen campaigns against the steppe tribes
(i) The Jurchen attack upon the Tatars
The Tatar tribe had a good relationship with the Jurchen regime at least 
in the 1130s. They served as a subordinate to the Jurchens, and many of their
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services have been discussed in Chapter One. Their subordinate relationship 
to the Jurchens was interrupted in 1195, according to Chin shih (CS). This 
incident was followed by a large-scale attack by the Jurchens into eastern 
Mongolia, which resulted in the defeat of the Tatars and provided Temujin 
with a chance to have his first contact with the Jurchen authority.
The disagreement between the Tatars and the Jurchens
From the perspective of the Mongols, the whole event seemed as simple 
as: the Tatars withdrew from their submission to the Altan-Qan ("the ruler of 
Chin") and since they were not strong enough to resist the Jurchens (?troops), 
the Tatars retreated northwards with all their possessions and belongings.1
This incident is recorded in CCL p. 19a as follows: "the tribal leader of 
the Tatars [called] Meh-wu-chen-hsiao-li-f u (*Megujin-Se’ultil) transgressed 
[their] agreement with the Chin, the Chin ruler sent ch ’eng-hsicing (Minister) 
Wan-Yen Hsiang to lead the troops pushing the Tatars to flight northwards." 
This CCL description coincides with the account in SH  §133 that "the Altan- 
Qan of the Kitat people, because Megujin-Se’iiltu of the Tatar and others 
would not enter upon an agreement with him, sent a message to Ongging- 
Chingsang to the effect that he should prepare his troops without delay. 
Ongging-Chingsang (* Wan-Yen ch ’eng-hsiang) pushed Megujin-Se’iiltu and 
the other Tatars, together with their cattle and provisions, upstream along the 
Ulja."2
When we- examine the account of this incident given by the Chinese, 
one of the parties which was actually involved in the battles, the scene is not 
that simple. The cause of the disagreement between the Tatars and the 
Jurchens is not supplied in three sources. It is found in CS.
1 j r p .3 3 7 .
2 Igor de Rachewiltz trans., PFEH 10 (1974), p.58.
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The Annals of CS records that in the ninth month of the fifth Ming- 
Ch’ang Year (1194), the court ordered the selection of thirty thousand troops 
for mobilisation in the next spring, also every lu (provincial district) and the 
"North Tsu-p’u" should assemble their troops at Lin-Huang in the summer of 
the sixth year (1195).3 In the fifth month of the sixth Ming-Ch’ang year 
(summer 1195), a Jurchen officer, Chia-Ku Ch’ing-Ch’en, was assigned to be 
in charge of border affairs at Lin-Huang. No more than a month after he 
arrived to take up his post,4 he launched an attack to the steppe tribes in the 
north. This attack was obviously the result of this previous mobilisation in that 
the troops consisted of Chinese soldiers and "North Tsu-p’u" people.
The initial eight thousand light calvary successfully stormed fourteen 
camps at "K’ao-lao le" (Kolen Lake), then the force returned to meet their rear 
force, which was ten thousand strong. A "subordinate Hsieh-ch’u" who was 
apparently in the service of the Jurchen calvary in this attack, carried some 
booty on their way back. This behaviour seemed unacceptable to Chia-Ku 
Ch’ing-Ch’en, who he sent a messenger to reprimand [Hsieh-ch’u] for this. 
Upon the reprimand, the "North Tsu-p’u" rebelled and left the Jurchen force, 
plundering all the way.5
According to the suggestion of Chinese scholar Wang Kuo-Wei, the 
"Tsu-p’u" or "North Tsu-p’u" people in Chinese Liao and Chin accounts were 
the Tatars,6 The problem of "North Tsu-p’u" people and Hsieh-ch’u can be 
analyzed as follows: In the above accounts in CS, the "North Tsu-p’u" had
3 CS  10 chi 10 p.233.
4 Chia-Ku Ch’ing-Ch’en sent a messenger to the court to report a victory in the sixth 
month o f  this year, just a month after he took over the post. Therefore, the battle must have 
been fought right after his arrival, and before the victory report reached the court. CS 10 chi 
10 p.236.
5 CS  10 chi 10 p.236-7, CS  94 chuan 32 the biography o f Chia-Ku Ch’ing-Ch’6n, p.2085.
6 Wang Kuo-Wei, "Ta-tan k’ao", 39 pages, in Wang, Meng-ku shih-liao chiao-chu ssu~ 
chung. Argument see pp.2b-3a.
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participated in the Kolen Lake attack in summer 1195. After this initial attack, 
Hsieh-ch’u returned with some booty. When he was reprimanded for his 
behaviour, the "North Tsu-p’u" rebelled and left.7 Three years later, Hsieh- 
ch’u submitted to the Fu-Chou headquarters which was in charge of the 
campaigns against Tsu-p’u.8 It seems that "Hsieh-ch’u" in these accounts must 
be designating a person or a tribal branch who or which related to the "North 
Tsu-p’u", or the "Tsu-p’u" people "to the north" of Jurchen China.
Can this disagreement between the "Tsu-p’u" people (the Tatars) and 
the Jurchens have been the real cause for the breach between the Tatars and 
Altan-Qan which resulted in Ongging-Chingsang’s attack and Tatars’ retreat 
along the Ulja? This is the only account in the Chinese sources which recounts 
a breach between the Jurchen authority and its northern subordinate on the eve 
of Ongging-Chingsang’s northern campaign. When this Tsu-p’u people is 
identified with the Tatars and Hsieh-ch’u a leading person of a branch of 
them,9 this event can be reasonably identified with the "disagreement" between 
Megujin-Se’ultu and the Altan-Qan in the other sources.
This conflict between the commander of the Jurchen troop and the 
"subordinate Hsieh-ch’u" also reveals the steppe nature of Hsieh-ch’u and these 
Tsu-p’u people. Regarding the punishment for carrying booty, researchers who 
are familiar with Mongol history will soon think of a later event when Temiijin 
punished his senior kinsmen for their disobedience in picking up booty in the 
battle, which resulted in these kinsmen’s dissension and departure. Victory, 
to the commanding general, is the purpose of the battle, but booty is a more 
concrete if primitive gain to his soldiers. The behaviour of Hsieh-ch’u follows 
the typical steppe way. "North Tsu-p’u"’s reaction to this reprimand:
7 CS 94 chuan 32 the biography o f Chia-Ku Ch’ing-Ch’en, p.2085.
8 CS  11 chi 11 p.247, and CS 94 chuan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen Hsiang, p.2090.
9 I cannot find any firm evidence to prove that this Hsieh-ch’u was Megujin-Se’ultu.
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separation and plundering, shows that they agreed with Hsieh-ch’u’s way and 
felt offended when the Jurchens forbade them to act according to this custom.
According to these accounts, the Jurchens had been preparing for a 
campaign since the autumn of 1194, for a purpose to attack the steppe people 
in the summer of 1195. Since the Tatars had been summoned to join the 
force, this attack was definitely not against the Tatars. Therefore, the fourteen 
camps at Kolen Lake cannot have been the residence of the Tatars. However, 
the dissension caused by carrying booty made the Tsu-p’u people depart, and 
this "rebellion" made the border region fall into chaos. Chia-Ku Ch’ing-Ch’en 
had been blamed with these subsequent turmoil, therefore, the emperor 
transferred his authority to Wan-Yen Hsiang in the eleventh month of that 
year.
Wan-Yen Hsiang had a position in the Jurchen court as Right c h ’eng- 
hsiang, therefore, he is referred to in Mongol sources in his title chingsang. 
His assignment for this frontier commander position is not clearly recorded in 
the sources, however, we can tell from the subsequent movements that the 
prime assignment of Wan-Yen Hsiang was not to launch a punitive attack 
against the disobedient Tatars but to carry out the originally designed large- 
scale campaign which was left uncompleted by the former commander Chia-Ku 
Ch’ing-Ch’en.
When Wan-Yen Hsiang arrived, he first subjugated the Hu-li Chiu, a 
band of "assorted people" (chiu) troubling the region between Pei-Ching (Ta- 
Ting)10 and Lin-Huang, two important bases of the Jurchen’s defence of the 
northern frontier. Then he set out from Lin-Huang towards Ta-yen-le (Great
10 This Pei-Ching (lit. northern capital) was Ta-Ting/w, the provincial capital o f Pei-Ching 
In (district), not modem Peking. Lin-Huang was situated about two hundred and five hundred 
kilometres to the north o f Pei-Ching (Ta-Ting/n), under the administration o f Pei-Ching lu at 
this time. CS  24 chih 5 pp.559-561. The distance supplied in the footnotes is based on the 
historical map reconstructed in Chung-kuo li-shih t i- l’u chi.
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Salt Lake)11 in the last month of the year, which is the first month of 1196. 
An account in the Annals records that in the first month of the first Ch’eng-An 
Year (1196), Yi-la-tu, the Jurchen chHin-mu shih (Officer of the Herds) of 
Great Salt Lake was defeated and killed by the Kuang-chi-la (Qonggirat).12 
The details of this battle are not available in the sources, but it is clear that the 
Qonggirats were engaged in the battle. The tribesmen had great losses in this 
battle, and the Jurchen generals were rewarded by the court in gold.13
However, Wan-Yen Hsiang’s plan for advance was turned down in the 
discussion at court. The officials had different opinions on his plan, and Wan- 
Yen Hsiang had been summoned to return to the court to debate in person, 
leaving all his troops and conquests beyond the frontier. This debate in the 
biography of Wan-Yen Hsiang can be identified with his returning in the 
second month of this year in the Annals. Chia-Ku Heng, the general who was 
put in charge of the Fu-Chou troops since the tenth month of the previous year, 
which dealt mainly with the Tatars, returned with Wan-Yen Hsiang from the 
front. Two days later, they were ordered to return to the front.14
After a while, a general Wan-Yen An-Kuo was sent to set out towards 
Tuo-ch’iian-tzu (Multitude Springs).15 Wan-Yen Hsiang also received a 
"secret decree" from the emperor which instructed him to advance. Then Wan- 
Yen Hsiang took the main force approaching the meeting place from the west, 
while a division of his troops went from the east. Before the two forces 
rejoined, the eastern division was reported to be unexpectedly encircled by the
11 Great Salt Lake was located in the northwest o f Lin-Huang at a distance o f two hundred 
and seventy kilometres.
12 CS  10 chi 10 p.238.
13 CS 94 chuan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen An-Kuo, p.2094.
14 CS  10 chi 10 pp.237-238, 94 chuan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen Hsiang, p.2088.
15 Tuo-ch’iian-tzu was located to the north northwest o f  Great Salt Lake at a distance o f  
about two hundred and thirty kilometres, its distance from the Keliiren river is about a hundred 
and fifty kilometres.
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Tsu-p’u at the Lung-Chu river (Keluren). The encirclement of the east-route 
troops was dated in the first Ch’eng-An Year (1196) in the biography of one 
of the participating generals.16
Obviously, the "mistreatment" of Hsieh-ch’u by the Jurchen general 
seemed to turn a friend into a foe and created one more enemy in this 
campaign. Wan-Yen Hsiang hastened forward with his west-route troops 
overnight to rescue the eastern troops. In this rescue, the Tsu-p’u people were 
defeated and fled towards Rive Wo-li-cha, which is the Ulja river in SH  §132. 
In this battle on the Keliiren, the Jurchens captured abundant carts and yurts 
and flocks and herds.17
Sometime around this period, the general Wan-Yen An-Kuo had arrived 
in Tuo-ch’uan-tzu and won a battle there. Unfortunately, the tribal identity of 
the steppe people he encountered is not mentioned in the sources. Wan-Yen 
Hsiang, the Ongging-Chingsang, then sent this general to pursue the defeated 
Tsu-p’u (Tatars). This pursuit was ambitious in the eyes of experienced 
generals because the provision supply for this long distance pursuit would be 
a problem. They reminded Wan-Yen Hsiang that it would not work, but Wan- 
Yen An-Kuo suggested that his ten thousand soldiers could carry live sheep, 
which must be seized locally, with the troops for daily sustainment.18 
Therefore, the pursuit proceeded.
The news of this pursuit conducted by Wan-yen An-Kuo probably 
reached the remote Temuj in-Mongol in a generalised form that Ongging- 
Chingsang was pushing the Tatars up the Ulja river.
16 CS 94 chuan 32 the biography o f  Yao-Li Po-Teh, p.2095.
17 CS 94 chuan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen Hsiang, pp.2088-2089.
18 CS 94 chuan 32 the biography o f  Wan-Yen An-Kuo, p.2095, the biography o f  Wan-Yen 
Hsiang, p. 2089.
The dispersal of the retreating Tatars
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According to CS, the Tsu-p’u people were pushed northwards by the 
pursuing force. They fled and dispersed, "eight or nine out of ten"19 of them 
were frozen and died in heavy rains. CS does not date the dispersal, but as the 
reason for the Tsu-p’u’s casualties shows, this pursuit and the dispersal must 
have happened in late winter to early spring.
Referring to the course of the retreat of the Tatars after the defeat at the 
Keluren river, SH  §132 relates that the Jurchen force pushed the Tatars, those 
under Megujin-Se’ultu, upstream along the Ulja. These Tatars fled "together 
with their cattle and provisions". JT  agrees that the Tatars approaching north 
carried all their belongings with them. SH  §133 continues that Temujin went 
downstream along the Ulja and broke up the Tatar’s stockade at Qusutu- 
Shitiigen and Naratu-Shitiigen by the Ulja, killed Megujin-Se’ultu and took as 
booty his silver cradle and his pearl blanket. This account implies that it was 
Temujin who caused the dispersal of these fleeing Tatars.
That strike by Temujin caused the dispersal of these Tatar "families" 
is possibly true. First of all, CS does not mention any fighting between 
Jurchen and Tatars in this pursuit. A ten thousand pursuing army could cause 
great casualties to the fleeing Tatars if they engaged in battle, and this 
"victory" should not have been omitted in Chinese records. Since most of the 
Tsu-p’u were as recorded died in the severe weather, not killed by soldiers, it 
seems there was no real engagement between the Jurchen troops and the 
Tatars. On the other hand, Temiijin was capable of launching a minor attack 
to make the frightened Tatars scatter, with his own force without the help of 
the Jiirkins and Toyoril.20
19 CS  94 chitan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen Hsiang, p.2089. It seems exaggerated 
because according to CS  Annals, the Tsu-p’u rebelled several months later. If this record is not 
exaggerated, these dispersed Tsu-p’u might be just a division o f  the whole tribe.
20 JT  did not mention the help o f Toyoril. This "help" is only mentioned in the SH.
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The direction of the approaching Tatars also shows that their dispersal 
must have been caused by the individual force of Temujin. The Jurchen 
pursuing troop must have set off from the Keluren, where the Tatars had been 
defeated, and were pushing the Tatars upstream along the Ulja. The force of 
Temujin was coming down from the direction of the Onan, and raided the 
Tatars down the Ulja.21 The Tatars were aware of the Jurchen’s pursuit from 
behind, but they might not have noticed an impending assault from the front. 
The Tatar non-military people were able to set up only a stockade along the 
river, and it was stormed by the aggressive force of Temujin.
A reference to the tribal business of Temujin further justifies the view 
that Temujin’s victory over the Tatars took place in late winter or early spring 
when he was staying in his winter retirement. When Temujin heard the news 
of the retreating Tatars, he was negotiating with the Jiirkins to settle their 
quarrel which started in a feast. The feast of these Qabul-Mongol kinsmen 
then must have taken place in late autumn or winter when the kinsmen 
returned to their winter campsite. The season agrees with the timing 
mentioned in CS, and in this way, the feast could be dated in late 1195.
Temujin: the submitted tribal leader?
CS does not state clearly whether Wan-Yen An-Kuo had fought the 
Tsu-p’u or not, but it asserts definitely that as a result of the pursuit, he had 
brought their tribal leader to submit.22 In JT, Megujin-Se’ultu was the one 
in charge of these Tatars retreating upstream along the Ulja, but he was killed 
by Temujin as related in all three sources. If Megujin-Se’ultu was killed, who 
was the tribal leader who submitted to Wan-Yen An-Kuo or the commander- 
in-chief, the Chingsang?
21 JT  and CCL, Temujin set o ff from the Onan. SH  §133, he moved downstream along 
the Ulja.
22 CS  10 chi 10 p.238, CS 94 chuan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen Hsiang, p.2089, and 
the biography o f  Wan-Yen An-Kuo, p.2094.
257
SH  §134 relates that Temujin went to the commander of the Jurchen
troops to report his destruction of the Tatars. The Jurchen commander was
happy and bestowed on him the appellation of Jayut-Quri, while a higher rank 
chao-t’ao could only be given by the Chin emperor. In this way, Temujin did
receive a subordinate title, or a position from the Jurchens, in other words, he
submitted to the Jurchen authority as he received the appellation, at the end of
this campaign.
Temujin was proud of this title. He spoke to his kinsmen on a later 
occasion saying that "don’t let it be said that your achievements were due to 
the support of me, the Chayut-Quri (= Jayut-Quri)."23 However, in the eyes 
of Jurchen commanders, this appointment might simply mean that the 
disobedient Tatar tribe, a subordinate watchman and military mercenary had 
been replaced by Temujin-Mongol. The Jurchens certainly needed someone 
to fill up the vacancy left by this former tributary and Temujin had wished to 
take advantage of this chance to be associated with this big, strong and wealthy 
regime.
CS was compiled under the Mongol regime. Therefore, in this official 
history, the omittance of the fact that Temujin, the founder of the Great 
Mongol Empire, was once a subordinate to the Jurchens is understandable. A 
hint of his subordinate position was carelessly retained in YS, which was 
compiled in the Han-Chinese Ming dynasty. The account relates that Temujin 
was paying a regular tribute (Chin, suei-pi) to the Jurchens, and he delivered 
it to the border office in person, until 1211 when the newly ascended Chin 
emperor Wan-Yen Yung-Chi (Yun-Chi in YS) ordered an attempt to capture 
this tribute payer when they arrived.24
23 SH  §179. The appellation appears in SH  §134 as Jayut-Quri.
24 YS 1 chi 1 p.15. The tribute was due in the third month o f the third Ta-An Year (1211) 
and the detail o f  this attempt is recorded by Sung Chinese in Chien-yenyi-lai ch'ao-yeh tsa-chi 
part B volume 19, p.585.
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This 1195/6 Jurchen campaign against the Tatars severely weakened the 
mighty Tatars and provided an opportunity for Temujin to become associated 
with the powerful Jurchen regime. It also weakened the steppe people along 
the Keluren and the Ulja since the huge army from Jurchen China sustained 
itself with local animals, the property and wealth of local nomads. The 
Jurchen troops returned to their country after completing this uneasy expedition 
which the regime had spent two years preparing for, while the fame of 
Temujin in this victory became spread across the steppe. Temujin seems to 
have been the only winner in this campaign.
(ii) The Jurchen campaign against the Mongol tribes along the frontier
The 1195/96 campaign did not bring peace to the northern frontier of 
Jurchen China. The Tatars were not totally overwhelmed. CS relates that the 
Tsu-p’u rebelled again in the tenth month of the same year (1196). Wan-Yen 
Hsiang, who had just attended the court as Left ch ’eng-hsiang, was sent back 
promptly to Pei-Ching.25 In the eleventh month, a Khitai called Te-Shou also 
rebelled at Hsin-Chou in the frontier zone within the Jurchen dominion. Wan- 
Yen Hsiang had managed to pacify the Te-Shou rebellion with the nearest 
T ’ai-Chou troop before the Winter Solstice. Then he returned from the border, 
while Wan-Yen Yi acted as his deputy in the north.26
25 CS 10 chi 10 p.240, 94 chuan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen Hsiang p.2089.
26 CS 10 chi 10 p.240, 94 chuan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen Hsiang pp.2089-2090. 
Hsin-Chou was under the administration o f  Shang-Ching lu (district), located on its western 
border, which adjoined Pei-Ching lu. T’ai-Chou was located on the eastern border o f  Pei- 
Ching lu. Regarding the date o f pacification, according to the biography, it was before the 
chiao, the Imperial Worship o f  Heaven. Some officials suggested that the emperor should 
postpone the impending worship to the first month o f next year because o f  Te-Shou’s rebellion 
but Wan-Yen Hsiang promised to pacify the rebellion before the date o f worship, (bio. o f  
Hsiang) According to the Monograph o f Rituals of CS, the Worship regularly took place four 
times a year, at the winter and summer solstices, and spring and autumn equinoxes. (C5 28 
chih 9 p.693) Therefore, this impending worship should be dated at the winter solstice o f  
1196.
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Wan-Yen Yi was properly installed in Hsiang’s former commanding 
position in the third month of the next year. In the fifth month, he moved 
northward to Lin-Huang, and Wan-Yen Hsiang met him over there.27 It 
seems that the border was still in trouble, although details are not available.
Later in the eighth month of the second Ch’eng-An Year (1197), the 
court summoned high rank officials to discuss the situation along its northern 
frontier. The court also instructed to its bureaucrats to recommend individuals 
who were competent in military affairs, the recommendation to be submitted 
confidentially in five days. After this meeting of the high ranking officials, 
Wan-Yen Yi was removed from his office and Wan-Yen Hsiang resumed his 
former position.28 According to the biography of Wan-Yen Hsiang, he was 
reassigned as the commander because Wan-Yen Yi fought the "rebellious tribes 
in the north" inappropriately.29 This court discussion and personnel 
rearrangement probably resulted from another rebellion of the steppe tribes.
Besides settling the problem of the unsuitable frontier commander, these 
high ranking officials also discussed the national policy towards the tribes in 
their north, and apparently, there was a divergence of opinion in the court. 
Eighty-four officials were present in this discussion. Five among the eighty- 
four insisted on undertaking an aggressive operation, in contrast, forty-six 
officials held a defensive attitude, while the remaining thirty-three suggested 
"to strike but also defend".30
The content of the discussion reveals that the Turkic Tatar was not the 
only troublesome steppe tribe. The Mongol tribes living around Buyur-Nayur
27 CS  10 chi 10 p.241.
28 CS 10 chi 10 pp.242-43,
29 CS 94 chuan 32 p.2090, "yi chan shih lii" (Yi fought without abiding by the 
discipline/principle). No details o f this event could be found elsewhere in CS.
30 CS 10 chi 10 p.242.
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and near to the Tatars, especially the Qonggirats, also attracted the attention of 
Jurchen officials. The Qonggirats, the in-law tribe to Temujin-Mongol, kept 
on harassing the Jurchen border, although they do not seem to have been keen 
on fighting for steppe supremacy. Their strength was shown in their defeat of 
the Jurchen c h 'un-mu shih of Great Salt Lake.
The diversity of opinion among these frontier generals is recorded in 
the biography of Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao in CS. In the opinion of Wan-Yen 
LIsiang, once the Qonggirats (Kuang-chi-la) were crushed, the Tatars (Tsu-p’u) 
would not have to worry about their eastern front, therefore, it would be more 
sensible to leave the Qonggirats untouched, in order to restrain the movement 
of the Tatars. On the other hand, Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao, who became the most 
eminent Jurchen general after 1198, insisted that both the Qonggirats and 
Tatars should be destroyed. "With the overwhelming power of [our] country, 
[it is humiliating if we] are unable to annihilate [these] little tribes, how [could 
you] even expect to use them to defend [ourselves]?" He volunteered to crush 
the Qonggirats with his troops, then marched northward to destroy also the 
Tatars,31
These two suggestions were both based on accurate observation of the 
situation in eastern Mongolia since the last campaign. Wan-Yen Hsiang 
thought cautiously of the tribal relations in the north: the Qonggirat were at 
least as strong as the Tatars, and the relationship between them was not good. 
He would prefer to manipulate the situation for the good of the Jurchens rather
31 CS 93 chuan 31 the biography o f Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao p.2073. This dispute might have 
taken place between the tenth month in 1196 and the winter o f 1197. The biography relates 
that "at that time the Tsu-p’u also rebelled, nei-tsu (member o f royal clan) Hsiang was [sent 
to be] discharging the affairs on behalf o f central government (sheng), at Pei-Ching, [the court] 
decreed to discuss the matter." Wan-Yen Hsiang had been assigned to be in charge at Pei- 
King three time in those years, respectively in 1195, followed by the first campaign against 
Tatar, 1196, followed by the rebellion o f Te-Shou and 1197, followed by the second campaign 
against the four tribes. The most likely date o f  Tsung-Hao’s proposal would be during or after 
Hsiang’s second assignment according to the change o f circumstance in the north. Moreover, 
Tsung-Hao’s proposing report had been sent again [and again] (ibid) before the court accepted 
the proposal. Therefore, the dispute must have taken place before Hsiang’s third assignment.
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than to restart the warfare. The opinion of Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao tells that the
Tatars who had been recently weakened in the 1195/6 campaign were no
longer the major trouble along the frontier. It was the Qonggirat tribe which
"coerced the other tribes to enter the border frequently", and it was the tribes
of Qatagin (He-ti-hsin) and Saljiyut (Shan-chih-k’un, *Saljiyun = Saljiyut) 
which troubled the frontier in those years. The Qatagin and Saljiyut tribes, as 
related in CS, were "separate tribes in the north" who travelled between the
Tsu-pTi and the Qonggirats. They stood independently in their own strength;
they did not belong to, nor were they subject to, any other power. 32
The court agreed with Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao’s proposal to attack . 33 
Wan-Yen Hsiang then set up the plan of the operation: the Jurchen troops 
would approach their targets from three directions, a troop from Lin-Huang 
under his command, a troop from Fu-Chou under Chia-Ku Heng to attack the 
Tatars, and a troop from T ’ai-Chou under Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao. This plan 
was approved by the court sometime after the ninth month and before the 
second month of the next year (1198).j4
These three division of the Jurchen force, in which the Fu-Chou troop 
aimed at the Tatars, T ’ai-Chou troop aimed at the Qonggirats, while the troop 
of Lin-Huang was stationed in the centre, covered the whole region stretched 
from the territory of the Tatar tribe in the west to those of the Qonggirat tribe 
in the east, including the tribes of Qatagin and Saljiyut who travelled between 
the Tatars and the Qonggirats. This was a challenging operation which aimed
at four powerful steppe tribes at the same time.
32 CS  93 chuan 31 the biography o f Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao p.2073. For more description 
o f these tribes, see Chapter Four.
33 CS 93 chuan 31 the biography o f Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao p.2073.
34 Wan-Yen Hsiang had been sent to Pei-Ching in the ninth month o f the second Ch’eng- 
An year (1197) and a later event which happened after the plan had been carried out was dated 
in the second month o f  the third Ch’eng-An year (1198) -— the submission o f Hsieh-ch’u. 
Therefore, the plan must have been put into practice during this period.
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The course of the campaign reveals that the Jurchen commanders tried 
to avoid military confrontations unless it was necessary. The T ’ai-Chou troop 
made the first move in a diplomatic approach. Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao observed 
the tribal relations in the north and noticed that P ’o-su-huo (*Bosqur) which 
was a branch of the Qonggirats, and probably was the one headed by 
Temujin’s father-in-law Dei-Sechen , 35 had allied with the Qatagin tribe. 
Under such circumstances, the strength of Qonggirat Major should have been 
divided. He supposed that the Qonggirat Major was afraid of the Jurchen 
attack and on the other side, it was restrained by its enemy (?Tatars), therefore, 
the situation was unfavourable for Qonggirat Major. The Jurchen general 
decided to take advantage of this situation by sending forward a vanguard 
consisted of two hundred soldiers to bring them to submission. He instructed 
his vanguard that "if the Qonggirats surrendered, you may recruit their force 
for [a later] attack against the Qatagins. You shall also detect the location of 
remaining tribes, send a messenger promptly to report these. The main force 
will [then] approach, it will join you and will definitely have them crushed." 
Everything turned out as expected, the vanguard gathered a calvary force of 
fourteen thousand Qonggirats, waiting at the site for the next instruction . 36
Meanwhile, the Tatars became less hostile. Presumably compelled by 
the threat of war and eager for trade , 37 in the spring of 1198, Hsieh-ch’u, that 
"North Tsu-p’u" or north "Tsu-p’u", came to Fu-chou, the base camp against 
the Tsu-p’u division, to submit. The emperor sent a messenger to Wan-Yen
35 Fact uncovered by Wang Kuo-Wei, ibid. p.9b. He compared the tribal identity o f  Dei- 
Sechen in his biography in YS\ Po-ssu-hu-erh [clan] o f the Qonggirats (YS 118 chuan 5 p.2915) 
to P’o-su-huo which allied with the Qatagins at this moment, and Dei-Sechen’s son Hou-hu 
(Huqu in JT) to the messenger sent by the *Bosqur who was called He-huo. I am not sure 
about the accuracy o f  the later comparison but the former one seems difficult to deny.
36 CS 93 chuan 31 the biography o f  Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao, p.2073,
37 CS 11 chi 11 pp.247-248, the second month, Hsieh-ch’u submitted ... the tenth month, 
Hsieh-ch’u requested to open a fair-market at Hsia-li-niao. Permission granted.
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Hsiang to consult his opinion. Wan-Yen Hsiang replied that it would be 
convenient to accept it. Then, the submission was accepted . 38
As the Qonggirat and the rebellious Tatars surrendered to the Jurchen
force without fighting, the Qatagins, the *Bosqur-Qonggirats and the Saljiyuts 
were isolated. The court bestowed a sword on Wan-Yen Hsiang to encourage
him to set forward. Wan-Yen Hsiang then moved further north and halted,
cautiously building fortifications to form a barrier. The work was completed
by frontier soldiers in fifty days. This movement and the construction of the
fortifications must have taken place from April to May, spring of 1198.39
The military engagement of the T’ai-Chou troop is not dated in the 
biography of Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao. According to the event sequence in the 
biography of Wan-Yen Hsiang, their attacks can be dated shortly after the 
completion of the fortifications, that is in late spring. Late spring is the most 
awkward period for nomads. Their flocks and herds were reduced and their 
horses were lean. Long before this operation, Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao had 
advised the court to attack the Qonggirats "during late spring when [their] 
horses were weak" . 40 Horses are the main vehicle in steppe calvary attacks, 
or defence. Temujin’s generals also advised him not to set out against the 
Naiman Tayang-Qan during spring for the same reason. Now the time had 
come. After sending a messenger to instruct the vanguard remaining in 
Qonggirat Major to join his force at the Yi-mi river (Amel/Emel in SH), Wan- 
Yen Tsung-Hao set out.
38 CS  94 chuan 32 the biography o f Wan-Yen Hsiang, p.2090.
39 CS 11 chi 11 p.247, Hsieh-ch’u submitted in the second month o f  the third Ch’eng-An 
year. The work started after their submission, and was completed in fifty days (one and a half 
months). According to the cross-reference table quoted, the work must have been completed 
in May 1198.
40 CS 93 chuan 31 the biography o f Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao, p.2073.
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When his troop arrived at the T ’e-li-ke mountain (*Telege[tu]7), they 
encountered the tribes of Shih-lu and Hun-f an (unable to identify) who were 
under the Saljiyut command. The Jurchen troop fell upon them, put them to 
flight, beheaded a thousand and two hundred and captured abundant booty,
including plenty of flocks and herds and carts. 41 According to the above 
description, this attack must have been an assault upon the base camp of these 
tribes, not a battlefield confrontation.
The messenger Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao sent to the Qonggirat Major had 
mistakenly gone astray into the *Bosqur-Qonggirat, therefore, the east troop 
did not receive his instruction and did not come. However, Wan-Yen Tsung- 
Hao had successfully put pressure on his enemies when he arrived at the Hu- 
hsieh river. The Qatagin leader Pai-ku-tai (?*Belgiitei), the Saljiyut leader Hu- 
pi-la (*Qubila[ij) and a representative from *Bosqur-Qonggirat called He-huo
(Hoqu), petitioned together for surrender. He accepted their submission and 
had them released by referring to the decree from the emperor. 42
This generous treatment to the tribal leaders "by referring to the decree" 
reveals that the emperor Chang-Tsung did not intend to annihilate the steppe 
tribes. The purpose of this operation against four tribes was not destructive, 
but to demonstrate Jurchen power to its annoying neighbours. We can also tell 
from the petition that these tribes did not wish to engage in battle with the 
unexpected Jurchen force, either. The reason behind the scene could have been 
their fear of its strength or more important, their own infirmity during late 
spring.
Although the tribes of Qatagin, Saljiyut and *Bosqur-Qonggirat 
surrendered together, a devastating disaster still fell upon the *Bosqur-
Qonggirat. After their surrender, the leader of Saljiyut proposed to the Jurchen 
troops to move towards the Emel river to attack one of his subject Ti-leh-fu
41 CS  93 chuan 31 the biography o f Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao, pp.2073-2074.
42 CS  93 chuan 31 the biography o f  Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao, p.2074.
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who refused to surrender. The Jurchen troops did so and fell upon them, 
beheaded three hundred of them and "four or five out of ten" drowned in the 
river. The troops captured twelve thousand of flocks and herds and also carts 
and tents . 43
The Qatagins [with its ally the *Bosqur-Qonggirat], afraid that the 
troops would proceed to their residence, abandoned their possessions, crossed 
the Emel and fled due west. According to the above geographical description, 
the Qatagin tribe was travelling between the territories of Tatars and the 
Qonggirats, therefore, when they went westward, they were entering the land 
of Qonggirat Major. Now, Tsung-Hao’s vanguard and the Qonggirat calvary 
under their tribe leader Te-li-hu appeared and pursued them. They attacked 
them at the Wa-li-pu river, over four thousand and five hundred people from 
the "nine tribes" (which means "miscellaneous branches") of *Bosqur were 
beheaded or drowned, the number of flocks and herds captured was 
uncountable.
* * * *
The slaughter of the Bosqur-Qonggirats was probably the largest battle 
in the 1197/98 operation, killing three times more than the initial assault at 
Telege mountain. However, this battle was fought by only two hundred 
Jurchens (Tsung-Hao’s vanguard) and a majority of fourteen thousand 
Qonggirats, and since the victims mentioned in CS were mainly the *Bosqur- 
Qonggirats, this warfare should be more appropriately interpreted as an 
domestic strife between Qonggirat Major and its departed branch *Bosqur- 
Qonggirat. The separation of *Bosqur-Qonggirat from the Qonggirat Major 
and its alliance with the Qatagins may have offended the Qonggirat Major, and 
their unhappiness would have been demonstrated in a massacre of the 
treacherous branch. The situation is similar to the extermination of the Chinos
43 Ibid.
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which has been discussed in Chapter Four. This attack of recruited steppe 
calvary against fleeing steppe people is comparable to Temujin’s attack upon 
the fleeing Tatars in the 1195/96 campaign. It was Temujin’s force who broke 
down the Tatars’ last stockade, and Temujin-Mongol had an old enmity with 
the Tatars.
Were these two destructions of steppe power completed not by the 
strength of the Jurchen force but by their clever manipulation of the existing 
tribal dissension for their use? How much effort did the Jurchen troops 
actually contribute to these two successes?
A sharp observation, a cautious calculation, an intelligent plan and 
strong backup were the most it had offered. First, right timing. The great 
victories over the Tatars happened in late winter to late spring, and the 
submission of the Tatars and these Mongol tribes between 1197 and 1198 also 
took place in spring, which was the worst time and the most infirm period for 
the steppe people. Second, to judge from the booty described in the sources, 
it seem that the Jurchen troops always fell upon the tribes unexpectedly at their 
base camp. This would be a fatal blow to the society of the tribes, moreover, 
the capture of their flocks and herds prevented the nomads from recovering 
soon and prevented the tribes from resuming their former prosperity, and 
strength, in a short period. Third, although there was a full-scale mobilisation 
behind the scenes, the Jurchen force approached the enemies carefully in order 
to minimise their losses. Wan-Yen An-Kuo taking of local live sheep as a 
provision supply, Wan-Yen Hsiang’s fortification to create a solid barrier and 
Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao’s recruitment of the Qonggirat calvary all show that these 
Jurchen generals were experts in mobilisation and strategy. Fourth, a well- 
informed understanding of the tribal relations on the steppe allowed the 
generals to "make use of the barbarian to counter barbarians" —  the 
traditional Chinese policy towards the steppe tribes, therefore, the expenditure 
o f Jurchen manpower would be minimised as much as possible.
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Nevertheless, the weakening of steppe tribes by destroying their 
economy intensified their harassment of the Jurchen border, since they could 
not sustain themselves due to poverty. The disturbance along the frontier 
continued, and although these were minor harassments which were not 
threatening to the regime, they stirred up other unrest in the Jurchen frontier 
zone. This unrest troubled the Jurchen court until the end of their regime. 
The details of this unrest can be found in CS but they are not going to be 
related in this survey.
Another disadvantage of these northern campaigns was the financial 
difficulty resulting from the huge expense of large-scale mobilisations and 
expeditions. The 1195/96 campaign mobilised thirty thousand men from 
every corner of the country, and in the 1197/98 campaign against four tribes, 
although the details cannot be found in the sources, the manpower mobilised 
could not have been less than in the previous campaign. These military 
expenditures compelled the government to sell Buddhist and Taoist monk 
licenses and honourary religious titles in the early summer of 1197 to meet the 
shortfall. 44 The campaign damaged the economies of both the nomads and 
Jurchen China.
In addition, administrative problems occurred as a result of each victory 
or conquest. The northern frontier of Jurchen China was too extensive to be 
fully garrisoned. In addition to building artificial fortifications, the Jurchen 
government had to appoint some representatives in the north as their "eyes" 
and "ears". The Jurchen commanders had appointed Temujin as Jayut-Quri 
after the first campaign, and probably installed an officer in *Bosqur-Qonggirat 
after the second campaign . 45 The northern frontier was at peace under the 
supervision of these acting agents, however, the Jurchens did not pay enough
44 CS 10 chi 10 p.241, the fourth month o f  the second Ch’eng-An Year.
45 CS 93 chuan 31 the biography o f  Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao p.2074, after the devastating 
slaughter, the *Bosqur[-Qonggirat] petitioned to have a Jurchen officer installed in their tribe. 
Further development o f  this request cannot be found in the sources.
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attention to the development of these supervisors. When one of these steppe 
potentates, that is Temujin, abandoned his submissive attitude and started an 
invasion in 1211, no one could stop him partly because the Jurchens were 
ignorant of his growing strength46 and partly because the above mentioned 
experienced commanders who had successfully dealt with the steppe tribes had 
all passed away: Wan-Yen Hsiang died in 1203 and Wan-Yen Tsung-Hao in 
1207.47
As for the career of Temujin, 1195-1198 was the crucial period of his
internal consolidation. Personally, after he won the recognition from the
Jurchen authority and the fame from the military victory, he was busy with
punishing his kinsmen the Jiirkin, collecting and receiving the scattered Kereits,
looting the Merkits and preparing for the restoration of Toyoril. While 
Temujin was increasing his strength, those powerful Turkic and Mongol tribes
to the southeast o f him, by contrast, were occupied and worn out in the battles
with the Jurchens. Temujin was able to extend his influence in central and
northern Mongolia without interruption, and he had advanced towards the
northeast and northwest freely, when the Jurchens and those tribes at his back
were occupied with each other. This favourable situation was valuable to the
young leader Temujin in his energetic thirties. After this period of preparation,
Temujin was strong enough to challenge the great Naiman in 1199. As for the
general situation on the steppe, the casualties among these powerful eastern
tribes in 1197/98 campaign were about six thousand, while the number in the
46 The reason for Temiijin’s break o ff from the Jurchen clearly revealed that the Jurchen 
regime had no idea about Temujin’s triumph in Mongolia: when the Jurchen messenger asked 
TemUjin to accept the authority o f  the newly ascended emperor Wan-Yen Yung-Chi by 
performing homage to the ascension decree, TemUjin refused because he thought Wan-Yen 
Yung-Chi was timid and too incompetent to be the Chin emperor —  he looked down upon 
him. The emperor was furious about this rudeness and he planned to catch Temujin when he 
came to pay tribute again. ( YS 1 chi 1 p. 15) The plot was reported to Temujin by some 
"assorted people" {chin) who were in service o f  the Jurchen, and this carelessness brought the 
Jurchen a disastrous invasion in early autumn o f that very year. {Chien-yen y i-la i ch'ao-yeh  
tsa-chi part B volume 19, p.585.)
47 The death o f  Wan-Yen Hsiang, see CS  11 chi 11 p.259, the death o f  Wan-Yen Tsung- 
Hao, see CS 12 chi 12 p.281 and 93 chuan 31 p.2079.
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first campaign is unknown. Their economy was devastated and was unable to 
recover in a short period. The once powerful eastern tribes were in decline, 
and a new power in central Mongolia was going to triumph.
II. ja yu t and quri
Temujin received the appellation/position of Jayut-Quri from the 
Jurchen commander after he caused the Tatars to disperse on the Ulja river in 
early 1196. He started his relationship with the Jurchen regime under this title, 
from then on the Termij in-Mongol and the Jurchens had a peaceful relationship 
for fifteen years, maintained presumably by Temujin’s subordinate position 
under this title. Therefore, the function and meaning of this title inevitably 
attracts our attention as a linkage in an international relationship.
The meaning of this appellation had been discussed extensively by 
modern researchers, and their suggestions and arguments are summarised in 
Paul Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo vol 1 pp.291-295. Paul Pelliot seems 
inclined to accept Naka Michiyo’s explanation of the term Jayut, that it is the 
plural of Mongolian jayun , meaning "hundred". Hence, combined with his 
study of the meaning of quri, Jayut-Quri means "a commander (quri) of 
hundreds'". This idea has been repeated in Igor de Rachewiltz’s annotation of 
the SH, and he seems not to deny it . 48
However, doubts regarding the view that Jayut-Quri could mean "a quri 
of hundreds" arise, when the actual situation has been considered. First, this 
interpretation does not fit the real strength of Temujin at this time, (discussion 
on his strength, see below) Second, a rank higher than this commanding title, 
according to the SH, is chao-t’ao, which might have been a commandership 
over ten thousand men as illustrated in the example of Wan-Yen An-Kuo
48 Igor de Rachewiltz annotates SH  §134, PFEH  10 (1974) p,59.
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(discussion see below). If the size of the later commandership is valid, the big
gap between these two ranks is difficult to explain. Third, Temujin was proud
of this title and showed off to his senior kinsmen his relationship with the
powerful Jurchen. Could a title of the commander of several hundred men
support such pride, when the first part is in Mongolian so that everyone of his
subjects would have understood that it is merely a commander of "hundreds"?
Would not the exalted position of a qan confer greater honour than that of a
subordinate to a foreign power as "a quri of hundreds"? Fourth, in the 1196
campaign, the Jurchen pursued the retreating Tatars with a force of ten
thousand. Generals had disputed over the supply of such a huge expeditionary
force, however it seems that none of the generals disagreed that such an
amount of professional soldiers must be despatched in order to overwhelm the
fleeing Tatars. Then, could Temujin possibly have caused this huge group of
retreating Tatars to disperse with just a few hundred men, even in an
unexpected raid, if Jayut-Quri means "a commander of hundreds" and the 
Jurchen authority was given him in accordance with his strength? Besides, this
is the first time Temujin ever tried his sword. Would Temujin dare to attack
the legendary powerful Tatars with just a few hundred men, even when the
Tatars were in retreat?
It seems that the meaning of Jayut-Quri cannot be simply supplied with 
a suggestion based on its assumed etymology. An analysis of this term below
follows the same approach towards defining Mongolian terminology which is
used in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, reexamining the meaning of the usage
and the function of the position at that period through an analysis of the
relevant accounts in the contemporary sources.
Ja 7 Ut as a region
In the accounts relating Temujin’s reception of this title, the 
transcription of the title reads Jaqut-Quri in SH  §134, Ch’a-wu-hu-lu in CCL 
p. 19b and JA W ’ T-Q WRY/JAWWT-Q WRY/JA WT-Q WRY/JAWT-QRY in JT
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p.338. Later the title appears in Temujin’s words to Altan and Quchar as 
Chayut-Quri in SH  § 179, Ch’a-wu-hu-lu in CCL p.57a and JAW’WT- 
Q WRY/JA W’T-Q WRY/JA WT-Q WRY in JT  p.392. So, the transcriptions of 
the first part of the title can then be summarised as:
1. JAW’T/JAWWT/JAWT/JAWT or JAW’WT/JAW’T/JAWT in JT\
2. Jayut or Chayut in the SH;
3. Ch’a-wu in CCL.
A possible counterpart of this phrase in the sources is a place name 
from where Jaya-Gambu came to Temujin sometime around the time when 
Temujin received this title. The regional name reads JAW’QWT or 
JARQWT/JAH-WQWT in JT.49 This term does not appear in Rashid al- 
DTn’s narrative description but is recorded as a part of Temujin’s speech; this 
implies that the term was used in a customary way by the Mongols.
The location of this region can be established by a comparison with 
another account of the same event. In JT  p.388, the sentence reads: "Jaya- 
Gambu anda was in the middle of JAW’QWT region" ? 0 In the 
corresponding record in CCL p.50ab, the sentence reads: "Jaya-Gambu lived 
in/between han [?and] sai".5] Because these two sentences are describing the 
same event, the J T s "JAW’QWT region" can be identified with the area of 
han sai in Chinese usage. In the classic usage of Chinese literary language, 
han is a general term denoting Chinese people and their abode, and sai means 
guarded strategic stronghold(s). The sai has an extended meaning when it 
refers to the strongholds along the frontier, where the territory inhabited by 
non-Chinese steppe tribes are usually mentioned as sai-wai, "beyond the sai". 
Therefore, "Jaya-Gambu lived in/between han-sai" would mean Jaya-Gambu
49 JT  p.388, variations on p. 1693.
50 "In the middle o f the Jayut region", "dar mayan walayat-i JAW’QWT". I would rather 
translate this walayat into a "region" than a "province" since there is no evidence which shows 
that the Jayut was a province in an administrative sense.
51 This account is not found in the relevant paragraph SH  §177.
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lived in a zone between China proper, which was under Jurchen rule at that 
time, and the abode of steppe tribesmen. When JAW’QWT region = between 
han sai, the JAW’QWT region in Temujin’s words must be the buffer zone 
along the northern frontier of the Jurchen realm.
Another example of ja yu t  as the name of a region is found also in JT, 
and this time, the usage is clearly described as Mongolian terminology. The 
title of a paragraph of historical description in JT  reads: "the narration of the 
beginning of Chlngglz-Khan’s undertaking to the direction {jamb) of KhitaT 
and Qara-KhitaT and Jurche[n], conquering most regions {wildyat) of that 
realm (mamlakat) which the Mongols call (that) CHAW’QWT" . 52 The region 
name of CHAW’QWT appears in the text again, where the Mongols set out to 
liberate "the region (wildyat) of KhitaT and Qara-Khital and Jurche[n], those 
regions {wildyat) which the Mongols call CHAW’QWT" . 53
This account is quite confusing at first sight, since the wilayat of Khitai 
and Qara-Khitai and Jurchen appear together in Chinggis-Qan’s first campaign 
against China. If the wildyat of Khitai and Qara-Khitai and Jurchen in this 
description are understood politically, the Jayut region would have covered 
northern China and further west to the north of Transoxiana. This does not fit 
the real situation, therefore, the usage of "Khitai and Qara-Khitai and Jurchen" 
in this description shall be considered from another perspective.
These phrases, "Khitai and Qara-Khitai and Jurchen", can be reasonably 
understood as an ethnic description, that is, the wilayat of Khitai and Qara- 
Khitai and Jurchen was the region inhabited by "Khitai and Qara-Khitai and 
Jurchen" people. This interpretation can be justified by the usage in the SH,
52 JT  p.441, CHAW ’QWT = JAW’QWT, /ch/ and 1)1 are interchangeable when the 
Mongolian terms were transcribed into Persian, for instance Chinggis = JNKYZ.
53 Base on text on p.441. Another version o f this description omits khitai-ra in the 
following sentence, (cf p. 1705) then the reading will become "... those regions (wilayat) which 
the Mongols call CHAW’QWT are called khan-zl in the terminology o f  KhitaT people".
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a source which was written and presented in the Mongolian language. The SH  
used "Altan-Qan" (Mong. altan = Chin, chin, means golden) to represent the 
Jurchen regime in China, while the term for their ethnic origin, the "Jiirche(~ 
t/d)", denotes only the Jurchen people ethnically, such as the Jurchens in their 
homeland in Manchuria (§274), and an ethnic Jurchen general Vuqanu (Chin. 
Wan-Nu) in §253. Neither of the terms "Jurche(-t/d)n was used to describe the 
people of northern China, which was under "ethnic" Jurchen rule at the time.
The SH  uses the term jayu t, curiously coinciding with Temujin’s usage, 
to describe the people who inhabited northern China under Jurchen rule. As 
recorded in SH  §281, Ogetei subdued the jaqud-un irgen and jaqut irgen. The 
terminology of jaqut irgen was never confused with or used equivalently to the 
Jurchen regime, the "Altan-Qan", or ethnic Jurchen people, the "Jurche(-t/d)".
Another mixed appearance of the usages of Khitai, Qara-Khitai and 
Jurchen is also found in the S H  s account of Chinggis-Qan’s campaign against 
the Chin regime. SH  §247 relates that in this campaign, the Mongols "pushing 
the Khitan, crushed the valiant and bold Jiiyin [troops] of the Qara-Khitan and 
the Jurchens (qara-kitad-un jiirched-iin jiiyin)". The phrase qara-kitad-un 
jiirched-iin jiiyin appears again in §248, suggesting clearly that the term "Qara- 
Khitan" here denotes the tribesmen of the late Liao regime and the term 
"Jurchen" here denotes the tribesmen of the recent Chin regime. The "Khitan" 
would be a general term covering the people and the region ruled by the 
regimes of Liao and Chin, as it was used in JT  throughout. The sentence 
should be understood as: the Mongols were pushing the Chinese, they crushed 
the valiant and bold tribal mercenary troop (jiiyin) which was made up of the 
tribesmen of Khitai and Jurchen.
In Chinggis-Qan’s initial campaign against the Chin regime, he did not 
penetrate deep into China proper and the major engagements were fought 
within the frontier zone. Therefore, the CHAW’QWT region mentioned in this 
event would have at least covered the northern frontier zone of Jurchen China,
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and this coverage coincides with the location of Jaya-Gambu in the previous 
account, where he took refuge temporarily.
However, ja yu t as a region might have had a wider coverage when we 
take the account of the jaqud-un irgen and jaqut irgen into consideration. 
Undeniably, these irgen in SH  §281 denote the people who inhabited northern 
China. In this way, the term ja yu t would have also meant the Jurchen realm 
in general. Since /ch/  and /j/ are interchangeable in medieval Mongolian, 
CHAW’QWT = JAW’QWT. As a result of the comparison, jayu t as a region 
in Mongolian terminology during the time of Temujin would mean Jurchen 
China in general and its northern frontier zone in particular.
None of Jurchen administrative district is named Jayut. Jayut then 
seems less likely to be a loan word from the proper name of a formal 
jurisdictional district in the Jurchen’s dominion. This Mongol terminology 
then could be more "Mongol" than "Jurchen" in its word formation. This 
outcome shows another direction in which the meaning of jayu t can be 
examined.
Jayut as a people
When we treat the ending of the term: -(y)ut as a plural ending in the 
Mongolian language, the stem of the term would be extracted as JAW’Q, 
JARQ/JAH-WQ from the regional name, and JAW’/JAW from Temujin’s title.
As seen in the sources compiled during this period, the -(y)ut ending 
may serve as a group identification of some people, such as the people of the 
Saljiyut tribe who were descended from a common ancestor called Salji. 
When ja yu t can be formed also by a stem of JAW’Q, JARQ/JAH-WQ or 
JAW’/JAW plus the Mongolian ending -(y)ut, the term means "the JAW’s". 
These JAW’ people might not necessarily have shared a genealogical bondage, 
but they might have shared the same ground of certain identity.
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This assumption may be established if we can find a people who 
inhabited northern China, its northern frontier zone in particular, sharing the 
same identity, and the descriptive title of their identity would fit the stem of 
this term. Some researchers suggest that they can possibly be related to the 
Chiu people in Chinese accounts ('Ijau/jou). Chinese researcher Shao Hsiin- 
Cheng suggested in the 1940s that the jayu t in Rashid al-Din’s history of 
Qubilai-Qan was the /&L in Chinese sources and that this Chinese 
character should be pronounced as cha (ja) or ch ’a (cha). Another Chinese 
researcher, Ts’ai Mei-Piao, agrees with his suggestion, and explains jayu t as 
a general term for the miscellaneous tribal people under Jurchen rule . 54
The question of the Chiu people (or ja/cha whatever) has been debated 
over decades in the academic field of Chinese Liao and Chin studies. Since 
this chapter focuses on the career of Temujin, I would rather not advance my 
argument on this topic here. However, I would like to point out the fact that 
previous researchers have generally agreed that the jiiyin irgen in the SH  was 
the Chiu people in Chinese sources, and Paul Buell had supplied a summarised 
description of the people that:
the Jiiyin peoples ... were not drawn from just one ethnic group 
but were variously comprised of Kitan, Tang Tit, Merkit, Tatar 
and even Jiirced bodies organized as part of the Chin frontier 
defense system. These Jiiyin were thus similar to the foederati 
of the Roman world who belonged to a variety of ethnic group 
but agreed to defend the Roman borders in exchange for a 
favored status within the limes (recepiio).n55 
However, the terms ja yu t irgen and jiiyin irgen both appear in the SH. They 
were used in this Mongolian source separately and definitely in different
54 Ts’ai Mei-Piao (Cai Meibiao), "The Evolution o f the Zha and the Zha Army", argument 
see pp.16-17. Shao Hstin-Cheng, "La-shih-teh-ting shih-chi hu-pi-lieh han chi yi-shih", 
argument see the annotation (an) on p.79.
55 Paul Buell, Tribe, qan and nlns in Early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yuan 
Dynasty, p.51.
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meanings, in which the jaqud-un irgen and jciqut irgen denote Chinese people 
in Jurchen China, and the jiiyin irgen, the equivalent to the Roman foederati. 
The different is so clear that I cannot accept the argument of "JAW’ people = 
Jiiyin people" by simply deny the accuracy of the former, or either usage. 
Moreover, Jayut-Quri would not be a quri who governs the jaqut irgen when 
jaqut irgen means general Chinese people, and no single piece of evidence in 
the Chinese sources can support the idea that Temujin exercised a governing 
power over the miscellaneous tribal people under Jurchen rule. More 
supportive analyses or careful inferences are needed for this interpretation, and 
unfortunately it is less than convincing at this stage.
Hence, as the meaning of ja yu t  is still not clear, there is space for a 
third assumption in reconsidering the meaning of the term jayut.
Jay u t as an adjective to describe the quri title
Another assumption of the meaning of Jayut-Quri would be "a Chinese 
quri", when ja yu t  in this phrase is used as an adjective to modify the noun: 
quri, means "a quri of Chinese origin". In this way, the title which the Jurchen 
commander gave to Temujin was quri, not Jayut-Quri.
This assumption sounds foolish at first sight because no supporting 
evidence can be found in the sources —  but precisely because none of the 
existing assumptions can be fully supported by available materials, the meaning 
of ja yu t remains uncertain and open to debate. An analysis of quri as an 
appellation, together with an examination of the principle of giving out 
titles/positions by the Jurchen authority may provide a reasonable ground for 
this "adjective" assumption.
First, many titles of important steppe leaders were Chinese in origin. 
This phenomenon has been discussed in Chapter Two in the paragraphs about 
the Naiman Inanch-Qan. To recapitulate briefly, the Naiman Tayang-Qan bore
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a title derived from Chinese tai-ong ("t’a-wang" in modern Mandarin) which 
means "grand prince" or "grand king", and the Kereit Ong-Qan bore a title 
derived from Chinese ong ("wang" in modern Mandarin) which means "prince" 
or "king". Some researchers even suggest that the first part of the name/title 
of one of Temujin’s ancestors, Senggiim-Bilge, might have derived from 
Khitan military commander position called "hsiang-wen", where the second 
part was Turkic in origin. 56 If this was so, accordingly, Senggtim, the heir 
o f the Kereit ong qan, also bore a Chinese-style title as a military commander. 
These titles might have been inherited, such as the Tayang title of the Naiman 
rulers, therefore, they were not necessarily given by the current Chinese 
authority although it was possible for them to be confirmed by the authority.
The above examples share a common feature: all of these
titles/positions were named in the official language of the Chinese regimes, 
Chinese or Khitan, none of them was in the language of the receivers, whether 
Turkic or Mongolian. Can this be a hint to the phrase formation of Jayut-Quri 
that, if ja yu t is definitely a Mongolian term and it does not exist in the 
Chinese or Jurchen languages, it would not be a part of the formal title given 
by the Jurchen regime, but an extra attachment to the formal title: quri?
We shall look into the origin of quri, to see if it will justify or deny 
this assumption. Quri would definitely be a Jurchen title for military 
commanders, if it can be identified with the position of "hu-lu". "Hu-lu" was 
a commanding position in the Jurchen’s tribal institution. The introductory 
paragraph of the Bureaucracy Monograph of CS reads:
Chin [regime] begins to set up offices since Ching-Tsu to 
master the tribes for conquering purpose .... The leaders are all 
called "po-chi-leh", hence T’ai-Tsu succeeded the throne as "tu 
po-chi-leh" [and] T’ai-Tsung stayed behind as "an-pan po-chi- 
leh". ... Next to this [position] is called "kuo-lun hu-lu po-chi-
56 Ch’en Te-Chih (Chen Dezhi), "Kereit Kingdom up to the Thirteenth Century", p.2.
278
leh, "kuo-lun" means noble, "hu-lu” as commander-in-chief. ... 
Next, above these "po-chi-leh"s, there are titles of "kuo-lun", 
"yi-shih", "hu-lu", "yi-lai”, "a-mai", "a-she", "tse", "teh", as the 
hierarchy for promoting royal members and meritorious 
officials. Their tribal leaders are called "po-ch’in (/chin)", 
[those who were] in command of several tribes are called "hu- 
lu". All these [offices] are abandoned [later] when Hsi-Tsung 
[re-]fixed the bureaucratic constitution. 57
The Chinese transcription of the Jurchen title "hu-lu" ( / ^ ^ '  ) here is 
exactly the same as C C V s transcription of the second part of Temujin’s title. 
This coincidence is significant in that both titles were non-Chinese in origin, 
and both of them were taken down in Chinese script around the same period 
during the Mongol Yuan dynasty in China. Could this similarity in 
transcription suggest a match between the two appellations?
The most important sources for Temujin’s career are presented in three 
languages: Persian for JT, Mongolian for the SH  and Chinese for CCL and the 
other relevant Chinese sources. Supposing that these sources were all based 
on Mongolian originals, the strict and precise transliteration in the SH  would 
be counted as the most reliable among the three. The second part of the 
title/position Jayut-Quri appears as quri in the SH. This is different to the 
transcription in CCL.
As for this difference in transcription or transliteration, we must bear 
in mind that the SH  was transliterated at a later period: the early Ming, while 
CCL was translated and CS was compiled during the reign of Qubilai, and JT  
after these . 58 Pelliot remarked that "The alternation of hu-lu, *quru, and hu-
57 CS 55 chih 36 pp. 1215-1216.
58 The compilation o f  CS  started in the reign o f  Qubilai in 1261, then resumed in 1279 
after an interruption. Finally it was completed in the reign o f last YUan emperor Toyan-Temiir 
in 1344. Chin Yti-Fu, Chung-kuo shih-hsueh shih, pp.108-110. The delay o f  completion was
279
li, quri, is not without other examples." He supplied evidence found in these 
sources that the Tatar Qori-Buqa given in SH  §59 reads Quru-Buqa in CCL 
and JT, and the Jurkin Taichu-Kiru (*Quru, Ik/ and /q/ share the same letter 
in Mongolian writing) in CCL appears in JT  as Taichu-Quri. 59 In my 
personal opinion, this interchange of vowels might not have resulted from 
narrators’ corruption of the principle of transcription, but have been owing to 
the colloquial variation of the original language, which was not in conformity 
during that period. Since quri/quru can be transcribed into hu-lu in Chinese, 
a match between CS 's  tribal commander position and CCU s Jurchen title 
becomes possible.
The Jurchen title of quri was not suppressed before 1149, as understood 
by Pelliot. The title of quri undeniably existed after that, because it was seen 
to be given by a Jurchen commander to Temujin several decades later. This 
fact cannot be denied in any way. Therefore, the last sentence of the above CS 
quotation, "all these [offices] are abandoned [later] when Hsi-Tsung [re-]fixed 
the bureaucratic constitution", should be understood as meaning that when Hsi- 
Tsung (reigned 1135-1149) adopted the Chinese style constitution, these tribal 
style principal offices/titles were avoided in the bureaucracy of central 
government.
Would the appellation have existed outside the Sinicized central 
bureaucracy of the Chin regime and have continued to function as a part of 
their tribal management? The multi-cultural nature of the Chin regime must 
be considered, and the diversity of the people under its rule would need diverse 
administration according to their custom and tradition, especially for those 
along the frontiers. The Monograph of Bureaucracy in CS records several
caused by a prolonged discussion o f the matter o f  legitimism, but the major task o f collecting 
materials and drafting should be dated in the long reign o f Qubilai. CCL was completed in 
the reign o f  Qubilai, see Yang Chih-Chiu (Yang Zhijiu) and others, Yiian-shih-hsiieh kai shuo,
p.286.
59 Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo , vol 1, p.294.
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titles which were maintained in the bureaucracy after the reform. These were 
officials who dealt with border affairs, and the titles were Liao (Khitan) in 
origin . 60
Looking into the sources, at least four examples of quri can be found
as a part of the title/name of northern tribal eminent figures during the lifetime
of Temujin. I f  the above reading of Taichu-Quri is correct, together with the
Kereit Qulbari-Quri in SH  §177, Jayut-Quri of the Temiljin-Mongol and the
Onggiit Alaqush-Tegin-Quri, the title of quri seems to prevail among the
steppe tribes at the turn of the thirteenth century. According to the common
practice during that period, a title or a description of personality usually adds
to the name of the person, after his proper name, not preceding it. For
instance. Sacha-Beki, Qadayan-Taishi and Todo’en-Otchigin. This custom 
helps us to narrow down the number of valid examples, when the "Qori-"s are
exempted.
Taichu-Quri was one of the leaders of the Jiirkin-Mongol, Temujin was 
a quri also the leader of Qabul-Mongol, and Qulbari was a Kereit prince or an 
important emir61 who Temujin had demanded that Toyoril send as his 
messenger to explain his hostility. As for the Onggiit leader at the time of 
Temujin, he is called Alaqush-Tegin-Quri in the sources. 62 Although Rashid 
al-DIn records that Alaqush was his name and Tegin-Quri was his title 
(laqab) , 63 "tegin quri" should not be read jointly as one title. The Turkic 
tegin title should be attached to his name Alaqush, as he is mentioned as
00 CS 55 chih 36 p.1216.
0! SH  §152 records that Qulbari was among the conspirators made up o f d e ’ti (princes) and 
noyan (emirs). No matter if Qulbari was a Kereit prince or an emir, he was obviously an 
important person in the Kereit regime since he could be invited to participate in a conspiracy 
against their ruler.
62 Alaqush-Digit-Quri in SH  §182 and §190, A-la-hu-ssu-ti-ch’i-huo-Ii in CCXp.65b, A-la-
wu-ssu-t’i-chi-hu-li in YS 118 chuan 5 his biography, variations in JT  ’LAOW S/’LAQWSH- 
TNKZ/’ WL A QW SH/’ LAQ WSH-TKYN.
03 JT  p.131.
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Alaqush-Tegin in JT  pp. 127, 132 and 216. Quri, Alaqush’s other title, was 
apparently obtained from a separate source. 64 These four persons who bore 
the quri description were all in commanding positions.
"The rulers of Khitai never gave out titles (alqab) to persons at random 
and [always] in calculation, they still continually having the custom nowadays. 
Their appellations are numerous, the grading which corresponds with every 
tribe and every province are exactly homogenous and suitable. They give the 
appellation like that to people, then every person knows his own rank and limit 
according to that title (laqab). For example, suppose a hundred persons will 
be presented in an assembly, according to the appellation which had been given 
to them, it fixes that everyone is in which place and where he shall sit. " 65 
Supposing that the quri ( -  "hu-lu") title had been given out according to 
accurate "grading", it must have been bestowed on a tribal leader who was 
acting as a "commander-in-chief1 or "in command of several tribes/clans". 
This principle fits both Temujin’s role as the general leader of the Qabul- 
Mongol, and Alaqush’s leading position to the Onggiits.
The sources do not supply information on how Taichu and Qulbari 
obtained their quri description, but the origin of Temujin’s is clear, and the one 
of the Onggiit leader can be understood as a position of frontier safeguard. 
The Onggiits guarded the passage and the passes of a wall erected by the 
Jurchens, the so-called Utku (or Ongti?) in JT* 6 or Utkiya in SH  §142, which 
lay between the Jurchens and the land of the tribes in their north. Temujin had 
been rewarded with the quri title/position after he rendered a military service 
to the Jurchens, and Alaqush apparently was performing a guarding duty for 
the Jurchens. This coherence in their services strongly implies that quri is
64 He was called just Alaqush in p. 132 and p.415. Tegin, a Turkic term for "princes". SH  
use the Mongolian plural ending in the place o f tegins therefore digit.
65 JT  p.169.
66 JT  p .131 ’NGW, variation ’TKW/’NKW (p. 1605).
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possibly an official position which the Jurchens assigned to its northern 
subordinates, and it was more a military or sentinel position along the frontier 
zone than a civil administrative post in the local bureaucracy.
Summing up the above discussion, we can reach the conclusion that
quri might have been an individual proper title, not a part of a title. When
quri was the formal official title given by the Jurchen authority, which Alaqush
also acquired, "Jayut-Quri" might not necessarily be an inseparable phrase. 
The quri appellation originates from a position in the Jurchen’s tribal
institution which governed several tribes/clans. It ceased to exist in the central
bureaucracy after the reform of Hsi-Tsung, but continued to function in the
Jurchen’s tribal management, thus, Temujin was given this title, which fitted
his commanding position over his tribesmen, by the Jurchen commander after
he became submissive to the Jurchen authority. As seen in the evidence of
walciyat-i JAW’QWT = Chinese region and jaqut irgen = Chinese people
Jayut, this Mongolian terminology, might have been used adjectivally as
"Chinese", then, "Jayut-Quri" might have borne the meaning of "Chinese quri"
—  not a quri who governed Chinese, but a quri appointed by Chinese
authority.
The above discussion does not deny the possible existence of a joint
phrase of Jayut-Quri. Another earlier appearance of the phrase Jayut-Quri, as 
a part of a tribal leader’s title, can be dated back to the 1130s, according to the
dating discussion in Chapter One. This account relates that Hambaqai-Qan 
arranged a marriage between his third son and the daughter of the leader of 
Ayiriyut-Buiruyut Chaqayan-Tatar. He went to the Tatars for the daughter, 
with the sixth son of Qabul-Qan, Todo’en-Otchigin. The Tatars were
preparing a feast and one of the Tatar leader called Mongke-Jayut-Quri 
(JAWWT-QWRY) invited Todo’en-Otchigin to join him. At midday of the
tenth day of the feast, a messenger from the tribal leader of [Chaqayan] Tatars 
hurried to this Mongke-Jayut-Quri with a secret message. After a discussion 
with his emirs, this Mongke-Jayut-Quri did not capture Todo’en-Otchigin in
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order to avoid future conflict with his clan (qabila), namely the Qabul- 
Mongol.
This passage does not exist in the JT  copy I based my research on. The
above third-hand description is quoted from a Chinese translation of the
Russian translation of JT, which is based on a Persian text which has never
been published . 67 The reason of Hambaqai’s departure to the Tatars in this
story is different from the one supplied in the SH, in which Hambaqai was
sending his daughter to the Tatars. Another interesting point is, the Tatar
leader who captured Hambaqai-Qan was not the "Jayut-Quri", who was 
supposed to have a close relationship to the Jurchens if  this appellation was
given by the Jurchen authority. Since I cannot examine this story in its
original Persian text, although the content is full of significance, I shall be
cautious in making any further interpretation of the event.
The rank  of quri as a commanding position
Since Chinese rulers never gave out titles at random, the rank of a 
commanding title reflected the strength or the importance of the receivers, or 
at least as he was judged by the giver, at the time when he was given the title. 
So, what would be the position, or rank, of quri in the hierarchy of Jurchen 
offices, when quri was bestowed to Temujin in 1196 as an official title in 
tribal governance?
The rank of quri is never stated explicitly in CS. To judge from other 
evidence, quri might not have been a very exalted position when it was given 
to Temujin. First, the position of chao-t'ao was mentioned in SH  §134 as a 
higher rank to quri, and the chao-t’ao position can only be conferred by the 
Chin emperor. This description explains the fact that the quri title is not 
significant enough to be bestowed by the emperor, therefore, quri must have
67 Shih chi, vol 1 part 2, pp.25-27, translated from the 1952 Russian translation o f  JT.
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been of less importance, and strength, than chao-t’ao. Second, another quri 
during this period, the Onggiit leader Alaqush, was commanding a tribe 
consisting of four thousand households. 68 The leader of such number of 
supporters could not be counted as powerful ruler. Therefore, the rank of quri 
in the Jurchen commanding hierarchy was definitely not a high one.
Indeed, Temujin should have been given an appropriate position 
according to his strength, when this position is related to tribal governance and 
military services. Does the example of the Alaqush quri imply that Temujin 
possessed only a strength of four thousand household in 1196?
This matter shall be examined from the perspective of the general 
principle of appellation-giving, and the special conditions in real circumstances. 
Looking back to our discussion in the first section of this chapter, there was 
a Jurchen general called Wan-Yen An-Kuo. He was a chao-t ’ao when he took 
part in the 1195-96 campaign. In the pursuit, Wan-Yen An-Kuo had been put 
in charge of a ten thousand troop. Therefore, since the position of chao-t’ao 
is higher than the one of quri, Temujin should not have possessed a strength 
more than his at this time. According to the principle of appellation-giving, 
if Temujin had reached the standard of being in charge of ten thousand men, 
he would not be offered a lesser position.
This strength estimation would appear strange because Temujin is 
recorded as possessing the support of at least thirteen giire ‘en to confront an 
enemy of thirty thousand in the Battle of Thirteen Glare’en, which was dated 
by the discussion in Chapter Two, in 1193. Saying Temujin was in charge of 
less than ten thousand men in 1996 is peculiar, unless his strength had been 
sharply reduced during the post-war period, however, Temujin did not seem 
to be isolated when he was merry-making with Jiirkin kinsmen. Therefore, the 
four thousand household strength of Temujin should be understood as the force
68 JT  p. 131, chahar hazar khana.
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which Temujin had demonstrated in front of the Jurchen commander in his 
attack of the Tatars in 1196, not his strength in total.
In the course of his attack on the Tatars, the Jiirkins did not come and
Toyoril was absent from Mongolia; Temujin assembled only his own force 
who happened to be staying nearby, and set out to raid the Tatars in a hurry.
Temujin might have raided the Tatars with a force equivalent to the strength
of four thousand households, which was strong enough to make the fleeing
Tatars disperse. The Jurchen commander did not acknowledge the huge
support behind this, thus, he gave a lesser title which corresponded to what he
saw, this small amount of force.
This analysis echoes the first' section of this chapter and clarifies two 
obscure circumstances in the 1196 dispersal of the Tatars. First, the small size 
of Temujin’s force confirms that the Tatars who Temujin dispersed was just 
a branch of them. The whole Tatar tribe possessed a strength of seventy 
thousand households, 69 which even the Jurchen pursuing force (ten thousand) 
would not have able to compete with. These fleeing Tatars may have been a 
branch of the Tatars who encircled the Jurchen division at Keliiren, not the 
whole tribe of the Tatars. Since the main body of the Tatars was left 
untouched, they were able to "rebel" again in a couple of months.
Second, there is the ignorance of the Jurchen authority about the 
situation in central Mongolia. Temujin had been given a lesser title after an 
easy raid, and this underestimation clearly reflected the carelessness of the 
Jurchen commander. He did not examine Temujin’s strength seriously 
therefore he did not discover Temujin’s potential to be s strong steppe leader, 
who was capable of looting the Merkits, taking care of the Kereit ong, and 
fighting the Buiruq-Naiman in the next three years. The Jurchen border 
generals might have had an accurate knowledge of the harassing Turkic and
69 JT  p.76.
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Mongol tribes on their frontier, however, the distant Temujin-Mongol were 
apparently too far away to be well supervised.
*  *  *  *
From the above discussion of the interactions between Jurchen China 
and the steppe tribes, the significance of these relationships can be summarised 
as follows. In the relationship of Temujin and the Jurchen authority, no matter 
whether Temujin was a Jayut-Quri or just a quri, by receiving this 
title/position, he won recognition from the Jurchen regime and a reputation 
among his kinsmen and the other steppe people. Although quri was not an 
exalted position, this subordinate relationship maintained peace between the 
Temuj in-Mongol and the Jurchen regime for fifteen years, which allowed 
Temujin to concentrate on his annexations in Mongolia without worrying about 
this mighty neighbour. Probably because of this less important position which 
was not conferred according to his real strength, the Jurchen regime also did 
not pay much attention to the development of the Temuj in-Mongol, until 
Temujin was capable of competing with the Jurchens.
As for the general situation between Jurchen China and the steppe 
tribes, the Jurchen regime attempted to maintain peace on the frontier by 
giving out benevolence. This policy worked when the tribal leaders wished so, 
for instance, Temujin had created a friendly linkage with the regime in this 
way. However, for those who did not come voluntarily to make their 
submission, might remained as the backbone of the Jurchen superiority. 
Sometimes, it was necessary to show its strength by beating the harassing 
tribesmen for their "restlessness" along the frontier. The Jurchen people 
conquered northern China on horseback, and they still had to stay on 
horseback, in order to preserve their regime against the steppe tribes.
The changing of Jurchen’s relationship with the tribes in their north 
between 1195 and 1198 provided a stable situation in which Temujin could
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enhance his power in central Mongolia. The warfare also weakened the Turkic 
and Mongol tribes in eastern Mongolia, as well as Jurchen China. Temujin 
owed a great deal of his rapid development to this favourable situation, hence 
the importance of the Jurchen warfare with the steppe tribes, not only the 
pursuit of a branch of fleeing Tatars, should not be ignored in the study of 
Temuj in’s rise to power.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, the above studies in Part One about early Kereit history 
and its impact on the history of Temujin have arrived at the following 
conclusions.
In the study of Toyoril’s first struggle for the Kereit qanship and its 
background, a sketch of Kereit history between 1130s and 1160s has been
restored. Toyoril had a just claim to the Kereit throne but the succession, it 
appeared, would be interrupted by the Betekin group in Kereit politics; Toyoril 
tried to secure the throne by destroying his Betekin-related half-brothers. In
fact, the Kereit princes were plotting against the potential candidate to the
throne; Toyoril’s three struggles against his rival brothers revealed that his 
brothers "harboured stinking livers" towards Toyoril as well. This internal 
struggle for leadership among the princes can be compared with the situation 
among the Taichiyuts at this time, who had never elected a general leader: 
therefore they remained in disorder until Temujin annexed them.
Merkit’s appearance in Toyoril’s three struggles for qanship is 
significant, and their close relationship provided grounds for believing the JT  
version of the Borte incident, in which Borte was sent to Toyoril by his Merkit 
son-in-law after her abduction. Toyoril’s resolution of this incident reveals the 
importance of maintaining peace in intertribal relationship at that period, and
this could only be achieved by political wisdom.
The studies also showed that Toyoril was very careful as well, in 
getting rid of his rival brothers in an indirect way. His murder of two 
threatening half-brothers can be compared with Temujin’s getting rid o f his 
offensive half-brother Bekter, which shows that there are some similarities in 
Toyoril and Temujin’s personality or situation.
As for Temujin’s ancestors, Qutula-Qan has been proved to have been
a commander-in-general for both Qabul-Mongol and Taichiyut-Mongol in the 
campaign of revenge for Hambaqai-Qan, but he had no right to govern those
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non-Qabul Mongols. Taichiyuts’ participation in Yestigei’s expedition to expel 
the Kereit Giir-Qan can be explained in terms of revenge for the
death/murdering of their elder Qadayan-Taishi. This should not be treated as 
evidence that the Taichiyuts were under Yesiigei’s rule during the time of 
Qutula.
The location of Toyoril in these three qanship struggles is useful in 
reconstructing Kereit’s intertribal relationship during different phases, and the 
estimation of the dating of certain events helps to fit the above events into the 
period of the 1130s to the 1160s: thus, Temujin was born during Mongol’s 
supremacy.
In the study of Toyoril’s second dethronement, the course of events has 
been restored. The study confirms that the Battle of Thirteen Gtire'en was
associated in the history of Temujin with Toyoril’s second dethronement, and 
Toyoril, in reality, did not have control over all the Kereit branches, especially 
the courageous Jirgin and numerous Saqayit —  this partly explains how 
Toyoril was dethroned so easily; on the other hand, the strength of the Naiman 
attacking force should not be overestimated.
Since Toyoril’s return to Mongolia can be related to the occasion when 
Temujin became famous in strength, this association can fix the timing of his
return, and partly explains the reason for Jaya-Gambu’s return to Mongolia. 
Since the Naiman Inanch-Qan, who dethroned Toyoril, could be the Pi-li-ke- 
po-wa of Chinese records, this suggests that Inanch was alive in early 1193. 
Jaya-Gambu must have arrived in the Tangyut nation no later than 1193, soon 
after the Battle of Thirteen Gtire’en. Comparing these two dating with the
possible duration of Toyoril’s exile in the west, Toyoril would probably have 
been dethroned in 1192/93 and have returned to Mongolia in late spring of
1196.
This dating is valuable to the study of Temujin’s history since it gives 
a possible dating for the Battle of Thirteen Gtire’en. Accordingly, Temujin 
was defeated in this battle when he was thirty-one. Acknowledging this age
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is useful in explaining the energetic development and expansion of Temujin’s 
power in the next decade, and the quietness (also peacefulness) before this 
period.
In the study of the third phase of the Kereit-Mongol relationship, the
two leaders turned from friends to foes. After Toyoril was restored to his 
previous position because of Temujin’s protection, a split in the Naiman 
authority and the funding from the Merkits’ wealth, the complicated political 
situation suggests that Toyoril had attempted to disable Temujin after he had 
outlasted his usefulness, and that they came into conflict when their 
interest/ambition clashed other. This clash in interest made the marriage 
proposal fail, and the subsequent shifting of supporters encouraged the Kereits 
to take the risk of raiding Temujin. The battle at Qalaqaljit-Elet disappointed
Toyoril’s supporters and the situation changed again, this time, Toyoril’s 
strength drained away while Temujin’s was strengthened. This marked the end
of the Kereit regime.
The reconstruction of many details, facts, sequence and dating of the 
incidents in Part One presents a lively steppe society between the 1130s and 
1203, in which the Tatars, the Merkits, the Kereits, the Betekins and the 
Mongols were frequently in contact or conflict with each other. On a broader 
scale, some of these steppe tribes had encountered Jurchen China in a context 
either of hostility or of submissiveness. This panoramic view from the 
perspective of a Turkic tribe in central Mongolia also resuscitated part of 
Mongol history which allowed us to have a better understanding of the 
background and the course of Temujin’s triumph and his relationship with 
surrounding tribes before he attained the age of forty-two.
In Part Two, our focus pulled back to the growth of Temuj in-Mongol. 
With abundant evidence which was extracted from the sources, the nature and 
the significance of genealogical connections and in-laws’ relationship among 
the ruling families of steppe tribes, as two important aspects of the social
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framework of steppe society, have been examined. These social connections 
had a great impact on Temujin’s endeavour in getting recognition as a steppe 
ruler, either from his kinsmen or from the other steppe tribes. It also assisted 
greatly in Temujin’s management of steppe society after he became a generally 
recognised steppe ruler.
Within the Mongol tribe, Temujin’s mother had made his closest 
brother clan, the Taichiyuts, "lose affection" for Temujin’s family when he was 
small. This unfavourable situation made it necessary for Temujin to attract the
support of his Mongol kinsmen from distant clans when he grew up, and this
strategy resulted first in his close association with Jamuqa and their speedy
break-up, due to the fact that Temujin had attracted many of Jamuqa’s
supporters to move to his side. After being elected the leader of the Qabul-
Mongol with the support of these kinsmen, he did not give up this policy of
attracting by courtesy until the Taichiyuts noticed that Temujin was attempting 
to drain away their supporters.
Temujin’s policy of attraction could not penetrate the sphere of
influence of the Taichiyuts. This forced Temujin to change his strategy. 
Inspired by a Je’iireit leader, Temujin abandoned his courteous approach and
adopted an aggressive manner against his brother clan. The attack was
successful, but, this transgression of social conduct was condemned by his
other Mongol kinsmen. Many important and huge Mongol tribes/clans allied
together to fight against this "evil kinsman", and Jamuqa, because of his
genealogical connection to the Nirun-Mongols, was once again put at the head
of these anti-Temiijin kinsmen, while some other clan leaders from the Qabul-
Mongol had second thoughts. Eventually, Temujin suppressed these opposing
kinsmen and "unified" his tribe under his single leadership.
Outside the NTrun genealogy, there were many Derelkln-Mongols and 
Turkic tribes inhabiting the steppe belt. Temujin obtained their friendship and 
support by creating an affectionate relationship with their ruling families, that
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is, via marriage. These in-laws then acted as Temujin’s "ears" and "eyes" 
across the steppe, informing Temujin of every unfavourable movement against 
him in advance. Therefore, Temujin was able to escape from several 
dangerous predicaments which would definitely have crushed to perish if  they 
had been successful.
When Temuj in-Mongol became a superpower in Mongolia, the in-laws’ 
relationship between Temujin’s family and the steppe tribal leaders changed in 
essence. Granting an in-laws’ relationship to the tribal leaders during this 
period appeared to be a favour or a reward rather than an affectionate 
association. However, in this way, Temujin associated himself with the tribal 
leaders of Onggiit, Uighur, Oirat and Qarluq, which meant that his authority 
extended through these marriage connections across the steppe belt as far as the 
border of the Qipchaq steppe —  he brought this extensive region to 
submission without using force. On the other hand, the individuals who came 
from those Derelkln tribes or Turkic tribes were able to become family 
members of Temujin’s family, and they exercised a different degree of 
influence in the Mongol court at a later period.
As for the powerful Jurchen regime to the south, Temiij in maintained 
a subordinate relationship to it. This position, although it did not reflect the 
real strength of Temujin, provided Temujin with a reputation as well as peace 
between the two powers. This peace in the south together with the kinship 
association with the NIruns plus the in-laws’ relationship to various steppe 
powers supplied Temujin with stable circumstances for expansion. Moreover, 
the Jurchen campaign against the Turkic or/and Mongol tribes living in the 
region of Buyur-Nayur weakened both sides; this provided a favourable 
situation for Temujin’s later expansion in eastern Mongolia and for his
invasion of China.
These three kinds of relationship constituted Temujin’s network of 
expansion. Although the use of force was inevitable on certain occasions, the
293
examination in Chapter Four to Chapter Six confirms that Temujin did not 
complete his conquest solely by the sword. It was convenient and more 
practical to take advantage of the traditional social framework in building up 
his strength, by associating himself with the existing powers on friendly terms, 
or by associating them to himself. In reality, Temujin, or the World 
Conqueror Chinggis-Qan, did not conquer all parts of his empire on the 
horseback. No one could have achieved such a "military conquest" with the 
strength of only one tribe, not even Temujin; but with the help of so many 
kinsmen, in-laws and the mercenary forces supplied by his in-laws, these 
associated "Mongols" together created the "Mongol" empire.
Thirdly, a chronology of important events can be set up in the light of 
the analyses in these two parts, and other discussions based on these three 
sources which cannot be found a suitable space in this thesis.1 The career of 
Chinggis-Qan, then, can be restored, or, rediscovered, in a more reliable and 
detailed event sequence and dating. A brief list is supplied as follows:
b. 1132 The Tatars formed a good relationship with the newly
established Jurchen regime in northern China.
c. 1130s The Kereit Marqus and the Mongol Hambaqai were murdered, 
c. 1130s The Tatars attacked the Kereit Sariq-Qan; Sariq-Qan fled to the
Betekin tribe where the Kereit Qurjaqus married the Betekin 
princess Tore-Qaimish. 
c. 1160s Qurjaqus-Qan died. The Kereit ulus was under a regency.
Toyoril struggled with his rival brothers for the Kereit throne 
and murdered them secretly.
1 The event sequence and dating listed here all have firm bases in sources or analyses, 
although part o f the analyses cannot be supplied within the limits o f this thesis. 1 have 
completed the discussions on the first and second anti-Temtijin coalition, SITs  confusion o f  
another event with the battle o f Koyiten, the pursuits o f the fleeing tribal leaders (especially 
the dating errors in sources), Temtljin’s expansion to the western steppe belt up to the Qipchaq 
tribe (in particular the tribal relationship out there also the relevant locations), before 
establishing this chronology. These discussions will be presented someday, when the situation 
allows.
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c. 1160s 
c. 1160s
1162
1171/72
?
1177
1178/79
1179/81
?
1192/93
1193
71194
?
1195
1195/96
1196:-
spring
?
?
Gtir-Qan attacked Toyoril, making him flee to the Merkit land. 
Toyoril married his daughter to their leader Toqtoya.
Toyoril obtained Yesugei’s assistance to expel Gur-Qan. Some 
Taichiyuts joined the expedition because of the suspicious death 
of Qadayan-Taishi. Qutula-Qan’s reign.
Temujin born.
Yesugei died.
The Taichiyuts separated from Temujin’s family.
Temujin married.
The Borte incident.
Temujin stayed with Jamuqa and both planned to invite the 
Qatagins and Saljiyuts to join them.
Temujin separated from Jamuqa and was elected the qan of the 
Qabul-Mongol.
Internal struggles for leadership among the Kereit princes. 
Erke-Qara fled to Naiman.
Toyoril was dethroned by the Naiman Inanch-Qan.
The Taichar incident and its consequence: the Battle of Thirteen
Gtire’en. Temujin was defeated. Jaya-Gambu left Temujin and 
went to the Tangyut nation.
Jaya-Gambu left the Tangyut nation and went into the Jayut 
region.
Some Je’iireits came to join Temujin.
Temujin was at odds with his Jurkin kinsmen.
The Jurchen campaign against the northern tribes, in which they 
encountered the Tatars and the Qonggirats.
Temujin dispersed a division of the Tatars on the Ulja river.
The Jurchen commander rewarded him with a title/position
which is related in the sources as Jayut-Quri.
Temujin attacked the Jtirkins. Leaders escaped.
Jaya-Gambu came to Temujin, being attacked half way by 
mistake by the Merkits.
late spring
autumn
winter 
1197:- 
autumn 
?
1198:-
winter/spring
?
1199:-
?
winter
winter
1199/1200
1200:-
spring
?
?
winter
winter
1201
1202:-
spring
summer
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Toyoril returned from the west and arrived at Guse’iir-Nayur, 
Temujin received him into his camp.
Temujin and Toyoril declared pseudo-father-and-son at Black 
Forest.
Temujin exterminated the Jiirkin line.
Temujin attacked the Merkits, plundered Toqtoya.
The Jurchens brought the Qonggirat Major to submission.
The Tatars submitted to the Jurchen. The Jurchen troops
compelled the surrender of the tribal leaders of Qatagin, Saljiyut 
and *Bosqor-Qonggirat, *Bosqor-Qonggirat dispersed
afterwards by other Qonggirats.
Toyoril attacked the Merkits, Toqtoya fled to Barqujin.
Toyoril’s restoration campaign against the Naiman Buiruq-Qan. 
The joint-force confronted the Naiman general Kokse’u-Sabraq.
Toyoril withdrew at night.
Kokse’u-Sabraq plundered the Kereits, Temujin helped Toyoril 
to recover them. The Red Hills Promise.
Toyoril attempted to bribe Boyorchu, but failed.
Toyoril planned to capture Temujin during the feast, but failed. 
Toyoril and Temujin set out against the Taichiyuts.
The first Mongol coalition against Temujin. They were
defeated at Buyur-Nayur.
Jaya-Gambu plotted against Toyoril, but failed.
Temujin attacked' the Tatars and defeated them at Dalan-
Nemiirges.
The second Mongol coalition against Temujin, with Jamuqa as 
Gur-Qan. They were defeated at Teni/Yedi-Qorqan.
Temujin attacked the Alchi-Tatars and Chaqayan-Tatars. 
Paused to avoid heat. Then renewed the warfare.
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autumn
winter
?
1202/03
1203:-
spring
?
?
summer
autumn
1204:-
spring
autumn
?
winter
1205
1206:-
spring
?
1207:-
autumn
?
1208:-
spring
The Battle of Koyiten. As a result, Jamuqa came to the Kereits,
Temujin annexed the Taichiyuts.
The marriage proposal.
Senggiim and some anti-Temujin kinsmen were plotting in the 
Kereit camp.
Temujin’s pasture was burnt secretly.
The conspiracy of the betrothal feast. Temujin returned home 
half way.
The Battle at Qalaqaljit-Elet.
Jiircedei brought the Terge-Emel Qonggirats to submission. 
Temujin drank at Baljuna. Qasar came.
Temujin attacked the Kereits and annexed the tribe.
The Naiman Tayang-Qan invited the Onggiits to attack Temujin. 
Temujin set out but had no chance of fighting.
Expedition to attack Tayang-Qan at the Orqan river. All anti- 
Temujin Mongols surrendered after this battle.
The capture and execution of Jamuqa.
Temujin annexed the Merkit tribe.
Temujin invaded the Tangyut nation.
Temujin obtained the title of Chinggis-Qan.
Temujin exterminated the Naiman Buiruq-Qan. Toqtoya and 
Giichultik fled to the Irtysh river.
Temujin attacked the Tangyuts.
Temujin sent envoys to the Kirgiz region and they returned with 
their envoys.
Temujin returned from Tangyut nation.
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winter
1209
1210: -
autumn
1211:-
spring
autumn
1212-1215
1216
1217:-
7
7
1218:-
7
7
1219-1224
1225:-
spring
autumn
1226
1227
With the guidance of Oirat leader Quduqa-Beki, Temujin’s
pursuing troop arrived at the Irtysh river and destroyed
Toqtoya. Guchtiluk escaped and went to Qara-Khitai.
The Uighur leader submitted to Temujin and fought the Merkit
fugitives at River *Chan.
Temujin attacked the Tangyuts.
Temujin attacked the Tangyuts.
The Uighur and Qarluq leaders came in person to submit. 
Temujin granted an in-laws’ relationship to them.
Temujin invaded Jurchen China.
Warfare in China. The Tumat tribe captured Qorchi and 
Quduqa.
Temujin returned to Mongolia in spring.
Temujin sent Siibe’etei to pursue the rest of Merkits and 
exterminated them at the *Chan river.
Temujin sent Boroyul to subdue the "rebellious" Tumats.
Temujin sent Jochi to attack Kirgiz, for their refusal to assist in 
the Tumat campaign.
Jebe caught and executed the Naiman Gtichiiluk.
Transoxiana campaign.
Temujin arrived in Mongolia.
Temujin attacked the Tangyuts.
Temujin in Tangyut. Appointed Ogetei as his successor in 
early spring, in a secret meeting in the absence of Chayatai.2
Temujin died. The destruction of the Tangyut nation.
2 According to JT.
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This chronicle is expected to be useful for future studies o f the career 
of Chinggis-Qan, a revision of the textual confusions in the sources and the 
most important, an overall view of steppe society during these one hundred 
years. The main purpose of this thesis, as recounted in the introductory pages, 
is to examine two selected aspects in the career of Chinggis-Qan from the 
perspective of his Turkic partners, Mongol kinsmen or other connections. By 
using this approach, the situation can be revealed in a more objective way, to 
be presented and to be judged as it was. I hope the above investigations in six 
chapters have proved this approach sensible and reasonable, and that this 
approach could be adopted extensively in efforts towards researching the "lost 
empires".
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Appendixes
Appendix I
Arabic and Persian Transliteration used in this Thesis
Consonants
>
j& S
# b j* d
L-> * « 
% P b t
•  1L—-> t b Z
o th ts ‘
e j
%
L> gh
& ch t-i> fc ht <3 q
t kh jj k
> d J a©
a dh J 1
j r f mI z a n
j zh 3 w
cr s a h
L ? sh 3 y
Vowels
Appendix II
Cross Reference Table of Chinese Phonetic Symbols 
and Romanisation used in this Thesis
Consonants
tip- bilabial stop voiceless unaspirated
X p’- bilabial stop voiceless aspirated
n m- bilabial nasal voiced
c f- labio-dental fricative voiceless
t i t- apical stop voiceless unaspirated
t i t ’- apical stop voiceless aspirated
11- apical nasal voiced
t i 1- apical lateral voiced
« k- velar stop voiceless unaspirated
t i
k5- velar stop voiceless aspirated
r h- velar fricative voiceless
chi, ch- palatal affricate voiceless unaspirated
< clTi,, ch5- palatal affricate voiceless aspirated
T hsi, hs- palatal fricative voiceless
chih, ch- retro-flex affricate voiceless unaspirated
ch’ih, ch’- retro-flex affricate voiceless aspirated
P shih, sh- retro-flex fricative voiceless
Q jih, j- retro-flex fricative voiced
P tzu, ts- blade-alveolar affricate voiceless unaspirated
t i
tz’u , t s ’- blade-alveolar affricate voiceless aspirated
A ssu, s- blade-alveolar fricative voiceless
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Vowels
yi, y-, -i~, -i
WU, W -, -U -, - u
yii, yii-, -ii-, -ii 
a, -a 
o, -o 
e, -e 
-eh 
ai, -ai 
ei, -ei 
ao, -ao
ou, -ou (with -i- as -iu)
an, -an (with -i- as -ien)
en, -en (with -i- as -in, with -u- as -un, with -ii- as -tin)
ang, -ang
-eng (with -i- as -ing, with -u- as -ung, with -u- as -iung)
)  L  erh
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Appendix III
Mongolian Transliteration used in this Thesis
'H n
Y,q, k, g
O? b
t p  p
T s
sh
6} t, d
t '  1
- p  m
*1 J- y
Lj ch
r
Consonants
Vowels
A  a
i  e
A 1
cf 0, u
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Appendix IV
Cross-references to a Scholarly View of the Subjects 
which are Discussed in this Thesis
L N Gumilev remarks that "a bibliography on all the subjects 
mentioned could amount to a list of many hundred articles and books. But it 
is impossible to make a single horse out of thousands of mice": to include 
every discussion or suggestion which previous scholars have made in this 
appendix is unrealistic. Paul Ratchnevsky’s life of Temujin, Cinggis-Khan, 
sein Leben und Wirken, (completed in 1978, published in 1983) could be used 
as a good introductory book for previous arguments, also worthy for his 
original findings and conclusions, "to which no review could do complete 
justice". (Review of the English translation of the book by Reuven Amitai- 
Preiss, The International History Review 15-3 (1993):558-559.) Except for 
certain presumptions regarding the thought of Temujin or Toyoril, which could 
only be confirmed perhaps by themselves, the comprehensive coverage of first­
hand sources —  though his JT  knowledge is obtained through Russian 
translation —  as well as secondary researches make this work indispensable 
to students of this subject.
The following passages are quoted in the page numbers of the English 
edition of this book, since it is in many ways an improvement on the German 
original. References are arranged in accordance with the corresponding topics 
in this thesis, listed in the order of appearance, with page numbers supplied 
respectively.
Anda relationship
On p.20, Ratchnevsky quotes the idea of Pelliot that this relationship "was 
regarded by the nomads as more binding than the tie of a direct blood 
relationship", and adds reference to the ritual of Khitan practice in Liao shih,
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also varied opinions of a possible obligation of communal life (Doerfer and 
Vladimirtsov).
The obligation of giiregen to stay in the bride’s family before marriage 
On p.21, regarding the arranged marriage of Temujin, he relates that this 
practice was common among the early Turkic-Mongol nomads; it originated 
in matriarchal conditions but later economic factors became important. He 
suggests that economic considerations were probably decisive in this case for 
Temujin.
The Oonggirat connection
On p. 17, he suggests that the marriage agreement for Temujin had won for 
Yesiigei a valuable alliance with the Qonggirat, while I would rather ascribe 
this significance to his successor Temujin, after the marriage finally proceeded. 
Discussion see chapter five section II.
The birth year of Temtiiin
On p. 17, he summarizes previous suggestions that the date could be 1155, 1162 
or 1167 and says that even Pelliot did not firmly commit himself to his 
suggested date. On p. 18, he states that according to Herbert Franke, it is 
assumed that Temujin was born around the mid 1160s.
The separation of the Taichiyuts
His description of the event on p.22 is unconvincing because he omitted to 
mention the quarrel between Ho’elun and his genealogical seniors. The 
narratives of Yesiigefs death "sealed the. fate of his family" and the khatuns 
of Hambaqai "no longer permitted Ho’elun to attend the ceremonies in 
veneration of their ancestors" but this needs more supporting evidence. Also, 
alluding to the mind of Yesiigei’s followers, he suggests their leaving is 
determined by a consideration of material gains while I argued, with evidence 
in Persian sources, from the viewpoint of the principle in kinship practice. 
Discussion see chapter four section II (i). His speculation regarding the mind
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of Temujin’s clansmen needs reexamination; also Quchar’s support in JT  has 
been wrongly attributed to this very moment while Quchar did join Temujin 
but on a later occasion.
Sustenance after the separation of the Taichiyuts
On p.23, he suggests that the children helped to provide the daily food with 
bows and hooks. My opinion is supplied in chapter four footnote 29.
The Bekter incident and the Taichiyut’s capture of Temuiin
His suggestion o f a possible connection between the Bekter incident and the
Taichiyuts’ capture of Temujin is related in chapter one section II. Regarding 
the motivation of the murder, he suggests that Temujin killed his half-brother 
because Bekter "withheld Temujin’s share" of gains (p. 154), or Bekter had 
challenged Temujin’s authority as the head of the family (p.24), while I 
interpreted this as a thoughtless action from a reckless teenager (chapter one 
and four).
Child captives
On p.26, he summarized the examples of captured young boys.
Outula’s comment on Toyoril
On p.32, he supplied a translation of the passage in JT  from a Russian 
translation, while I have translated the whole passage (with annotation), based 
on a slightly different understanding, from Persian in chapter one section II.
The Dating of Gtir-Oan’s attack on Tovoril
On p.33, he argued that the date of Toyoril’s appeal to Yesiigei for help "must 
have been" before 1171 if we follow the chronology of the SH  since by that 
date Qutula-Qan was no longer alive. This is doubtful if it is derived from 
Hsi-Hsia shu shih in which the chronological statements "are unreliable" (his 
comment on the same page), or based on the SH  which was not compiled in 
chronological order. Studies in the book known as the SH  are related in a 
recently completed but unpublished article by the author of this thesis.
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The Borte incident
On p.35, he states that the version in JT  is "implausible" because "it is
improbable that the Merkits would, as Rashid suggests, have renounced their
revenge for the abduction of Ho’elun, handing Borte over to the leader of the
Keraits, the cindci of their enemy". I cannot see that this doubt is strong
enough for us to deny the authenticity of J T  s version, although as he
comments, the stories in JT  "contain innumerable exaggerations", (p.31) My
opinion is expressed, with an extensive analysis of the Toyoril-Toqtoya 
relationship, in chapter one section I.
The breach between Temujin and Jamuaa
On pp.37-39, he relates the debate between Barthold and Vladimirtsov on 
Temujin’s "class" component, and he himself states that Jamuqa relied on the 
support of conservative elements who upheld the tribal constitution and the 
solidarity of the tribal princes, while Temujin’s supporters were from "other 
levels" of society which sought for freedom and a better life. I am afraid that, 
in this account, he has mistaken the master of those otegiX boyol for somebody 
other than Temujin, and, it is a fact that Temujin became a qan after his 
conservative consultation, according to the tribal constitution, with the 
aristocratic princes of his own clan. Ratchnevsky also assumes that Temujin 
agreed to become a noker (comrade here in the Soviet sense?) to Jamuqa and 
the "dependents" of Temujin’s relatives were with (under) Jamuqa at this time. 
As for the separation, he relates that "doubtless, Temujin was uninvolved in the 
break" because since he was ambitious, he could not have been satisfied with 
a subservient position to Jamuqa, also Temujin made use of the chance to 
recruit his own following. My explanation of the motivation of their "stay 
together", the joint effort to attract followers, also the consequence of the 
separation (shift of supporters) from a genealogical perspective is stated in 
chapter four section II (ii).
The background of the supporters who shifted from Jamuaa to Ternium
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On pp.39-40, he suggests that many people were attracted by Temujin’s policy 
of generosity therefore they joined him, and the background of many of these 
newcomers is otegu boyol. My detailed analysis of these people and their 
motivation for coming from a kinship point of view is provided in chapter four 
section II (ii) (the motivation regrading the Bayarin Qorchi is in footnote 57). 
Also, the event of the Je’iireits is conflated here.
The motivation of the Battle of Thirteen Gtire’en
On p.45, he suggests that political considerations, rather than any relationship 
to the horse thief, underlay Jamuqa’s reaction to the incident and "as soon as" 
Temujin was elected a qan, Jamuqa "decided to do battle". My argument on 
the nature of the attack, that it was punitive in defending a principle in kinship 
practice, is found in chapter one section II, chapter two section II (i) and 
chapter four section II (ii).
Boiling the enemies in cauldrons
On pp.46-47, he mentioned the reference to "boiling in a cauldron", ascribing 
it to Siberian folklore and Chinese practice.
The dating of the Battle of Thirteen Gtire’en
On pp.49-50, Ratchnevsky raised an interesting question, namely that there was 
a ten-year blank in Temujin’s life history between 1187 to 1196, based on the 
dating of the Jurchen-Tatar military conflict in Chin shih, and a list of datings: 
the Borte campaign took place around 1184, Temujin’s election as a qan 
followed some eighteen months later and the Battle of Gure’en took place at 
the latest in 1187. He supplies no reference for the inference or evidence for 
the latter dating. My reconstruction of the dating of the Battle of Thirteen 
Giire’en is in chapter two section III, where the result removes the possibility 
of a ten-year gap between the battle and the attack against the Tatars.
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ToyoriPs exile
On p.51, he asserts that JT  relates that the exact date for the meeting by
Guse’iir-Nayur was in February/March 1196. This appears curious to me 
because this dating does not appear in the Persian text used in this thesis. The
Russian translation used by Ratchnevsky is inaccessible to me. As for the 
duration of ToyoriPs exile, he mentions that ToyoriFs absence "was a 
relatively long one" but gives no further discussion on this topic.
The Jurchen campaign against the steppe tribes (1195/961 
On p.52, he described the revolt of Hsieh-ch’u in a campaign "against the 
Qonggirat", and says that the Jurchen troop was so "weakened by the loss" of 
this rebel that the Qonggirat were able to attack one Chinese unit and kill its 
commanding officer. The description around which I put quotation marks is 
not found in Chin shih 10, which has been mistaken in the footnote as Yuan 
shih 10. Chin shih does not state that the Qonggirat had attacked the Jurchen 
ch'un-mu shih, it just says "defeated".
Partner relationship between Toyoril and Temujin
On p.53, he says that because Temujin "still need" Toyoril and "for this reason 
alone", Temujin helped Toyoril to be restored to his throne, and then the 
political initiative had passed into Temujin’s hands so that Temujin made use 
of the assistance of Toyoril to realize his ambitious plans. My different focus 
on the beginning of the partnership between these two is supplied in chapter 
three section II, where the Red Hill Promise in late 1199 serves as the key
factor. The conclusion that Temujin "needed" Toyoril needs to be re-examined 
because it was Temujin sustaining and protecting Toyoril since 1196, not vice 
versa.
The principle of Kin’s Peace
On p.54, he touches on this issue in that he writes: "attacking or executing 
clansmen offended against tribal custom" but there is no further discussion.
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Chronology confusions
On p.56, he relates that "The events which followed the execution of the Jurkin 
princes and the death of Buri are confused, their dating is doubtful and the 
many contradictions between the texts emphasize the problematical character 
of the chronology". On p.61, he relates that "the chronology of the Secret 
History is unreliable because the author considers the individual episodes of his 
epic to be more important than either their interrelation or correct 
chronological order", without further discussion. The confusions have been 
partly solved by an analysis of the writing style of the SH: my argument about 
the events in this period has been briefly related at the end of chapter two 
section II (ii), and as for the interrelation and the chronological order of the 
accounts in the SH, I have done an overall examination of the source but this 
remains unpublished.
The battlefield of Baidaraq-Belchir
On pp.58-59, Ratchnevsky cites the hypothesis by Gumilev that Temujin might
have made some demands of Toyoril —  a claim to succeed to the Kereit 
throne (?) —  which made him leave the battlefield immediately, and he
considers this explanation "plausible". I am in doubt of the plausibility of this
suggestion because if Temujin had made any such request, he would have kept
an eye on the response of Toyoril and when he discovered that Toyoril refused 
and left, he would not have remained on the battlefield to wait to be slain by
Kokse’u-Sabraq. The angry words about the desertion which he uttered next
morning makes it clear that he had no idea of Toyoril’s departure.
The first anti-Temuiin Mongol coalition
On p.61, he interpreted this event according to the description in Yuan shih: 
that the tribes united against Temujin out of fear, and he states that the fear 
was of Temujin’s ambition to annex them. He also explains, on p.62, the 
nature of the coalition from the social background of the participators, in relate 
to "the old steppe order". My interpretation from the perspective of defending 
the principle o f kinship practice is related in chapter four section II (iii).
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The iasaa issued during the battle against the Tatars
On p. 66, he interprets this order as a violation of the traditional way because 
of economic considerations and suggests that Temujin was fully aware of the 
negative consequence of this order. I consider this to be a simple military 
order which, however, brought about an unexpected result. See chapter four 
section II (iii).
Temuiin’s ambition for the Kereit throne
On pp.67-68, he implies that Temujin had an ambition for the Kereit throne, 
to be achieved by removing Senggum. My analysis of the marriage proposal 
in chapter three section III shows that if Temujin did have ambitions in the 
Kereit ulus, the takeover would be in the next generation, not with reference 
to himself. On p.81, Ratchnevsky argues, basing this on his assumption of the 
"long-sought goal" of Temujin, that after the defeat of Ong-Qan. Temujin was 
sitting on the Kereit throne. This argument is rather odd because the Kereit 
people had been distributed among the Mongols, according to the SH. Then, 
the so-called Kereit throne could no longer have existed.
Kereit’s reasons for turning against Temujin
On pp.67-68, he suggests, as a reason from a personal perspective that 
Senggum wanted to get rid of Temujin as a competitor to the throne, and
Toyoril wanted to get rid of his ambitious vassal. I have supplied an analysis 
from a broader perspective, in particular in relation to their fear of a suspicious 
alliance between Temujin and the Naiman, also a shift of supporters during this 
crucial moment, in chapter three section III.
Baliuna
On pp.71-73, there is a good summary of the interpretations of Temujin’s 
situation when he was at Baljuna, which provides background information for 
my analysis in chapter three section III about another shift of supporters after 
the battle at Qalaqaljit-Elet.
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Inviting submission
On p.82, he cites the passage recorded by al-‘Umari regarding the invitation 
to the other Mongol tribes to submit and relates that the Oirat and the 
Qonggirat responded to the call and joined the Mongol army. In fact, the Oirat 
was not a Mongol tribe and it joined Temujin quite late after Temujin started 
to expand westward; also al-‘Umari’s passage might have been a general 
description of Temujin’s peaceful expansion policy without special reference 
to Mongol tribes. This can be related to the discussion in chapter five section
II.
Jamuqa
On pp.87-88, Ratchnevsky relates his understanding of Jamuqa and concludes 
that Jamuqa lost because "the Mongol nation declared its support" for Temujin. 
My very close investigation of Jamuqa’s role in the career of Temujin can be 
found in chapter three section III and chapter four section II (ii) and (iii).
The meaning of Chinggis
On pp.89-90, he lists the previous suggestions of the meaning of the title and 
he inclines to accept the meaning of "ocean or sea" which is proposed by von 
Ramstedt and Pelliot. The most recent study of de Rachewiltz on this subject 
is quoted in the end of chapter four.
The submission of the rulers of Uighur and Oarluq
On pp. 102-103, he recounts the submission of these two tribes. However, the 
Uighur was not "the first people outside the Mongol nation to acknowledge 
Genghis Khan’s suzerainty" —  this was the Oirats. Also, he attributed the in­
laws’ relationship between Temiijin-Mongol and the Qarluq ruler to the latter’s 
peaceful submission, while I have supplied an analysis of the offering of this 
relationship in chapter five section II from a strategic point of view.
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The personality of Temujin
From p. 145 to p. 169, Ratchnevsky supplies an enjoyable account of the 
personality of Temujin, also a description of certain Mongolian social values 
in that Temujin was like an angel when he was generous but when it came to 
"his desire for power", "all other considerations and feelings were subjugated 
to this desire", (p. 158) My overall survey of the character of Temujin, based 
on his relationship with surrounding people, can be found in chapter one 
section II (towards his brothers), chapter three section II and III (towards his 
allies and competitors), chapter four section II (towards his kinsmen), chapter 
five section II (towards submissive tribal leaders from the steppe belt) and 
section III (towards his in-laws).
The conquests, administration and legislation
From p. 169 to p. 186, Ratchnevsky accounts for Temujin’s conquests, 
administration and legislation but he never mention other means which 
Temujin had made use of to achieve his conquests, except for force. My view 
of Temujin’s strategy in gathering support and unifying the Mongol tribes, and 
the peaceful policy which had successfully brought the whole steppe belt into 
submission, also the administration of his "steppe empire" through social 
relationships (with regard to customary principles and obligations) are found 
in chapter four and five.
O, wonder
How many goodly creatures are there here 
How beauteous mankind is 
O brave new world 
That has such people in’t
— William Shakespeare
